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RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN    PROBLEM 


Books  by 
JOHN  SPARGO 

RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  BOLSHEVISM 

BOLSHEVISM 

AMERICANISM  AND  SOCIAL  DEMOCRACY 

SOCIAL  DEMOCRACY  EXPLAINED 


HARPER  &  BROTHERS,  NEW  YORK 

ESTABLISHED     1817 


RUSSIA 

AS   AN 

AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

BY 

JOHN    SPARGO 

AUTHOR    OF 

"  BOLSHEVISM  "  "  TUE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  BOLSHEVISM  " 

"  SOCIAL  DEMOCRACY  EXPLAINED"  ETC. 


ff^ 


HARPER  fcf  BROTHERS  PUBLISHERS 
NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 


Russia  as  an  Amkrican  Problem 

Copyright.  1920.  by  Harper  &   Brothers 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 

Published,  February,  1920 


DK 

J75r' 
CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

Preface vii 

I.  Russia  as  an  American  problem i 

II.  Russia  and  Western  civilization 46 

III.  Russia's  subjection  to  Germany 100 

IV.  Japan  as  Germany's  successor 142 

V.  Japan  and  Siberia 199 

VI.  Russia's  needs  and  resources 259 

Postscriptum 337 

APPENDICES 

//.     Autonomy  for  different  nationalities  in  Russia  349 

B.  Russian     economic     concessions     granted     by 

THE    BOLSHEVIKI 353 

C.  Statistical    tables    illustrative    of    Russia's 

GR.OWTH 356 

D.  Japan's  territorial  aims 358 

E.  Japan's  demands  on  China ,  360 

F.  Russian  water-power  project  on  river  Vyg  .     .  373 

G.  Development    of    Russian    and    Siberian    Co- 

operatives       381 

//.    Correspondence   between  the  Allied  and  As- 
sociated Powers  and  Admiral  Kolchak  .     .     .  392 
/.      Soviet  government  of  Russia  on  alleged  secret 

German-Japanese  treaty 402 

Index 405 


O  ■' 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  an  earnest  attempt  to  interest  my 
fellow-citizens  in  the  great  problem  of  Russia's 
reconstruction.  I  have  tried  to  present  that  prob- 
lem as  a  challenge  to  America  in  the  hope  that  I 
might  thereby  render  a  service  of  friendship  to 
Russia  and  a  service  of  loyalty  to  my  own  country. 

My  interest  in  Russia  dates  back  to  my  boy- 
hood. Thirty  years  ago  it  was  my  good  fortune 
to  fall  under  the  inspiration  of  that  great  Russian, 
Sergius  Michaelovitch  Kravchinski,  best  known 
by  his  pseudonym,  "Sergius  Stepniak."  That 
brave  and  brilliant  revolutionist  first  aroused 
my  interest  in  the  Russian  revolutionary  struggle, 
and  through  all  the  intervening  years  that  interest 
has  grown.  It  has  been  my  good  fortune  to  know 
intimately  and  well  many  of  the  brave  men  and 
women  whose  courage  and  sacrifice  maintained 
the  long  struggle  against  czarism.  Inspired  and 
guided  by  these  friends,  I  have  tried  to  under- 
stand Russia  and  its  great  political  and  economic 
problems. 

This  brief  autobiographical  note  will  serve  to 
explain  to  the  reader  why  I  have  felt  justified  in 
writing  so  freely  about  Russian  problems,  both 
in  this  volume  and  elsewhere.  My  studies  of 
Russian  history  and  politics  antedated  the  Revolu- 
tion by  many  years. 


PREFACE 

Shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War 
in  1914  I  contributed  to  the  pages  of  a  weekly 
review  an  article  upon  the  relation  of  Russia 
to  the  war  which  my  friend,  George  Plechanov, 
one  of  the  greatest  of  Russian  Socialist  thinkers, 
generously  approved  and  translated.  In  that 
article  I  set  forth  my  reasons  for  believing  (1)  that 
the  cause  of  freedom  in  Russia  would  be  served 
by  an  Allied  victory,  even  under  czarism;  (2)  that 
any  attempt  to  establish  a  Socialist  regime  in 
Russia,  until  an  extensive  capitalist  development 
and  a  long  period  of  democratic  government  had 
paved  the  way  for  it,  would  fail  and  lead  to  terrible 
reaction.  That  forecast  has  certainly  been  literally 
fulfilled.  Russia  is  not  ready  for  anything  like 
a  Socialist  state.  The  only  economic  basis  upon 
which  a  Socialist  commonwealth  can  possibly  be 
established,  namely,  a  highly  developed  indus- 
trialism, is  lacking.  Russia  may  in  some  future 
time  organize  her  life  upon  Socialist  lines,  but 
first  of  all  she  must  be  developed  economically. 
At  present  she  needs  capital  and  capitalist  enterprise. 

I  trust  that  I  have  succeeded  in  conveying 
through  these  pages  my  profound  faith  in  Russia's 
future.  Her  present  position  is  lamentable  indeed, 
and  her  needs  are  so  great  and  so  numerous  that 
the  mind  is  almost  incapable  of  comprehending 
them.  Yet  I  do  not  for  one  moment  doubt  that  she 
will  survive  and  become  a  great  democratic  nation. 

Perhaps  it  is  hardly  necessary  for  me  to  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that  this  book  has  been  written 
during  a  period  of  unrest  and  uncertainty  almost 
unparalleled.     As  these  lines  are  being  written  the 


PREFACE 

fate  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  undetermined. 
Sometimes  during  the  progress  of  the  book  it  has 
seemed  that  the  overthrow  of  the  Bolshevist 
government  was  a  matter  of  a  few  days  at  most; 
now  the  tide  has  turned  and  in  a  military  sense  the 
Bolsheviki  seem  more  strongly  intrenched  than 
ever.  In  a  word,  everything  is  unsettled.  Yet, 
disadvantageous  and  unpropitious  as  such  con- 
ditions are  for  serious  writing  upon  problems  of 
vital  importance,  it  was  not  possible  for  me  to 
wait.  Any  appeal  for  active  assistance  to  Russia, 
upon  the  scale  necessary  to  enable  her  to  recon- 
struct her  economic  life,  must  be  made  without 
delay  if  it  is  to  produce  any  good  result.  There- 
fore, fully  conscious  of  the  difficulties  and  dangers 
which  confront  the  writer  who  chooses  to  write 
of  contemporary  political  and  economic  problems, 
I  have  felt  impelled  to  prepare  this  somewhat 
elaborate  statement  of  the  problem  of  Russia's 
reconstruction. 

Because  I  believe  that  the  future  of  our  own 
country  depends  to  a  very  large  extent  upon  the 
manner  in  which  the  Russian  problem  is  met,  I 
have  ventured  to  entitle  my  book  Russia  as  an 
American  Problem.  It  is  my  earnest  hope  that  my 
fellow-citizens  will  regard  that  as  a  challenge,  and 
that  they  will  give  to  the  Russian  problem  the 
attention  which  its  relation  to  our  own  place  in 
civilization  warrants. 

John  Spargo. 
"Nestle  down" 
Old  Bennington,  Vermont, 
November  iS,  IQTQ. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN    PROBLEM 


RUSSIA   AS   AN 
AMERICAN    PROBLEM 


A 


RUSSIA   AS   AN   AMERICAN    PROBLEM 

I 

T  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War 


the  Russian  Empire  embraced  practically  one- 
sixth  of  the  land  area  of  the  globe.  It  stretched 
from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the  Gulf  of  Anadyr  and 
from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Sea  of  Japan.  In  that 
vast  territory,  which  could  easily  be  made  to 
sustain  a  population  several  times  greater,  there 
were,  according  to  official  figures,  about  179  mill- 
ions of  people,  excluding  the  population  of  Fin- 
land.1    It    was    a    population    of     heterogeneous 

1  The  figures  published  by  the  Czar's  Ministry  of  the  Interior  were, 
for  1914,  182,182,600  persons,  including  the  population  of  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Finland,  or  178,905,500,  if  the  population  of  Finland  be 
excluded.  1  he  representatives  of  the  Soviet  government  have  claimed, 
however,  that  these  figures — which  were  estimated — greatly  exaggerate 
the  population.  They  say  that  the  total  was  not  more  than  155 
millions,  made  up  as  follows:  European  Russia,  107,800,000;  Poland, 
12,400,000;  Caucasus,  15,200,000;  Siberia,  10,400,000;  Central 
Aiia,  11,200,000.  See  Soviet  Rustic,  June  28,  1919,  for  an  interesting 
study  oi  this  subject. 


2      RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

composition,  embracing  many  diverse  races.  We 
get  some  idea  of  the  great  Babel  of  peoples  from 
the  fact,  related  by  Ross,1  that  a  "certain  booklet 
prints  the  Lord's  Prayer  in  each  of  the  languages 
spoken  within  the  empire,  and  the  number  is  103." 

The  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  the  various  separa- 
tist movements  arising  out  of  the  Revolution  have 
seriously  dismembered  European  Russia,  and  until 
normal  conditions  have  been  restored  it  will  be 
practically  impossible  to  know  its  boundaries,  its 
area,  or  its  population.  At  the  present  time  it 
can  best  be  described  as  an  undefined  area  occupied 
by  an  undetermined  number  of  inhabitants.  A 
great  historical  process  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  Russia  and  the  rest  of  the  civilized  world  has 
been  violently  interrupted.  If  the  separation 
from  Russia  of  numerous  small  states,  such  as 
Ukraine,  Esthonia,  Livonia,  Lithuania,  Georgia, 
and  others,  is  permitted  to  stand,  each  setting  up 
its  own  independent  sovereignty,  European  Russia 
will  be  in  danger  of  "Balkanization."  In  the 
case  of  the  petty  "independencies  "  of  the  Caucasus 
there  is  danger  not  only  of  sacrificing  Armenia 
to  wild  tribes,  but  of  sacrificing  a  relatively  high 
culture  to  barbarism.  Here  at  least  Russian 
sovereignty  brought  about  a  great  advance  in 
civilization. 

It  was  Mr.  Balfour  who  first  sounded  the  much- 
needed  warning  against  the  dangers  of  a  Balkani- 
zation of  Europe.  By  that  term  the  British 
statesman  meant  the  breaking  up  of  great  nations 
into  a  lot  of  little  states  with  opposing  interests. 

1  Ro^,  Russia  in  Upheaval,  p.  116. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM      3 

The  narrow  limits  within  which  the  vital  interests 
of  such  petty  states  are  circumscribed  tend  always 
to  exaggerate  the  inevitable  friction  incidental 
to  their  mutual  relations  and  to  produce  a  cor- 
respondingly narrow  circumscription  of  vision. 
Such  states  are  always  prone  to  quarrel  and  fight. 
The  League  of  Nations  might  easily  be  wrecked 
against  this  rock.  The  chances  of  success  for  the 
League  of  Nations  are  necessarily  in  inverse  ratio 
to  the  number  of  small  states  existing. 

Among  the  numerous  idealizations  of  the  demo- 
cratic war  aims  of  the  Allied  nations,  which  proved 
of  such  tremendous  importance  and  value,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  indulged  in  some  very  questionable 
rhetorical  declarations  about  the  right  of  small 
nationalities  to  self-determination  and  self-sover- 
eignty which  have  given,  and  will  continue  to  give, 
a  good  deal  of  trouble.  Followed  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion this  principle  would  result  in  the  dissolu- 
tion of  every  great  nation  and  the  creation  of  a 
vast  number  of  little  states,  with  an  endless  multi- 
plication of  boundaries  and  frontiers  and  a  result- 
ing increase  of  local  prejudices  and  petty  aggres- 
sions. In  the  crude  form  in  which  it  was  expressed 
by  President  Wilson,  and  understood  by  the  host 
of  petty  nationalists  who  hailed  it  with  rejoicing, 
without  careful  and  elaborate  qualification,  this 
doctrine  of  the  self-determination  of  nationalities 
is  both  exceedingly  reactionary  and  exceedingly 
dangerous.  Except  in  very  rare  instances,  the 
secession  of  small  states  and  nationalities  from 
the  larger  states  and  nations  to  which  they  have 
been  welded  by  the  historic  processes  of  national 


4      RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

development  is  a  backward  step,  quite  inconsistent 
with  the  ordered  and  peaceful  progress  of  man- 
kind. 

In  an  interview  widely  published  in  the  French 
press,  in  July,  19 19,  M.  Sazonov  set  forth  in  detail 
the  Russian  view  of  the  place  of  the  different 
nationalities  within  reconstituted  Russia  and  the 
degree  of  autonomy  to  be  enjoyed  by  them.  The 
former  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  pointed  out 
that  over-centralization  was  one  of  the  cardinal 
defects  of  the  old  system.  No  other  living  Rus- 
sian possesses  a  more  extensive  knowledge  of  the 
evils  which  resulted  from  "the  endeavor  to  direct 
details  of  life  in  the  remotest  corner  of  the  huge 
empire  from  a  far-away  bureaucratic  center." 
M.  Sazonov  points  out  that  "autonomous  arrange- 
ment for  nationalities  naturally  complies  with 
the  general  system  of  decentralization  to  be  applied 
in  the  reconstruction  of  Russia."  Provincial  self- 
government  is  quite  compatible  with  the  sover- 
eignty of  a  single  unified  state.  The  best  safe- 
guard of  the  culture  and  essential  freedom  of  the 
various  nationalities  in  Russia  lies  in  unity  with 
Russia  upon  conditions  which  give  them  a  generous 
measure  of  local  autonomy.1 

There  is  no  good  reason  for  permitting  a  small 
nationality  to  erect  a  Chinese  Wall  around  the 
territory  which  it  inhabits,  and  so  to  be  an  obstacle 
to  the  development  of  larger  political  entities.  A 
brief  study  of  the  geographical  distribution  of 
small  nationalities  will  show  that  they  are  com- 
monly   found    occupying    coastal    territory    which 

1  See  interview  with  M.  Sazonov,  Appendix  A, 


RUSSIA  AS   AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM      5 

becomes  essential  to  the  economic  development 
of  much  larger  hinterland  areas  and  populations. 
It  is  preposterous  to  set  up,  in  the  name  of  democ- 
racy and  internationalism,  the  doctrine  that  a 
people  occupying  a  narrow  strip  of  coast  border- 
ing on  a  great  sea,  the  means  of  ingress  and  egress 
for  a  continent,  must  be  given  exclusive  sover- 
eignty over  that  coastal  territory.  The  rights  of 
nationalities,  like  all  other  human  rights,  are 
only  valid  in  so  far  as  they  harmonize  with  the 
rights  of  mankind.  Let  us  take  Russia  as  an 
example:  During  four  hundred  years  Russia  strug- 
gled to  gain  access  to  the  sea.  Must  we  now 
acknowledge  the  right  of  Esthonia,  Livonia,  and 
Lithuania,  with  a  population  of  some  five  millions 
of  people,  to  set  up  exclusive  sovereignty  over  the 
Baltic  coast  territory  of  the  former  Russian  Em- 
pire, and  thus  deprive  a  hundred  and  fifty  millions, 
or  more,  from  access  to  the  ocean  and  its  trade 
routes? 

Peace  treaties  may  decree  such  arrangements, 
and  powerful  leagues  and  alliances  of  nations  may, 
for  a  time,  enforce  such  decrees.  There  is,  how- 
ever, a  law  that  is  both  older  and  stronger  than 
any  league  or  alliance,  the  law,  namely,  that 
wherever  great  masses  of  people,  whether  tribe  or 
nation,  occupying  a  hinterland  find  the  way  to 
the  sea  blocked  by  a  less  numerous  people  occupy- 
ing the  coast,  they  do  not  accept  the  status  quo, 
but  push  their  way  seaward  until  they  have  access 
to  the  sea.  Russia  will  not  long  suffer  little  states 
to  shut  her  off  from  the  Baltic.  Not  to  under- 
stand this  primary  law  of  the  evolution  of  states 
2 


6      RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

is  to  fail  to  comprehend  one  of  the  plainest  lessons 
of  history. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  the  crude  concep- 
tion of  the  right  of  nations,  -per  se,  to  self-deter- 
mination and  self-sovereignty  is  common  to  those 
who  advocate  the  most  narrow  and  selfish  forms 
of  exaggerated  nationalism,  and  those  who  advo- 
cate, in  the  name  of  internationalism,  the  repudia- 
tion of  national  interests  and  obligations — <z-na- 
tionalism.  Thus  we  find  men  who  in  one  breath 
deny  that  nationalism  means  or  can  mean  anything 
to  them,  and  declare  that  their  loyalty  belongs, 
not  to  a  nation,  but  to  mankind,  enthusiastically 
supporting  the  narrow  and  extreme  nationalism 
of  Sinn  Fein,  Esthonian  independence,  Indian 
independence,  and  so  on.  The  Russian  Bolshe- 
viki,  with  similar  inconsistency,  during  the  Keren- 
sky  regime  and  afterward,  encouraged  the  separa- 
tism, inspired  by  the  most  extreme  and  selfish 
form  of  nationalism,  which  logically  tended  to  the 
dismemberment  of  Russia  and,  in  so  far  as  it 
succeeded,  was  an  evolution  away  from  interna- 
tional solidarity  and  mutualism. 

With  the  exception  of  Poland  and  Finland,  the 
independent  sovereignty  of  which  most  liberal 
Russians  concede  to  be  justified  and  calculated 
to  make  for  progress  and  peace,  the  splitting  up  of 
European  Russia  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  retrogres- 
sive step,  injurious  to  Russia  and  to  the  seceding 
states.  Finland  and  Poland  have  great  traditions 
and  national  culture.  Moreover,  their  indepen- 
dence is  possible  without  hampering  the  life  of 
Russia.     None  of  these  things  can  be  said  of  the 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM      7 

other  nationalities  that  have  declared  their  separa- 
tion from  Russia.  The  Ukrainians,  for  example, 
have  no  great  national  culture  or  tradition  in  the 
modern  sense,  and  their  separation  from  Russia 
means  for  the  world  in  general  simply  that  another 
small  state  must  be  reckoned  with,  while  for 
Russia  it  means  that  a  part  of  her  patrimony  is 
lost. 

In  this  connection  the  comment  of  Professor  Ross 
on  conditions  in  the  Volga  territory  is  worthy  of 
note:  "Reviewing  the  diversity  of  types  along 
the  Volga  artery,  one  realizes  what  a  blessing  is  a 
central  government  that  enforces  peace  among 
intermingled  elements  having  so  little  in  common. 
If  those  who  cry  down  external  authority  and 
demand  local  independence  had  their  way  in  this 
Volga  basin,  the  juxtaposed  races  and  faiths 
would  soon  be  scratching  out  one  another's  eyes 
and  the  great  river  would  cease  to  be  a  safe,  con- 
tinuous highway  for  populations  two  thousand 
miles  apart."  x 

The  solution  of  the  Russian  problem,  as  it  is 
called,  must  include  the  whole  territory  of  Euro- 
pean Russia  as  it  was  before  the  war — with  the 
exception  of  Poland  and  Finland  as  already  noted — 
in  one  federated  body.  That  should  be  insisted 
upon  by  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  interest  of 
peace.  This  does  not  preclude  giving  a  large 
measure  of  autonomy  and  self-government  to  the 
various  provinces.  It  does,  however,  provide  for 
the  unity  in  foreign  relations,  and  in  such  matters 
as  railway  construction  and  administration,  essen- 

1  Ross,  op.  cit.,  p.  44. 


8      RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

tial    to    rapid,    efficient,    and    peaceful    economic 
progress. 

ii 

It  is  impossible  for  an  intelligent  and  well- 
informed  American  to  regard  the  condition  of  a  great 
nation  like  Russia  with  indifference.  In  the  con- 
flict of  opinion  which  has  raged  around  the  tragedy 
of  Russia's  internal  strife  since  the  overthrow  of 
the  Romanov  dynasty,  and,  more  especially,  since 
the  seizure  of  power  by  the  Bolsheviki,  we  have 
heard  much  of  the  doctrine  that  we  have  no  legiti- 
mate concern  in  Russia's  life.  This  view  is  ad- 
vanced by  the  spokesmen  of  two  opposite  groups, 
which  may  be  broadly  denned  as  the  tories  and  the 
radicals.  On  the  one  side  are  those  reactionaries, 
chauvinists  of  the  worst  type,  whose  whole  mental 
attitude  is  reactionary.  They  fear  change  and 
progress.  In  the  twentieth  century  they  are 
clinging  to  the  theories  and  policies  of  the  early 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  attitude  of 
this  group  is  quite  natural  and  easily  compre- 
hensible. 

On  the  other  side  are  certain  liberals  and  radi- 
cals, men  and  women  who  are  in  more  or  less 
open  revolt  against  the  existing  order  and  impa- 
tiently clamoring  for  comprehensive  and  funda- 
mental change.  In  general  they  are  as  much 
ahead  of  their  time  as  the  reactionaries  are  behind 
it.  The  fact  that  this  group  takes  upon  a  matter 
of  such  vital  importance  a  position  identical  with 
that  taken  by  the  other  is  an  illuminating  example 
of  the  manner  in  which  under  stress  of  emotional 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM      9 

intensity,  partizanship,  or  exaggerated  interest  of 
any  kind,  mental  and  moral  compromises  are 
unconsciously  or  subconsciously  effected.  That 
their  attitude  is  the  creature  of  such  compromise 
is  quite  easily  ascertained:  all  that  is  necessary 
is  to  note  how  violently  they  depart  from  the 
principle  upon  which  their  attitude  is  based  when 
they  adopt — as  they  generally  do — toward  other 
matters  which  involve  the  same  questions  of 
fundamental  principle  an  attitude  based  upon 
diametrically  opposite  reasoning.  A  single  example 
will  suffice  to  illustrate  this:  the  same  men  who 
urge,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  that  America  has  no 
business  to  concern  itself  with  the  Russian  struggle, 
that  we  have  no  legitimate  concern  in  Russia's 
life  warranting  us  to  interfere,  and  that  we  should 
adopt  the  policy  of  "hands  ofF,"  take  exactly  the 
opposite  attitude  in  the  case  of  Ireland,  notwith- 
standing the  fact,  so  obvious  to  the  disciplined 
mind,  that  if  neutrality  and  non-interference  are 
fundamental  principles  they  must  apply  to  the  case 
of  Ireland. 

The  realist  sees  quite  plainly  that  indifFerence 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  the  condition 
of  a  great  nation  like  Russia  is  practically  impos- 
sible, and  that  it  would  be  morally  indefensible 
if  it  were  practicable.  At  the  very  outset  we  are 
confronted  by  the  elementary  and  self-evident 
truth  that  there  can  be  no  healthful  peace  any- 
where in  the  civilized  world  so  long  as  a  nation  of 
156  millions  of  people,1  occupying  a  vast  territory 

1  I  have  used  here  the  official  Russian  figures  of  the  population  of 
Russia  in  1914,  exclusive  of  Finland  and  Poland. 


io    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

like  Russia,  is  torn  by  anarchy  and  civil  war, 
ravaged  by  disease  and  decimated  by  famine. 
Even  if  we  put  aside  every  consideration  of  human- 
ity and  confine  ourselves  to  the  hard,  cold  facts 
of  self-interest,  we  have  very  profound  and  im- 
portant reasons  to  be  concerned  in  the  solution 
of  Russia's  great  problem.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
we  cannot  put  the  considerations  of  humanity 
aside  as  of  no  importance,  and  we  ought  not  to 
if  we  could.  We  cannot  as  civilized  human  beings 
ignore  the  sufferings  of  Russia.  At  a  given  mo- 
ment it  may  be  difficult,  or  even  impossible,  to 
discover  any  means  of  rendering  effective  help, 
but  we  are  bound  by  the  moral  law  which  governs 
men  and  nations  to  hold  toward  her  a  compas- 
sionate and  sympathetic  attitude,  and  to  give 
succor  to  the  limit  of  our  power  whenever  the 
means  can  be  found. 

We  have  a  definite  ana  vastly  important  interest 
in  the  peace  and  progressive  prosperity  of  the  world. 
Europe  and  Asia  are  our  neighbors.  They  are 
close  to  us  and  their  lives  touch  our  life  in  direct 
and  vital  ways.  War  in  Europe  means  danger 
for  us.  If  there  is  serious  interruption  of  the 
economic  life  of  Europe  because  war  has  broken 
out  in  the  Balkans  or  elsewhere,  or  for  any  other 
reason,  our  own  economic  life  is  at  once  affected. 
We  live  in  an  era  of  international  capitalism  and 
our  life  and  progress  depend  upon  international 
trade  exchanges.  The  closing  of  a  great  market, 
interruption  of  trade  communications,  or  stoppage 
of  the  supply  of  raw  materials,  means  for  us  closed 
factories,  economic  depression,  unemployment,  hun- 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    n 

ger,  strife,  excessive  mortality,  and  increased  crime. 
Our  interest  is  not  only  bound  up  with  the  relations 
of  our  neighbors,  so  that  it  is  a  matter  of  impor- 
tance to  us  that  they  remain  at  peace,  but  also 
with  their  prosperity.  Even  before  the  war  with 
Germany  ended  every  thoughtful  student  realized 
that  our  own  interest,  and  that  of  all  the  Allied 
nations,  required  the  quickest  possible  economic 
rehabilitation  of  the  enemy  after  the  war.  Simi- 
larly our  interest,  and  the  interest  of  every  civilized 
nation,  requires  the  quickest  possible  restoration 
of  Russia. 

This  is  not  economic  imperialism,  Dut  its  an- 
tithesis. It  is  the  highest  form  of  international 
mutualism.  To  deny  it  is  to  deny  the  only  practi- 
cal alternative  to  the  rule  of  the  world  by  brutal 
and  selfish  might.  There  can  be  no  other  basis 
for  a  sound  and  enduring  internationalism.  Sopho- 
moric  rhetoric  about  "a  world  without  frontiers" 
will  not  carry  us  very  far.  The  only  interna- 
tionalism which  will  meet  the  acid  test  is  that 
which  logically  proceeds  from  the  healthy  and 
enlightened  self-interest  of  nations,  each  nation 
seeking  and  finding  its  own  highest  good  in  the 
good  of  all. 

in 

In  order  that  we  may  understand  the  present 
needs  of  Russia,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  to 
the  conditions  which  obtained  under  czarism 
immediately  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  A 
careful  observer  wrote,  "The  greater  part  of  the 
Russian    people    are    in    a    chronic    state   of   semi- 


12    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

starvation."1  In  some  provinces  more  than  a 
quarter  of  the  villagers  lived  under  the  most 
wretched  conditions,  sharing  hovels  which  meas- 
ured fourteen  feet  square  and  seven  feet  high 
with  all  their  domestic  animals.2  And  the  con- 
dition of  the  industrial  proletariat  in  the  cities  was 
almost,  if  not  quite,  as  bad.  Perhaps  no  workers 
in  the  world  except  the  Japanese  were  paid  as 
wages  a  smaller  part  of  their  total  product.  Pro- 
fessor Ross  cites  some  interesting  figures  upon 
this  point.  For  example,  "in  1912,  when  raw 
immigrant  labor  commanded  $1.65  a  day  in  the 
industrial  centers  of  the  United  States,  this  class 
of  labor  was  paid  about  thirty  cents  a  day  in  the 
industrial  centers  of  southern  Russia."3  A  ma- 
chinist who  had  worked  all  over  southern  Russia 
had  never  received  more  than  eighty-five  cents  a 
day.  "It  seems  safe  to  say,"  says  this  trained 
and  competent  observer,  "that  before  the  Revolu- 
tion the  share  of  his  product  that  fell  to  the  Rus- 
sian working-man  was  less  than  a  third  of  that 
received  by  the  American  wage-earner."  4 

In  some  of  the  great  factories  ordinary  workers 
were  receiving  65  copecks — about  32  cents — a  day 
in  the  first  half  of  1914.  In  a  great  many  cases 
wages  were  paid  by  the  month,  and  28  rubles — 
about  $14 — was  a  common  rate  of  pay.5  Sixteen 
hours'  work  a  day  was  common.  A  fair  idea  of 
the   wages    paid    immediately    prior   to   the   war 


1  Quoted  by  Wilcox,  Russia's  Ruin,  p.  7.  2  Idem. 

3  Ross,  op.  cit.,  p.  268.  4  Idem. 

5  See  Bolshevism  and  the  United  States,  by  Charles  Edward  Russell, 
p.  176. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    13 

can  be  obtained  from  the  following  examples: 
Carpenters,  60  cents  a  day;  blacksmiths,  60  cents; 
saddlers,  50  cents;  turners,  70  cents;  firemen,  55 
cents.  Even  if  we  disregard  the  normal  exchange 
rate  and  consider  that  under  nominal  pre-war  con- 
ditions the  purchasing  power  of  a  ruble  in  Russia 
was  about  the  same  as  that  of  a  dollar  in  the 
United  States — thus  doubling  the  real  wages — 
it  is  still  apparent  that  the  wage  rate  was  dis- 
tressingly low.  Even  in  January,  1917,  after  an 
unprecedented  rise  in  wages,  weavers  in  Petrograd 
were  working  sixteen  hours  a  day  and  receiving 
65  rubles — about  $32.50 — a  month.1  As  a  result 
of  these  miserable  wages,  the  most  distressing  con- 
ditions of  poverty  and  overcrowding  prevailed. 
Investigations  in  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg — as 
it  was  then  called — showed  that  tens  of  thousands 
of  families  lived  in  single  rooms,  many  of  them  dark, 
and  that  there  were  thousands  of  families  living  in 
"stalls" — a  single  room  being  divided  into  several 
stalls  by  partitions  about  six  feet  high,  which 
left  a  space  for  air  and  light  between  the  top  of 
the  partition  and  the  ceiling.2 

We  are  not  primarily  concerned  with  these  dis- 
tressing social  conditions,  however.  Our  principal 
interest  lies  in  the  basic  social  and  economic  arrange- 
ments which  bear  an  important  relation  to  the 
problem  of  economic  reconstruction.  Let  us  take 
agriculture,  for  example.  Russia  is  a  great  grain- 
producing  country.     She  was  a  great  grain-export- 


1  Russell,  op.  cit.,  p.  176.    Sec  also  Ross,  op.  cii.,  p.  32. 
1  See  M.  Olgin,  The  Soul  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  p.  14. 


i4    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

ing  country  and  her  surplus  was  an  important 
factor  in  feeding  Europe.  One-fifth  of  all  the  food 
grains — wheat,  corn,  rye,  oats,  and  barley — of  the 
world  was  produced  in  Russia.  She  produced 
19  per  cent,  of  the  world's  wheat,  more  than  24 
per  cent,  of  its  oats,  48  per  cent,  of  its  rye,  and 
nearly  32  per  cent,  of  its  barley.  The  total  annual 
production  of  these  staple  grains  was  about  19,600,- 
000,000  poods,1  or  353,919,294  tons.  The  export 
of  these  food  grains  amounted  to  650,000,000  poods, 
valued  at  640,000,000  rubles.  The  wheat  exported 
amounted  to  222,500,000  poods,  the  barley  to 
209,000,000  poods,  the  oats  to  59,400,000  poods.2 
Europe  needs  the  food  which  Russia  can  supply. 
Russia  is  necessary  to  the  economic  existence  of 
Europe,  and  the  interest  of  the  United  States  is 
almost  equally  involved.  Until  the  products  of 
Russian  agriculture  flow  freely  once  more  into 
the  channels  of  European  trade  the  whole  economic 
life  of  the  world  will  be  deranged.  While  it  is  of 
more  immediate  and  vital  importance  to  European 
nations,  the  quick  restoration  of  Russia  to  her 
position  as  a  great  food-exporting  nation  is  very 
important  to  the  United  States.  There  can  be  no 
real  solution  of  the  great  problem  presented  by  the 
high  cost  of  food  until  Russia's  produces  again 
find  their  way  into  the  world  market.  There  is 
not  a  wage-earner's  family  from  Maine  to  Cali- 
fornia whose  interests  are  not  affected.     It  is  not 


1  A  pood  equals  36.1  American  pounds. 

2 These  figures  are  taken  from  the  elaborate  diagrams  in  Professor 
Goldstein's  Russia,  Her  Economic  Past  and  Future.  They  are  based 
on  the  average  for  the  years  1910-11 — 1912-13. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    15 

an  exaggeration  to  say  that  what  is  called  the 
Russian  problem  enters  into  the  grocery  bill  of 
every  American  household. 

It  is  to  our  interest  not  merely  that  Russia 
resumes  her  place  as  a  food-exporting  nation,  but 
also  that  her  agricultural  production  be  greatly 
increased,  and  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Impressive 
as  the  figures  of  her  pre-war  production  and  export 
are,  they  do  not  represent  anything  like  the  pro- 
duction and  export  of  which  she  is  capable.  De- 
spite the  wonderfully  rich  soil  of  the  greater  pait 
of  her  wheat-producing  land,  which  is  far  superior 
to  that  possessed  by  any  other  European  country, 
we  find  Russia's  production  per  acre  the  poorest  of 
all.  The  following  table  shows  the  wheat  pro- 
duction of  the  various  European  nations  in  poods 
per  dessiatine: * 

TABLE  A 

ANNUAL   AVERAGE    WHEAT   YIELD,    I9OI-IO 

Country  Poods  per  Dcssiaiine 

Denmark  (1901-05) 183 

Belgium 157 

Holland 153 

Great  Britain 148 

Germany 130 

Sweden 125 

France 90 

Austria 85 

Rumania 79 

Hungary 76 

Italy.  • 63 

Bulgaria 62 

Spain 62 

Serbia 56 

Russia 45 

1  A  ck'.siarine  is  equal  to  2.705  acres;  a  pood,  as  previously  explained, 
to  36.I  pounds. 


6    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


Most  of  these  are  not  wheat-producing  countries 
in  any  important  sense  and  the  total  amount  of 
home-grown  wheat  is  small  in  comparison  with 
the  total  amount  consumed.  A  much  more  satis- 
factory measure  of  Russia's  backwardness  is  ob- 
tained by  comparing  the  yield  of  wheat  per  acre 
in  the  principal  wheat-producing  countries  of  the 
world.  Canada's  average  yield  of  wheat  per  acre 
is  nearly  twice  that  of  Russia.  The  figures  for  the 
principal  wheat-growing  countries  are  as  follows: 

TABLE  B 

ANNUAL  AVERAGE  YIELD  OF  WHEAT  PER  ACRE  IN  THE  PRINCIPAL  WHEAT- 
GROWING   COUNTRIES 
Country  Bushels  ptr  Acre 

Canada 19  .2 

Rumania 16.8 

United  States 14.4 

Australia 1 1 .9 

British  India II. 5 

Argentina 10.6 

Russia 10 .0 

While  Russia  during  the  three-year  period  191 1- 
13  had  under  cultivation  an  area  greater  than 
that  under  cultivation  in  the  United  States  by 
about  23  per  cent.,  the  total  product  was  fully  10 
per  cent.  less.  There  are  several  reasons  for  this 
backward  state  of  Russian  agricultural  production, 
one  of  the  most  important  being  the  limited  use  of 
agricultural  machinery  and  the  wide-spread  use 
of  very  primitive  methods  of  cultivation.  Not 
very  many  years  ago  it  was  stated  in  a  report 
published  in  the  official  journal  of  the  Russian 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  that  out  of  18,000,000 
plows  in  use  in  Russia   12,000,000  were  made  of 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    17 

wood,  and  that  of  22,884,000  harrows  21,000,000 
were  either  made  wholly  of  wood  or  of  wood  with 
iron  teeth.1  The  five  years  preceding  the  war 
brought  about  a  great  improvement  in  this  respect. 
There  was  a  very  notable  increase  in  the  amount 
of  agricultural  machinery  imported  into  Russia, 
as  well  as  in  the  manufacture  of  such  machinery 
in  Russia.  In  the  five-year  period  1895-99  the 
total  value  of  all  the  agricultural  machinery  im- 
ported into  Russia  was  53,000,000  rubles.  In  the 
next  five-year  period,  1900-04,  it  had  risen  to 
about  102,700,000  rubles.  In  the  next  five-year 
period,  1905-09,  it  rose  to  131,500,000  rubles, 
while  in  the  next  three  years,  1910-12,  the  amount 
was  166,900,000  rubles,  representing  a  greater 
annual  average  than  the  total  for  the  five-year 
period  1895-99.  In  the  same  period  the  value  of 
the  agricultural  implements  manufactured  in  Rus- 
sia rose  in  nearly  the  same  proportion,  from  9,600,- 
000  rubles  in  1895  to  52,600,000  rubles  in  1912.2 

The  improvement  in  technic  made  possible  by 
the  increased  use  of  machinery  indicated  by  these 
figures  is  reflected  in  the  improved  productivity 
of  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  war.  On 
communally  owned  lands  the  average  yield  of  grains 
in  European  Russia  was  34  poods  per  dessiatine 
in  the  ten-year  period  1881-90,  39  poods  in  1891- 
1900,  and  43  poods  in  1901-10.  On  the  privately 
owned  lands  the  progress  was  equally  marked,  the 
corresponding  figures  being  42  poods  per  dessiatine 
in  1881-90,  47  poods  in  1891-1900,  and  54  poods  in 

1  Quoted  by  Wilcox,  op,  cit.,  p.  6, 

2  Goldstein,  op.  cit. 


i8    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

1 901-10.  This  great  improvement  was  due,  to  a 
very  great  extent,  to  the  fact  that  the  Russian 
government  and  the  local  zemstvos  had  devoted 
a  great  deal  of  money  and  effort  to  the  development 
of  agricultural  production.  The  number  of  agri- 
cultural expert  advisers,  instructors,  and  agents 
employed  by  the  Russian  government  rose  from 
141  in  1907  to  1,365  in  1912.  In  the  same  period 
the  number  employed  in  this  work  by  the  zemstvos 
rose  from  593  in  the  former  year  to  3,266  in  the 
latter. 

The  need  for  a  great  increase  in  the  productivity 
of  land,  as  well  as  in  the  number  of  acres  cultivated, 
was  now  quite  clearly  recognized.  With  the  rise 
and  growth  of  large  cities  a  larger  proportion  of 
the  wheat  and  other  food  grains  was  being  used 
in  Russia  itself,  and  a  great  part  of  what  was 
exported  was  not  really  a  "surplus"  at  all,  but 
was  sorely  needed  by  the  Russian  peasants  them- 
selves.1 Meantime,  Russia  was  losing  her  place 
in  the  wheat-market,  especially  in  the  trade  with 
Great  Britain,  so  important  to  her.  In  the  ten 
years  1881-90  Russia  supplied  practically  64  per 
cent,  of  the  wheat  imported  into  the  United  King- 
dom, Canada  about  17  per  cent.,  Australia  15  per 
cent.,  and  Argentina  about  4  per  cent.  In  the 
three-year  period  191 1-1 3  the  figures  were:  Canada, 
38  per  cent.;  Argentina,  25  per  cent.;  Australia, 
20  per  cent.;  Russia,  less  than  17  per  cent. 

Such  facts  as  these  caused  the  Russian  govern- 
ment, through  the  Department  of  Agriculture, 
to  spend  a  great  deal  of  money  for  the  improvement 

1  See  p.  105. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM     19 

of  agriculture  through  such  agencies  as  schools, 
experimental  stations,  expert  advice  on  soils,  seeds, 
fertilizers,  and  so  on.  In  the  year  1913  the  De- 
partment of  Agriculture  expended  about  30  mill- 
ion rubles,  as  against  an  average  annual  expendi- 
ture of  12  million  rubles  in  the  five-year  period 
1908-12.  It  is  probably  quite  safe  to  say  that  no 
department  of  the  Russian  government  ever  spent 
public  funds  with  equal  honesty,  efficiency,  and 
good  result.  The  work  of  the  government  was 
admirably  supplemented  by  the  zemstvos  and  the 
local  agricultural  societies.  These  were  of  two 
kinds,  general  associations  for  the  improvement  of 
agriculture  by  means  of  lectures,  demonstrations, 
and  exhibitions  and  co-operative  associations  for 
purchasing  supplies  and  selling  products.  There 
were  4,685  of  the  general  associations  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1914,  and  2,967  of  these,  or  63.3  per  cent., 
had  been  formed  since  January  1,  1909.  There 
were  also  1,254  agricultural  co-operatives,  of  which 
number  1,058,  or  about  80  per  cent.,  had  been 
formed  since  January  1,  1909.  About  50  per  cent, 
of  these  co-operatives  were  of  milk  producers, 
about  30  per  cent,  were  for  general  trading,  some- 
thing over  10  per  cent,  were  for  the  co-operative 
purchase  and  use  of  agricultural  machinery.  In 
addition  there  were  various  co-operatives  not 
classified. 

When  the  war  broke  out  in  1914  Russia  was 
engaged  in  the  vitally  important  work  of  moderniz- 
ing her  agricultural  methods,  as  the  figures  above 
quoted  show.  That  work  was  interrupted  by  the  war 
and  the  over-mobilization  which  foolish  and  short- 


20    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

sighted  bureaucrats  brought  about  with  such  dis- 
astrous consequences.  About  19,000,000  men  were 
mobilized,  not  less  than  10,000,000  actually  serving 
at  the  front.  Nearly  four  years  of  terrible  warfare 
destroyed  much  of  the  gain  that  had  been  achieved, 
and  internal  revolution  completed  the  process  of 
destruction.  We  must  regard  Russia  now  as  a 
potentially  great  agricultural  country  awaiting 
development,  capable  of  furnishing  an  enormous 
supply  of  food  to  other  nations.  It  is  not  an 
exaggeration  to  say  that  she  is  easily  capable  of 
providing  abundantly  for  her  own  millions — even 
according  to  the  greatly  improved  standards  now 
recognized  as  desirable — and  furnishing  the  nations 
of  continental  Europe  with  a  large  part  of  all  the 
food  grains  they  need. 

For  reasons  already  indicated,  such  a  regenera- 
tion of  Russian  agriculture  would  benefit  America 
as  well  as  Europe.  In  a  very  real  sense,  therefore, 
the  restoration  and  development  of  Russian  agri- 
culture is  a  problem  of  world-wide  importance. 
Throughout  the  world  the  development  of  industry 
increasingly  masses  millions  of  people  in  cities 
and  towns,  and  so  makes  the  production  of  food 
upon  a  large  scale  essential  to  the  life  of  even 
nation.  More  food  must  be  produced  if  progress 
is  to  be  maintained.  There  are  vast  tracts  of  grain- 
lands  and  grazing-lands  in  Russia  which  will  not 
within  any  computable  time  be  economically  use- 
ful for  any  other  purpose.  In  the  utilization  of 
these  immense  areas  lies  the  hope  of  European 
civilization.  We  must  remember  that  of  the  entire 
land  area  of  Russia  little  more  than  5  per  cent. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    21 

was  under  cultivation  when  the  war  broke  out. 
Adequate  railway  communications,  storage  facili- 
ties, and  irrigation,  together  with  a  rational  system 
of  land  tenure,  would  easily  make  possible  the 
production  of  grain  and  other  crops  ten  times 
as  great  as  the  highest  total  ever  yet  reached. 

Not  only  that,  but  on  the  immense  stretches 
of  grazing-lands  an  enormous  number  of  cattle 
can  be  maintained,  adding  another  important  con- 
tribution to  the  world's  food-supply.  The  progres- 
sive industrialization  and  urbanization  of  the  world 
makes  the  supply  of  beef  and  other  flesh  foods  a 
very  grave  problem.  Even  in  the  United  States 
this  problem  assumes  a  grave  character.  Mean- 
time Russia  with  her  practically  limitless  possi- 
bilities for  such  production  is  almost  wholly  unde- 
veloped. While  Argentina  had,  in  191 3,  about 
5,320  head  of  cattle  per  1,000  of  her  population, 
and  Australia  4,600,  Russia  had  only  390! 1  Yet 
neither  of  these  countries  possessed  greater  natural 
advantages  than  Russia.  Comparing  Russia  with 
the  United  States  and  Canada,  we  find  her  again 
at  the  bottom,  though  the  difference  is  naturally 
not  so  enormous.  The  figures  are:  Canada,  1,050 
•head  of  cattle  for  each  1,000  of  population;  the 
United  States,  860;  Russia,  as  stated,  390.  This 
was  the  situation  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war; 
naturally,  it  is  now  infinitely  worse. 

An  important  factor  in  the  problem  is  the  great 
scarcity  of  horses  over  the  greater  part  of  Russia. 
An  immense  number  of  horses  were  killed  during 

1  In  these  figures  S  sheep  or  hops  are  reckoned  as  equivalent  to  I 
head  of  cattle.     See  Goldstein,  op.  cit.,  p.  iS. 


22    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

the  war  and  a  great  many  captured  by  the  Ger- 
mans. Hundreds  of  thousands  of  others  have 
been  killed  for  food.  The  result  is  that,  according 
to  the  official  organs  of  the  Bolshevist  government, 
horses  have  almost  disappeared  from  some  dis- 
tricts. In  the  country  districts,  says  Pravday  there 
is  only  one  horse  to  every  97  acres  of  ground,  and 
there  are  many  districts  where  85  per  cent,  of  the 
peasants  have  no  horses  at  all.  In  Petrograd  the 
number  of  horses  in  peace  times  was  69,000,  but 
now — July,  1919 — it  is  only  iOjOOO.1  Undoubtedly 
this  condition  will  greatly  stimulate  the  use  of 
machinery  in  the  development  of  Russian  agri- 
culture. 

IV 

It  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  here  the  conditions 
of  Russia's  industries  with  anything  like  the 
detail  of  the  foregoing  account  of  her  agriculture. 
A  very  brief  summary  of  the  most  salient  facts 
will  suffice  for  our  present  discussion  of  the  relation 
of  Russia's  economic  life  to  our  own.  As  will  be 
shown  later  on,  Russian  industrial  development 
lags  far  behind  even  her  agricultural  production. 
This  is  shown  at  every  point  of  comparison  with 
the  great  industrial  nations.  It  is  perhaps  suffi- 
ciently indicated  for  our  present  purpose  by  the 
fact  that  the  total  capital  represented  in  all  the 
industrial  and  commercial  joint-stock  companies 
of  Russia,  exclusive  of  banks  and  of  railroads — the 
majority   of  which   latter   are   state   enterprises — 

1  Commerce  Reports,  United  States  Department  of  Commerce,  No. 
219,  September,  1919. 


RUSSIA  AS   AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    23 

was  only  about  2  billion  dollars  in  1917.  That 
is  to  say,  it  approximated  the  stock-and-bond 
capital  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation. 
If  we  imagine  the  population  of  the  United  States 
increased  to  179  millions,  and  its  area  nearly 
trebled,1  and  that  outside  of  the  banks  and  rail- 
ways all  the  invested  capital  of  the  country  was 
that  now  represented  by  the  United  States  Steel 
Corporation,  we  shall  be  able  to  obtain  a  mental 
picture  of  Russia's  backward  condition  from  the 
standpoint  of  capitalist  development. 

The  condition  of  the  Russian  railways  and  their 
utter  inadequacy  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  nation 
has  been  the  subject  of  much  comment.  When 
the  World  War  began  the  passenger  and  freight 
capacity  of  the  entire  railway  system  of  the  Russian 
Empire  was  barely  in  excess  of  that  of  Canada.  In 
other  words,  179  millions  of  people  in  Russia 
depended  upon  a  railway  service  only  equal  in 
capacity  to  that  possessed  by  8  millions  of  people 
in  Canada.  Not  only  was  the  system  of  railway 
transportation  altogether  inadequate;  it  was  badly 
managed  and  subject  to  graft,  organized  and  un- 
organized. The  wretched  administration  of  the 
railroads  under  the  bureaucracy  was  indeed  one 
of  the  principal  causes  of  Russia's  economic  re- 
tardation. 

With  all  its  shortcomings,  however,  it  was,  as 
Mr.  Russell  remarks,  "the  arterial  system  of 
Russia's  body."  2     Constructed  mainly  with  a  view 

1 'I  he  fipurrs  arc:     Russia,  R, 660,000  s  juarc  miles;    United  States, 
3,02^1,7^  square  milts. 
-  RubSt-11,  op.  tit.,  p.  181. 


24    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

to  strategic  advantages,  it  made  it  possible  for 
food,  fuel,  and  raw  materials  to  be  conveyed  from 
the  places  of  their  origin  to  the  industrial  centers. 
It  made  possible  the  transportation  of  the  cotton 
of  Turkestan  to  the  mills  of  Moscow,  the  coal  and 
coke  of  the  Donetz  Basin  to  Petrograd,  and  Ameri- 
can-made machinery  from  Vladivostok  to  the 
Caucasus.  Great  extensions  of  the  railway  system 
were  planned,  and  would  have  been  undertaken 
but  for  the  war.  While  these  were  largely  designed 
in  accordance  with  military  strategy  rather  than 
economic  needs,  they  would  have  added  greatly 
to  the  industrial  development  of  the  country. 

The  mobilization  measures  which  were  under- 
taken at  the  beginning  of  the  war  imposed  upon 
the  railways  such  a  volume  of  traffic  as  to  throw 
the  whole  system  into  confusion.  Several  times 
as  many  men  were  mobilized  as  could  possibly  be 
used  or  even  equipped.  No  regard  whatever 
was  paid  to  the  very  elementary  fact  that  railways 
and  factories  must  be  manned  if  armies  are  to  be 
used.  Millions  of  men  were  needlessly  mobilized 
so  that  the  transportation  of  men  alone  taxed 
the  railways  to  the  uttermost  of  their  capacity. 
Freight  was  piled  up,  the  whole  system  congested 
and  choked.  As  the  war  proceeded,  and  the 
weeks  and  months  lapsed  into  years,  things  grew 
steadily  worse.  Rails  and  road-beds  gave  out 
and  there  were  neither  materials  nor  men  to  replace 
them.  Engines  and  cars  wore  out  or  broke,  and 
there  were  few  repairs  and  still  fewer  replacements. 
The  "arterial  system"  of  the  nation  was  steadily 
weakened  and  well-nigh  destroved. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    25 

By  the  time  the  Revolution  occurred  in  March, 
191 7,  Russia  was  a  nation  in  which  millions  of 
people  were  suffering  from  hunger,  living  upon  the 
most  meager  rations,  notwithstanding  that  there 
was  abundant  food  in  the  country.  The  food 
could  not  be  made  available  to  the  people  in  the 
great  cities,  simply  because  the  means  of  trans- 
portation were  lacking.  Soon  after  Kerensky 
came  into  power  it  was  officially  estimated  that  the 
railway  equipment  and  capacity  was  about  65  per 
cent,  of  what  it  had  been  at  the  beginning  of 
August,  1914.  At  the  same  time,  it  was  subject 
to  the  immense  additional  strain  of  war  require- 
ments, so  that  the  actual  relation  of  the  railway 
service  to  the  economic  life  of  the  nation  was  far 
worse  than  the  foregoing  official  estimate  reveals. 

After  the  Bolsheviki  assumed  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment things  rapidly  went  from  bad  to  worse. 
This  was  inevitable  in  the  circumstances.  Under 
Kerensky  arrangements  had  been  made  for  the 
rehabilitation  of  the  railway  system  under  the 
direction  of  the  American  Railroad  Commission, 
headed  by  Mr.  Stevens.  That  expert  body  could 
not  have  given  Russia  an  adequate  system  of 
railroads,  but  it  could  and  would  have  restored 
the  existing  system,  supplied  new  locomotives  and 
cars,  and  made  it  perform  far  more  effective  service 
than  it  had  ever  done  before.  The  Bolshevist 
counter-revolution  put  an  end  to  this  great  enter- 
prise which  was  Russia's  hope. 

How  the  Bolshevist  regime  affected  the  rail- 
roads is  clearly  shown  by  Mr.  Russell  in  figures 
officially   published   by  the   Bolshevist    authorities 


26    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

themselves.  On  October  I,  1917,  there  were 
52,597  versts1  of  railroad  in  operation;  on  October 
1,  1918,  21,800.  On  October  1,  1917,  there  were 
15,732  available  locomotives;  on  October  1,  1918, 
5,037.  On  October  1,  1917,  there  were  521,591 
available  freight-cars;  on  October  1,  1918,  227,274-2 
Not  all  this  serious  deterioration  can  be  fairly 
charged  to  the  wretched  incompetence  of  the  Bol- 
sheviki,  or  even  to  the  inherent  defects  of  Bol- 
shevism, as  Mr.  Russell  seems  to  believe.  It  is  a 
fact,  however,  that  the  deterioration  in  the  system 
of  communication  and  transportation  on  which  the 
life  of  Russia  depended  took  place,  under  Bolshe- 
vism, at  the  very  time  when  a  vast  improvement 
in  the  system  was  about  to  be  made.  No  greater 
injury  could  have  been  inflicted  upon  the  Russian 
people. 

It  is  quite  certain  that  if  Russia  is  to  live  as  a 
civilized  nation — and  doubt  upon  that  point  is 
surely  impossible — her  railway  system  will  have 
to  be  restored  and  extended.  This  is  an  impera- 
tive necessity  of  her  life  under  any  rule  whatsoever. 
Whether  as  a  Bolshevist  state,  a  Socialist  republic, 
a  monarchy,  or  a  tributary  and  vassal  state  under 
the  suzerainty  of  Japan  or  some  other  power,  to 
live  in  civilization  she  must  have  railroads.  In 
the  near  future  this  need  will  have  to  be  faced 
and  met.  It  will  be  necessary,  first  of  all,  to  restore 
the  existing  system.  Expansion  will  come  later. 
Whether  this  restoration  is  to  be  accomplished 
by  means  of  American  capital  or  by  German  or 
Japanese,  or  by  a  combination  of  these  two,  is  a 

1  A  verst  equals  0.663  mile.  2  Russell,  op.  cil.,  p.  1S4. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    27 

matter  of  profound  consequence,  not  to  Russia 
alone,  but  to  this  and  every  other  civilized  nation. 
It  involves  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  to  believe 
that  the  determination  of  this  question  will  decide 
the  course  and  character  of  world  politics  during 
the  remainder  of  this  century. 

When  the  World  War  began  Russia  had  approxi- 
mately 46,600  miles  of  railway  as  against  261,000 
in  the  United  States,  giving  a  mileage  per  1,000 
of  population  of  0.26  for  Russia  and  2.66  for  the 
United  States.  In  order  to  make  the  comparison 
intelligible  and  just  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  enormous  difference  in  the  area  of  the  two 
countries  makes  Russia's  inferiority  very  much 
greater.  To  the  fact  that  the  United  States  has 
about  six  times  the  railway  mileage  of  Russia 
must  be  added  the  fact  that  she  has  not  much  more 
than  one-third  as  much  territory. 

Soon  after  the  war  with  Japan  the  Russian 
government  began  to  encourage  private  enterprise 
in  the  construction  and  operation  of  railroads. 
From  1908  to  1 9 14  most  of  the  new  roads  con- 
structed were  the  result  of  private  enterprise. 
For  the  concessions  to  build  and  operate  these 
roads  the  companies  paid  to  the  Russian  govern- 
ment certain  stipulated  percentages  of  the  profits 
made,  the  state  thus  becoming  a  sort  of  partner 
with  the  private  capitalists.  In  1909  the  state 
received  from  this  source  3,900,000  rubles;  in  191 3 
it  received  34,000,000  rubles.  In  1914  a  commission 
reported  on  a  plan  for  constructing  some  18,000 
miles  of  new  railroads,  8,500  of  which  it  was  pro- 
posed to  begin  in  1915.     In  1916,  after  the  experi- 


28    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

cnces  of  the  war  had  shown  how  perilous  the 
situation  was,  there  was  another  commission, 
which  reported  shortly  before  the  Revolution. 
The  plans  reported  by  this  body  required  that, 
including  certain  strategic  military  lines,  there 
should  be  built  in  the  ten  years  1917-26  some 
30,000  miles.  It  was  proposed  that  4,150  miles 
should  be  built  in  the  first  five-year  period  and 
1,400  annually  thereafter,  these  to  be  in  addition 
to  the  strategic  lines  for  military  purposes.  Even 
if  this  program  were  carried  out  Russia  would 
still  be  very  inadequately  served.  Her  total  rail- 
way mileage  in  1927  would  be  something  like 
three  and  a  half  times  less  than  that  of  the  United 
States  in  19 14. 

These  figures  plainly  show  not  only  the  great 
need  for  railway  construction  in  Russia,  but  the 
more  significant  fact  that  the  need  has  been  very 
clearly  recognized.  Whenever  the  internal  strife 
in  Russia  is  brought  to  an  end,  and  order  takes 
the  place  of  chaos,  the  leading  minds  of  Russia 
will  be  directed  to  this  great  and  vital  problem. 
It  is  probably  a  conservative  estimate  that  to 
bring  the  existing  lines  into  good  condition,  to 
renew  the  outworn  rails  and  rolling-stock,  would 
require  an  immediate  expenditure  of  not  less  than 
a  billion  dollars.  Even  if  the  minimum  program 
of  the  1916  commission  above  mentioned  should 
be  accepted  as  the  maximum  construction  program 
to  be  undertaken,  that  would  involve  for  the  decade 
an  expenditure  of  over  four  billions  more.  The 
construction  of  4,000  to  5,000  miles  of  railway 
annually   would    require    not    less   than    2,000,000 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    29 

tons  of  iron  and  steel,  more  than  one-half  the 
total  annual  production  for  the  years  191 2-1 3. 
It  is  self-evident  that  for  carrying  out  this  or 
any  other  comprehensive  program  of  railway 
construction  Russia  will  have  to  depend  mainly 
upon  foreign  capital  and  foreign  industry.  Weak- 
ened by  long  years  of  war  and  revolutionary  mad- 
ness far  worse  than  war,  her  treasury  drained,  her 
industries  practically  ruined,  she  has  no  alterna- 
tive except  ruin  and  decadence.  That  she  will 
endeavor  to  secure  the  necessary  capital  and  goods 
from  abroad,  in  exchange  for  her  securities,  rich 
concessions,  and  raw  materials,  is  beyond  any 
question  or  doubt.  The  United  States  is  better 
able  to  supply  what  Russia  needs  than  any  other 
country,  and  there  are  reasons  of  the  greatest 
importance,  reasons  which  transcend  all  sordid 
and  selfish  considerations,  why  she  should  do  it. 
It  is  probable  that  in  no  other  way  can  Russia  be 
saved  from  the  domination  and  economic  control 
of  the  most  dangerous  and  reactionary  forces  in 
the  world,  forces  which,  if  they  become  possessed 
of  Russia's  almost  limitless  resources,  will  chal- 
lenge, and  perhaps  overthrow,  Western  civiliza- 
tion. In  this  grave  fact  lies  the  challenge  to 
America  to  regard  Russia's  rehabilitation  as  an 
American  problem. 


Prophecy  concerning  Russian  political  develop- 
ments is  proverbially  difficult  and  hazardous. 
The  student  of  Russian  history  and  politics  is 
constantly  reminded  of  this  fact,  and  the  present 


3o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

writer  has  no  intention  of  assuming  the  prophetic 
role.  He  does  not  presume  to  forecast  how  or  when 
Russia  will  settle  the  great  internal  conflict  by 
which  she  is  beset  and  torn.  It  seems  highly  prob- 
able that  a  crisis  will  be  reached  before  long,  per- 
haps before  these  pages  are  published.  The  present 
condition  of  affairs  cannot  be  reasonably  expected 
to  endure  for  very  long.  That  is  the  nearest  ap- 
proach to  a  prophecy  which  the  writer  will  permit 
himself  to  indulge  in. 

There  are  at  least  three  distinct  possibilities 
confronting  Russia.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  pos- 
sible that  the  Bolshevist  regime  will  be  over- 
thrown, or  will  fall  to  pieces  of  its  own  inherent 
weakness,  and  that  its  place  will  be  taken  by  a 
radical  democratic  government,  Populistic  rather 
than  Socialistic,  based  upon  equal  suffrage.  Such 
a  government  would  be  republican  in  form,  of 
course,  and  would  have  to  represent  a  coalition 
of  liberal  and  radical  democratic  forces.  It  would 
resemble  in  its  general  character  the  Provisional 
government  as  it  was  under  Kerensky,  with  men 
of  the  type  of  Paul  Miliukov  and  Peter  Struve 
exercising  a  greater  influence  than  was  possible 
at  the  time  of  the  Kerensky  regime.  By  many 
thoughtful  Russians  this  is  regarded  as  the  most 
probable  outcome,  as  well  as  the  most  desirable  one. 

Let  us  consider,  very  briefly,  the  task  by  which 
such  a  government  would  be  confronted.  This 
is  not  a  matter  of  speculation,  but  of  plain  and 
obvious  fact.  Its  task  would  be  twofold.  In  the 
first  place,  it  would  have  to  face  the  imperative 
necessity   of   rehabilitating    and    regenerating   the 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    31 

economic  life  of  the  nation.  It  would  have  to  find 
ways  and  means  to  restore  the  old  railways  and  to 
build  new  ones.  Even  a  very  modest  program, 
providing  only  the  absolute  minimum  of  land 
transportation  compatible  with  economic  safety, 
would  require  an  expenditure  of  a  vast  sum,  aggre- 
gating billions  of  dollars,  as  we  have  already  seen. 
In  addition  to  the  restoration  of  the  railway  trans- 
portation system,  it  would  have  to  find  ways  and 
means  to  build  up  its  agricultural  and  industrial 
production.  For  this  a  vast  amount  of  machinery 
would  be  required,  agricultural  machinery  and 
implements  for  the  farms  and  power  looms,  motors, 
turbines,  and  so  on,  for  the  development  of  the 
manufacture  of  textiles,  iron  and  steel,  mining, 
oil  production,  and  the  like.  By  state  or  private 
enterprise,  or  perhaps  by  a  combination  of  both, 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  these  and 
similar  things  would  have  to  be  secured  without  delay. 
In  the  second  place,  the  government  would  have 
to  attend  to  the  gigantic  task  of  establishing  the 
political  life  of  the  nation  upon  a  stable  and  secure 
basis.  It  would  be  compelled  to  undo  much  of 
the  ruinous  work  of  the  Revolution  and  its  after- 
math under  Bolshevism.  For  example,  take  the 
dismemberment  of  European  Russia:  the  position 
of  the  states  which  have  declared  their  independence 
is  such  that,  almost  as  a  primary  essential  to  life 
itself,  the  new  Russian  government  must  address 
itself  to  the  admittedly  difficult  task  of  reuniting 
them  to  Russia  and  restoring  European  Russia 
as  she  was  before  the  Revolution,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Poland   and    Finland,   whose  position  has 


32    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

been  fixed  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  and  whose 
independence  is  not  at  all  incompatible  with 
Russia's  welfare. 

It  may  be  fairly  assumed  that,  in  the  event  of 
such  a  triumph  over  the  Bolsheviki  as  we  are  dis- 
cussing, Siberia  would  continue  to  be  part  of  Rus- 
sia; that  the  government  set  up  in  Siberia  by  the 
anti-Bolshevist  forces  would  welcome  the  oppor- 
tunity to  unite  with  a  genuinely  democratic  Rus- 
sian government  based  upon  the  will  of  the  people 
freely  expressed  through  a  democratically  elected 
Constituent  Assembly.  That,  at  any  rate,  has 
been  the  avowed  aim  of  the  Omsk  government 
throughout  all  the  vicissitudes  of  its  stormy  life. 
Given  such  a  reunion,  the  Russian  Republic  would 
be  smaller  than  the  old  empire  of  the  czars  only 
by  the  total  area  of  Finland  and  Poland,  a  trifle 
in  comparison  with  the  immense  area  involved. 
It  would  stretch  from  Riga  to  Kamchatka,  and 
from  Odessa  to  Vladivostok. 

We  have  only  to  picture  Russia  weakened  and 
crippled  by  years  of  war  and  revolution  unparal- 
leled in  modern  history,  struggling  under  the 
immense  burden  thus  outlined,  to  realize  how 
enormously  difficult  it  would  be  for  her  to  defend 
herself  against  an  aggressive  and  powerful  neighbor. 
Japan,  dominating  the  whole  life  of  China,  abso- 
lutely in  control  of  Manchuria,  could  take  south- 
eastern Siberia  at  any  time,  if  Russia  were  forced 
to  rely  upon  her  own  resources.  Only  the  League  of 
Nations  could  protect  her  against  aggression  by 
Japan.  Moreover,  we  shall  do  well  to  remember 
that,    in   certain   by   no   means   impossible   circum- 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    33 

stances,  Japan  may  be  powerful  enough  to  defy  suc- 
cessfully the  League  of  Nations,  no  matter  how  strong 
the  League  may  be.  Her  hegemony  of  Asia  securely- 
established,  she  could  challenge  the  Western  World. 

Let  us  consider  now  the  second  of  the  three 
possibilities  confronting  Russia.  It  is  quite  pos- 
sible that  the  Bolsheviki  will  not  be  overthrown, 
but  will  retain  their  control  of  Russia  west  of  the 
Urals.  This  would  probably  only  be  made  possible 
by  the  abandonment  of  the  worst  features  of  Bol- 
shevism by  the  Bolsheviki  themselves.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  this  process  had  already  begun  in 
the  summer  of  1919,  as  Tchaykovsky  and  other 
Russian  leaders  pointed  out.  A  reformed  Bolshevist 
regime  might  very  well  manage  to  maintain  itself  in 
power  and  to  secure  recognition  by  other  nations, 
with  a  consequent  resumption  of  trade  relations. 
Siberia  would  be  left  to  itself,  an  independent  state. 

If  this  should  be  the  outcome  there  is  every 
reason  to  believe  that  Germany  would  be  given 
every  possible  economic  advantage  over  any  other 
of  the  great  nations  in  all  commercial  relations 
with  Bolshevist  Russia.  This  is  indicated  by  the 
whole  history  of  the  Bolsheviki  and  their  notori- 
ously intimate  relations  with  Germany.  It  is  not 
merely  a  question  of  natural  advantages  due  to 
geographical  position,  but  of  deliberate  govern- 
mental policy.  The  Bolsheviki  have  made  no 
secret  of  the  fact  that  they  are  willing  to  trade 
"concessions"  of  all  kinds  for  raw  materials,  in- 
cluding their  richest  forest  areas  and  mining  lands.1 

1  See   Ransome,  Russia  in  IQIQ,   pp.   105,   161,  etc.     See  also  Ap- 
pendix  H  at  »nd  of  this  volume. 


34    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Pavlovltch,  Krasin,  Rykov,  and  other  Bolshevist 
officials  have  had  to  fight  constantly  against 
attacks  by  those  who  charge  them  with  "selling 
Soviet  Russia  into  the  hands  of  foreign  capitalist- 
imperialists."  No  one  who  is  familiar  with  the 
circumstances  doubts  that  in  the  event  of  the 
Bolshevist  government  retaining  its  power  Germany 
will  be  its  economic  master. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  Urals  a  great  deal 
would  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  government 
established  in  Siberia.  There  is  no  likelihood  that 
Siberia  will  accept  any  union  with  European  Russia 
under  Bolshevist  rule,  even  if  the  latter  be  reformed. 
If  the  liberal  democrats  and  Socialists  should  win 
in  the  struggle  against  the  reactionary  militaristic 
and  monarchistic  elements,  Siberia  would  be 
dominated  by  elements  strongly  favorable  to  the 
Western  democratic  nations,  and  especially  to  the 
United  States.  A  democratic  Republic  of  Siberia 
would  be  subject  to  two  very  great  and  grave 
perils — one  military,  the  other  economic.  On  the 
military  side  it  would  be  menaced  by  aggressive 
Japan.  Not  for  many  years  would  Siberia  possess 
the  population  and  military  strength  necessary  to 
defend  herself  against  a  serious  and  determined 
attack  by  Japan.  The  only  defense  of  Siberia's 
independence,  should  such  an  attack  be  made, 
would  be  the  League  of  Nations  dominated  by  a 
determination  to  defeat  such  aggression  by 
Japan,  no  matter  what  the  cost  might  be. 

Siberia's  economic  peril  comes  partly  from 
Germany  and  partly  from  Japan,  or,  more  accu- 
rately, Japan-China.     The  danger  is  that  Siberia 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    35 

will  be  obliged  to  place  herself  under  the  economic 
control  of  Germany  and  Japan.  Against  this  the 
League  of  Nations  cannot  protect  her.  The  League 
will  not  interfere  with  the  "peaceful  penetration" 
of  Siberia  by  Germany  or  Japan  or  both;  it  most 
assuredly  will  not  compel  Siberia  to  suffer  decay 
and  ruin  for  lack  of  the  things  essential  to  her  life, 
things  which  she  must  obtain  somehow,  preferably 
from  America,  but  if  need  be  from  Germany  and 
Japan.  To  save  Siberia  from  this  peril  the  United 
States  must  supply  the  things  required  to  place 
her  upon  her  feet  in  a  position  of  economic  security. 

We  come  now  to  the  third  possibility,  namely, 
the  separation  of  Siberia  from  Russia  under  mo- 
narchical government.  Whether  Bolshevism,  re- 
formed and  modified,  prevails  in  Russia  or  such  a 
liberal  democratic  republic  as  has  been  sketched, 
the  reactionary  militarist  and  monarchist  forces 
may  triumph  in  Siberia  and  set  up  a  monarchy. 
This  they  may  do  with  or  without  Japanese  aid. 
In  either  case,  such  a  government  would  be  al- 
lied in  sympathy  with  Japan.  The  semi-Oriental 
Japanese  monarchism  conforms  to  the  natural 
instincts  of  the  great  mass  of  monarchists,  bureau- 
crats, and  aristocratic  military  officers  who  have 
centered  around  the  Omsk  government,  co-operat- 
ing with  other  elements  in  wresting  Siberia  from 
the  Bolsheviki.  Their  pro-Japanese  inclinations 
have  been  clearly  manifested  throughout  the 
struggle  and  have  caused  great  uneasiness  among 
the  democratic  forces. 

The  danger  to  the  Western  World  from  such  an 
outcome  of  the  Siberian  struggle  is  obvious  enough. 


36    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

The  immediate  result  would  be  an  alliance  between 
Siberia  and  Japan,  with  Japan  in  control.  This 
would  mean  that  the  vast  resources,  human  and 
material,  of  Japan,  China,  and  Siberia  would  be 
united  under  the  highly  efficient  and  equally  un- 
scrupulous leadership  of  "the  Asiatic  Prussia." 
Such  an  aggregation  of  military  and  economic 
power  as  that  could  flout  the  League  of  Nations. 
In  actuality  it  would  amount  to  a  rival  league. 
No  "economic  boycott"  could  be  effective  against 
such  a  combination,  for  the  simple  reason  that  it 
could  easily  extend  its  power  over  practically  all 
of  the  rest  of  Asia,  finding  sufficient  opportunities 
for  economic  exploitation  to  last  an  almost  incal- 
culable time.  Hindustan,  for  example,  would  al- 
most certainly  be  brought  under  this  hegemony. 

There  remains  yet  another  factor  in  the  problem 
to  be  taken  into  account,  namely,  the  possibility 
that  Germany  may  join  hands  with  Japan.  The 
Junker  class  is  still  strong  and  powerful  in  Germany, 
and  it  is  quite  possible  that  it  may  regain  control 
before  very  long.  As  a  monarchy,  and  perhaps 
even  as  a  republic  completely  dominated  by  mili- 
tarist and  imperialist  motives,  an  alliance  with 
Japan  upon  terms  which  would  leave  her  free  to 
exploit  European  Russia  would  not  be  unnatural. 
It  is  well  known  that  during  the  war,  especially 
during  the  period  prior  to  the  entrance  of  the 
United  States  into  the  conflict,  pro-German  senti- 
ment was  rampant  in  Japan.  On  more  than  one 
occasion  Japanese  statesmen  and  diplomats  made 
veiled  threats  of  a  separate  peace  with  Germany 
and  subsequent  alliance  with  her.     It  was  by  such 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    37 

a  threat,  cunningly  veiled,  that  the  secret  agree- 
ment of  19 16  was  forced  upon  Russia.  A  Berlin- 
Tokio  combination  is  quite  possible.  Such  a  com- 
bination would  be  far  more  formidable  and  fraught 
with  far  greater  menace  than  the  old  Berlin-to- 
Bagdad  vision  of  the  Pan-Germanists. 

Any  such  orientation  of  world  power  as  we  have 
been  discussing  must  inevitably  produce  a  pro- 
found effect  upon  the  great  Occidental  nations. 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  by  no  nation  would  the  con- 
sequences be  more  seriously  felt  than  by  the 
United  States.  It  requires  no  surrender  to  sensa- 
tional anti-Japanese  sentiment  to  realize  this  fact. 
The  consolidation  of  political,  military,  and  eco- 
nomic power  from  Berlin  to  Tokio  would  make 
inevitable  the  militarization  of  every  civilized 
nation  not  included  in  that  combination,  in  prep- 
aration for  another  great  struggle.  And  even  if 
we  omit  Germany  altogether,  considering  only  the 
development  of  a  Pan-Asian  empire  under  Japanese 
leadership  and  direction,  the  consequences  to 
Occidental  civilization  can  hardly  be  regarded  as 
less  serious.  In  a  struggle  between  the  East 
and  the  West  the  United  States  would  be  com- 
pelled to  assume  a  burden  incomparably  heavier 
than  any  it  has  yet  had  to  bear. 


VI 

Here  and  now  we  are  concerned  with  the  im- 
perative necessity  of  a  program  of  economic 
reconstruction   in    Russia    involving   a   stupendous 

volume  of  trade.     Whatever  the  outcome  of  the 

•1 


38    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

internal  conflict,  and  whatever  the  nature  of  the 
government  or  governments  which  shall  be  in- 
trusted with  the  great  responsibility  of  governing 
Russia,  the  minimum  economic  program  must  be 
essentially  the  same  and  must  involve  a  colossal 
outlay.  That  program  is  of  very  great  and  vital 
importance  to  the  United  States. 

There  is  nothing  to  be  gained  by  trying  to  gloss 
with  sentimental  idealization  the  hard,  cold  facts 
of  life.  We  are  a  capitalist  nation,  living  in  a 
capitalist  world  in  an  era  of  capitalism.  Some  of 
us  believe  that  another  form  of  society  would  be 
better  and  give  larger  happiness  to  a  far  greater 
number  of  people.  In  the  mean  time,  only  vision- 
aries and  addle-pated  chatterers  profess  to  be  "in- 
different to  the  success  or  failure  of  our  capitalist 
enterprise.  Failure  means  disaster  and  suffering 
for  the  masses,  not  merely  a  loss  of  profits  for  a 
small  class  of  investors.  If  a  great  foreign  market 
is  closed  to  our  trade  for  any  reason,  unless  others 
as  great  or  greater  are  opened  up,  the  contraction 
of  the  market  affects  adversely  the  whole  economic 
life  of  the  nation. 

It  is  exceedingly  doubtful  whether  any  nation 
with  a  highly  developed  industrial  system  could, 
acting  alone,  emancipate  itself  from  a  large  meas- 
ure of  dependence  upon  capitalism,  so  long  as  other 
leading  industrial  nations  maintained  capitalist 
methods.  That,  however,  is  an  academic  question 
merely,  for  whoever  is  guided  in  his  thinking  by 
the  realities  of  life  must  recognize  that  there  is 
not  the  remotest  chance  of  such  an  attempt  being 
made.     Even  if  we  had  a  government  composed 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    39 

wholly  of  Socialists,  that  government  would  have 
to  protect  and  foster  foreign  trade,  or  bring  about 
a  terrible  amount  of  poverty  and  suffering.  And 
as  long  as  the  nations  so  traded  with  retained 
capitalism,  so  long  would  our  trade  relations 
make  the  whole  subject  of  capitalist  prosperity 
of  vital  importance  to  us. 

A  congestion  of  the  world  market  for  the  princi- 
pal products  of  industry,  a  general  decline  in  the 
demand  for  manufactures,  necessarily  means  idle 
factories,  unemployment  for  many  wage-earners 
with  resulting  poverty  and  its  concomitant  evils. 
It  is  sheer  economic  ignorance  to  contend  that  the 
development  of  trade  opportunities  is  of  moment 
only  to  the  relatively  small  class  of  capitalist 
investors.  On  the  contrary,  every  wage-earner 
employed  in  industry  is  directly  and  intimately 
concerned.  Indeed,  there  is  no  part  of  the  social 
body  which  is  not  affected. 

from  this  point  of  view,  the  question  of  our 
participation  in  the  enormous  volume  of  trade 
essential  to  Russia's  regeneration  and  reconstruc- 
tion becomes  a  social  question  affecting  the  whole 
nation.  When  we  reflect  that  normally,  in  the 
absence  of  some  great  and  unusual  demand  arising 
from  exceptional  circumstances,  the  early  part  of 
192 1  may  be  expected  to  mark  the  beginning  of  a 
period  of  industrial  depression,  the  inevitable 
Russian  demand  assumes  additional  importance. 
//  is  obvious  that  the  volume  oj  trade  which  the  Russian 
development  must  create  will,  if  we  secure  it,  suffice 
to  carry  us  through  what  must  otherwise  be  a  period 
oj  great   depression   and  hardship,   with  every   mill 


4o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

and  factory  running  to  its  full  capacity,  and  with 
every  worker  fully  employed. 

If  this  were  the  only  issue  at  stake  it  would 
abundantly  justify  the  claim  that  Russia's  economic 
reconstruction  is  an  American  problem.  It  is  to 
the  interest  of  every  American,  and  especially  of 
the  working-class  of  America,  that  every  honorable 
means,  compatible  with  justice  and  friendship  to 
Russia,  be  used  to  secure  the  right  to  supply  the 
bulk  of  the  stupendous  mass  of  machinery  and 
manufactured  goods  which  Russia  must  have  in 
order  to  live  as  a  civilized  nation.  By  so  doing 
we  shall  gain  great  advantages  for  ourselves. 
There  is  a  selfish  motive,  therefore,  but  none  need 
attempt  to  disguise  or  disavow  it  since  the  advan- 
tage to  Russia  will  be  equally  as  great  as  to  us. 
For  us  it  is  a  question  of  profit;  for  Russia  a  ques- 
tion of  life. 

The  great  program  of  reconstruction  we  are 
discussing  is  not  something  which  Russia  can 
adopt  or  reject,  hasten  or  delay,  according  to  her 
desire.  The  need  is  urgent  and  imperative,  a 
matter  of  life  or  death.  She  must  have  steel  rails 
and  locomotives  and  machinery  for  manufacturing. 
If  America  does  not  furnish  them  they  will  be 
furnished  by  some  other  nation  or  nations,  in  all 
probability  by  Germany  and  Japan,  the  lion's 
share  going  to  Japan.  Controlling  the  greater  part 
of  China's  resources,  with  an  abundant  supply  of 
cheap  labor,  Japan  is  perhaps  the  only  nation 
besides  the  United  States  in  a  position  to  meet 
Russia's  requirements.  This  she  can  do,  in  large 
part  if  not  altogether,  either  alone  or  in  co-opera- 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    41 

tion  with  Germany.  Even  if  we  leave  out  of 
account  altogether  the  possibilities  of  political 
and  military  domination  of  Russia  by  these  two 
nations,  an  alliance  dominating  eastern  Europe 
and  the  whole  of  Asia,  we  must  face  the  possibility 
of  an  economic  alliance.  It  would  be  a  perfectly 
natural  arrangement  for  these  two  nations  to 
unite  upon  an  economic  policy  which  would  give 
to  Germany  the  economic  control  of  European 
Russia,  and  to  Japan  the  economic  control  of 
Asiatic  Russia. 

We  shall  see  in  subsequent  chapters  how  in  the 
pre-war  period  Germany  strove  with  eager  per- 
sistence to  dominate  Russia's  economic  life.  We 
shall  see,  also,  how  Japan  by  closely  copying  the 
German  methods  made  rapid  and  substantial 
progress  toward  the. realization  of  a  like  mastery 
of  China's  economic  life.  There  is  no  reason  to 
believe  that  the  changes  which  have  taken  place 
in  Germany  have  been  of  such  a  profound  nature 
as  to  alter  her  attitude  toward  Russia.  Economic 
imperialism  continues  to  be  the  dominant  motive 
of  her  rulers.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  even  before  her 
sullen  delegates  signed  the  Peace  Treaty  at  Ver- 
sailles, Germany  was*  working  with  all  her  char- 
acteristic energy  and  cunning  to  reclaim  her  lost 
ascendancy  over  Russia's  economic  life.  There 
are  still  elements  in  that  great  country  ready  to 
welcome  Germany  and  to  aid  her  whenever  it 
can  be  done  with  safety.  There  could  be  no 
greater  mistake  than  to  regard  Germany  as  a 
reformed  nation,  no  longer  a  menace  to  Russia. 

It  would  be  easy  to  present  a  formidable  array 


42    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

of  evidence  in  proof  of  the  statement  that  Ger- 
many began  her  efforts  to  reclaim  her  economic 
ascendancy  over  Russia  before  the  armistice  was 
ended,  but  the  .following  typical  examples  must 
suffice.  It  is  well  known  that  Krasin,  the  Bol- 
shevist People's  Commissar  for  Trade  and  Industry, 
was  not  a  Socialist  at  all,  nor  in  favor  of  the  Revolu- 
tion.1 It  is  not  so  well  known,  however,  that  he 
was  for  many  years  the  manager  of  the  great  Ger- 
man firm  of  Siemens-Schuckart.  He  is  an  engineer 
and  in  the  summer  of  1919  was  engaged  in  trying 
to  bring  about  the  development,  by  German  capi- 
talists, of  the  long-mooted  Great  North  Way  scheme. 
This  would  link  up  the  Siberian  waterways  with  the 
Murman  coast,  the  Baltic  ports,  and  the  great  water- 
ways of  European  Russia.  It  would  give  Germany 
the  economic  domination  of  the  whole  of  northern 
Russia.  Krasin  offered  the  concession  for  this  great 
prize  to  his  intimate  friend,  Ullman,  an  engineer 
acting  for  a  great  German  concern.2 

According  to  Nicholas  Tchaykovsky,  soon  after 
the  defeat  of  Germany  by  the  Allies  Krasin  was 
offered  three  portfolios  by  the  Bolshevist  govern- 
ment, the  portfolios  of  Commerce  and  Industry, 
Transports,  and  War  and  Munitions.  Krasin  ac- 
cepted, but  stipulated  the  following  conditions: 

(1)  The  appointment  of  German  specialists  in 
all  branches  of  his  departments,  quite  regardless 
of  their  social  or  political  views. 

1  See  Ransome,  op.  cit.,  pp,  153-155. 

2  An  account  of  this  was  given  by  Gregor  Alexinsky,  the  well-known 
Russian  Social  Democrat,  in  an  interview  published  in  The  New  York 
Times,  September  17,  1919. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    43 

(2)  The  abolition  of  all  workers'  and  employees' 
committees  of  control  and  the  appointment  in  their 
place  of  responsible  directors  with  full  powers. 

(3)  The  introduction  of  the  piece-work  payment 
system  instead  of  day-work  payment,  of  overtime 
work  in  factories  and  on  railroads  where  necessary, 
regardless  of  the  eight-hour  day  legislation. 

"All  these  conditions  were  accepted,"  says 
Tchaykovsky,  "and  at  present  M.  Krasin,  at  the 
head  of  an  important  organization  of  German 
technical  experts  of  all  kinds,  is  working  to 
bring  order  into  the  Bolshevist  chaos.  Delega- 
tions of  German  merchants,  whose  arrival  in 
Russia  was  recently  announced  in  the  press,  are 
coming  to  arrange  the  import  into  starving 
Germany  of  raw  materials  from  Russia.  How- 
ever, the  political  power  remains  in  the  hands 
of  the  Bolsheviki,  in  spite  of  all  concessions  to 
common  sense,  with  only  two  modifications:  the 
terror  is  better  organized  at  present  than  at  the 
beginning,  and  German  specialists  have  now  as 
much  power  as  the  German  managers,  slave- 
drivers  used  to  have  at  the  time  of  serfdom.  This 
is,  in  brief,  the  direct  consequence  of  the  natural 
evolution  of  Bolshevism  in  Russia.  It  is  to  attain 
this  end  that  the  Bolshevist  leaders,  like  Trotzky, 
say  'they  will  right  until  they  are  let  alone." 

On  August  7,  1919,  it  was  said  in  the  British 
House  of  Commons,  by  Mr.  Raper,  M.P.,  that  a 
very  powerful  syndicate  of  German  banks  had  been 
formed,  under  the  leadership  of  the  Deutsche 
Bank,  for  the  economical  exploitation  of  Central 
Russia.     It    was    said    that    this    syndicate    had 


44    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

recently  sent  a  special  commission  to  negotiate 
with  the  Bolshevist  government  with  regard  to 
the  exportation  from  Russia  to  Germany  of  grain 
and  raw  materials,  and  the  importation  into  Russia 
of  German  manufactured  goods.1  Corroborative 
evidence  of  the  activity  of  the  Germans  in  this 
respect,  and  of  their  close  relations  with  the  Bol- 
shevist government,  appeared  in  great  abundance 
in  the  Swedish  and  Danish  Socialist  press  from 
July,  1919,  onward,  coming  from  both  German 
and  Russian  sources.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
whatever  that  there  is  danger  that  Russia — 
European  Russia,  at  any  rate — will  again  fall 
under  the  blighting  control  of  German  economic 
imperialism.  The  whole  body  of  liberal  demo- 
cratic thought  in  Russia  is  fully  aware  of  this 
and  would,  therefore,  greatly  prefer  to  deal  with 
the  United  States. 

Japan  has  been  equally  active  in  her  efforts  to 
gain  a  strangle-hold  upon  the  economic  life  of 
Siberia.  Undoubtedly  she  would  like  to  annex 
Siberia,  or  the  southeastern  part  of  it,  and  will  do  so 
if  favorable  opportunity  presents  itself.  This  is 
made  clear  by  the  facts  presented  in  a  later  chap- 
ter.2 Even  if  the  issue  of  the  conflict  in  Russia 
is  the  most  favorable  one  imaginable,  and  the 
liberal  and  radical  democratic  forces  succeed  in 
controlling  and  welding  together  Greater  Russia, 
that  fact  alone  will  not  prevent  the  subjection  of 
Russia  to  German,  Japanese,  or  Japanese-German 
economic  bondage  and  spoliation.  The  funda- 
mental fact  of  all   is  that   Russia  must  have   an 

1  Manchester  Guardian,  August  8,  1918.  2  Sec  Chapter  IV. 


RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM    4s 

immense  mass  of  things  for  which  she  is  able  and 
ready  to  pay.  She  must  have  cloth,  clothing, 
shoes,  tools,  machinery,  and  railway  equipment 
in  an  almost  unlimited  quantity.  For  these  things 
she  can  soon  pay  with  great  quantities  of  raw 
materials  which  are  needed  by  this  and  other 
nations. 

If  we  seize  the  opportunity  we  shall  render 
Russia  a  great  service  and  link  her  to  the  civiliza- 
tion of  the  West  by  strong  and  enduring  ties,  while, 
at  the  same  time,  we  make  immense  gains.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  fail  and  Russia  is  compelled 
to  turn  to  Japan,  she  will  be  linked  to  the  civiliza- 
tion of  the  East  and  become  an  important  element 
in  an  orientation  of  power  full  of  peril  to  all  the 
democratic  and  progressive  nations  of  the  world. 
All  that  is  best  in  Russian  life  turns  instinctively 
to  the  West,  desiring  unity  and  fellowship  with  the 
Occidental  nations.  Whether  that  desire  shall  be 
fulfilled  or  Russia  be  compelled  to  wear  the  Oriental 
yoke  is  primarily  an  American  problem. 


II 

RUSSIA   AND   WESTERN   CIVILIZATION 


THERE  are  few  countries  whose  history  and 
politics  present  so  many  difficulties  to  the 
foreigner  as  do  the  history  and  politics  of  Russia, 
the  great  land,  neither  Asiatic  nor  European,  so 
aptly  and  justly  described  as  "the  land  of  paradox." 
Because  she  is  neither  Asiatic  nor  European  Russia 
puzzles  equally  the  Oriental  and  the  Occidental 
mind.  This  is  the  natural  result  of  her  geographical 
position,  and  of  the  history  of  upward  of  a  thousand 
years,  conditioned,  in  large  measure,  by  that  posi- 
tion, which  made  her  a  buffer  between  the  Orient 
and  the  Occident,  separating  Europe  from  Asia, 
and  subject  to  great  pressure  on  either  side. 

Eleven  centuries  have  passed  since  the  warring 
Slav  and  Finnish  tribes  who  were  the  progenitors 
of  the  Russians  of  to-day  invited  certain  Scandina- 
vian princes  to  rule  over  them.  Thus  the  founda- 
tions of  the  great  Russian  Empire  were  laid.  The 
original  tribes  were  predominantly  European,  and 
the  first  power  to  weld  these  tribes  into  something 
like  a  nation  was  European.  Fundamentally, 
therefore,    Russia    is    a    European    nation.     Not- 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    47 

withstanding  this  fact,  however,  the  Russians  of 
modern  times  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  wholly 
identified  themselves  with   European  civilization. 

The  reason  for  this  is  not  difficult  to  discover. 
For  the  greater  part  of  her  history  Russia  has  been 
subject  to  tremendous  pressure  and  aggression 
from  Asia.  During  many  centuries  invading  hordes 
of  Asiatic  barbarians  not  only  threatened  her 
existence  and  absorbed  her  energies,  but,  what  is 
equally  important,  they  made  it  almost  impossible 
for  her  to  develop  naturally  along  lines  of  her  own 
choosing.  In  particular  they  rendered  difficult 
anything  like  adequate  communication  with  the 
great  nations  of  western  Europe.  Again  and  again 
the  hordes  of  Asia  swept  over  Russia  and  for  cen- 
turies held  the  land  and  its  peaceful  people  in 
subjection.  When  an  invasion  took  place  the 
marauders  devastated  the  country  and  inflicted 
great  suffering  upon  the  people.  In  the  intervals, 
in  times  of  peace,  the  people  were  forced  to  pay 
taxes  to  the  Asiatic  foe,  taxes  which  kept  them  in 
poverty  and  economic  bondage.  When  we  remem- 
ber the  long  period  of  years  during  which  Russia 
bore  the  Tatar  yoke,  and  the  fact  that  for  the 
greater  part  of  ten  centuries  she  had  to  exert  her 
might  to  withstand  the  rapacious  attacks  of  the 
robber  nomads  who  were  her  most  powerful  neigh- 
bors, it  is  easy  to  understand  why  this  nation  of 
European  origin  has  developed  characteristics  so 
un-European. 

When  Vladimir  I,  the  pagan  Varangian,  intro- 
duced Christianity  and  the  Byzantine  Orthodox 
Church  into  Russia  he  opened  up  what,  but  for 


48    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Asiatic  interference,  would  have  been  a  permanent 
direct  channel  of  communication  between  Russia 
and  western  Europe.  Not  the  least  serious  of  the 
consequences  of  the  Asiatic  aggressions  was  the 
severance  of  the  communication  between  Russia 
and  Byzantium,  through  which  the  former  was 
brought  into  touch  with  Western  civilization. 
Vladimir  the  Holy,  as  he  is  known,  wTas  as  brutal 
and  as  treacherous  a  pagan  as  ever  lived  prior  to 
his  sudden  conversion  to  Christianity  and  the 
Orthodox  Byzantine  Church,  which  became  the 
Orthodox  Russian  Church. 

Byzantine  influence  upon  Russia  has  been  im- 
measurably great,  alike  in  its  effect  upon  the 
character  of  the  Russian  people  and  upon  their 
political  and  social  institutions  and  ideals.  Byzan- 
tine Christianity  was  admirably  adapted  to  Russia, 
its  very  elements  of  corruption  from  Oriental 
sources  fitting  it  to  serve  a  nation  likewise  subject 
to  Oriental  infusion.  Whatever  heritage  of  Greek 
culture  it  had  received  was  corrupted  by  long 
contact  with  Asia.  There  was  little  of  the  demo- 
cratic spiritual  idealism  of  Hellenism  in  the  ecclesi- 
astical system  which  Byzantium  imposed  upon 
Russia.  In  place  of  the  freedom  of  belief  which 
characterized  the  religion  of  the  ancient  Greeks, 
and  the  rich  and  fruitful  individualism  which  it 
fostered,  Byzantine  orthodoxy  insisted  upon  narrow 
uniformity,  servility,  and  formalism  and  produced 
a  soulless,  dogmatic  scholasticism.  For  the  demo- 
cratic ideal  of  Hellenism  it  substituted  a  semi- 
Oriental  despotic  monarchism. 

Thus  Byzantine  orthodoxy  exerted  upon  Russia 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    49 

an  influence  that  was  far  from  being  exclusively 
spiritual.  Its  influence  upon  the  political  and 
social  development  of  the  country  was  even  more 
profound.  The  peculiarly  strong  position  of  Rus- 
sian monarchy  during  so  many  centuries,  the 
sincere  reverence  for  the  czars,  was  the  natural 
result  of  the  theocratic  character  of  the  Orthodox 
Church.  In  modern  Russian  politics  Byzantinism 
has  long  been  a  synonym  for  ultra-conservatism. 
It  must  be  remembered  also  that  from  the  begin- 
ning the  Byzantine  religion  was  closely  interwoven 
with  the  economic  life  of  the  nation.  It  was  after 
the  Greek  merchants  had  developed  their  highly 
profitable  trade  relations  with  Russia  that  the 
Greek  Church  laid  the  foundations  of  its  remark- 
able rule  there.  And  it  was  trade  with  Byzantium, 
more  than  anything  else,  which  paved  the  way  for 
the  great  imperial  vision  of  successive  czars,  the 
vision  of  Constantinople  wrested  from  the  Moham- 
medan Turk  and  restored  to  Christian  rule  by 
Russia.  Thus  the  dominant  feature  of  that  foreign 
policy  which  for  centuries  has  so  profoundly  affected 
Russia's  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world  grew 
out  of  the  momentous  act  of  Vladimir,  the  selection 
of  the  religion  of  Byzantium  for  his  people.1 

When  the  Asiatic  invaders  in  the  eleventh  and 
twelfth  centuries  deprived  Russia  of  direct  com- 
munication with  Byzantium  they  imposed  upon 
her  a  great  loss.  It  was  through  Byzantium  that 
she  had  contact  with  the  civilization  of  the  West. 


1  There  is  an  admirable  discussion  of  this  whole  subject  in  the  work 
of  the  well-known  Russian  Social  Democrat,  (Irej»or  Alexkisky,  Russia 
and  Europe,  1917. 


5o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

To  break  that  contact  in  the  most  important  forma- 
tive period  of  her  history,  and  thus  to  impose  upon 
her  isolation  from  the  main  currents  of  European 
influence,  proved  a  serious  matter  for  Russia.  To 
the  hordes  of  invaders  who  came  across  the  great 
steppes,  like  a  mighty  tide  of  savagery,  may  be 
fairly  ascribed  no  small  part  of  modern  Russia's 
difficulty  to  understand,  or  be  understood  by,  the 
European  nations  and  our  own  European-bred 
nation. 

II 

From  the  early  part  of  the  seventeenth  century 
down  to  the  last  decade  Russian  history  discloses 
an  ever-growing  revolt  on  the  part  of  the  Intel- 
lectuals against  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church 
and  against  Byzantinism.  At  first  this  appears 
as  a  form  of  religious  liberalism,  a  revolt  against 
the  dogmatism  and  ritualism  of  the  church.  Quite 
early,  however,  we  discern  a  much  broader  and 
profounder  purpose.  The  revolt  is  seen  to  be 
directed  mainly  against  those  elements  of  Byzan- 
tine religion  and  ecclesiasticism  which  suggest 
Asiatic  origin,  and  it  is  accompanied  by  a  cult  of 
Occidentalism,  an  almost  fanatical  idealization 
of  the  culture  of  western  Europe.  There  is  a 
definite  propaganda  in  favor  of  the  adoption  of  the 
ideas,  ideals,  political  institutions,  and  ways  of  life 
of  western  Europe.  The  advocates  of  this  policy 
came  to  be  known  as  Zapadniki,  that  is,  admirers 
of  western  Europe,  the  name  being  derived  from 
the  word  Zapad — West. 

Through  the  whole  intellectual  history  of  eigh- 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    51 

teenth-century  Russia  runs  the  passion  for  Euro- 
peanization.  Peter  I  had  gone  in  for  a  certain 
amount  of  Europeanization,  principally  in  external, 
material  things,  againsc  the  strong  protests  of  the 
conservatives.  But  neither  he  nor  Catherine  II 
possessed  any  great  amount  of  sympathy  with  the 
spiritual  ideology  of  the  Zapadniki.  In  the  early 
part  of  her  reign  Catherine  did  indeed  profess 
great  admiration  for  French  literature,  which  was 
already  burgeoning  the  spirit  of  revolution.  She 
patronized  and  flattered  Voltaire  and  the  Ency- 
clopedists, yet  when  the  French  Revolution  oc- 
curred and  stimulated  the  Zapadniki,  as  was 
inevitable,  she  became  a  fanatical  oppressor  and 
used  every  means  at  her  command  to  exterminate 
the  slightest  vestige  of  French  idealism.  The  old 
Byzantine  religion  with  its  sanctification  of  mo- 
narchical absolutism  was  far  more  attractive  to  her 
in  this  later  period  than  the  ideas  of  Voltaire  and 
Diderot  in  which  she  had  found  pleasure  in  the 
days  when  they  seemed  too  remote  to  imperil  the 
Russian  monarchy.  In  vain  she  tried  to  divert 
the  current  of  Russian  intellectualism  away  from 
dangerous  Occidentalism  back  to  the  old  Byzantine 
channels.  The  best  minds  in  Russia  were  sub- 
jected to  harsh  punishments,  but  nothing  could 
arrest  the  onward  march  of  the  spirit  of  the  French 
Revolution. 

Ever  since  that  great  event  the  intellectual  life  of 
Russia  has  continued  to  reach  out  to  western 
Europe,  and  to  the  great  American  Republic  which 
is  so  closely  and  intimately  related  to  western 
Europe  in  its  culture.     All  that  is  best  in  modern 


52    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Russian  life  partakes  of  this  spirit  and  feels  a 
community  of  interest  with  the  democratic  culture 
and  aspirations  of  those  nations  most  permeated 
by  the  spirit  of  the  French  Revolution — that  is  to 
say,  the  nations  of  western  Europe  and  the  United 
States  of  America.  On  the  other  hand,  the  re- 
actionary elements  in  Russia  have  steadfastly 
preferred  and  fostered  union  with  those  nations 
in  Central  Europe  least  affected  by  that  spirit. 

These  are  facts  of  the  highest  importance  to  us 
in  these  critical  days.  It  is  not  easy  to  over- 
estimate their  importance  when  once  we  have 
perceived  their  significance.  They  mean  that 
there  is  already  established  in  the  best  minds  of 
Russia  a  deep-seated  preference  for  our  ideals  and 
our  ways  over  those  of  any  of  the  nations  of  Asia, 
on  the  one  hand,  or  of  Central  Europe,  upon  the 
other  hand.  By  the  overthrow  of  czarism  Russia 
destroyed  a  form  of  government  which  was  semi- 
Oriental  and  admirably  adapted  for  communion 
and  co-operation  with  Asiatic  imperialism  and  cor- 
respondingly ill  fitted  for  communion  and  co-opera- 
tion with  us.  By  that  great  fact  we  are  confronted 
with  a  splendid  opportunity  to  become  the  chief 
factor  in  the  economic  reconstruction  of  Russia. 
If  we  fail  to  understand  that  opportunity  and  to 
use  it,  we  shall  not  only  lose  the  chance  to  forge 
chains  of  enduring  friendship  with  one  of  the 
greatest  potential  powers  in  the  world,  but  we  shall 
force  Russia  to  orientalize  her  economic  life,  and 
perhaps  to  become  linked  for  centuries  to  that 
Asiatic  power  whose  rapid  growth  is  a  potential 
peril  not  to  be  lightly  considered.     That  would  be 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    53 

as  disastrous  for  us  as  for  Russia;    indeed,  ours 
might  well  prove  to  be  the  greater  disaster. 


in 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  whereas  the  spiritual 
and  cultural  development  of  modern  Russia  has 
been  toward  a  union  of  understanding  with  the 
democratic  nations,  her  economic  evolution  has 
been  controlled  by  a  very  different  spirit.  Con- 
temporaneous with  her  growing  intellectual  and 
spiritual  union  with  the  most  democratic  nations 
has  been  her  growing  economic  union  with  the 
least  democratic  and  most  militaristic  of  the  great 
nations.  The  huge  French  loan  of  850,000,000 
rubles  in  1906  was  at  once  a  check  and  a  challenge 
to  the  progress  of  that  economic  union  with  Ger- 
many. The  real  object  of  that  loan,  which  was 
the  principal  factor  in  defeating  the  revolutionary 
movement  of  that  time,  was  not  the  maintenance 
of  czarism.  From  every  point  of  view  the  French 
capitalists,  like  those  of  England,  would  have  pre- 
ferred a  constitutional  government  on  democratic 
lines.  What  the  financiers  of  western  Europe 
feared  was  that  Germany,  already  having  a  strangle- 
hold upon  the  economic  life  of  Russia,  would  take 
advantage  of  a  revolutionary  uprising  in  Russia, 
and  the  consequent  disorganization  of  the  country, 
and  become  the  absolute  master  of  Russia,  politi- 
cally and  militarily  as  well  as  economically.  With 
such  a  control  of  the  great  Slav  empire,  Germany 
would  necessarily  have  become  the  invincible  dic- 
tator of  Europe,  and  therefore  of  the  world. 


54    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

The  subtle  political  strategy  of  the  great  French 
loan,  for  which  British  diplomacy  was  mainly 
responsible,  illustrates  in  a  remarkably  clear  way 
the  sinister  and  dangerous  power  of  financial 
imperialism.  That  in  this  instance  its  results  were, 
upon  the  whole,  beneficial,  that  German  domina- 
tion of  Europe  would  have  been  disastrous  to  man- 
kind, and  that  it  would  have  upheld  czarism  and 
prevented  the  achievement  of  democratic  govern- 
ment in  Russia,  must  not  be  permitted  to  minimize 
or  obscure  the  fact  that  irresponsible  international 
finance  is  a  menace  to  the  peace  and  security  of 
nations. 

How  great  the  control  of  Russia's  economic  life 
by  Germany  had  become  is  seen  by  the  fact  that 
in  the  first  half  of  the  year  1914,  of  the  total  imports 
into  Russia  49.6  per  cent. — almost  one-half — were 
from  Germany,  as  against  13.3  per  cent,  from 
England,  her  nearest  competitor.  That  fact  alone 
demonstrates  the  baselessness  and  insincerity  of 
the  loud  protestations  against  "the  terrible  com- 
petition of  the  British"  made  by  German  leaders 
shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War. 
The  fact  is  that  Germany  was  steadily  gaining 
over  all  her  competitors  in  the  Russian  market, 
and  gradually  progressing  toward  her  cherished 
goal — the  complete  monopolization  of  Russian 
trade  and  commerce.  As  early  as  1902  Professor 
Goldstein,  of  the  University  of  Moscow,  in  a  special 
report  to  Count  Witte,  the  Russian  Minister  of 
Finance,  pointed  out  that  unless  Russia  radically 
changed  her  foreign  trade  policy  she  must  inevitably 
become    a    German    colony.     Three    years    later 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    55 

the  commercial  treaty  with  Germany  aroused  great 
interest  and  anxiety  and  the  term  "German  colony" 
as  a  description  of  Russia  came  into  frequent  use. 
The  most  thoughtful  students  of  Russian  economic 
life  realized  that  it  could  not  fail  to  be  gravely 
dangerous  for  Russia  to  permit  her  great  natural 
resources,  her  industries,  her  commerce,  trade, 
and  banking,  to  be  monopolized  by  any  one  country. 
Most  of  them  realized  that  what  must  needs  be 
dangerous  in  any  case  was  doubly  so  when  the 
monopolist  country  was  Germany,  the  most  aggres- 
sive and  ambitious  of  all  the  Western  nations. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  geographical  propinquity 
of  Germany  gave  her  a  very  great  natural  advantage 
in  dealing  with  Russia.  But  it  was  not  to  that 
advantage  alone,  or  even  mainly,  that  Germany 
owed  her  rapid  progress  toward  complete  economic 
domination  of  the  Czar's  empire.  Other  factors 
were  even  more  influential.  In  the  first  place,  as 
already  noted,  the  reactionary  elements  in  Russia 
favored  Germany  as  against  more  democratic 
countries  like  France  and  England.  It  had  long 
been  a  cardinal  principle  of  Germany's  foreign 
policy  to  secure  large  and  ever-increasing  power 
over  the  government  of  Russia.  The  Czar's 
bureaucracy  was  saturated  with  German  influence 
and  German  sympathy.  The  Czar  himself  seven- 
eighths  German,  married  to  a  German  princess; 
many  of  the  leading  government  and  army  officials 
either  German  or  connected  by  marriage  ties  with 
Germany;  the  secret  service  largely  controlled  by 
Germans  or  by  Russians  with  German  wives;  the 
great   landowners  of  whole   provinces  of  German 


56    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

descent  and  speaking  German — such  facts  as  these 
made  Germany's  economic  conquest  of  Russia 
relatively  easy.  The  census  of  1897  showed  that 
there  were  resident  in  Russia  twenty  times  as 
many  German  subjects  as  British  subjects,  the 
figures  being  158,103  Germans  to  7,481  British. 
These  figures  do  not  tell  the  whole  story,  however, 
for  there  were  1,790,500  persons  in  Russia  whose 
language  was  German,  not  Russian.  Numerous 
colonies  of  German  settlers,  no  longer  counted  as 
German  subjects,  aided  Germany's  designs. 

Secondly,  Germany's  economic  policy  toward 
Russia  was  essentially  a  form  of  warfare.  Her 
system  of  "export  bounties"  was  not  only  designed 
to  give  German  capitalists  an  immense  and  un- 
natural advantage  over  their  competitors  from 
other  lands,  but  also  to  prevent  in  a  most  effectual 
manner  the  normal  development  of  Russian  in- 
dustry, and,  therefore,  of  her  economic  indepen- 
dence. These  export  bounties  made  it  possible  for 
German  manufacturers  to  sell  goods  in  Russia 
at  prices  far  below  those  which  obtained  in  Ger- 
many for  the  same  goods.  Sometimes,  indeed, 
goods  were  sold  in  Russia  for  less  than  it  cost  to 
produce  them.  This  weapon  of  export  bounties 
was  used  also  in  the  markets  of  France  and  Eng- 
land. Thus,  in  1909,  the  Rheinland-Westphalia 
Coal  Mines  Syndicate  sold  coal  in  France  at  a  net 
price  just  one-half  of  that  obtained  in  the  domestic 
market.  The  German  syndicate  of  alcohol  dis- 
tillers for  years  sold  its  product  in  the  London  mar- 
ket at  one-half  the  price  charged  for  the  same 
product  in  the  home  market. 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    57 

Serious  as  such  competition  must  be  to  highly 
developed  industrial  countries  like  France  and 
England,  to  countries  whose  industries  are  weak 
and  undeveloped  it  is  infinitely  more  serious, 
because  it  makes  the  development  of  native  in- 
dustry practically  impossible.  The  only  chance 
such  a  country  has  is  to  protect  itself  by  imposing 
very  high  import  duties  with  a  view  to  making 
general  importation  difficult  and  well-nigh  impos- 
sible. This  Russia  was  compelled  to  do.  Before 
the  World  War  her  import  duties  were  exceedingly 
high,  averaging  almost  one-third  of  the  value  of  the 
products.  But  the  remedy  here  was  perhaps  worse 
than  the  disease.  It  meant  that  the  same  obstacle 
was  opposed  to  the  imports,  greatly  needed  and 
desired,  from  fair-dealing  nations  whose  trade 
would  have  an  opposite  effect  from  that  of  Ger- 
many and  stimulate  native  industry  instead  of 
crushing  it.  She  could  not  discriminate  against 
Germany  by  special  import  duties  without  bring- 
ing about  a  state  of  war  with  that  country  and 
inviting  extermination. 

A  brief  study  of  the  commercial  tables  will  show 
that  in  one  very  important  respect  the  trade  of 
Russia  and  Germany  was  unlike  that  which  is 
carried  on  between  free  nations  to  their  mutual 
advantage.  It  resembled  rather  that  form  of 
trade  by  means  of  which  a  colony  is  exploited  by 
the  nation  owning  and  governing  it.  Trade  be- 
tween free  nations  is  co-operative  and  mutually 
helpful.  While  each  nation  may  specialize  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  its  natural  resources,  its  popula- 
tion,   nnd   its   particular  evolution,   the   net   result 


58    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

is  an  all-round  industrial  development.  But  in 
the  case  of  a  colony  exploited  by  the  nation  exercis- 
ing sovereignty  over  it  the  former  is  frequently 
kept  from  developing  its  own  industry  along 
normal  lines.  It  is  required  to  furnish  to  the 
ruling  and  exploiting  nation  its  raw  materials 
and  to  accept  from  the  latter  its  manufactured 
goods.  This  was  precisely  the  position  of  Russia 
in  her  trade  with  Germany.  She  exported  to 
Germany  her  raw  materials  and  imported  them  as 
manufactured  goods. 

As  I  have  pointed  out  in  an  earlier  work,1  Ger- 
man statesmen  long  made  it  one  of  their  principal 
tasks  to  contrive  to  prevent  Russia's  industrial 
development  and  to  keep  her  in  a  backward 
economic  condition.  As  a  highly  developed  indus- 
trial nation  Russia  would  have  been  a  competitor 
as  well  as  a  customer.  With  her  vast  natural 
resources  she  might  well  have  become,  in  a  com- 
paratively short  time,  Germany's  most  formidable 
rival.  In  particular  her  geographical  position 
would  have  given  to  Russia  an  enormous  advantage 
in  the  competition  to  supply  the  great  markets  of 
Asia.  On  the  other  hand,  as  an  agricultural  coun- 
try Russia  would  be  a  great  provider  of  important 
raw  materials  of  basic  importance  at  a  low  price,  as 
well  as  a  great  buyer  of  German  manufactured  goods. 

Of  course,  it  is  quite  possible,  and  even  highly 
probable,  that,  in  the  long  run,  a  policy  the  very 
opposite  of  this  would  have  been  more  successful. 
England,  the  success  of  whose  foreign-trade  policy 
is    hardly    disputable,    found   it    profitable   to   aid 

1  Bolshevism,  New  York,  1919,  pp.  79-80. 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    59 

rather  than  hinder  the  industrial  development 
of  the  countries  with  which  she  traded.  British 
traders  and  statesmen  saw  profit  and  advantage 
to  England  in  the  rapid  industrial  development  of 
Germany  and  the  United  States.  The  competitor 
is  also  a  customer;  retarded  economic  development 
inevitably  means  relatively  low  consumption.  That 
is  why  German  merchant-ships  were  free  to  enter 
British  harbors  without  let  or  hindrance;  why 
British  statesmen  placed  no  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  Germany's  progress  as  a  maritime  mercantile 
power.  The  difference  between  the  policies  of  the 
two  nations  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  policy 
of  England  was  the  natural  development  of  capi- 
talism influenced  by  a  minimum  of  state  inter- 
ference and  policy,  while  that  of  Germany  was 
artificial,  the  product  of  statecraft  rather  than  of 
capitalism  pure  and  simple. 

However  that  may  be,  and  whatever  may  be  the 
explanation  of  the  differences  of  method,  it  is  quite 
obvious  that  the  commercial  policy  of  Germany 
in  her  dealings  with  Russia  tended,  in  direct  pro- 
portion to  its  success,  to  isolate  Russia  from  the 
general  industrial  advance  of  Europe  and  to  keep 
her  in  an  anachronistic  state.  Not  merely  was 
the  state  in  which  she  sought  to  keep  the  great 
Slav  nation  an  anachronism,  an  eighteenth-century 
system  in  the  world  of  the  twentieth  century; 
it  was  also  an  anomaly  which  could  not  long  exist. 
The  economic  life  of  Russia  could  not  be  subject 
to  German  monopoly  and  her  political  independence 
left  to  her.  Once  Germany — or  any  other  nation — 
became  the  ruler  of  her  economic  life,  her  political 


60    RUSSIA  AS   AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

domination  by  that  nation  must  soon  follow. 
Russian  nationalism  sought  freedom  from  Ger- 
many's economic  domination,  therefore,  as  a  means 
to  the  preservation  of  her  political  independence 
as  a  nation.  That  is  why  the  best  thought  of 
modern  Russia  has  desired  closer  economic  co- 
operation with  western  Europe  and  the  United 
States,  precisely  as  it  has  reached  out  for  closer 
intellectual  and  spiritual  relationship  with  them. 

IV 

As  far  back  as  the  days  of  Ivan  the  Terrible  we 
find  Russia  reaching  out  to  Europe  for  assistance 
in  the  development  of  her  economic  life.  It  was 
not  merely  for  commercial  intercourse,  as  many 
writers  have  taken  for  granted,  but  for  aid  in  the 
development  of  an  indigenous  industry  upon  which 
her  prosperity  might  be  firmly  based.  Commercial 
intercourse,  upon  a  quite  considerable  scale,  there 
had  been  for  several  centuries  before  the  time  of 
Ivan  the  Terrible.  There  was  an  influential 
merchant  class  fully  five  hundred  years  before 
that  time.  In  centers  like  Kiev,  Novgorod,  and 
Pskov  Russian  merchants  met  and  traded  with 
merchants  from  foreign  countries.  The  Russians 
exchanged  skins,  flax,  wool/wheat,  honey,  and  other 
products  for  wine,  weapons,  manufactured  silks 
and  woolens,  and  so  on.  As  early  as  the  twelfth 
century  the  merchants  of  Gothland  founded  regular 
market  "courts"  or  "yards,"  which  later,  in  the 
fourteenth  century,  were  brought  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Free  Towns  of  the  Hanseatic  League. 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    61 

By  this  means  the  entire  trade  passing  through 
Novgorod  was  controlled  by  the  Hanseatic  League. 
The  merchants  of  Novgorod  became  virtually  mid- 
dlemen, agents  merely  for  the  factories  of  the  Hanse 
towns.  They  bought,  at  prices  fixed  by  the 
League,  the  goods  which  Russian  merchants  had 
gathered  and  turned  them  over  to  the  League. 
In  the  same  manner  they  sold  the  goods  produced 
in  the  Hanse  towns  to  the  Russian  merchants, 
also  at  prices  fixed  by  the  League.  This  monopoly 
was  strikingly  like  that  which  in  the  opening  years 
of  the  twentieth  century  Germany  sought  to  attain 
in  her  trade  with  Russia.  It  was  not  challenged 
until  Swedish  and  Livonian  competitors,  toward 
the  close  of  the  fifteenth  century,  began  to  draw 
the  trade  of  Russia  along  new  routes.  It  was  not 
broken  up  until  well  on  in  the  sixteenth  century, 
when  the  English  appeared  on  the  scene  and  opened 
a  new  chapter  in  Russia's  economic  history.1 

Before  the  English  came,  during  the  latter  part  of 
the  fifteenth  century,  in  the  reign  of  Ivan  III, 
the  principality  of  Moscow  made  the  first  real 
attempt  to  create  an  enduring  civilization  in  Russia 
and  to  introduce  European  industrial  methods. 
Architects,  engineers,  masters,  and  artisans  of 
various  crafts  and  physicians  were  imported  from 
Italy.  "Among  them  were  celebrated  masters  like 
Fiorventi,  nicknamed  Aristotele,  Petro  Antonio, 
and  Marcus  Aloysius.  Fiorventi  taught  the  Musco- 
vites how  to  make  bricks  and  lime  and  the  use  of 
machinery;    he  founded  cannon  and  constructed  a 

1  Cf.   Paul    Miliukov,   Studies    in  the  History   of   Russian    Culture, 
Part  I. 


62    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

floating  bridge  near  Novgorod,"  says  Alexinsky.1 
These  Italian  pioneers  gave  a  great  impetus  to 
Russian  industrial  capitalism,  though  it  was,  of 
course,  petty  industrialism. 

With  the  coming  of  the  English  in  the  sixteenth 
century,  during  the  reign  of  Ivan  the  Terrible,  a 
new  spirit  of  daring  and  energetic  enterprise  was 
brought  into  play.  Ivan  III  had  freed  Russia 
from  the  Tatar  yoke  and  his  grandson,  Ivan  the 
Terrible,  carried  on  the  struggle  against  the  ancient 
foe,  wresting  territory  from  the  Tatars  for  the 
first  time  in  history  and  making  the  Volga  a  Rus- 
sian river.  The  Muscovite  had  crushed  the  great 
Asiatic  foe  which  in  the  name  of  Mohammed  had 
so  long  menaced  Christian  Europe. 

After  his  epoch-making  successes  against  the 
ancient  foe,  Ivan  the  Terrible  turned  his  attention 
to  the  west.  He  saw  with  remarkable  clarity, 
which  proves  his  sound  statesmanship,  that  Russia 
must  be  raised  in  civilization  to  the  level  of  her 
western  neighbors.  He  saw,  also,  that  expansion 
westward  and  the  attainment  of  a  seaboard  which 
would  give  direct  communication  with  western 
Europe  was  far  more  desirable  than  expansion 
eastward.  Just  as  he  had  carried  to  a  triumphant 
conclusion  the  struggle  against  the  Tatars  so  well 
begun  by  his  grandfather,  so  he  undertook  to 
carry  forward  the  work  of  promoting  civilization 
which  Ivan  III  began.  Far  more  clearly  than 
Ivan  III,  as  clearly,  in  fact,  as  Peter  the  Great  saw  it 
nearly  two  centuries  later,  he  saw  that  such  a 
civilization  to  be  enduring  must  be  founded  upon 

1  Russia  and  Europe,  by  Gregor  Alexinsky,  pp.  24-25. 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    63 

a  sound  economic  basis.  He  sought,  therefore,  to 
establish  industrialism  in  Russia.  To  this  end  he 
proposed  to  foster  the  immigration  of  thousands 
of  master-workmen  and  skilled  artisans  into  his 
realm.  To  reach  the  western  seaboard  he  planned 
to  subjugate  Livonia. 

To  carry  out  his  scheme  of  promoting  the  whole- 
sale immigration  of  workmen  he  sent  a  Saxon 
agent  as  envoy  to  the  Emperor  of  Germany.  But 
his  immediate  neighbors  to  the  west  were  alarmed 
at  the  prospect  of  a  civilized  and  greatly  strength- 
ened Muscovite  empire  and  determined  to  thwart 
his  immigration  scheme.  When  Ivan's  agents 
collected  about  125  Germans  and  brought  them 
to  Liibeck  for  shipment,  Charles  V  dispersed  them. 
The  famous  Livonian  Order  would  not  permit  the 
immigration  scheme  to  be  carried  out.  The  atti- 
tude of  Ivan's  western  neighbors  is  fairly  indicated 
by  the  threat  of  the  King  of  Poland  that  he  would 
put  to  death  English  sailors  who  should  try  to 
trade  in  arms  with  Russia.  They  felt  that  the 
Muscovites  were  already  formidable  enough  with- 
out being  strengthened  by  direct  foreign  trade  with 
western  Europe,  the  importation  of  arms  and  hosts 
of  skilled  workmen.  Said  the  Polish  king,  "The 
Muscovite,  who  is  not  only  our  opponent  of  to-day, 
but  the  eternal  enemy  of  all  free  nations,  should 
not  be  allowed  to  supply  himself  with  cannon, 
bullets,  and  munitions  or  with  artisans  who  manu- 
facture arms  hitherto  unknown  to  those  barbarians." 

In  1553,  some  five  or  six  years  after  the  Livonian 
Order  prevented  the  importation  of  German  work- 
men, a  British  ship  belonging  to  a  squadron  which 


64    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

was  trying  to  reach  China  by  the  Northeast  Pas- 
sage entered  the  northern  Dvina.  According  to 
some  authorities,  Ivan  the  Terrible  heard  of  the 
ship  which  had  thus  got  astray  and  sent  for  her 
officers  to  visit  him  in  Moscow.  Other  accounts 
say  that  the  captain  of  the  ship,  Richard  Chancel- 
lor, himself  conceived  the  idea  of  going  to  Moscow 
in  quest  of  trade.  In  any  event,  he  met  with  a 
most  favorable  reception  at  the  hands  of  the 
ambitious  Czar,  and  on  his  return  to  England 
Queen  Mary  sent  to  Moscow  a  special  envoy  who 
arranged  a  trade  agreement  under  which  English- 
men were  given  the  right  to  trade  freely  in  Russian 
towns  and  Russians  the  right  to  trade  with  equal 
freedom  in  England.  While  the  latter  right  had 
little  practical  value,  owing  to  the  lack  of  means  of 
communication  and  transportation,  the  agreement 
was  highly  flattering  to  the  pride  of  Ivan  the 
Terrible,  and  probably  gave  birth  to  that  admira- 
tion for  England  and  the  English  which  later 
caused  him  to  be  called  "the  English  Czar."  It 
was  not  long  before  English  traders  began  to  arrive 
at  Archangel,  which  ever  since  then  has  been  the 
base  for  Anglo-Russian  commerce. 

The  coming  of  the  English  traders  began  that 
intense  rivalry  for  the  trade  of  Russia  between 
England  and  Germany  which  was  destined  to  last 
for  nearly  four  centuries,  until  the  fateful  World 
War.  Indeed,  it  cannot  be  said  to  have  ended  as 
yet,  but  only  to  have  entered  upon  a  new  phase, 
for  the  Treaty  of  Peace  had  not  yet  been  signed 
when  the  reports  of  renewed  efforts  by  Germany 
to  gain  control  of  the  Russian  market  began  to 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    65 

appear.  As  we  have  seen,  German  traders  had 
carried  on  a  very  considerable  trade  in  Russia  for 
centuries  before  the  English  arrived.  They  oper- 
ated through  the  Hanseatic  League,  and  their 
market  was  the  free  city  of  Novgorod,  which  was 
virtually  an  independent  city-republic.  Much  to 
Ivan's  delight,  the  new  markets  opened  by  the 
vigorous  English  greatly  weakened  Novgorod  and 
lessened  its  economic  importance.  Nothing  could 
be  more  welcome  to  the  Czar,  whose  monarchical 
pride  and  ambition  were  offended  by  the  existence 
of  such  independent  city-republics  outside  the 
sovereignty  of  the  state. 

Greatly  aided  by  the  Czar,  the  English  traders 
soon  gained  in  the  rivalry  with  the  Germans, 
wresting  away  a  large  part  of  their  trade.  It 
must  be  admitted  that  this  result  was  not  altogether 
due  to  the  partiality  of  Ivan  the  Terrible.  The 
English  brought  a  new  spirit  with  them.  Farthest 
removed  from  Russia  of  the  principal  trading 
nations  of  Europe,  an  island  race  with  no  need 
to  fear  attack  by  a  great  inland  nation  so  far 
remote,  the  English  naturally  were  free  from  that 
fear  of  the  "Muscovite  barbarians"  which  domi- 
nated their  nearer  neighbors.  It  was  quite  natural 
that  they  should  be  willing  to  assist  Ivan  in  carry- 
ing out  his  plans  to  establish  an  industrial  civiliza- 
tion, since  it  profited  them  greatly  and  imperiled 
them  not  at  all.  By  the  middle  of  the  reign  of 
Queen  Elizabeth  England's  trade  with  Russia  was 
more  profitable  than  that  with  any  other  country.1 

1  G.  Schultze-Gavcrnitz,  Studies  in  the  National  and  Political  Economy 
of  Russia 


66    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

In  1566  Ivan  appealed,  through  the  English 
Ambassador  at  Moscow,  to  Queen  Elizabeth  to 
send  him  some  good  master-workmen,  artificers, 
and  technical  advisers,  as  well  as  a  skilled  physician 
and  a  pharmacist.  Elizabeth  hastened  to  fulfil 
this  request,  and  the  following  year  the  English 
workers  arrived  in  Russia,  soon  to  be  followed  by 
others.  In  1 569  we  find  the  Czar  granting  a  patent 
to  English  manufacturers  for  the  establishment 
of  metal  works  at  Vytchegda,  Vologda.  English 
pioneers  penetrated  into  the  Ural  Mountains  and 
prospected  for  iron  in  the  vicinity  of  Perm.  In  a 
few  years  there  were  English-owned  factories  in 
several  places  along  the  route  from  Archangel  to 
Moscow.  A  fair  beginning  was  thus  made  to 
realize  Ivan's  plans  for  the  creation  of  an  industrial 
system  which  would  support  an  enduring  civiliza- 
tion and  bring  Russia  into  the  great  family  of 
European  nations. 


Ivan  the  Terrible  did  not  succeed  in  extending 
his  dominion  to  the  Baltic  coast.  More  than  a 
century  was  destined  to  elapse  before  that  goal 
could  be  attained.  Then,  by  the  Treaty  of  Nystad, 
in  1721,  at  the  end  of  the  Northern  War,  Peter  the 
Great  had  the  satisfaction  of  acquiring  for  Russia 
important  parts  of  the  Swedish  Baltic  prov- 
inces, Livonia,  Esthonia,  and  part  of  Finland. 
Thus  the  end  for  which  Ivan  the  Terrible  had 
fought  so  bitterly  and  made  such  enormous  sacri- 
fices was  attained  by  his  greater  successor. 

The   interval   between  the   death  of  Ivan  the 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    67 

Terrible  and  the  reign  of  Peter  the  Great  was  a 
period  of  great  economic  expansion.  It  is  custom- 
ary to  say  that  the  latter  sovereign  introduced 
the  Russian  industrial  revolution.  In  point  of 
fact,  however,  the  industrial  revolution  began 
quite  early  in  the  seventeenth  century,  fully 
seventy  years  before  Peter  came  to  the  throne. 
The  whole  of  the  seventeenth  century,  from  the 
accession  of  Michael  Romanov  in  161 3  onward, 
was  a  time  of  economic  expansion  and  growth  so 
rapid  and  wide-spread  that  it  can  only  be  described 
by  the  term  "economic  revolution."  In  that 
development  the  great  trading  nations  of  Europe 
nearly  all  bore  a  part.  The  nation  was  being 
hammered  into  shape,  as  it  were;  markets  were 
established  and  unified;  the  two  great  trade  routes 
from  Novgorod  to  Moscow  and  from  Archangel  to 
Moscow  were  developed,  the  English  building 
factories  all  along  the  latter  route. 

The  English  had  now  to  face  another  competitor. 
The  Dutch,  coming  by  way  of  the  Arctic  Ocean 
and  the  White  Sea,  the  route  used  by  the  English, 
and  also  by  the  Baltic  route  used  by  the  Germans 
and  the  Swedes,  came  late  in  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, and  by  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth 
were  already  surpassing  the  English.  By  1603 
the  English  were  complaining  that  after  seventy 
years  of  trading  with  Russia  they  were  losing  to 
the  Dutch,  who  were  finding  trade  with  Russia 
extremely  profitable.  Other  participants  in  the 
race  for  the  profitable  Russian  trade  were  the 
Danes,  the  Swedes,  the  French,  and,  of  course,  the 
Germans.     Riga   and   Konigsberg  grew  in   impor- 


68    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

tance  as  centers  of  trade.  Russia  had  become 
one  of  the  great  trading  nations  of  the  world  and 
its  contacts  with  western  Europe  steadily  grew  in 
number  and  importance.  While  most  of  the  indus- 
tries were  on  a  small  scale,  there  were,  nevertheless, 
a  number  of  quite  large  industrial  establishments, 
including  iron-works,  glass-works,  paper-mills,  dis- 
tilleries, and  woolen  mills. 

On  the  other  hand,  simultaneously  Russia  was 
developing  a  vast  trade  with  Asia.  Her  merchants 
bought  silk  and  other  merchandise  in  Persia  and 
other  Asiatic  countries  and  sold  them  to  the  mer- 
chants of  England,  Holland,  France,  Sweden, 
Germany,  and  other  countries  at  enormous  profit. 
Thus  there  was  developed  in  Russia  a  commercial 
capitalism  of  very  great  importance  to  the  world. 
Private  traders  belonging  to  several  of  the  European 
countries,  and,  in  some  instances,  their  govern- 
ments, resented  having  to  deal  with  Persia  through 
Russian  intermediaries  who  absorbed  the  greater 
part  of  the  profits.  They  sought  to  obtain  from 
Russia  the  right  to  cross  her  territory  in  order  to 
deal  directly  with  the  Persians  and  other  Orientals. 
As  early  as  1614  England  demanded  the  right  to 
use  the  Volga  highway  for  that  purpose.  In  1629 
France  through  her  ambassador  presented  a  similar 
claim,  being  followed  in  the  next  year  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Netherlands.  To  all  these  demands 
the  Czar  made  blunt  refusal.  From  the  trade  with 
the  Orient  the  government  derived  a  large  revenue, 
while  the  merchants  of  Russia  waxed  fat.  That 
the  Czar  should  be  unwilling  to  forgo  the  great 
advantage    derived    from    Russia's    geographical 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN   CIVILIZATION    69 

position  and  permit  foreign  traders  to  freely  cross 
his  territory  is  not  a  matter  for  surprise. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  Russian  government 
began  the  policy  of  establishing  commercial  monop- 
olies, using  the  principal  merchants  as  its  agents 
and  middlemen.  The  English  complained  that 
"the  Czar  was  the  first  merchant  in  his  dominions." 
It  monopolized  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  alcohol, 
its  forests,  some  branches  of  trade  with  the  Orient, 
and  some  native  commodities.  In  some  instances 
the  merchant-middlemen  received  commissions  on 
the  exchanges  made  with  foreign  merchants;  in 
others  they  purchased  the  state  commodities  and 
resold  them  at  a  profit.  This  class  became  im- 
mensely rich  and  influential.  By  1680,  it  is  worthy 
of  note,  the  English  traders  had  been  left  hopelessi}' 
behind  and  the  Dutch  were  the  supreme  traders 
in  the  Russian  market.  Even  the  trade  of  the 
Archangel-to-Moscow  route  was  practically  all 
in.  the  hands  of  Dutchmen  and  Germans,  who 
maintained  their  representatives  and  offices  in 
Moscow. 

Peter  the  Great,  found  a  highly  developed  com- 
mercial capitalism.  The  latter  half  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  had,  in  the  manner  already  de- 
scribed, brought  about  a  great  concentration  of 
capital  which  enabled  Peter  to  finance  the  great 
industrial  undertakings  which  made  industrial 
(as  distinguished  from  commercial)  capitalism  a 
power  in  Russia.  As  Toughan-Paranovsky,  the 
great  Russian  economist,  has  clearly  shown,1  unlike 

1  The    Russian    Fcinory    ■■■:   the   Past   and   Present,   by   M.   Toiij>lian- 
ll.ii  ,iiio\  sky,  Vol.  I,  pp.  fcs— 12. 


7o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

the  earlier  commercial  capitalism,  which  for  a  long 
time  depended  on  foreign  enterprise,  the  new 
industrialism  was  almost  altogether  Russian.  It 
was  an  indigenous  product.  The  rich  Muscovite 
merchants  became  the  owners  of  the  factories, 
sometimes  as  individuals,  sometimes  as  corporations 
or  gilds. 

When  we  remember  that  the  whole  period  of  the 
reign  of  Peter  the  Great  was  one  of  war  and  adjust- 
ment of  territorial  rights  and  boundaries,  the 
industrial  progress  achieved  during  that  time 
seems  all  the  more  astonishing.  Some  of  that 
industrial  achievement  was,  of  course,  due  to  the 
exigencies  of  war  and  to  the  determination  of  the 
Czar  to  create  a  great  navy,  following  the  success- 
ful attainment  of  a  hold  on  the  Baltic  seaboard. 
By  granting  valuable  privileges  and  monopolies  to 
stimulate  private  industrial  enterprise,  by  means 
of  state  contracts  and  by  state  monopoly,  Peter 
the  Great  hastened  the  process  of  industrial  evolu- 
tion, and  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  if  his 
successors  had  manifested  anything  like  equal 
wisdom  and  energy  to  his,  Russia  to-day  would  be 
one  of  the  most  highly  developed  industrial  nations 
in  the  world.  He  brought  to  Russia  the  most  able 
technical  advisers,  directors,  and  organizers  of  in- 
dustry, taking  great  care  that  Russia  should  profit 
by  the  experience  of  countries  like  England  and 
Germany,  and  have  the  full  advantage  of  every 
improvement  in  technic. 

By  these  means  Peter  the  Great  sought  to 
"Europeanize"  Russian  economic  life.  In  the 
externals  of  civilization,  too,  he  ardently  sought  to 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    71 

mold  Russia  to  a  likeness  to  western  European 
nations.  It  is  greatly  to  his  credit  as  a  statesman 
that  he  should  have  seen  so  clearly  that  the  future 
of  Russia  lay  in  a  community  with  western  Europe 
rather  than  with  the  Far  East.  On  the  other  hand, 
his  statesmanship  shows  little  trace  of  the  liberal 
idealism  that  even  then  was  stirring  the  western 
nations.  Nor  does  it  show  anything  of  that  sturdy 
individualism  which  characterized  the  life  of  those 
nations.  Alarmed  by  their  Czar's  introduction 
of  so  many  new  ways  and  customs,  the  conserva- 
tives of  the  time  begged  him  to  "  stop  all  the  chinks  " 
through  which  the  methods  and  spirit  of  the  West 
could  enter,  even  to  suppress  all  postal  communica- 
tion.1 Peter  was  wise  enough  not  to  heed  these 
narrow  reactionaries,  but  he  did  stop  all  or  nearly 
all  the  chinks  against  the  introduction  of  those 
spiritual  and  intellectual  ideals  which  were  shaping 
the  life  of  western  Europe. 

It  may  be  said  in  his  defense  that  incessant  war- 
fare, the  necessity  of  welding  a  heterogeneous 
assortment  of  races  together,  and  of  establishing 
order  in  vast  newly  acquired  territories,  made  the 
introduction  of  anything  like  liberal  ideals  impos- 
sible. Be  that  how  it  may,  it  is  a  remarkable  fact 
that  Peter  the  Great  took  from  western  Europe 
only  its  material  advantages.  The  institution 
of  serfdom  was  utterly  unsuited  to  factory  pro- 
duction. The  factory  system  requires  large  num- 
bers of  workers,  skilled  and  unskilled.  By  far 
the  greater  part  of  the  labor  of  Russia  was  bound 
to  the  soil  in  serfage.      But  the  nobles  who  owned 

1  Alcvinskv,  op.  rit.,  p.  ■ ' 


72    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

the  serfs  were  not  the  owners  of  the  factories;  these 
belonged  to  merchants,  native  and  foreign,  who 
could  not  command  the  labor  of  serfs.  How  to 
get  workers  for  their  factories  immediately  became 
a  matter  of  urgent  and  vital  concern.  The  Czar 
granted  the  factory-owners  the  right  to  employ 
either  Russian  or  foreign  workmen  for  wages,  but 
as  far  as  the  former  class  was  concerned — and  of 
necessity  it  was  the  main  source  of  supply — there 
were  only  the  "free"  workers,  consisting  principally 
of  ex-serfs  who  had  run  away  from  their  masters, 
to  be  drawn  upon.  The  owners  of  these  serfs 
naturally  demanded  that  they  should  be  returned 
to  their  villages  and  their  serfdom.  Peter  the 
Great  could  not  well  deny  the  validity  of  this  claim, 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  he  could  not  afford  to  com- 
ply with  the  demand  and  destroy  the  new  indus- 
tries on  which  so  much  depended. 

It  was  quite  evident  that  the  new  industrial  sys- 
tem, in  Russia  as  elsewhere,  could  not  flourish 
within  the  confines  of  serfdom  and  feudalism. 
Peter  was  confronted  by  an  emergency  which,  had 
he  possessed  any  liberal  ideals  at  all,  any  spiritual 
sympathy  with  or  insight  into  the  Europeanization 
whose  material  advantages  he  saw  so  clearly,  must 
have  led  him  to  declare  that  serfdom  could  no  longer 
be  maintained.  On  the  contrary,  while  he  forbade 
the  return  of  the  serfs  who  had  already  become 
factory-workers  to  their  lawful  owners,  in  another 
ukase  he  authorized  the  owners  of  industries  to 
buy  peasants  to  work  in  them,  stipulating  that  the 
peasants  must  be  bought,  not  as  individuals,  but 
by  the  whole  village,  and  that  everv  such  village 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    73 

must   be   attached   to   the   industrial   undertaking 
itself  and  not  to  the  person  of  the  owner. 

The  despotic  spirit  displayed  in  this  order  is 
Oriental  rather  than  European.  It  takes  no 
account  of  the  individual  at  all.  By  it  Peter  the 
Great  gave  to  serfdom  a  new  lease  of  life  as  well  as  a 
harsher  character  than  it  had  ever  before  possessed. 
Instead  of  industrialism  putting  an  end  to  serfdom 
and  to  the  superstructure  of  feudalism  which  rested 
upon  it,  as  it  had  done  in  the  western  nations, 
Russian  industrialism  adopted  serfdom  and  both 
brutalized  it  and  prolonged  its  existence.  Not 
only  so,  but  in  doing  this  it  placed  a  heavy  burden 
upon  the  new  industrial  system,  almost  sufficient 
to  crush  it.  No  greater  blow  could  have  been 
directed  against  the  growing  industrial  system  than 
that  which  made  it  dependent  upon  serf  labor. 
In  the  most  critical  period  of  his  great  work  of 
uniting  Russia  to  western  Europe  Peter  forged  a 
chain  binding  it  to  Asia. 


vi 

Peter  the  Great  died  in  1725.  From  that  time  to 
the  accession  of  Catherine  II  in  1762  the  influence 
of  Germany  over  the  political  and  economic  life 
of  Russia  grew  with  astonishing  rapidity.  The 
male  line  of  the  Romanov  dynasty  having  become 
extinct,  the  succession  passed  to  various  members 
of  the  female  line  connected  with  Germany  by 
marriage  ties.  In  this  manner  the  influence  of 
Germany  in  Russian  court  eireles  increased  in  the 
most    amazing   degree.     Thus   Anne  of  Courland, 


74    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

assisted  by  her  lover  and  Minister,  Biihren,  and  a 
host  of  German  officials,  imposed  upon  Russia  a 
typical  German  regime.  While  Elizabeth,  who  fol- 
lowed her,  hated  the  Germans  and  greatly  lessened 
the  influence  they  had  acquired  under  Anne,  she 
found  herself  compelled  to  name  as  heir  apparent 
Charles  Peter  Ulrich,  a  German  of  the  Germans, 
who  worshiped  Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia  as 
intensely  as  Elizabeth  had  hated  him.  Curiously 
enough,  it  was  left  to  his  consort,  who  succeeded 
him,  herself  a  petty  German  princess,  to  bring 
back  the  Russian  spirit  to  the  Russian  court. 

Catherine  II  aimed  to  continue  the  great  work 
of  Peter  the  Great,  and  her  success  in  prosecuting 
that  aim  was  remarkable.  Like  Peter  the  Great, 
she  desired  to  unite  Russia,  economically,  at  any 
rate,  to  western  Europe.  In  the  second  year  of 
her  reign  she  published  a  ukase  inviting  foreigners 
to  enter  Russia  upon  terms  remarkable  for  their 
liberality.  She  promised  them  full  religious  liberty 
with  subventions  by  the  state  toward  the  cost  of 
establishing  places  of  worship,  perpetual  exemption 
from  compulsory  military  duty,  exemption  from 
all  forms  of  taxation  for  a  long  period,  local  auton- 
omy, and  a  fairly  liberal  measure  of  self-govern- 
ment. By  this  method  she  attracted  a  large  num- 
ber of  foreigners,  including  English,  Germans, 
French,  Swedes,  Italians,  and  Bulgarians. 

Many  of  these  immigrants  became  factory- 
workers.  A  small  percentage  of  each  nationality 
consisted  of  capitalists  who  established  factories 
of  their  own  or  acquired  existing  factories  which 
their  Russian  owners  desired  to  sell.     These  were 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    75 

the  very  ends  the  astute  Catherine  sought.  Rus- 
sian industry  was  in  a  bad  way  and  needed  rein- 
forcement by  foreign  capital,  foreign  labor,  and 
foreign  technical  skill.  The  policy  of  Peter  the 
Great  in  linking  the  new  industrial  system  to  serf- 
dom was  the  primary  cause  of  this  serious  con- 
dition. Secondary  causes  were  the  incompetence, 
corruption,  and  indifference  of  Peter's  immediate 
successors,  and  the  opposition  of  the  old  nobility 
to  the  manufacturers  and  their  interests. 

So  long  as  serfdom  remained  as  the  basis  of  the 
labor-supply  industrial  production  was  bound  to 
be  costly.  Every  factory  was  burdened  with 
inemcients  and  wastrels,  simply  because  there  was 
no  selective  process.  The  manufacturers  had  to 
buy  whole  village  populations,  and  every  serf  so 
bought  was  bound  for  life  to  the  particular  indus- 
trial establishment  for  which  he  had  been  pur- 
chased. However  low  the  price  paid  for  such 
forced  mass-labor  might  be,  it  was  bound  to  prove 
terribly  expensive,  as  all  human  experience  shows. 
The  labor  cost  of  the  commodities  produced  was 
therefore  very  high.  In  the  second  place,  the 
transference  of  whole  masses  of  peasants  to  factory 
production,  village  by  village,  seriously  affected 
agriculture.  So  much  for  the  primary  factor  in  the 
industrial  decline. 

When  we  come  to  the  secondary  factors  we  are 
brought  face  to  face  with  the  manner  in  which 
the  German  parasites  battened  in  luxury  upon  the 
spoils  of  the  nation's  economic  life.  The  enormous 
wealth  heaped  upon  the  infamous  Biihren  by  his 
roval  mistress  Anne  is  an  illustration  of  how  indus- 


76    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

try  was  robbed  to  sustain  these  parasites.  A  host 
of  adventurers  flocked  around  the  weak  and  silly 
woman  who  reigned  over  the  great  empire,  like 
greedy  vultures,  receiving  vast  sums  of  money, 
lands,  and  whole  villages  of  serfs.  After  the  death 
of  Peter  the  Great  the  nobles  set  themselves  in 
bitter  opposition  to  the  manufacturers,  especially 
to  their  right  to  own  serfs.  By  the  time  Catherine 
II  came  to  the  throne  the  power  of  the  nobility 
had  become  so  great  that  even  that  great  monarch 
could  not  resist  it.  In  the  very  first  year  of  her 
reign  a  law  was  passed  forbidding  the  purchase  of 
serfs  and  their  employment  in  factories  by  persons 
not  belonging  to  the  nobility.  This  law,  the  last 
of  a  series  of  measures  aimed  to  destroy  the  mer- 
chant-manufacturing class,  practically  gave  the 
nobles  a  monopoly  of  industry.  Thus  the  organi- 
zation of  industry  to  a  very  large  extent  became  the 
function  of  a  class  wholly  unfitted  to  perform  that 
function.  They  lacked  almost  every  necessary 
qualification  for  the  direction  of  industry.  At  the 
bottom  of  the  industrial  system  was  a  mass  of 
inefficient  forced  labor;  at  the  top  equally  ineffi- 
cient directors. 

Like  Peter  the  Great,  Catherine  II — equally 
great  as  a  sovereign — lacked  the  vision  and  the 
courage  to  decree  the  abolition  of  serfdom  and  thus 
free  the  pathway  of  industrial  development.  Like 
her  great  predecessor,  again,  while  she  desired 
to  appropriate  the  material  advantages  of  the 
western  nations,  she  shrank  from  and  feared  their 
political  and  spiritual  ideals  and  turned  instinc- 
tively to  Germany  for  political  support   and   co- 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    77 

operation.  She  was  a  Prussian  at  heart,  possessing 
all  the  vices  and  weaknesses  of  the  Prussian  au- 
tocracy. She  was  vain,  arrogant,  coarse,  aggres- 
sive, unscrupulous,  greedy,  and  brutal.  Yet  withal 
she  possessed  a  certain  genius  for  statecraft  and 
empire-building.  When  the  ferment  of  the  French 
Revolution  began  to  manifest  itself  as  a  serious 
and  vital  challenge  to  the  existing  order  she  threw 
off  every  pretense  of  sympathy  with  it,  as  one 
discards  an  old  garment,  and  set  about  exterminat- 
ing every  heterodox  opinion  and  belief.  She 
wanted  Frederick  William  II  of  Germany  to  lead  a 
crusade  to  suppress  the  French  Revolution.  Early 
in  her  reign  she  had  introduced  a  scheme  to  es- 
tablish a  sort  of  consultative  parliament,  a  fairly 
democratic  elective  body,  together  with  other 
liberal  legislative  reforms.  Finding  that  these 
logically  led  to  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs,  she 
abandoned  them  and  adopted  a  policy  that  was 
utterly  reactionary. 

Like  Peter  the  Great,  Catherine  II  made  the 
mistake  of  supposing  that  the  material  advantages 
of  western  European  nations  and  their  cultural 
refinements  could  be  transplanted  in  Russia  with- 
out changing  the  political  and  social  structure. 
Both  monarchs  believed  that  the  immigration  of 
a  few  thousand  people  from  the  western  nations 
would  result  in  spreading  western  efficiency  and 
prosperity  throughout  the  nation.  They  were, 
of  course,  blind  to  the  plainest  of  all  the  lessons  of 
history.  As  a  result  of  her  ukase  of  1763  there 
was  a  great  influx  of  German  agriculturists,  who 
established    agricultural   villages   along  the  Volga. 


78    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Ten  years  later  there  was  a  similar  influx  of  Ger- 
man-Dutch Protestants.  It  soon  appeared  that 
these  colonists  were  more  prosperous  than  the 
Russian  peasants  around  them,  a  fact  partly  due 
to  their  superiority  and  partly  also  to  the  special 
privileges  they  enjoyed  as  a  reward  for  settling  in 
Russia.  There  was  not — and  there  has  never 
since  been — any  evidence  that  the  immigration 
had  raised  the  general  level  of  prosperity  or 
efficiency. 

Similarly,  in  the  industrial  sphere  immigration 
failed  to  give  life  to  Russian  industry.  The  foreign 
settlers  might  succeed  as  manufacturers,  but  they 
did  not  impart  the  capacity  to  succeed  to  the 
natives.  When  Peter  the  Great  died  practically 
all  the  existing  industries  were  owned  and  con- 
trolled by  Russians.  Only  an  insignificant  number 
were  owned  by  foreigners.  At  the  time  of  the 
death  of  Catherine  II,  seventy  years  later,  a  very 
large  percentage  of  the  existing  industries  were 
owned  by  foreigners — Germans,  English,  French, 
Swedes,  Italians,  and  Bulgarians.  In  St.  Peters- 
burg 22  per  cent,  of  the  factories  belonged  to 
foreigners,  and  in  Moscow  conditions  were  similar. 

In  considering  the  nature  and  extent  of  western 
influence  upon  Russia  in  the  eighteenth  century 
it  is  important  to  observe  two  consequences  of  the 
policy  initiated  by  Peter  the  Great  and  continued 
by  Catherine  II  which  have  exerted  a  profound 
influence  upon  Russia  right  down  to  our  own  day. 
In  the  first  place,  the  preservation  of  serfdom  for 
more  than  a  century  set  a  gulf  between  the  workers 
of  Russia  and  those  of  western  Europe.     In  the 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    79 

second  place,  the  artificial  bolstering  up  of  the 
nobility  and  the  restrictions  placed  upon  the 
merchant-manufacturing  class,  at  the  time  when 
the  great  middle  class,  the  bourgeoisie,  was  gain- 
ing ascendancy  in  the  western  nations,  was  directly 
responsible  for  the  fact  that  there  was  not  enough 
power  in  the  Russian  bourgeoisie  to  force  the 
adoption  of  constitutional  government  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  or  to  carry  on  the  government 
when  the  rotten  fabric  of  czarism  fell  in  the 
twentieth. 

VII 

It  was  during  the  reign  of  Alexander  I  that  the 
idealism  of  western  Europe  reached  Russia  through 
what  may  be  termed  the  channels  of  natural  inter- 
course in  volume  sufficient  to  produce  a  lasting 
influence.  Prior  to  that  time  various  sovereigns 
had  tried  to  impose  some  of  the  refinements  of 
western  civilization  upon  Russia,  as  well  as  some 
of  its  material  advantages.  To  this  end  they  had 
encouraged  immigration  and  colonization,  with 
what  result  we  have  already  noted.  As  far  as 
possible,  they  had  strenuously  tried  to  "stop  all 
the  chinks"  through  which  liberal  political  ideas 
might  enter  Russia,  and  when  the  French  Revolu- 
tion generated  a  pulsing  current  which  swept  from 
Paris  to  Moscow  Catherine  II  used  every  possible 
means  to  prevent  Russia's  contamination. 

Alexander  I  began  his  reign  as  a  libera!  democrat, 
instituting  many  reforms.  Before  long,  however, 
it  became  evident  that  he  was  essentially  a  tyrant 
at  heart,  despite  his  acceptance  of  certain  liberal 


80    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

ideas  and  ideals.  "If  civilization  were  more  ad- 
vanced, I  would  abolish  this  slavery  if  it  cost  me 
my  head,"  he  said,  but  his  whole  course  of  action 
proved  that  this  intellectual  liberalism  did  not 
penetrate  his  soul.  Clearly  perceiving  the  evils  of 
serfdom,  this  royal  disciple  of  Rousseau  and  his 
gospel  of  humanity  suffered  the  ancient  evil  to 
continue.  When  he  conceived  reforms  it  was 
only  as  an  autocrat.  It  was  said  of  him  that  "he 
would  gladly  agree  that  every  one  should  be  free, 
if  every  one  would  do  exactly  as  he  desired."  He 
thought  of  himself  as  the  chosen  instrument  of 
divine  Providence,  set  apart  to  confer  happiness 
and  order  upon  the  world.  This  he  was  ready  to 
do  with  the  most  ruthless  brutality.  It  was  in 
this  spirit  that  he  planned  with  Napoleon  the 
division  of  the  world  at  the  memorable  meeting  at 
Tilsit,  following  the  Russian-French  war  of  1807. 
The  final  downfall  of  Napoleon  at  Waterloo  left 
Alexander  the  most  powerful  sovereign  in  Europe, 
not  merely  because  of  the  size  and  might  of  his 
empire,  but  also  because  of  his  own  leadership. 
It  was  then  that  he  launched  the  Holy  Alliance,  a 
product  of  extreme  pietism,  for  which  the  teachings 
of  Rousseau  had  prepared  the  way.  It  was  quite 
characteristic  of  Alexander  at  this  period  to  press 
his  liberal  ideas  into  the  mold  of  evangelical 
religion.  The  genesis  of  the  Holy  Alliance  takes 
us  back  far  beyond  the  days  when  he  fell  under 
the  influence  of  the  religious  mystics  and  the 
leaders  of  the  great  evangelical  revival.  It  dates 
from  the  proposal  for  a  European  Confederation 
submitted   to    Pitt    in    1804.     In   that    document 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    81 

Alexander  argued  that  the  outcome  of  the  war 
must  be  the  universal  triumph  of  "the  sacred 
rights  of  humanity."  He  wanted  a  Confederation 
of  European  Powers,  and  asked,  "Why  could  not 
one  submit  to  it  the  positive  rights  of  nations, 
assure  the  privilege  of  neutrality,  insert  the  obliga- 
tion of  never  beginning  war  until  all  the  resources 
which  the  mediation  of  a  third  party  could  offer 
have  been  exhausted?"  He  argued  that  this  would 
mean  "a  league  whose  stipulations  would  form, 
so  to  speak,  a  new  code  of  the  law  of  nations  .  .  . 
while  those  who  infringe  it  would  risk  bringing  upon 
themselves  the  forces  of  the  new  union."  Clearly 
this  is  derived  from  Rousseau  and  forms  a  very 
significant  anticipation  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

It  was  quite  in  keeping  with  the  character  of 
Alexander  that  he  should  have  joined  hands  with 
the  arch-reactionary,  Metternich,  in  attempting 
to  suppress  by  force  the  revolutionary  movements 
in  Germany,  Italy,  and  Spain.  It  was  equally 
characteristic  of  him  to  adopt  a  brutally  reactionary 
policy  at  home.  While  he  continued  to  indulge 
in  liberal  phrases  he  ruled  as  a  tyrant.  He  saw 
his  people  impoverished,  but  did  nothing  except 
impose  new  burdens  upon  them.  Acknowledging 
serfdom  to  be  a  monstrous  evil,  he  permitted  it  to 
continue.  Such  was  the  character  and  the  record 
of  the  great  "Liberal  Czar,"  the  Muscovite  who 
preached  liberal  ideals  to  western  Europe  and 
practised  tyranny  at  home. 

It  was  not  through  the  Czar  that  Russia  was 
influenced  by  the  social  idealism  which  stirred 
France  and  England  in  the  early  part  of  the  nine- 


82    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

teenth  century.  The  war  of  1812  has  been  called 
"the  first  war  of  the  Russian  people."  It  was 
not  the  Czar  and  his  nobles  who  won  the  war, 
but  the  masses  of  the  people.  They  were  the 
conquerors  of  Napoleon.  During  the  Napoleonic 
invasion  there  was  born  in  the  hearts  of  the  Russian 
people  a  genuine  and  strong  patriotism,  coupled 
with  a  profound  contempt  for  the  Czar  and  the 
nobility.  After  the  Grand  Army  of  Napoleon 
had  been  driven  from  Russian  soil,  Alexander 
joined  with  the  Emperors  of  Prussia  and  Austria 
in  pursuing  it  across  Europe. 

In  this  manner  many  of  the  young  Russian  offi- 
cers were  brought  into  close  personal  contact  with 
European  civilization.  They  found  in  Germany 
and  in  France  a  degree  of  prosperity  which  con- 
trasted strangely  with  the  terrible  poverty  of  the 
masses  in  Russia.  They  found,  too,  in  both  coun- 
tries a  degree  of  freedom,  a  regard  for  the  individual 
life,  which  they  could  not  at  first  comprehend. 
They  became  acquainted  with  the  numerous 
societies  which  were  promulgating  radical  political 
and  social  theories.  During  their  stay  in  France 
these  Russian  officers  were  drawn  into  close  rela- 
tions with  various  revolutionary  groups,  secret, 
conspiratory  societies  for  the  most  part,  whose 
teachings  possessed  for  them  all  the  fascination  of 
novelty.  When  they  returned  to  Russia,  at  the 
end  of  18 1 5,  they  returned  as  revolutionary  idealists 
and  saw  their  country  and  its  problems  in  a  new 
light.  Moreover,  they  had  established  personal 
relations  with  the  leading  spirits  of  the  revolu- 
tionary movements  of  Europe, 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    83 

These  youthful  and  ardent  idealists  had  very- 
little  idea  of  the  strength  of  the  autocracy.  They 
did  not  understand  the  terror  with  which  their 
generous  visions  would  inspire  the  Czar  and  the 
nobility.  They  were  thwarted  at  every  turn,  and 
after  ten  years  of  baffled  effort  they  resorted  to 
armed  revolt,  in  December,  1825,  only  to  be 
crushed  by  the  government.  The  Decembrists, 
as  they  came  to  be  known,  were  defeated,  but 
they  did  not  fail.  Martyrdom  for  a  great  cause 
never  fails.  Their  success  was  greater  than  they 
realized:  they  had  planted  in  fertile  soil  the  seed 
of  Europe's  vision  of  a  free  life  for  mankind  and 
linked  Russia  and  western  Europe  together  in  a 
spiritual  union. 

Five  of  the  Decembrists — among  them  the  brill- 
iant poet  Ryleef — were  hanged  and  about  a  hun- 
dred more — -"young  men  who  represented  the 
flower  of  Russian  intelligence"  * — were  sent  to 
Siberia.  How  deeply  and  profoundly  they  im- 
pressed the  intellectual  life  of  their  time  is  reflect- 
ed in  its  literature.  Ryleef,  Pushkin,  LermontofF, 
Gogol,  and  Turgeniev  all  reflect  that  influence. 
Their  writings  are  all  tinged  with  the  passion  for 
social  regeneration,  which  was  the  gift  of  western 
civilization  to  the  great  Slav  nation's  culture. 

The  reign  of  Nicholas  I,  who  succeeded  his 
brother,  Alexander  I,  in  1825,  was  a  period  of  dark 
reaction.  The  crushing  of  the  Decembrist  agita- 
tion and  uprising  was  the  prelude  to  a  reign  of 
tyranny  and  resistance  to  progress.  In  183 1  the 
Polish    insurrection    was    suppressed    with    brutal 

1  Kropotkin,  Ideals  and  Realities  in  Russian  Literature,  p.  35. 


84    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

severity,  and  after  that  had  been  accomplished 
the  administration  which  was  established  by 
Nicholas  I  was  extremely  harsh  and  cruel.  The 
aim  was  to  destroy  every  vestige  of  Polish  national- 
ism, and  even  the  Polish  language.  To  keep  out 
foreign  revolutionary  ideas  he  established  a  rigid 
and  severe  censorship,  and  practically  made  it 
impossible  for  Russians  to  visit  foreign  countries. 
His  policies,  domestic  and  foreign,  were  all  governed 
by  his  fear  of  revolution  and  his  determination 
to  maintain  the  principle  of  absolute  autocracy. 
He  died  before  the  end  of  the  disastrous  Crimean 
War,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Alexander  II. 

On  the  3d  of  March,  1861,  Alexander  II  signed 
the  Act  of  Liberation  by  which  serfdom  was 
abolished.  He  believed  that  by  this  radical  step 
the  revolutionary  agitation  and  unrest  would  be 
brought  to  an  end,  and  that  a  new  era  of  prosperity 
would  be  inaugurated.  This  was  the  belief  like- 
wise of  many  of  the  revolutionists  themselves. 
Thus  Alexander  Herzen  in  his  brilliant  agitation 
for  the  abolition  of  serfdom  through  his  Kolokol 
had  contended,  as  did  Tchernyshevsky,  who  was 
in  large  measure  responsible  for  inducing  the  Czar 
to  sign  the  Act  of  Liberation.  Alexander  might 
well  be  pardoned  for  his  roseate  confidence  in  view 
of  the  optimism  of  those  two  great  founders  of  the 
modern  Socialist  movement. 

Llerzen  exercised  a  profound  and  far-reaching 
influence  upon  his  native  land,  despite  the  fact 
that  he  never  saw  it  after  1847.  All  the  rest  of  his 
life,  until  his  death  in  1870,  was  spent  in  exile  in 
Fiance,  England,  Italy,   and   Switzerland.     When 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    85 

he  was  twenty-two  years  of  age  he  was  sent  into 
exile  for  singing  students'  songs  in  praise  of  the 
Decembrist  martyrs,  and  spent  six  years  in  the 
Urals.  Returning  to  Moscow,  his  native  town,  in 
1840  he  joined  Bakunin  and  other  friends  in  revolu- 
tionary propaganda  for  which  he  was  again  sent 
into  exile  in  1842.  He  remained  in  exile  until 
1847,  when  he  received  permission  to  leave  Russia. 
Notwithstanding  the  brief  period  of  his  active 
participation  in  the  Russian  revolutionary  move- 
ment in  Russia  itself,  the  influence  he  exercised 
upon  the  movement  from  abroad  through  his 
writings,  which  were  clandestinely  circulated,  was 
enormous. 

The  first  years  of  the  reign  of  Alexander  II  were 
characterized  by  a  degree  of  liberalism  in  marked 
contrast  to  the  policy  of  repression  and  suppression 
pursued  by  Nicholas  I  and  by  Alexander  II  him- 
self later  on.  The  liberalism  of  the  early  period 
made  possible  Tchernyshevsky's  Contemporary  Re- 
view, the  great  literary  forum  of  the  period.  It 
was  Tchcrnyshevsky  who  popularized  the  theories 
of  Saint-Simon,  Fourier,  and  Proudhon,  the  French 
Utopians,  and  of  Robert  Owen,  the  English  Utopian. 
Of  these  social  thinkers,  Fourier  and  Owen  probably 
made  the  deepest  and  most  lasting  impression 
upon  the  revolutionary  Socialist  movement  of 
Russia,  though  Saint-Simon  roused  the  greatest 
amount  of  purely  intellectual  interest.  Tcherny- 
shevsky  himself  was  perhaps  equally  influenced 
by  Owen  and  by  Fourier.  Owen's  practical  experi- 
ments, his  sense  of  the  value  of  concrete  example, 
appealed  to  the  great  Russian.     At  the  same  time 


86    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

he  was  convinced  that  Fourier  was  right  in  looking 
to  a  highly  developed  industrial  technic  and  large- 
scale  production  as  prerequisite  to  a  Socialist 
society.1 

It  is  not  difficult  to  understand  why  the  emanci- 
pation of  the  serfs  failed  to  produce  the  results 
which  these  men  had  foretold  and  the  Czar  had 
believed  to  be  certain.  In  the  first  place,  not 
enough  land  was  allotted  to  satisfy  the  needs  of 
the  people,  whose  agricultural  methods  were  exceed- 
ingly primitive.  The  average  allotment  per  house- 
hold was  something  less  than  six  and  a  quarter 
acres,  and,  in  most  cases,  a  proportion  of  this  land 
was  of  a  very  poor  quality.  Moreover,  the  change 
did  not  bring  individual  land  ownership,  but  simply 
extended  the  mir.  The  individual  peasant  was 
simply  a  partner  in  the  ownership  of  an  area  of 
communal  land  owned  jointly  by  all  the  house- 
holders of  his  village.  It  was  the  custom  of  the 
mir  to  divide  this  communal  land  into  patches 
of  equal  area,  each  household  receiving  its  share 
of  the  land  graded  according  to  its  quality.  Thus 
the  holding  of  one  household  would  consist  of  a 
strip  of  good  land  in  one  place,  a  strip  of  poorer 
land  in  another,  and  a  strip  of  still  poorer  land  else- 
where. Sometimes  these  strips  would  be  no  more 
than  four  feet  wide.  In  many  cases  some  of  the 
strips  allotted  to  a  household  would  be  situated 
ten  or  twelve  miles  away  from  the  cottage.  Bearing 
in  mind  the  fact  that  most  of  the  peasants  lacked 
capital  and  that  their  methods  were  unscientific 
and  primitive,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  why  the 

1  G.  Plechanov,  N.  Tchernyskevsky,  pp.  75,  301-302. 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    87 

land  problem  became  the  dominant  economic  and 
political  concern  of  80  per  cent,  of  the  Russian  people. 

Furthermore,  the  land  was  not  given  to  the 
peasants.  It  had  to  be  "redeemed" — that  is  to 
say,  paid  for — and  the  price  fixed  was  so  high  that 
the  "redemption  tax"  of  necessity  added  greatly 
to  the  impoverishment  of  the  people.  Among  the 
peasants  the  idea  spread  that  the  Czar  had  really 
given  them  the  land  and  that  it  was  only  the  greed 
of  the  nobles  and  officials  which  imposed  upon 
them  the  necessity  of  paying  for  it.  From  im- 
memorial times  the  land  had,  they  believed,  be- 
longed to  them  and  not  to  the  nobles.  There  was 
a  folk-saying  which  summed  up  their  belief,  "The 
nobles  own  us,  but  the  land  is  ours." 

In  the  discontent  which  resulted  from  this  method 
of  dealing  with  the  land  problem — the  "land  hun- 
ger" of  the  peasants,  their  poverty,  their  sense  of 
being  cheated,  the  crushing  burden  of  taxation — 
the  peculiar  agrarian  Socialism  of  Russia  arose  and 
flourished.  The  emancipation  did,  indeed,  bring 
one  form  of  relief.  It  abolished  the  adscriptio 
glebes  by  which  the  peasants  were  bound  to  a 
particular  piece  of  land  and  to  its  owner,  and  set 
them  free  to  go  wherever  they  would  as  "free" 
laborers.  This  made  it  possible  for  many  to  be- 
come wage-laborers  on  the  large  estates,  and  for 
others  to  work  in  the  factories  of  the  industrial 
centers  for  a  portion  of  each  year,  the  season 
when  work  on  their  land  was  not  possible.  But 
while  this  mitigated  their  suffering  considerably, 
gave  them  a  feeling  of  personal  independence,  and 
made  it  possible  for  them  to  earn  the  money  with 


88    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

which  to  pay  their  taxes,  it  did  not  materially 
lessen  their  discontent.  On  the  contrary,  by 
bringing  masses  of  peasant  workers  into  the  towns 
in  pursuit  of  this  seasonal  employment  it  provided 
facilities  for  agitation  which  had  not  existed  before. 
Thus  the  agrarian  Socialism  of  the  peasants  and 
the  Nihilism  of  the  Intellectuals — a  doctrine  of 
negation  which,  stimulated  by  Darwinism,  paved 
the  way  for  Bolshevism — made  considerable  head- 
way. 

VIII 

In  this  period  of  Nihilism  there  is  disclosed  a 
remarkable  development  of  the  attitude  of  Russia 
to  western  civilization.  Instead  of  the  old  attitude 
of  unrestrained  admiration  and  idealization  which 
characterized  the  Intellectuals,  there  is  a  tendency 
to  regard  western  Europe  generally,  and  France 
particularly,  much  more  critically  and  to  idealize 
Russia.  The  conservatives  for  the  most  part  con- 
tinued to  deplore  all  European  influences  and  to 
struggle  against  them. 

In  part  the  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  Russian 
liberals  was  a  natural  reaction.  At  first  they  had 
idealized  France  and  the  western  nations  in  general 
in  the  most  extravagant  fashion,  surrounding 
them  with  a  glamour  which  seems  almost  childish 
in  its  romanticism.  The  case  of  Herzen  illustrates 
in  an  admirable  way  the  reaction  which  took  place 
in  many  minds.  He  had  gone  to  France  and  Eng- 
land a  reverent  worshiper.  In  bitter  revolt  against 
Russian  government  and  Russian  social  conditions, 
he  saw  little  or  nothing  admirable  in  his  native 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    89 

land.  In  the  western  nations  he  had  great  faith 
and  looked  forward  to  visiting  them  with  some- 
thing of  the  reverence  with  which  a  religious 
devotee  approaches  a  sacred  shrine.  Herzen  him- 
self wrote  long  afterward  that  at  this  period  of  his 
life  he  "illumined  Europe  with  magical  colors," 
that  he  "believed  in  Europe,  and  above  all  in 
France."  He  lived  in  Paris  through  the  Revolu- 
tion of  1848  and  was  astounded  by  the  manner  in 
which  force  was  used  against  the  revolutionists. 
He  saw  the  great  and  growing  power  of  the  bour- 
geoisie as  though  his  disappointment  were  a  great 
magnifying-glass.  This  embourgeoisemcnt  sickened 
and  terrified  him.  All  was  so  different  from  his 
preconceived  fancy.  With  much  bitter  humility, 
he  renounced  his  passion  for  France  and  turned 
to  Russia  with  new  admiration  and  hope.1 

The  changed  attitude  of  many  of  the  Russian 
liberals — using  this  term  in  a  very  wide  sense — 
was  due,  however,  less  to  any  loss  of  faith  in 
France  or  western  democracy  than  to  a  new  con- 
ception of  Russia,  a  conception  mainly  derived 
from  French  Socialist  thinkers.  These  French 
Socialists  saw  in  the  mir  the  basis  for  an  equali- 
tarian  social  system.  Here,  indeed,  was  com- 
munism in  the  fundamental  economic  element, 
t  he  land,  already  existing.  Proudhon  rejoiced 
that  the  mir  had  not  been  abolished  with  serfdom, 
but  remained  for  "free  laborers"  to  develop, 
lie  contended  that  there  could  be  nothing  better 
than  this  communal  land  system,  "which  is  con- 
trary to  inequality"  and  which  provided,  he  said, 

1  Sec  Herzcn's  account  of  this  change  in  his  book,  The  Other  Shore. 


9o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

the  only  foundation  necessary  for  a  Socialist 
system  of  society.1  This  view  was  also  adopted 
by  Herzen,  Tchernyshevsky,  Bakunin,  and  many 
other  Russian  Socialists,  with  the  result  that  they 
saw  Russia  in  a  new  light,  as  a  nation  destined  to 
fill  a  great  role,  as  perhaps  the  first  nation  in  the 
world  to  realize  Socialism  after  all. 

This  was  entirely  contrary  to  the  Marxian 
theory  of  social  progress,  first  outlined  in  the  Com- 
munist Manifesto  in  1847.  Herzen  and  Marx  had 
met  in  Germany  and  in  France  in  1848  and  1849. 
They  were  not  over-friendly,  even  at  that  time, 
mainly  on  account  of  Marx's  bitter  attack  upon 
Herzen's  bosom  friend,  Bakunin.  Marx  had  ac- 
cused Bakunin  of  being  a  paid  spy  in  the  service 
of  the  Russian  Ambassador,  alleging  that  the 
information  came  from  "George  Sand,"  who  held 
documentary  proof  of  the  fact.  The  great  French 
novelist  indignantly  denied  the  statement  in  so 
far  as  it  concerned  her.  "I  never  had  any  reason, 
or  authority,  to  express  any  doubts  as  to  the  loyalty 
of  his  character  and  the  sincerity  of  his  views," 
she  wrote.  Although  many  years  afterward  Marx 
revived  the  ugly  charge,  he  withdrew  it  at  the  time 
and  published  Madame  Sand's  letter.  There  was 
a  formal  reconciliation  of  the  two  men,  effected 
through  a  mutual  friend,  but  the  wound  rankled 
in  Bakunin's  breast.  Herzen  took  the  side  of 
Bakunin  and  cordially  hated  Marx.  Later  on,  in 
1852,  an  article,  believed  to  have  been  written  by 
Marx,  accusing  Herzen  of  being  a  paid  spy  of  the 
Russian  government,  appeared  in  a  German  news- 

1  P.  J.  YtouH\\on,(Euvres  Posthumes,  Paris,  1866,  Vol.  I,  p.  89. 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    9iv 

paper.     The  charge  was  as  baseless  as  the  similar 
charge  against  Bakunin. 

The  opposition  of  Bakunin  and  Herzen  to  Marx 
did  not  depend  upon  these  personal  incidents, 
however.  Its  roots  lay  far  deeper  than  that.  In 
the  great  controversy  which  so  profoundly  affected 
the  development  of  Russian  Socialism  there  were 
fundamental  philosophical  issues  at  stake.  In 
1849  Bakunin  published  his  pamphlet,  An  Appeal 
to  the  Slavs,  in  which  he  set  forth  his  doctrine  of 
"Panslavisme."  He  urged  the  union,  cultural 
and  political,  of  all  the  Slavs  for  the  purpose  of 
destroying  the  Russian,  Austrian,  and  Prussian 
empires.  He  believed  that  a  great  Federation  of 
Slavs  could  be  formed  upon  a  communistic  basis, 
urging  that  the  Slavs  were  communists  by  in- 
stinct. Against  this  theory,  which  was  so  vio- 
lently opposed  to  his  own,  Marx  contended  with 
great  spirit,  contending  that  the  Slav  nations  and 
provinces  must,  like  the  western  nations,  pass 
through  a  process  of  industrial  development,  and 
that  only  a  fully  developed  capitalism  could  give 
birth  to  the  new  social  order.  In  a  scathing  criti- 
cism of  Bakunin  which  infuriated  Herzen,  Marx 
wrote  in  a  contemptuous  spirit  concerning  the 
Slavs,  a  spirit  quite  commonly  encountered  in 
German  Socialist  writings  down  to  the  present 
time.  He  denounced  Panslavisme  as  "a  move- 
ment which  strives  only  to  subject  the  civilized 
West  to  the  barbarian  East;  the  city  to  the  vil- 
lage; commerce,  industry,  science,  and  progress 
to  the  primitive  culture  of  the  Slavish  serfs."1 

1  Xtu?  Rhenische  Zeiturg,  February  14,  ic.}9. 


92    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

The  controversy  thus  begun  extended  over 
many  years  and  engaged  the  attention  of  practically 
all  the  Socialist  Intellectuals  of  Russia.  Herzen 
not  only  gladly  accepted  the  view  that  the  com- 
munism which  western  Europe  was  struggling 
toward  as  an  ideal  to  be  attained  was  in  Russia  a 
reality,  but  he  accepted  the  view  of  Bakunin, 
Proudhon,  and  others  that  the  laboring  masses 
of  Russia,  the  peasantry,  could  avoid  the  long 
struggle  of  parliamentary  politics.  His  argument 
was  to  this  effect:  the  communism  instinctive  in  the 
Russian  mind  had  withstood  every  political  change; 
it  was  not  necessary  for  Russia  to  pass  through 
a  period  of  embourgeoisement,  for  whenever  the 
Russian  people  should  revolt  it  would  not  be  to 
replace  the  tyranny  of  a  Czar  by  that  of  a  bour- 
geois parliament,  nor  even  a  republic  with  a  Presi- 
dent, but  to  attain  "a  veritable  and  complete 
liberty."  l  We  have  here  another  of  the  numerous 
anticipations  of  Leninism  to  be  found  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Herzen.  He  saw  in  the  Russian  muzhik 
not  only  the  equal  of  the  "class-conscious"  French 
artisan,  but  even  his  superior,  destined  to  succeed 
sooner  in  creating  a  Socialist  state  of  society  be- 
cause of  his  communistic  mentality.  Very  similar 
views  were  put  forward  by  Bakunin,  Tcherny- 
shevsky,  and  other  writers  of  the  period,  as  well 
as  by  their  successors  in  the  eighteen-seventies 
and  eighteen-eighties. 

It  is  practically  impossible  for  the  Western 
World  to  understand  the  intensity  of  the  struggle 
which   ensued   from   this   philosophical   difference. 

1  Vide  Herzen's  Open  Letter  to  Linton,  the  English  Chartist. 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    93 

The  Marxian  view  had  its  champions,  and  it  is  a 
curious  fact  that,  as  Marx  himself  wrote  to  his  friend 
Kugelmann,  it  had  many  among  the  "Russian 
autocrats."  On  receiving  from  Russia,  in  October, 
1868,  news  of  the  publication  of  his  Capital  in  Rus- 
sian, Marx  wrote:  "It  is  strange  that  the  Russians 
should  always  have  been  my  well-wishers,  for  I 
have  fought  against  them  for  twenty-five  years. 
In  1843-44  tne  Russian  autocrats  thought  a  lot 
about  me  in  Paris,  and  my  books  against  Proudhon 
in  1847  and  against  Duncker  in  1848  were  received 
with  great  favor  in  Russia.  Of  course,  the  Russian 
aristocracy  have  been  influenced  by  French  and 
German  culture." 

In  1879  arose  that  peculiarly  Russian  movement, 
the  Narodnya  Folya,  the  terroristic  People's  Will 
party.  This  movement  was  based  upon  the  teach- 
ings of  Herzen,  Bakunin,  Tchernyshevsky,  and 
Lopatin  as  against  those  of  the  Marx-Engels  school. 
There  were,  however,  some  supporters  of  the  latter 
in  Russia,  and  the  relation  of  the  Marxian  theory 
of  historical  development  to  Russia  became  the 
subject  of  much  discussion.  Would  the  viir  and 
the  communist  mentality  of  the  Russian  masses 
prove  obstacles  to  the  development  of  capitalism 
in  Russia?  Would  these  be  destroyed  by  capital- 
ism, or  would  they  survive  and  become  the  basis 
of  a  truly  Russian  form  of  Socialist  society?  These 
questions  were  submitted  to  Marx,  and  his  reply 
to  them  was  published  in  the  leading  radical 
magazine  of  the  period,  Fatherland's  Records. 
Most  of  the  copies  of  the  issue  seem  to  have  been 
confiscated   by  the   police,   causing   Lavroff  to   re- 


94    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

publish  Marx's  article,  in  1886,  in  his  Messenger 
of  the  People's  Will,  edited  from  Paris. 

In  this  article,  which  holds  an  important  place 
in  the  literature  of  Russian  Socialism,  Marx  took 
up  the  theory  of  Tchernyshevsky  and  his  friends 
that,  instead  of  going  through  a  long  process  of 
capitalist  development,  Russia  might  "adopt  all 
the  fruits  of  this  system  without  going  through  the 
tortures  connected  with  it,  and  develop  in  accord- 
ance with  its  peculiar  historical  environment." 
Marx  did  not  consider  this  altogether  impossible. 
In  one  pregnant  sentence  he  lays  significant  stress 
upon  the  element  of  national  choice  as  a  factor 
in  social  evolution,  showing  that  to  Marx  the 
economic  motivation  of  history  was  not  the  rigid 
and  absolute  process  which  the  Marxists  who 
were  "more  Marxist  than  Marx"  believed  it  to  be. 
"If  Russia  will  follow  the  way  chosen  by  it  after 
1 86 1,  it  will  lose  one  of  the  most  convenient  oppor- 
tunities which  history  ever  offered  to  a  people — 
to  evade  all  the  features  of  the  capitalist  system." 
This  reads  more  like  a  passage  from  the  writings 
of  Proudhon  or  Bakunin  than  a  passage  from  Marx! 
After  a  discussion  of  the  extent  and  manner  of  the 
application  of  his  theory  of  capitalist  accumulation 
to  Russia,  he  summed  up  in  these  words:  "If 
Russia  endeavors  to  become  a  capitalistic  land  like 
western  Europe  (and  during  late  years  it  has 
labored  sufficiently  in  that  respect)  it  will  not 
reach  it  without  first  transforming  a  good  portion 
of  its  peasants  into  proletarians.  But  after  this, 
first  having  fallen  under  the  yoke  of  a  capitalistic 
regime,  it  will  be  compelled  to  submit  to  the  cruel 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION    95 

laws  of  capitalism  on  a  par  with  other  unsuspecting 
nations." 

Events  in  Russia  since  the  overthrow  of  czarism 
lend  some  interest  and  importance  to  the  discus- 
sion of  this  same  great  question  by  Marx  and 
Engels  in  their  joint  preface  to  Plechanov's  trans- 
lation of  the  Communist  Manifesto,  published 
twenty-eight  years  ago,  "//  the  Russian  revolution 
is  the  signal  for  the  labor  revolution  in  the  West,  so 
that  both  complete  each  other,  the  modern  Russian 
communal  land  ownership  might  become  the  basis 
for  a  communistic  development."  It  is  not  difficult 
to  discern  in  this  passage  the  intellectual  parentage 
of  Lenin's  policy  of  desperately  striving  to  spread 
Bolshevism  in  the  western  nations.  On  more  than 
one  occasion  Lenin  has  openly  declared  that  the 
sole  chance  for  the  permanent  success  of  his  policy 
depended  upon  Bolshevist  revolutions  in  the  western 
nations. 

Besides  the  conflict  between  the  two  rival  phi- 
losophies we  have  thus  far  discussed  there  was  a 
third  element  in  the  development  of  the  Russian 
revolutionary  movement,  namely,  the  tactics  in- 
spired by  the  great  French  revolutionist,  Auguste 
Blanqui.  Just  as  Russian  Marxists  were  often 
"more  Marxist  than  Marx,"  so  the  Russian  Blan- 
quists  were  "more  Blanquist  than  Blanqui."  The 
school  of  Herzen,  Bakunin,  and  Tchernyshevsky 
idealized  both  the  mir  and  the  muzhik.  They 
held  that  the  muzhiks  were  communists  by  nature; 
that  the  difficulties  which  seemed  so  great  to  the 
Intellectuals,  who  had  lost  contact  with  reality, 
did  not  exist  for  the  peasants  with  their  peculiar 


96    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

genius.  All  that  was  needed  was  for  the  Intel- 
lectuals, with  their  intellectual  consciousness  of  the 
communist  ideal  of  society,  to  go  down  "among 
the  people"  who  were  innately  communists,  but 
not  conscious  of  the  fact  or  its  significance.  A 
touch  of  intellect  would,  they  believed,  liberate 
a  great  mass  spiritual  movement.  How  miserably 
they  failed  is  well  known.  Only  here  and  there 
did  a  few  peasants  respond  to  their  appeal.  Gen- 
erally the  peasants  fell  upon  the  propagandists, 
beat  them  mercilessly,  and,  in  many  cases,  bound 
them  and  turned  them  over  to  the  police  or  to  the 
landowners. 

It  soon  became  obvious  that  a  long,  long  time 
must  elapse  before  anything  like  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  peasants  could  be  induced  to  join 
in  a  revolution.  The  central  idea  of  the  "  Bakunin- 
ists"  was  thus  discredited.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  was  no  ground  for  hoping  that  the  proletarian 
revolution,  which  was  the  central  idea  of  Marxism, 
could  take  place  within  any  reasonably  near  time. 
The  industrial  proletariat  was  an  almost  infinites- 
imal part  of  the  population.  For  many  Russian 
Intellectuals  it  was  at  once  impossible  to  accept 
the  Bakunist  idea  of  abolishing  the  state  and  the 
Marxist  idea  of  bringing  it  under  the  rule  of  the 
proletariat.  There  could  be  no  thoroughgoing 
change,  they  said,  without  capturing  and  using 
the  governmental  power.  But  for  this  the  ma- 
jority of  the  people  could  not  be  prepared.  Must 
the  struggle  be  abandoned,  then?  No.  It  was 
possible  to  capture  the  state,  as  Blanqui  had 
shown.     All  that  was  necessarv  was  for  a  deter- 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION   97 

mined,  revolutionary  minority  to  seize  the  state 
by  force  and  liberate  the  people. 

Trust  in  the  Russian  people  themselves  was 
wholly  lacking  in  this  policy.  "Never,  neither 
to-day  nor  in  the  future,  would  the  people,  left  to 
itself,  be  capable  of  achieving  a  social  revolution. 
We  alone,  the  revolutionary  minority,  might 
achieve  it,  and  we  must  do  so  as  soon  as  possible."  ! 
These  Blanquist  apostles  of  conspiratory  action 
looking  to  coups  d'etat  by  revolutionary  minorities, 
who  despised  the  reliance  of  such  leaders  as 
Lavroff  on  the  education  of  the  masses,  were  the 
real  progenitors  of  Bolshevism.  On  its  practical 
side  Bolshevism  is  mainly  a  revival  of  Blanquism. 
There  are,  indeed,  elements  of  Marxism  in  its 
theoretical  propaganda,  and  its  vocabulary  is 
notably  that  of  Marx.  Its  practical  methods, 
however,  are  chiefly  those  of  Blanquism,  from  which 
it  derives  its  anti-democratic,  despotic  character. 


IX 

In  the  dark  period  which  followed  the  Act  of 
Liberation,  the  famous  Circle  of  Tchaykovsky  and 
the  Land  and  Freedom  Society  made  a  brave  strug- 
gle against  the  ever-increasing  despotism  of  the 
government,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  ignorance 
of  the  peasants,  on  the  other.  Their  failure  led  to 
the  adoption  of  terrorism  by  a  majority  of  the 
Land  and  Freedom  Society,  which  split  in  1879. 
Two  years  later,  March  1,  1S81,  Sophia  Perovskaya 

'Quoted  from  I*.  [.avroff's  Thr  Propagandist  Namdniki  of  (he  Years 
1873-78  by  Al'-vir^ky,  o/>.  cit,,  p.  343, 


98    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

and  her  associates  assassinated  Alexander  II,  a 
few  days  before  the  date  he  had  privately  set  for 
the  introduction  of  extensive  reforms.  The  assas- 
sination did  not  temper  the  despotism  of  the  regime, 
which,  instead  of  becoming  better,  became  very 
much  worse.  It  was  feared  by  the  peasants  that 
serfdom  was  to  be  restored.  Poles  and  Jews  were 
mercilessly  persecuted  and  all  "foreign"  influences 
repressed  with  great  brutality. 

It  was  in  this  period  that  the  Marxian  Socialist 
movement  began  to  make  headway  under  the 
leadership  of  Plechanov,  Deutsch,  Vera  Zasulich, 
and  others.  The  revolutionary  thought  of  Russia 
was  turned  into  the  channel  through  which  it  was 
destined  to  flow  for  the  next  twenty  years.  Then 
terrorism  was  revived  with  most  disastrous  results. 
Then  followed  the  great  revolutionary  movement 
of  1905,  which  the  bureaucracy  drowned  in  blood. 

Throughout  the  whole  period  of  the  modern 
revolutionary  movement — that  is  to  say,  since  the 
Decembrist  uprising  in  1825 — the  minds  of  pro- 
gressive Russians  have  been  most  profoundly 
influenced  by  the  democratic  thought  of  western 
Europe  and,  in  recent  years,  the  United  States  of 
America.  On  the  other  hand,  the  reactionaries 
have  cultivated  German  friendship  and  sought 
to  lessen  the  influence  of  the  western  nations  on 
Russian  life,  economically,  politically,  and  cultur- 
ally. One  very  considerable  section  of  the  reac- 
tionary elements  frankly  stood  for  a  close  economic 
union  with  Germany,  for  the  control  of  the  Balkans 
by  Austro-German  imperialism,  and  for  Russia  to 
leave  European  affairs  severely  alone  in  order  to 


RUSSIA  AND  WESTERN  CIVILIZATION   99 

become  "the  great  Asiatic  power.'*  The  logical 
result  of  that  policy  would  be  a  bloc  composed  of 
Russia,  China,  and  Japan.  That  in  the  event  of 
such  a  union  being  effected  Japan,  and  not  Russia, 
would  be  the  leader  is  almost  self-evident. 


rn 

Russia's  subjection  to  Germany 


RUSSIA'S  economic  policy  in  the  quarter  of  a 
century  following  the  conclusion  of  the  Russo- 
Turkish  War  and  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  was 
dominated  by  political  and  military  considerations, 
by  the  interests  of  the  bureaucratic  oligarchy  into 
which  czarism  had  developed  during  the  reign  of 
Alexander  III.  This  is  not  less  true  of  the  policy 
prevailing  during  the  regime  of  Witte,  the  arch- 
foe  of  the  bureaucracy,  than  of  that  which  pre- 
vailed under  his  immediate  predecessors,  Vishne- 
gradski  and  Bunge,  who  were  with  and  of  the 
bureaucracy.  "We  sell  our  military  prestige  for 
the  economic  prestige  we  lack,"  said  Vishnegradski 
on  one  occasion. 

Throughout  his  official  career  Witte  was  in  a 
most  anomalous  position.  He  was  essentially  a 
capitalist  statesman,  trying  to  carry  out  a  vast 
policy  of  capitalist  development  in  a  nation  gov- 
erned by  motives  and  methods  incompatible  with 
capitalism.  If  ever  a  statesman  found  himself 
out  of  his  proper  time  and  place,  Serge  Julievich 
Witte  did.  He  was  a  keen  if  not  a  profound 
student  of  history.  At  the  same  time  he  was  a 
shrewd    capitalist   with    a    remarkable   genius   for 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    101 

organization  and  a  not  less  remarkable  creative 
imagination.  In  many  respects  his  mentality 
greatly  resembled  that  of  the  great  American 
capitalists,  James  J.  Hill,  Edward  H.  Harriman, 
and  others.  At  the  very  time  when  the  bureaucracy 
was  bent  upon  intensifying  the  Orientalism  of 
Russia  he  saw  the  need  of  modernizing  and  Euro- 
peanizing  it.  He  wanted  to  make  Russia  a  great 
modern  state,  its  vital  forces  dependent  upon  and 
springing  from  industrial  and  commercial  capi- 
talism. He  wanted  the  policies  of  the  state  to  be 
controlled  by  the  interests  of  capitalist  develop- 
ment, instead  of  the  development  of  capitalism 
being  controlled  and  conditioned  by  the  policies 
of  the  state.  The  very  nature  of  a  bureaucratic 
oligarchy  was  incompatible  with  this  theory  and 
purpose. 

As  head  of  the  Railroad  Department  under 
Minister  of  Finance  Vishnegradski,  Witte  undoubt- 
edly saved  the  railway  system  of  Russia  from 
ruin,  and  greatly  extended  it.  He  made  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railroad  possible.  As  Minister  of  Finance 
following  Vishnegradski,  he  was  compelled  by  the 
very  nature  of  the  bureaucracy  to  devise  and  im- 
pose upon  the  country  a  fiscal  policy  which  was 
artificial,  oppressive,  and  fundamentally  unsound, 
a  policy  which  was,  moreover,  essentially  antago- 
nistic to  his  hopes  and  his  aims,  as  he  could  not 
fail  to  recognize.  Coming  into  office  at  a  time 
of  the  most  appalling  poverty,  before  the  country 
had  recovered  from  the  terrible  famines  of  1891-92, 
In  found  himself  compelled  to  resort  to  the  most 
extraordinary  financial  juggling,  the  net  results  of 


102    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

which  were  increased  taxation  and  inflated  prices, 
the  imposition  of  new  economic  burdens  upon  a 
people  already  crushed.  Witte  was  too  brutal 
and  callous  to  pay  much  heed  to  this  fact  were  it 
not  that  it  was  in  the  interest  of  a  s}rstem  funda- 
mentally antagonistic  to  his  own  ideas  and  plans. 
Witte  was  far  from  opposing  the  desire  of  the 
bureaucracy  to  extend  Russia's  Asiatic  dominions. 
He  favored  the  extension  of  Russian  influence  in 
northern  China  and  Persia,  especially  the  domi- 
nation of  Manchuria  by  so-called  "spontaneous 
infiltration"  and  other  methods.  His  motives, 
however,  were  quite  different  from  those  of  the  bu- 
reaucrats. He  saw  in  this  Asiatic  expansion  great 
economic  resources  to  be  exploited  by  western 
methods.  A  cardinal  feature  of  his  policy  was 
the  development  of  industry,  to  which  end  he  both 
fostered  protection  and  encouraged  the  intro- 
duction of  foreign  capital  for  industrial  purposes. 
By  increasing  indirect  taxation,  by  enormous  prof- 
its derived  from  the  state  monopolies  through 
excessively  high  charges — a  disguised  form  of  taxa- 
tion— and  foreign  loans,  Witte  built  up  that  great 
fiscal  system  which  year  by  year  added  to  the 
impoverishment  of  the  people  and,  by  limiting 
their  purchasing  power,  restricted  the  volume  of 
effective  demand  for  commodities  upon  which  the 
"infant  industries"  depended.  The  whole  policy 
resulted  in  enriching  the  bureaucracy's  treasury 
far  more  than  it  helped  Russian  industry.  The 
average  gross  income  per  head  at  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century  was  five  times  higher  in  Ger- 
many than  in  Russia,  yet  prices  in  Russia  were 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    103 

so  much  higher  that  the  advantage  of  the  German 
consumer  over  the  Russian  consumer  was  even 
greater  than  indicated  by  the  difference  in  income. 

It  is  to  the  credit  of  Witte  that  he  very  clearly 
saw  that  Russia  was  greatly  menaced  by  the 
aggressive  economic  policy  of  Germany,  that  she 
was  in  fact  in  danger  of  being  reduced  to  a  con- 
dition of  economic  dependence  upon  Germany 
amounting  to  vassalage.  He  was  among  the  first 
Russian  economists  to  recognize  the  "German 
colony"  peril,  as  it  came  to  be  known.  His  stout 
resistance  to  Germany's  aggressiveness  was  in 
large  part  responsible  for  the  opposition  of  a 
powerful  section  of  the  bureaucracy,  which  was 
strongly  attached  to  Germany  by  many  ties.  Ger- 
man intrigue  and  the  Germanophile  bureaucracy's 
hatred  were  directed  against  him.  For  years  Witte 
was  the  foreign  statesman  most  feared  and  most 
cordially  hated  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  Berlin. 

Had  the  relations  between  Russia  and  England 
been  more  friendly  Witte  would  undoubtedly 
have  turned  to  English  capitalists  for  a  very  large 
part  of  the  capital  needed  to  develop  Russian 
industry.  As  it  was,  England  was  suspicious  of 
Russia  and  in  no  mood  to  assist  in  building  up  her 
railways  and  her  industries,  thus  making  her  a 
more  formidable  potential  foe,  capable  of  leveling 
a  dangerous  attack  against  India.  Thus  it  was 
that  Witte  had  to  rely  mainly  upon  French,  Bel- 
gian, and  German  capital.  The  protective  policy 
of  Witte  was  far  from  being  a  success.  Despite 
the  high  tariffs  imposed,  imports  steadily  increased. 
Home   manufactures   grew,    it  is  true,  but  not  so 


io4    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

rapidly.1  Germany,  thanks  to  her  system  of  "ex- 
port bounties"  and  other  devices,  acquired  an 
ever-increasing  share  of  this  import  trade  and 
steadily  enlarged  her  control  over  the  economic 
life  of  the  Czar's  empire. 

Witte  was  thus  checkmated  on  all  sides.  He 
had  believed  that  the  desire  of  the  oligarchy  for 
military  and  political  expansion  in  Asia  could  be 
made  to  serve  his  ambitious  program  of  economic 
expansion.  He  imagined  Russia  Europeanized 
by  a  rapid  process  of  industrial  evolution,  trans- 
formed in  a  few  years  into  a  great  manufacturing 
country.  As  such,  he  believed,  Russia  would  profit 
by  her  Asiatic  colonization,  finding  both  a  market 
for  her  goods  and  an  almost  inexhaustible  source 
of  supply.  Asiatic  expansion  meant,  therefore, 
one  thing  to  the  oligarchy  and  quite  another  thing 
to  Witte.  The  former  wanted  a  great  Oriental 
empire,  while  Witte  wanted  Russia  to  step  from 
Orientalism  to  Occidentalism,  from  Oriental  feudal- 
ism to  modern  industrialism.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that  Japan  had  not  yet  become  a  great 
nation,  either  politically  or  industrially.  So  Witte 
saw  in  Asia  only  an  effete  civilization  and  was 
strengthened  in  his  resolve  to  link  Russia  more 
closely  to  the  Western  World.  He  was  almost 
equally  unfortunate  in  his  domestic  policy.  In 
the  first  place,  the  measures  devised  to  foster 
Russia's  native  industrial  development  and  emanci- 
pate her  from  Germany's  economic  domination 
had  the  contrary  effect  of  impeding  rather  than 
accelerating  the  former  and  of  increasing  the  latter. 

•  A.  Ular,  Russia  from  Within  (1905),  p.  152. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     105 

Industry  increased,  it  is  true,  but  neither  so  fast 
as  Germanjr's  trade  nor  as  the  impoverishment  of 
the  masses.  This  impoverishment  grew  so  serious 
that  the  most  bounteous  harvests  mattered  little 
or  nothing:  despite  good  harvests  there  was  under- 
consumption amounting  to  actual  famine  in  the  land. 
Neither  at  this  period  nor  later  did  famine  in 
Russia  necessarily  mean  shortage  of  food,  it  must 
be  remembered.  There  was  generally  food  enough 
in  the  land.  Under  the  old  regime  there  was 
always  an  immense  exportation  of  grain,  even  in 
the  worst  famine  years.  True,  this  so-called  "sur- 
plus" was  in  fact  not  a  surplus  at  all.  "Grain 
was  exported  from  some  provinces  when  in  others 
thousands  were  dying  of  starvation,  or  only  keeping 
body  and  soul  together  with  bread  made  from 
the  bark  of  trees,"  says  Wilcox.1  The  same  well- 
informed  writer  tells  us  that,  "In  the  worst  of  the 
famine  years  there  was  no  very  considerable  fall 
in  the  amount  of  grain  exported,  and  Englishmen 
grew  fat  on  bread  made  of  Russian  wheat,  while 
the  entire  population  of  Russian  villages  lay 
through  the  winter  in  a  kind  of  hibernation,  to 
which  they  had  trained  themselves  as  the  only 
means  of  husbanding  their  physical  resources  and 
preventing  themselves  from  dying  of  hunger."  2 

11 

1  he  failure  of  \\  itte  was  relative,  not  absolute. 
Moreover,  it  was  due  mainly  to  the  fact  that  he 
was    attempting    the    almost    impossible    task    of 

1  A'uj  ,:d ' s  Ruin-,  by  h.  H.  Wilcox,  p.  6.  2  Idem,  p.  7. 


106    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

accelerating  industrial  progress  within  the  rigid 
circle  of  a  political  system  essentially  antagonistic 
to  industrialism.  If  the  gain  made  was  far  from 
commensurate  to  the  size  and  population  of  Russia, 
her  possibilities  or  the  magnitude  of  the  efforts 
made  by  Witte,  it  was  great  enough  to  demon- 
strate the  fact  that  Russia  possessed  the  poten- 
tialities of  a  vast  industrial  development.  The 
only  full  census  of  the  population  of  Russia  was 
made  in  1897.  From  it  we  can  gather  some  idea 
of  the  growth  of  urban  populations — itself  an 
indication  of  industrial  growth.  In  1867  there 
were  twelve  cities  with  a  population  of  50,000  to 
100,000;  in  1897  there  were  thirty-seven  such 
cities,  with  a  total  population  of  2,401,000  as  against 
834,000  in  cities  of  this  class  thirty  years  before. 
The  population  of  St.  Petersburg  in  1867  was 
539,471;  in  1897  it  was  1,267,023,  a  gain  of  over 
136  per  cent  Moscow  in  the  same  period  increased 
its  population  from  351,609  to  1,035,664 — an  in- 
crease of  nearly  195  per  cent.  In  Lodz,  the  center 
of  the  textile  industry  in  the  Polish  provinces, 
the  population  was  32,437  in  1867  and  315,209  in 
1897 — an  increase  of  872  per  cent.  In  Ivanovo- 
Vosnesenk,  the  center  of  the  textile  industry  in 
central  Russia,  the  population  rose  from  1,350  in 
1867  to  53,949  in  1897— an  increase  of  over  3,896 
per  cent.  If  we  turn  from  textiles  to  iron,  we 
find  that  in  Ekaterinoslav,  the  center  of  the  coal 
industry  of  southern  Russia,  the  population  in  1867 
was  19,908  and  had  risen  in  1897  to  121,216 — an 
increase  of  508  percent.  The  population  of  Baku, 
center  of  the  oil  industry  in  the  Caucasus,  on  the 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     107 

Caspian  Sea,  increased  about  702  per  cent. — from 
13,992  in  1867  to  112,253  in  1897.  Libau,  a  Baltic 
seaport,  grew  from  10,227  in  1867  to  64,505  in  1897 
— an  increase  of  540  per  cent.,  while  Tzaritzyn,  a 
port  on  the  Volga,  grew  from  8,456  in  1867  to  55,967 
in  1897 — an  increase  of  562  per  cent.1 

In  the  year  1887  there  were  employed  in  textile 
manufacture  399,178  workmen,  and  the  value  of 
the  textile  production  was  463,044,000  rubles.  In 
1897  the  number  of  employees  in  this  industry 
had  risen  to  642,520  and  the  value  of  the  product 
to  946,296,000  rubles.  In  1887  the  coal  production 
amounted  to  4,534,000  tons,  valued  at  13,839,000 
rubles;  in  1897  the  production  rose  to  11,203,000 
tons,  valued  at  38,945,000  rubles.  In  the  same 
period  the  oil  industry  was  marked  by  a  similar 
development,  the  product  in  1887  was  2,733,000 
tons,  valued  at  5,006,000  rubles;  in  1897  the  pro- 
duction was  7,831,000  tons,  valued  at  36,558,000 
rubles.  Iron  and  steel — the  barometer  industry — 
shows  very  similar  progress.  For  instance,  the 
increase  of  cast-iron  production  amounted  to 
125,000  tons  yearly  in  the  same  period,  the  figures 
being  594,000  tons  in  1887,  valued  at  25,405,000 
rubles,  and  1,848,000  tons,  valued  at  77,731,000 
rubles  in  1897.  Steel  in  finished  products  to  the 
amount  of  157,000  tons,  valued  at  22,094,000  rubles, 
was  produced  in  1S87,  and  in  1897  the  production 
was  920,000  tons,  valued  at  125,942,000  rubles.2 

1  These  figures  arc  taken  from  V.  I.  Pokrovsky's  Russia  at  the  End 
of  the  A  inrtcevth  Century,  published  hy  the  Russian  Ministry  ot  Finance, 
and  quoted  hy  M.  Ol^in,  The  Snul  of  ik<-  Russian  Revolution,  in  an 
appendix  which  pives  the  entire  tabic.     See  Appendix  C,  Table  I. 

2  See  Appendix  C,  Table  II. 


10S    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Naturally,  this  industrial  progress  was  attend- 
ed by  a  considerable  concentration  of  workmen 
in  factories — that  is  to  say,  by  the  growth  of 
the  industrial  proletariat.  According  to  Toughan- 
Baranovsky,  in  1879  there  were  203  cotton  factories 
each  employing  more  than  100  persons,  the  total 
number  of  employees  being  153,332.  In  1894 
there  were  224  such  factories,  the  number  of  em- 
ployees being  234,506.  The  distribution  of  these 
reveals  a  growth  of  large  factories  and  a  decrease 
in  the  number  of  small  ones.  Thus,  in  1879  there 
were  118  factories  in  the  class  employing  from  100 
to  500  persons,  while  in  1897  there  were  108.  In 
the  fprmer  year  the  total  number  of  persons  em- 
ployed in  factories  of  this  class  was  28,212,  while  in 
1894  it  had  dropped  to  27,050.  Factories  employ- 
ing from  500  to  1,000  workers  increased  from  44  in 
1879  to  48  in  1897,  the  total  number  of  workers 
employed  in  factories  of  this  class  also  showing  a 
small  gain,  the  numbers  being  32,591  in  1897  and 
33,462  in  1894.  In  1879  there  were  40  factories 
employing  from  1,000  to  5,000  workers,  the  total 
number  of  employees  being  83,583.  In  1894  the 
number  of  such  factories  had  risen  to  60  and  the 
total  number  of  employees  to  119,013.  In  1S79 
there  was  only  1  factory  employing  more  than  5,000 
workers,  the  number  employed  being  8,946.  In 
1894  there  were  8  such  factories  and  the  number  of 
workers  employed  was  54,981.* 

These  figures  relate  only  to  cotton  manufacture. 
If  we  turn  to  the  statistics  of  general  industrial 

1  Toughan-Baranovsky,  The  Russian  Factory  in  ihe  Past  and  Present. 
See  also  Appendix  A,  Tabic  II. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    109 

production  we  find  the  same  tendency  even  more 
plainly  indicated.  In  1897  mining,  manufacture, 
and  transportation  gave  employment  to  about 
3,000,000  persons.  In  1879  there  were  979  fac- 
tories employing  between  100  and  500  persons 
each,  the  total  number  of  employees  in  such  fac- 
tories being  219,400.  In  1894  tne  number  of  such 
factories  was  1,136  and  of  employees  252,700. 
Factories  employing  between  500  and  1,000  persons 
numbered  164  in  1S79,  the  total  number  of  persons 
employed  in  them  being  113,900.  In  1894  there 
were  215  such  factories,  employing  143,500  persons. 
In  1879  there  were  86  factories  employing  over  1,000 
persons  each,  the  total  number  employed  being 
163,000.  In  1894  there  were  1 17  such  factories, 
the  total  number  of  persons  employed  in  them 
being  259,50c.1 

In  the  eleven-year  period  1887-97  the  total  pro- 
duction of  Russian  mining  and  manufacture  rose 
from  1.3  billions  of  rubles  in  1887  to  2.8  billions  of 
rubles  in  1897.  From  1887  to  1890  the  annual 
increase  was  56  millions  of  rubles;  from  1893  to 
1897  it  was  276  millions  of  rubles.2  These  and 
similar  figures  illustrative  of  the  industrial  develop- 
ment of  Russia  in  this  period  may  be  considered 
from  two  separate  and  distinct  points  of  view. 
On  the  one  hand  they  invite  comparison  with 
similar  statistical  data  relating  to  other  nations. 
So  considered  they  serve  mainly  to  show  Russia's 
backwardness  from  the  point  of  view  of  industrial 

'  I  lifse  fi:;:irts  arc  taken  from  tables  by  Po^oshcv,  quoted  by  M. 
Ol^in,  op. 

-  OI -in,  op.  ill.,  p.  8. 


no    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

development.  Having  regard  to  the  long  time 
which  had  elapsed  since  the  introduction  of  the 
factory  system  under  Ivan  the  Terrible,  to  the  area 
and  population  of  the  empire,  and  to  its  vast 
natural  resources,  the  totals  are  impressively 
meager,  especially  when  we  compare  them  with 
American,  British,  and  German  figures.  Such  a 
comparison  shows  quite  clearly  how  czarism  hin- 
dered the  economic  growth  of  the  nation.  On  the 
other  hand,  such  figures  as  we  have  been  consider- 
ing show  that  by  the  last  decade  of  the  nineteenth 
century  industrial  capitalism  had  become  firmly 
rooted  in  the  life  of  the  great  Slav  nation.  It  was 
truly  an  era  of  industrial  revolution. 

Not  even  the  reactionary  regime  of  the  czarist 
bureaucracy  could  longer  hold  in  check  the  great 
economic  forces  which  had  been  so  slowly  developed. 
Once  a  certain  momentum  was  attained  by  those 
forces  they  became  irresistible:  the  bureaucratic 
regime  might  continue  to  harass  and  obstruct, 
but  it  could  not  prevent  the  progress  of  indus- 
trialism. The  war  between  Japan  and  China  in 
1894-95,  and  the  victory  of  the  former,  exerted  a 
profound  influence  upon  Russian  industrial  devel- 
opment as  well  as  upon  her  foreign  policy.  The 
great  increase  in  the  number  of  new  joint-stock 
companies  formed  in  the  years  immediately  fol- 
lowing Japan's  astonishing  demonstration  of  mili- 
tary and  industrial  strength  are  very  illuminating. 
In  the  three  years  1893-95  there  had  been  formed 
197  new  joint-stock  companies  with  a  capital  stock 
of  about  191,800,000  rubles.  In  the  three  years 
1896-98   there  were   467   such   companies   formed 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    in 

with  a  capital  stock  of  about  604,000,000  rubles. 
If  we  take  the  average  of  the  three-year  period 
1893-95,  we  find  that  in  each  of  the  three  years 
there  were  organized  66  joint-stock  companies, 
with  a  total  capital  stock  of  something  less  than 
64,000,000  rubles.  In  the  four  years  1896-99 
the  average  number  of  joint-stock  companies 
formed  was  193  and  the  average  total  capital  stock, 
roughly,  236,400,000  rubles.  The  progress  of  this 
movement  is  shown  in  the  following  table: 


TABLE  A 


STOCK    COMPANIKS    IN    RUSSIA 


Year 

No.  of  Nezv 

Companies 

Capital  Stock  in  Rubles 

1893 

55 

56,600,000 

1894 

64 

57,600,000 

1895 

7« 

77,600,000 

1896 

127 

180,700,000 

1897 

136 

187,500,000 

1898 

204 

236,100,000 

1899 

305 

341,400,000 

In  the  same  period  there  was  an  extensive, 
almost  feverish,  growth  of  railway  mileage.  This 
was  doubled  between  1S90  and  1897  and  there  was 
a  corresponding  increase  in  equipment,  in  the 
number  of  locomotives  and  passenger  and  freight- 
cars.  Of  course,  it  is  true  that  a  very  considerable 
part  of  this  railroad  development  was  due  to 
reasons  of  military  strategy  and  should  be  credited, 
therefore,  to  the  foreign  policy  of  the  bureaucracy 
rather  than  to  the  natural  development  of  indus- 
trialism.    Nevertheless,    in     Russia,   as    in    every 


ii2    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

country,  the  development  of  railway  transporta- 
tion forms  an  essential  part  of  the  industrial  develop- 
ment of  the  country.  Lack  of  railway  facilities 
has  greatly  hampered  Russia's  industrial  progress. 
Take,  for  example,  the  immense  possibilities  of 
iron  production  in  the  Ural  Mountains,  which  was 
begun  as  far  back  as  the  reign  of  Ivan  the  Terrible. 
Because  until  recently  there  was  no  coal  mined 
in  the  Ural  Mountains,  it  was  necessary  to  bring 
coal  from  western  Siberia.  Lack  of  adequate  rail- 
way transportation  has  been  one  of  the  chief  factors 
in  retarding  the  development  of  this  great  industry. 
How  inadequate  Russia's  railway  system  has 
been  and  is  may  be  seen  by  comparing  her  rail- 
road mileage  with  that  of  other  countries.  The 
Russian  Empire,  as  it  was  constituted  at  the  time 
of  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War  in  1914,  embraced 
an  area  three  times  the  size  of  the  United  States, 
an  area  approximating  almost  one-sixth  of  the 
land  of  the  globe.  Yet  it  had  only  39,706  miles 
of  railroad  as  compared  with  258,782  in  the  United 
States.1  Whereas  in  the  United  States  there  was 
a  mileage  per  10,000  of  population  of  practically 
29  miles,  in  Russia  there  was  less  than  3  miles. 
With  a  population  of  160,000,000,  excluding  present 
Poland  and  Finland,  Russia  possessed,  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war,  a  railway  system  whose  freight- 
carrying  capacity  only  slightly  exceeded  that  pos- 
sessed by  the  railways  of  Canada,  a  country  with  a 
population  of  8,ooo,ooo.2 

1  United  States  figures  are  for  1910. 

2  Russia,  Her  Economic  Past  and  Future,  by  Dr.  Joseph  M.  Gold- 
stein, p.  52. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     113 

The  conclusion  which  these  figures  of  railway 
transportation  suggest  is  that  Russia  is  a  country 
as  yet  undeveloped,  whose  industrial  evolution  is 
barely  begun.  The  statistics  of  every  department 
of  Russia's  economic  life  lead  irresistibly  to  the 
same  conclusion.  Lest  we  exaggerate  the  un- 
doubted progress  in  industrial  development  which 
occurred  in  Russia  in  the  years  immediately  pre- 
ceding the  World  War,  it  may  be  well  to  remember 
that  before  the  Revolution  in  1917  the  total  capital 
represented  in  all  the  industrial  and  commercial 
joint-stock  companies  of  Russia,  exclusive  of  banks 
and  railroads,  was  only  around  two  billion  dollars — 
about  one-ninth  of  the  capital  invested  in  the  stocks 
and  bonds  of  the  railways  of  the  United  States. 
The  stock-and-bond  capital  of  one  American  cor- 
poration— the  United  States  Steel  Corporation — 
was  almost  equal  to  the  entire  capital  of  Russia's 
industrial  and  commercial  joint-stock  companies, 
exclusive  of  railroads  and  banks.1  With  a  popula- 
tion of  179,000,000,  the  total  paid-up  capital  of  all 
Russian  industrial  and  commercial  corporations 
was  less  than  two  billions  of  dollars,  as  against 
twelve  billions  of  dollars  for  England  with  a  popula- 
tion of  45,000,000,  the  English  figures  being  exclu- 
sive of  the  immense  sums  invested  in  the  railway 
companies  of  the  nation.  In  Russia  with  179,000,- 
000  people  there  were  barely  2,000  joint-stock 
companies;  in  England  with  45,000,000  people 
there  were  more  than  56,000  such  companies.2 

The  inference  to  be  drawn  from  these  and 
similar  statistics  is  that  Russia  is  a  land  that  offers 

1  Goldstein,  op.  cit.,  p.  7.  J  Idem,  p.  7. 


ii4    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

almost  unlimited  opportunities  for  industrial  de- 
velopment. Her  known  natural  resources  are 
immeasurable.  They  are  greater  in  sum  and 
variety  than  the  known  natural  resources  of  any 
other  nation.  As  yet  only  the  merest  fringe  of 
these  has  been  touched,  just  enough  to  indicate 
the  immense  stored  reservoir  which  lies  waiting 
for  labor  and  enterprise  to  create  channels  for  the 
distribution  of  its  riches. 


HI 

As  we  have  already  observed,  the  war  between 
Japan  and  China,  and  the  emergence  of  Japan  from 
obscurity  to  a  place  among  the  great  powers, 
greatly  afFected  the  foreign  policy  of  Russia  and  also 
stimulated  her  industrial  growth.  The  war  was 
terminated  by  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki,  signed 
on  April  17,  1895.  By  that  treaty  Japan  imposed 
upon  China  the  following  conditions: 

1.  Recognition  of  the  complete  independence  of  Korea. 

2.  Cession  by  China  to  Japan  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula 
and  adjacent  waters,  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan,  the  islands 
of  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores. 

3.  Payment  by  China  to  Japan  of  an  indemnity  of  200,000,- 
000  taels,  Wei-hai-wei  to  be  held  in  pledge  by  Japan  until 
this  was  paid. 

4.  Opening  up  to  trade  of  Saslich,  Chungking,  Suchow,  and 
Hangchow,  and  of  the  Yangtse-kiang  to  navigation.1 

The  gains  made  by  Japan  at  the  expense  of  the 
Celestial  Empire  were  such  as  would  practically 

1  Japan,  From  the  Age  of  the  Gods  to  the  Fall  of  Tsingtau,  by  F.  Had- 
land  Davis,  p.  a68;  Japan,  the  Rise  of  &  Modern  Power,  by  Robert  P. 
Porter,  p.  139. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     115 

make  impossible  the  fulfilment  of  Russia's  great 
plans  for  Asiatic  expansion.  The  bureaucracy 
had  been  anxious  to  bring  the  whole  of  Manchuria 
within  the  sphere  of  Russian  control  and,  ulti- 
mately, absorb  it  into  the  Russian  Empire.  To 
that  end  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway,  a  large 
part  of  the  eastern  section  of  which  traversed 
Chinese  territory,  logically  tended.  This  policy 
really  dated  from  1854,  when  Count  Muraviev 
seized  the  Amur  River  during  the  blockade  of  the 
Black  Sea  in  the  Crimean  War.  The  Treaty  of 
Aigun,  in  1858,  supplemented  by  another  treaty 
made  two  years  later,  began  the  intimate  relations 
between  Russia  and  China  which  lasted  for  the 
next  half-century.  By  those  treaties  Russia  ac- 
quired the  whole  coast  of  Manchuria  to  the  frontier 
of  Korea  and  the  right  to  establish  the  great  harbor 
of  Vladivostok  as  an  eastern  seaport  and  the  gate- 
way to  Siberia.1 

The  bureaucracy  also  wanted  to  secure  a  footing 
in  Korea,  which  possessed  splendid  harbor  and  port 
facilities  greatly  desired  by  Russia.  Once  estab- 
lished in  Korea,  Russia  would  undoubtedly  have 
absorbed  it  and  incorporated  it  into  the  empire. 
That  this  was  the  grandiose  scheme  of  the  bureau- 
cracy there  can  be  no  possible  doubt.  To  that 
scheme  the  Japanese,  by  acquiring  domination  of 
Korea — which  was  the  reality  masked  by  the 
diplomatic  rhetoric  about  the  "recognition  of  the 
complete  independence  of  Korea" — dealt  what 
would  have  been  a  death-blow  if  the  Treaty  of 
Shimonoseki  had  been  permitted  to  stand. 

1  See  "Vladimir,"  Russia  on  the  Pacific,  p.  317  el  scq. 


n6    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

Six  days  after  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of 
Shimonoseki  the  Russian  government  made  the 
following  remonstrance  to  Japan: 

"The  government  of  his  Majesty  the  Emperor 
of  All  the  Russias,  in  examining  the  conditions  of 
peace  which  Japan  has  imposed  on  China,  finds 
that  the  possession  of  the  Peninsula  of  Liaotung, 
claimed  by  Japan,  would  be  a  constant  menace 
to  the  capital  of  China,  would  at  the  same  time 
render  illusory  the  independence  of  Korea,  and 
would  henceforth  be  a  perpetual  obstacle  to  the 
permanent  peace  of  the  Far  East.  Consequently, 
the  government  of  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  would 
give  a  new  proof  of  their  sincere  friendship  for  the 
government  of  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan 
by  advising  them  to  renounc  *  the  definitive  possession 
of  the  Peninsula  of  Liaotung."  * 

Back  of  this  formidable  threat  disguised  as 
advice  prompted  by  "sincere  friendship"  a  subtle 
and  sinister  chain  of  diplomatic  intrigue  was  hid- 
den. It  is  hardly  to  be  doubted  that  Germany 
had  exercised  a  great,  and  perhaps  controlling, 
influence  in  the  shaping  of  Russia's  policy.  In 
February,  1895,  Russia,  seeing  the  inevitable  out- 
come of  the  war,  had  circularized  the  great  Euro- 
pean powers  and  the  United  States  on  the  question 
of  the  terms  which  Japan  should  be  permitted  to 
impose  upon  China.  The  Japanese  knew,  of 
course,  that  France  and  Russia  would  be  opposed 
to  having  Japan  gain  possession  of  Dalny  and 
Port  Arthur  and  equally  to  her  virtual  annexation 
of  Korea.     In  the  first  place,  these  were  obvious 

1  Italics  arc  mine. — The  Author. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     117 

Russian  objectives.  In  the  second  place,  not  only 
were  Russian  and  French  interests  practically 
identical,  owing  to  the  large  French  investments 
in  the  Russian  loans  which  furnished  the  capital 
used  by  the  Russian  government  in  constructing 
the  Trans-Siberian  Railway,  but  the  interests  of 
France  in  Asia,  her  possessions  in  Tongking  and 
Annam,  naturally  made  her  averse  to  seeing  a 
great,  militant  Asiatic  power  arise.  That  France 
supported  Russia's  remonstrance  against  the  Treaty 
of  Shimonoseki  did  not  surprise  the  Japanese. 

Japan  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  Great 
Britain  would  interfere  with  her.  On  the  contrary, 
it  was  reasonable  to  expect  her  support  against 
Russia  and  France.  She  was  not  allied  with 
China  in  any  waj*,  as  the  war  had  shown.  Indeed, 
her  attitude  had  been  uniformly  friendly  to  Japan. 
Furthermore,  not  only  were  Anglo-French  and 
Anglo-Russian  relations  strained  at  the  time,  but, 
what  was  more  important,  the  possession  of  Man- 
churia and  the  Liaotung  Peninsula  by  Russia  meant 
a  potential  danger  to  India. 

Nor  had  Japan  any  reason  to  expect  that  the 
attitude  of  German}-  would  be  hostile  to  her. 
Germany  had  no  territorial  interests  in  the  Far 
East;  it  was  well  known  that  her  foreign  policy 
had  always  aimed  at  preventing  Russia  from 
becoming  a  great  naval  power.  In  the  extension 
of  Russia  to  the  Liaotung  Peninsula  or  to  Korea, 
and  the  acquisition  by  her  of  great  ice-free  ports, 
German}-,  it  was  naturally  expected,  would  see  a 
menace  to  her  own  ambitions.  Just  before  the 
war   began,   indeed,   Germany   had   clearly  shown 


n8    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

that  she  would  not  permit  Russia  to  establish  a 
protectorate  over  Korea.  Finally,  there  were  two 
acts  on  the  part  of  Germany  which  Japan  was 
justified  in  regarding  as  pledges  of  exceptional 
friendship.  The  first  was  the  friendly  warning 
conveyed  to  her  in  March,  1895,  that  Russia  and 
France  intended  to  intervene  should  Japan  acquire 
any  territory  in  Manchuria.  The  second  was  the 
telegram  sent  to  Count  Mutsu,  the  Japanese  For- 
eign Minister,  by  Baron  von  Gutschmid,  the  Ger- 
man Minister  at  Tokio,  warmly  congratulating 
Japan  upon  the  conclusion  of  peace  at  Shimonoseki. 
Like  a  thunderbolt  out  of  a  clear  sky,  on  April 
23,  1895,  immediately  following  the  deliverance 
of  the  Russian  note  advising  Japan  to  "renounce 
the  definitive  possession  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula," 
Baron  von  Gutschmid  delivered  on  behalf  of  the 
German  government  a  brutally  offensive  note, 
also  advising  Japan  to  give  up  the  Liaotung  Penin- 
sula and  pointing  out  that  Japan  could  have  no 
chance  of  victory  in  a  war  against  Russia,  France, 
and  Germany!  The  German  Ambassador  was 
induced  to  withdraw  this  note  on  the  pretext 
that  the  Japanese  translation  was  defective  and 
did  not  correctly  represent  the  German  original, 
and  to  substitute  another  note  identical  with  that 
of  Russia  and  France.  It  was,  of  course,  out  of 
the  question  that  Japan  should  resist  a  demand 
presented  with  such  a  show  of  force.  She  could 
not  expect  Great  Britain  to  quarrel  with  Germany, 
Russia,  and  France,  and  go  to  war  with  them  to 
help  Japan.  Lord  Rosebery  refused  to  join  with 
the  three  European  powers  in  coercive  measures 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    119 

against  Japan,  but  he  could  not  be  expected  to 
challenge  them  to  war.  Consequently,  Japan 
abandoned  her  claims  in  Korea  and  the  Liaotung 
Peninsula  and  received  from  China  an  additional 
indemnity  of  30,000,000  taels,  payment  of  which 
was  secured  by  a  loan  to  China  guaranteed  by 
Russia.1 

Toward  the  end  of  1897  Germany — using  the 
murder  of  two  missionaries  as  a  pretext — began  to 
bring  pressure  upon  China  to  cede  to  her  the  im- 
portant strategic  harbor  of  Kiaochau,  on  the 
Shantung  Peninsula,  and  on  March  6,  1898,  the 
Kiaochau  district  was  formally  turned  over  to  her 
on  "a  lease  for  ninety-nine  years,"  a  diplomatic 
fiction  intended  to  cover  permanent  occupation. 
Thus  Germany  had  acquired  one  of  the  most  com- 
manding strategic  naval  bases  in  the  Far  East. 
So  far  Germany's  policy  seems  simple  enough. 
It  appears  as  an  ordinary  bit  of  diplomatic  chicane 
and  spoliation.  What  is  less  explicable  is  the 
fact  that  the  Kaiser  suggested  to  Czar  Nicholas  II 
that  Russia  take  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan. 
Thus  with  the  connivance  of  Germany,  and  at  her 
instigation,  Russia  forced  China  to  cede  to  her  the 
southern  part  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula  for  "a 
lease  of  twenty-five  years,"  and  so  acquired  Dalny 
and  Port  Arthur,  ice-free  ports  of  the  highest 
strategic  value.  Russia  occupied  these  ports  on 
March  28,  1898,  and  twelve  days  later  France 
secured  a  "lease"  of  Kwang-cho-wau,  between 
Tongking  and  Canton. 

China  was  being  partitioned  and,  at  the  same 

1  Porter,  op.  cit.,  pp.  140-142;  Davis,  op.  cit.,  pp.  269-270. 


120    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

time,  an  iron  ring  was  being  drawn  around  Japan. 
It  was  a  great  relief  to  the  latter  when  the  British 
government,  unwilling  to  see  Germany  and  Russia 
intrenching  themselves  in  such  strong  strategic 
centers  without  securing  some  point  of  equal 
advantage,  proposed  to  take  over  Wei-hai-wei, 
on  the  Shantung  Peninsula,  which  Japan  held  as 
a  pledge  under  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Shimo- 
noseki.  Great  Britain,  therefore,  took  over  Wei- 
hai-wei  from  Japan,  "leasing"  it  from  China  with 
Japan's  hearty  assent,  the  "lease"  to  terminate 
only  when  Russia  evacuated  the  Liaotung  Penin- 
sula. 

Even  now,  after  the  lapse  of  more  than  twenty 
years,  and  the  numerous  revelations  of  the  diplo- 
matic intrigues  of  Germany  and  Russia  which  have 
occurred  as  the  result  of  war  and  revolution, 
Germany's  motives  in  apparently  advancing  Rus- 
sian imperialistic  designs  are  by  no  means  certain- 
ly established.  Was  it  a  deliberate  attempt  to 
bring  Russia  into  conflict  with  Japan?  There  is 
much  to  suggest  that  this  question  must  be  answered 
in  the  affirmative,  but  the  further  question  then 
arises,  what  German  purpose  would  such  a  war 
serve?  Certainly  the  treacherous  policy  pursued 
toward  Japan  so  recently  precludes  any  suggestion 
that  the  Kaiser  was  actuated  by  friendship  for 
that  country.  A  victory  by  Japan  over  Russia 
might,  indeed,  cause  her  to  attempt  to  take  Kiao- 
chau.  On  the  other  hand,  a  victory  by  Russia 
would  be  a  blow  to  what  the  world  recognized  to 
be  the  central  principle  of  Germany's  foreign 
policy.     Can   it   be   that   Germany  was   counting 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     121 

upon  Russia's  defeat  by  Japan,  and  upon  revolu- 
tion following  such  defeat,  as  a  preliminary  con- 
dition for  an  attack  upon  France  and  for  the 
conquest  of  Europe?  Russia  was  rotten  with  cor- 
ruption, as  the  Germans  well  knew.  England  was 
involved  in  great  difficulties  in  India,  Egypt,  and 
South  Africa.  With  Russia  crushed  militarily 
and  financially — and  perhaps  disintegrated  politi- 
cally— Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and  Turkey 
would  be  invincible,  the  United  States  of  America 
not  being  considered  as  entering  into  the  problem 
at  all. 

It  would  be  too  great  a  digression  from  our  main 
purpose  to  enter  upon  a  detailed  discussion  of  the 
questions  raised  in  the  foregoing  paragraph.  The 
principal  reason  for  sketching  the  events  which 
led  Russia  into  the  disastrous  war  with  Japan  in 
1904  is  the  fact  that  the  war  and  the  foreign  policy 
which  led  up  to  it  were  important  factors  leading  to 
a  great  acceleration  of  Russia's  industrial  progress. 

The  bureaucracy  pushed  on  in  Manchuria  and 
Korea  against  the  advice  of  General  Kuropatkin, 
who  saw  that  war  in  the  Far  Fast  would  pave  the 
way  for  European  war.  The  Czar  himself  was  be- 
lieved to  have  sided  with  Kuropatkin,  but  to  have 
been  overruled  by  the  bureaucracy.1  Kuropatkin, 
finding  the  force  against  him  so  strong,  attempted 
to  resign,  but  was  prevented  from  doing  so. 

In  August,  1903,  Japan  proposed  a  treaty  the 
substance  of  which  was  that  Russia  should  dominate 
Manchuria  and  leave  Japan  to  dominate  Korea. 
Russia    submitted,    nearly    two    months    later,    a 

1  Purur,  '.;>.  c'.:.,  p.  i  '  i. 


122    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

counter-proposal  in  the  form  of  a  treaty  under 
which  Japan  would  undertake  to  refrain  from 
using  any  part  of  Korea  for  strategic  purposes  or 
erecting  any  military  works  of  any  kind.  There 
was  also  to  be  a  neutral  zone  in  northern  Korea. 
Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  was  to  have  absolute 
freedom  in  Manchuria.  In  December  Kuropatkin 
proposed  that  Russia  should  agree  to  confine 
her  interest  in  the  Far  East  to  northern  Manchuria, 
restoring  the  whole  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula  to 
China.  He  insisted  that  the  Japanese  army  was 
fully  equal  to  that  of  any  European  nation  and 
not  to  be  lightly  regarded.  On  January  13,  1904, 
Japan  renewed,  practically  as  an  ultimatum,  the 
proposals  made  by  her  in  August.  No  reply  being 
received  from  Russia,  war  was  declared  on  Febru- 
ary 10,  1904. 

This  is  not  the  place  even  to  sketch  the  history 
of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.1  As  all  the  world 
knows,  Russia  was  subject  to  a  series  of  humiliating 
defeats,  notably  the  disastrous  defeat  at  Mukden, 
in  March,  1905,  and  the  destruction  of  her  great 
Baltic  fleet,  off  the  island  of  Tsushima,  in  May. 
In  June  President  Roosevelt  interceded  and  pro- 
posed peace  negotiations,  acting  on  suggestions 
emanating  from  Russia.  The  war  came  to  an 
end  with  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth,  signed  on 
September  5th,  by  which  Russia  agreed  to  cede 
to  Japan  the  half  of  Saghalien  Island  she  had 
annexed  in  1875,  to  recognize  Japan's  suzerainty 
over  Korea,  to  evacuate  Manchuria,  surrender  her 

1  Perhaps  the  best  story  uf  trie  war  is  that  by  Major  F.  B.  Maurice, 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XII. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     123 

lease  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula  and  Port  Arthur, 
and  to  pay  Japan  the  sum  of  40,000,000  rubles, 
not  as  indemnity,  but  as  payment  for  the  main- 
tenance of  Russian  prisoners. 

With  the  calamitous  ending  of  its  "great  advent- 
ure" in  the  Far  East,  Russia  had  to  abandon  the 
grandiose  imperialistic  vision  of  becoming  the 
master  of  Asia.  That  was  the  role  chosen  by 
Japan.  Russia  was  forced  back  toward  Central 
Asia — precisely  where  the  Pan-Germanists  desired 
that  she  should  be.  Of  course,  baffled  in  the  East, 
the  Russian  bureaucracy  would  turn  to  the  West. 
If  Russia's  future  was  not  in  the  Far  East,  after  all, 
it  must  be  in  Europe.  But  the  Pan-German 
philosophy  and  the  military  policy  based  upon  it 
had  made  provision  against  that  very  thing. 
Blocking  the  way  to  the  Mediterranean,  command- 
ing the  principal  channel  of  her  trade,  was  Germany, 
master  of  the  empire  of  the  Turks,  and  therefore 
of  the  Dardanelles,  as  absolutely  supreme  in  her 
domination  of  the  maritime  highway  from  the 
Black  Sea  and  the  Sea  of  Azov  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean as  of  the  other  great  highway,  the  Baltic 
Sea.  "Turkey  opposes  an  obstacle  to  the  pene- 
tration of  the  Mediterranean  by  the  mighty 
Eurasian  nation,  Russia.  This  obstacle  resides 
rather  in  the  fortified  works  on  the  Bosphorus  and 
the  Dardanelles  than  in  the  international  treaties 
concerning  these  straits.  Germany  also  is  greatly 
interested  in  the  maintenance  of  this  barrier.  // 
is  greatly  to  the  interest  of  Germany  that  this  barrier 
should  be  maintained  and  that  Russia  should  not 
penetrate  the  Mediterranean.'''     Thus  a  noted  Ger- 


i24    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

man  militarist  had  written  in  1902. 1  Another 
influential  writer  of  the  same  school  pointed  out 
that  the  treaty  relating  to  the  Bagdad  Railway 
not  only  tended  to  exclude  Russia  from  Asia  Minor, 
but  also  to  isolate  her  from  Europe  and  confine  her 
to  Central  Asia,  "her  true  sphere."  2  In  this  way 
Russia  would  be  so  hemmed  in  and  so  hampered 
in  her  economic  development  that  she  could  hardly 
escape  becoming  virtually  a  German  colony. 

Japan's  defeat  of  Russia  was,  therefore,  a  victory 
for  German}-.  In  no  country  in  the  world,  outside 
of  Japan  itself,  was  the  Japanese  victory  hailed 
with  such  great  rejoicing  as  in  Germany.  The 
military  caste  of  Germany  was  elated,  because 
the  victory  of  Japan  was  regarded  as  a  vindication 
of  German  military  methods,  the  Japanese  army 
having  been  trained  by  German  officers.  The 
exultant  Japanese  sent  telegrams  to  their  German 
instructors  in  the  hour  of  their  triumph  and  pride. 
It  is  not  without  reason  that  the  Japanese  have 
become  known  as  "the  Prussians  of  Asia."  It 
was  Prussia  that  Japan  selected  as  the  model  to 
copy,  and  the  whole  Japanese  army  was  imbued 
with  the  ideals  and  the  spirit  of  Prussian  mili- 
tarism. In  vain  do  the  Japanese  and  their  cham- 
pions protest  against  such  statements  as  this:  the 
evidence  that  by  1904  Japan  had  been  thoroughly 
Prussianized  and  militarized  is  quite  overwhelming 
and  indisputable.3     It  was  natural  that  her  victory 

1  Colonel  Rogalla  von  Bieberstein,  quoted  by  Andre  Cberadame,  La 
Question  d'Oriait,  La  Macedoine.     Le  chemin  de  fer  de  Bagdad,  p.  253. 
-  Colonel  Hiidebrandr,  quoted  by  Cberadame,  op.  cit.,  p.  255. 
sSee  pj).  145-148. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    125 

over  Russia  should  evoke  rejoicing  in  Berlin. 
When  the  battle  of  Mukden — up  to  that  time  the 
biggest  battle  in  history — ended  so  disastrously 
for  Russia,  there  was  exultation  in  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse.  Russia  was  now  in  no  condition  to  help 
France.  It  was,  therefore,  a  favorable  moment 
for  opening  up  the  dispute  with  France  over  the 
Moroccan  question.  A  few  days  after  the  Japanese 
triumph  the  Kaiser  visited  Tangier.1 

Wilhelm  was  pursuing  a  cunningly  conceived 
policy  which  had  become  well  recognized.  In  the 
eighteen-eighties  Bismarck  told  Prince  von  Biilow: 
"In  Russia  there  is  a  serious  amount  of  unrest 
and  agitation  for  territorial  expansion  which  may 
easily  result  in  an  explosion.  It  would  be  best 
for  the  peace  of  the  world  if  the  explosion  took 
place  in  Asia,  and  not  in  Europe.  We  must  be 
careful  not  to  stand  in  the  way,  otherwise  we  may 
have  to  bear  the  brunt  of  it."  2  The  same  thought 
is  expressed  more  brutally  in  these  words  by 
General  Friedrich  von  Bernhardi:  "The  political 
rivalry  between  the  two  nations  of  the  yellow  race 
must  be  kepi  alive.  If  they  are  antagonistic,  they 
will  both  probably  look  for  help  against  each  other 
in  their  relations  to  Europe,  and  thus  enable  the 
European  powers  to  retain  their  possessions  in  Asia."3 

The  Russian  bureaucracy  had  played  precisely 
the  role  Germany  desired.  Russia  had  been  beaten 
and  humiliated,  on  sea  and  on  land,  by  a  nation 
of  little  over  45,000,000  people,  possessing  not  a 

1  March  21,  1905.     See  Porter,  op.  cit.,  pp.  205-206. 

2  Quoted  by  Kawakami,  Japan  and  World  Peace,  p.  4. 

3  ka'.sakami,  \deni,  p.  6. 


126    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

tithe  of  her  resources,  human  or  material.  With 
a  population  three  times  larger  than  Japan's,  with 
an  annual  budget  of  two  billions  as  against  Japan's 
paltry  budget  of  sixty  millions,  the  Russian  giant 
had  been  thrashed.  Here  was  positive  proof  of 
the  inefficiency  and  utter  incompetence  of  the 
bureaucratic  oligarchy.  It  had  not  been  driven 
into  the  war,  which  could  have  been  easily  averted 
without  loss  of  honor.  It  had  been  fully  warned 
by  Kuropatkin  concerning  Japan's  preparedness. 
No  modern  army  was  ever  subjected  to  anything 
like  the  incompetence  which  characterized  the 
government  of  Czar  Nicholas  II.  Many  Russians 
of  liberal,  and  even  revolutionary,  sympathies 
have  vigorously  protested  against  such  criticisms 
as  this,  denying  that  the  bureaucracy  of  Russia 
was  more  incompetent  than  bureaucracies  generally 
are.  However  that  may  be,  the  evidence  of  gross 
incompetence  in  this  instance  is  overwhelming. 

Even  worse  than  the  incompetence,  if  that  were 
possible,  was  the  terrible  corruption  and  graft 
which  ran  riot.  Here  again  it  may  be  urged, 
with  some  justice,  that  the  Russian  bureaucracy 
was  not  more  corrupt  than  the  French,  for  example. 
With  that  question  we  are  not  here  and  now  con- 
cerned. The  horrible  scandals  of  the  Turkish  war 
in  1877  were  outclassed.  Everywhere  was  looting 
and  graft.  The  army  and  navy  were  honey- 
combed with  this  form  of  treachery.  Kuropatkin 
himself  managed  to  amass  a  personal  fortune  of 
over  six  million  rubles,  it  was  charged  at  the  time.1 
Generals  and  officers  on  campaign  levied  enormous 

1  Ular,  Russia  from  Within,  1905,  p.  257. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    127 

percentages  on  the  allowances  made  to  them  for 
maintenance  of  the  army.  The  negotiations  to 
purchase  cruisers  from  Argentina  were  held  up 
because  high  officers  insisted  on  dealing  only  with 
an  American  agent  who  had  agreed  to  pay  them 
enormous  commissions.  Arsenals  supposed  to  be 
full  were  in  fact  empty.  "Gold-mines"  had  been 
paid  for  which  never  existed.  Funds  of  the  Red 
Cross,  intended  for  the  relief  of  the  soldiers,  were 
embezzled  by  an  intimate  friend  of  the  Dowager 
Empress.  Treason  was  rampant  in  the  army. 
In  the  famous  trial  of  Colonel  Grimm,  the  accused, 
addressing  the  officers  conducting  the  trial,  said, 
"I  am  guilty,  but  three-quarters  of  you  deserve 
to  be  at  my  side  on  this  bench."  The  war  cost 
Russia  more  than  #1,600,000  a  day,  and  of  that 
sum  it  was  estimated  that  at  least  20  per  cent, 
found  its  way  into  the  pockets  of  the  officials.1 
And  it  is  as  certain  as  anything  can  be  that  German 
influences  had  long  been  at  work  systematically 
corrupting  the  Russian  bureaucracy,  the  army, 
and  the  navy,  thus  sapping  the  giant's  strength. 


IV 

The  period  of  the  Japanese  war,  and  the  nine 
years  which  intervened  between  the  Treaty  of 
Portsmouth  and  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War 
witnessed  a  remarkable  growth  of  Russian  industry 
and  commerce.  A  few  statistical  illustrations  will 
make  this  growth  quite  plain: 

In   1900-01   Russia  produced  16,750,000  tons  of 

1  Sec  Liar,  np.  c;t.,  for  a  striking  summary  of  this  subject. 


i28    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

coal.  In  1902-03  the  amount  produced  was 
17,200,000  tons.  In  1 91 2-1 3  it  was  34,000,000 
tons.  When  the  war  broke  out  in  1914  coal  pro- 
duction was  at  the  rate  of  40,000,000  tons  per  year. 

In  1902-03  the  production  of  copper  was  about 
9,000  tons.  In  191 2-13  it  was  over  34,000  tons. 
In  the  first  half  of  1914  production  was  at  the  rate 
of  40,000  tons  a  year. 

In  1902-03  the  production  of  iron  ore  was 
4,200,000  tons  for  the  year.  In  the  year  1912-13 
the  production  was  8,900,000  tons. 

In  1902-03  the  amount  of  pig-iron  produced 
was  2,500,000  tons.  In  191 2-1 3  it  was  4,400,000 
tons.  In  the  first  half  of  1914  production  was  at 
the  rate  of  5,000,000  tons  a  year. 

In  the  case  of  oil  only  do  we  find  an  exception 
to  this  rule  of  industrial  progress.  The  exhaustion 
of  some  oil-fields,  and  governmental  action  restrain- 
ing the  development  of  others,  resulted  in  a  decline 
from  an  annual  production  of  10,800,000  tons  in 
1902-03  to  9,200,000  tons  in  1912-13.  This  was 
a  temporary  and  incidental  check,  however,  and 
not  indicative  of  a  general  decline  in  this  important 
industry.1 

The  industrial  progress  indicated  by  these  figures, 
and  the  equally  great  increase  in  the  volume  of 
agricultural  production,  brought  about  an  immense 
growth  of  commerce.  In  1901  there  were  862,000 
commercial  houses  in  Russia.     By  191 1  the  num- 

1  For  most  of  the  figures  on  this  subject  I  am  indebted  to  the  admi- 
rable monograph  by  Prof.  J.  M.  Goldstein,  Russia,  Her  Economic 
Past,  Present,  and  Future.  Professor  Goldstein  is  acknowledged  to 
be  th**  foremost  Russian  authority  on  the  subject  of  trade  development. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    129 

ber  had  increased  to  1,117,000,  and  in  June,  1914, 
to  i,5co,ooo.1  It  is  very  interesting  to  follow  the 
steady  increase  in  the  volume  of  Russian  com- 
merce. The  total  value  of  Russian  imports  and 
exports  during  the  first  quarter  of  the  nineteenth 
century  averaged  112,300,000  rubles  per  annum. 
From  1825  to  1849  it  was  221,200,000  rubles. 
From  1875  to  1900  it  was  1,092,000,000.  In  other 
words,  the  commerce  increased  by  972  per  cent., 
nearly  ten  times  what  it  was.2  During  the  first 
five  years  of  the  present  century  the  total  of  Russia's 
foreign  trade  increased  by  one-third,  the  amount 
for  1905  being  1,702,000,000  rubles.  By  1910  it 
had  risen  to  2,533,000,000  rubles,  and  by  1913  to 
2,690,000,000  rubles.3 

Russia,  like  the  United  States,  may  fairly  be 
called  a  self-sufficing  nation.  That  is,  it  has  within 
its  boundaries  the  material  requisites  to  supply 
all  the  fundamental  needs  of  its  people.  It  pro- 
duces, or  can  produce,  enough  grain  and  other 
foodstuffs  to  feed  them,  wool,  flax,  and  cotton  to 
clothe  them,  lumber  and  metals  to  house  them 
and  provide  them  with  tools  and  machinery.  Like 
the  United  States,  Russia  could,  under  favorable 
conditions,  live  in  some  degree  of  comfort  if  con- 
fined absolutely  to  its  own  resources.  The  United 
States  does  not,  however,  confine  itself  to  its  own 
resources  in  this  manner,  but  imports  many  things, 
its  pre-war  importations  amounting  to  nearly  two 

1  A.  J.  Sack,  America's  Possible  Share  in  tlu  Economic  Future  of 
Russia,  p.  7.  s  Alexinsky,  op.  cit.,  p.  47. 

3  If !<•<■: e  figures  arc  :;ivcn  m  rhc  Report  of  the  Minister  of  Finance 
on  ike  BaJt  '•  F-   :>/.;!:  of  IQ14,  Part  II. 


i3o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

billion  dollars  a  year.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
United  States  exports  a  great  many  things,  es- 
pecially foodstuffs  and  manufactured  articles.  Rus- 
sia likewise  imports  many  things  and  exports  many. 
The  value  of  her  imports  prior  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  World  War  was  about  700  million  dollars  a 
year.  The  main  difference  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, as  a  leading  Bolshevist  journal  has  pointed 
out,  lies  in  the  fact  that  Russia  imports  a  smaller 
proportion  of  raw  materials  or  articles  of  luxury 
than  the  United  States,  and  a  larger  proportion  of 
manufactured  goods,  such  as  tools,  machinery, 
electrical  supplies,  and  so  forth.  Her  exports  are 
principally  of  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials.  The 
United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  exports  large 
quantities  of  manufactured  goods.1 

In  the  five-year  period  1909-13  Russia's  imports 
averaged  1,136,900,000  rubles  annually,  and  her 
exports  in  the  same  period  averaged  1,501,400,000 
rubles  annually.  For  the  three-year  period  1911-13 
the  figures  were  higher,  being  imports  1,236,000,000 
rubles  per  annum  and  exports  1,544,000,000  rubles. 
Of  the  imports,  foodstuffs  of  all  kinds  amounted  to 
218  millions  of  rubles;  raw  materials  and  materials 
partially  manufactured  to  592  millions  of  rubles; 
manufactured  goods  ready  for  use,  412  millions; 
animals,  14  millions.  Of  the  exports,  foodstuffs 
amounted  to  893  millions  of  rubles;  raw  and  un- 
finished materials,  544  millions;  manufactured  goods 
ready  for  use,  76  millions;  animals,  31  millions. 
The  following  tables  give  the  imports  and  exports 
for  the  five-year  period  1909-13: 

1  Soviet  Russia,  Vol.  I,  No.  5,  p.  8,  July  5,  1919. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     131 


TABLE  B 

IMPORTS   INTO   RUSSIA,    IOO9-I3 


Commodity 

Average  Value  per  Year 
fur  Period  (Rubles)  1 

Percentage  of 
Total  Imports 

Foodstuffs  of  vegetable  origin 

Machinery  and  implements. . .  . 

155,800,000 
135,600,000 
139,900,000 
125,400,000 
110,300,000 
97,100,000 
64,600,000 
55,400,000 
51,200,000 
47,500,000 

1 6 1 ,900,000 

13 
II 
11 
II 

9 
8 

5 
4 
4 
4 

rT 

7 
9 
9 
0 

Silk,  flax,  and  all  kinds  of  tissues. . .  . 
Animal  products,  fish,  etc 

Raw  cotton 

7 

5 

7 

9 

5 
2 

Metals  and  manufactures  of  metal..  . 
Minerals 

Lumber  and  forest  products 

Wool 

All  others 

0 

TABLE  C 

KXPORTS    FROM   RUSSIA,    I909-I3 


Commodity 


Wheat. 
Barley. 
Oats.  . 
Corn .  . 
Rye .  .  . 
Bran.  . 
Flour. . 


Forest  products 

Flax  and  hemp 

Eggs 

Butter 

Sugar.  . 

Oil  and  oil  products.  . 

Oil  cake 

Hides  and  skins  (raw) 

Oil  seeds 

Furs 

Platinum 

All  others 


Average  Value  per  Year  for 
Period  (Rubles)* 


293,000,000 
175,700,000 
56,500,000 
34,100,000 
33,700,000 
30,400,000 
20,300,000 

Total  643,700,000 
145,100,000 
89,300,000 
76,400,00 
62,500,000 
40,900,000 
36,700,000 
35,500,000 
30,600,000 
24,200,000 
16,600,000 
14,200,000 

285,900,000 


Percentage  of 
Total  Ei]>orts 


429 

9-7 
5-9 
5-i 
4i 

-  7 
2  -5 
2.4 
2  .0 
1.6 
1 .1 
1 .0 
19 .0 


'  In  round  figures 


"Id? 


132    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Of  the  total  volume  of  imports  into  Russia  food- 
stuffs naturally  constituted  a  minor  part,  the  total 
value  of  all  foodstuffs  of  vegetable  origin  and  of  all 
animal  products,  a  large  part  of  which  consisted 
of  other  than  food  articles,  was  in  191 2  about 
280,000,000  rubles,  as  against  about  653,000,000 
rubles  for  machinery,  implements,  and  raw  materials 
and  semi-manufactured  goods.  With  the  sole 
exception  of  machinery  and  implements,  for  which 
she  remains  dependent  upon  the  outside  world, 
Russia's  imports  before  the  war  were  already 
become  of  second ary  importance  to  her  home  pro- 
duction. For  example,  in  191 2  the  importation 
of  wool  amounted  to  2,150,000  poods,1  but  in  the 
same  year  the  domestic  production  was  13,500,000 
poods.  That  is  to  say,  Russia  produced  86  per 
cent,  of  all  the  wool  she  consumed.  In  the  same 
year  she  imported  306,000,000  poods  of  coal,  but 
produced  1,887,000,000  poods,  87  per  cent,  of  her 
total  coal  consumption. 

How  vastly  more  important  was  her  trade  with 
the  western  nations  than  with  the  Far  East  is 
indicated  by  the  fact  that  of  the  total  volume  of 
her  international  trade  by  far  the  greater  part 
passes  by  way  of  her  European  frontier.  For  the 
five-year  period  1907-11  the  value  of  the  goods 
passing  her  western  frontiers,  both  imports  and 
exports,  averaged  2,083,700,000  rubles  a  year, 
while  the  value  of  those  passing  her  Asiatic  frontiers 
averaged  only  202,702,000  rubles,  or  less  than  one- 
tenth  as  much.  The  Russian  Social  Democrat, 
Alcxinsky,  quoting  these  figures,  points  out  that 

lA  pood  equals  36.1  American  pounds. 


RUSSIA'S   SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     133 

though  under  the  old  regime  Russia's  political  life 
was  far  from  being  truly  Europeanized,  her  eco- 
nomic life  was  interwoven  with  that  of  Europe  and 
its  connections  with  Asia  of  minor  importance 
only.1  Of  all  Russia's  export  trade  fully  one-third 
was  sent  from  the  ports  of  the  Black  Sea  and  the 
Sea  of  Azov  through  the  Dardanelles,  including  not 
less  than  80  per  cent,  of  the  total  exportation  of 
cereals.  Almost  another  third,  over  30  per  cent.,  of 
the  total  export  trade  was  by  way  of  the  Baltic.  And 
Germany  dominated  both  routes,  being  in  a  position 
to  close  them  to  Russian  commerce  almost  at  a 
moment's  notice. 


Perhaps  the  most  remarkable  feature  of  the 
economic  supremacy  of  German)'  in  Russia  im- 
mediately prior  to  the  World  War  was  the  fact 
that  this  supremacy  was  attained  despite  the  vast 
preponderance  of  French  and  British  capital 
invested.  Foreign  capital  has  entered  Russia  in  two 
principal  ways,  namely,  through  loans  raised  in 
the  bourses  and  exchanges  of  luiropcan  countries 
by  Russian  municipal  and  state  authorities,  and 
by  foreign  investments  in  Russian  industrial  and 
commercial  enterprises.  A  portion  of  the  latter 
represents  capital  invested  in  enterprises  of  Rus- 
sian origin — that  is  to  say,  enterprises  founded  on 
Russian  capital  mainly,  and  the  rest  capital  in- 
vested in  enterprises  due  to  the  initiative  of,  and 
controlled  by,  the  foreign  investors  themselves. 
It  is  a  fact  of  the  utmost  importance,  though  frc- 

1  Alcxinsky,  op.  cii.,  p.  .(*. 
10 


134    RUSSIA  AS  AN   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

quently  overlooked,  that,  while  foreign  investment 
represents  a  very  considerable  proportion  of  the 
total  capital  invested  in  Russian  industry,  only 
a  very  small  part  of  the  total  foreign  capital  in- 
vested in  Russia  represents  investment  in  indus- 
trial and  commercial  concerns.  By  far  the  greater 
part  represents  loans  to  the  state  and  to  municipali- 
ties, and  represents  a  bonded  indebtedness  to  be 
met  from  public  revenues.  The  splendid  solvency 
of  Russia  immediately  prior  to  the  World  War, 
despite  her  unsound  financial  policy,  was  due  to 
her  immense  resources.  The  reckless  borrowing 
and  the  inefficiency  of  the  old  regime  were  such 
that  any  other  nation  than  Russia  would  have  been 
in  danger  of  being  brought  to  a  state  of  bankruptcy. 
The  outbreak  of  the  war  actually  found  Russia 
behindhand  in  the  payments  to  meet  her  liabilities.1 

Of  the  foreign  capital  invested  in  Russia  up  to  1914 
the  greatest  part  was  French.  Although  exact  figures 
are  not  available,  the  total  French  capital  invested 
probably  far  exceeded  the  combined  totals  of  Ger- 
man, British,  Belgian,  and  American  investments. 
Owing  to  the  somewhat  strained  relations  between 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  from,  say,  1880  to  1906, 
British  capital  did  not  flow  freely  into  Russia. 
Therefore,  Russian  development  depended  mainly 
on  French,  Belgian,  and  German  capital.  From 
1908  to  1914  there  was  a  great  increase  in  the  in- 
flow of  British  capital,  particular^  in  connection 
with  the  development  of  the  oil  industry. 

In  1890  there  were  in  the  whole  of  Russia  only 
16  joint-stock  companies  wholly  owned  and  con- 

1  See  Hynclman,  The  Awakening  of  Asia,  p.  232. 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    13 


trolled  by  foreign  capitalists.  The  following  figures 
show  with  great  clearness  the  relative  importance 
of  foreign  capital  in  Russian  industrial  and  com- 
mercial development: 

No.  of  Joint-stock 
Companies  Formed  on 
Period  Foreign  Capital 

1891-1900 215 

1901-1910 160 

I9II-I9I3 8~ 

In  the  last-named  period  of  three  years,  1911-13, 
774  companies  were  formed  on  Russian  capital. 
Thus  one-fifth  of  the  new  undertakings  were  of 
foreign  origin.  The  average  share  capital  of  the 
Russian  companies  was  1,220,000  rubles  per  com- 
pany, while  the  average  capital  of  the  companies 
of  foreign  origin  was  1,736,000  rubles. 

While  the  French  and  the  English  financial  in- 
vestments in  Russia  far  exceed  those  of  Germany, 
which  are,  indeed,  relatively  unimportant,  this  is 
not  true  of  the  general  economic  relations.  In 
the  matter  of  economic  exchanges  Germany  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  was  far  ahead  of  both 
countries.  This  means  that  her  influence  upon 
the  economic  life  of  Russia,  and  the  profit  derived 
from  trade  with  Russia,  were  disproportionate 
to  the  amount  of  her  invested  capital.  In  other 
words,  Germany  profited  at  the  expense  of  France 
and  England  as  well  as  of  Russia.  This  is  a  form 
of  economic  parasitism  the  significance  of  which 
has  not  generally  been  understood. 

In  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  trade 
of  Russia  with  Germany  and  France  was  fairly 
well  balanced,  the  volume  of  French  trade,  imports 


136    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

and  exports,  being  about  nine-tenths  that  of  the 
trade  with  Germany.  By  the  end  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  the  volume  of  French  trade  had 
grown  to  be  three  times  what  it  was  fifty  years 
before,  while  the  volume  of  trade  with  Germany 
had  grown  to  eleven  and  a  half  times  what  it  was. 
In  the  five  years  1901-05,  of  the  total  imports  into 
Russia  35.8  per  cent.  wTere  from  Germany  and  4.3 
per  cent,  from  France.  In  191 3  Germany's  share 
in  Russia's  total  imports  was  52.7  per  cent.,  and  that 
of  France  4.6  per  cent.  In  five  years,  from  1908 
to  191 2,  inclusive,  German  imports  rose  from 
331,000,000  to  519,000,000  rubles,  while  French 
imports  rose  only  from  35,700,000  to  56,000,000 
rubles.  In  considering  these  figures  we  must 
remember  that  the  amount  of  French  capital  in- 
vested in  Russia  is  many  times  that  of  the  German 
capital  so  invested.  It  should  also  be  remembered 
that  Russian  exports  to  France  have  increased 
faster  than  French  exports  to  Russia.  The  figures 
are  significant: 


Year       Russian  Imports  From 
1908  Germany  .331,800,000  rubles 
1908  France  .. .   35,700,000      " 
1913  Germany  .642,700,000      " 
1913  France...  56,000,000     " 


Year         Russian  Exports  To 
1908  Germany  .278,900,000  rubles 
190S  France. . .   64,600,000     " 
1913  Germany  .452,600,000     " 
1913  France..  .100,800,000     " 


It  will  be  seen  that  the  volume  of  commercial 
transactions,  importations  and  exportations,  be- 
tween Russia  and  the  two  countries  was: 

1908  With  Germany 610,700,000  rubles 

With  France 99,300,000      " 

I913  With  Germany 1,095,300,000      " 

With  France 156,800,000     " 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY     137 

England's  trade  with  Russia  is  second  to  Ger- 
many's in  importance.  This  statement  alone  indi- 
cates the  enormous  changes  which  have  taken 
place  since  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
Then  England's  share  in  Russia's  commerce  was 
twice  that  of  Germany,  whereas  when  the  war 
broke  out  in  1914  Germany's  share  was  practically 
four  times  that  of  England.  The  steady  progress 
of  Germany  toward  the  goal  of  absolute  mastery 
of  the  commerce  of  Russia  is  shown  very  clearly 
in  the  following  table  relating  to  imports: 


TABLE  D1 

SHOWING  RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF  BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  IMPORTS 


Percentage  of  Total 

Percentage  of  Toial 

Period 

Russian  Imports 
From  England 

Russian  Imports 
From  Germany 

1846-1S48 

29.2 

15-7 

1898-1902 

18.6 

34-6 

1903-1907 

14.8 

37-2 

1908-1912 

13 -4 

41 .6 

January 

>  1913-June, 

19 

4 

12. S 

4S.9 

January 

-June,  1914 

1.3-3 

49.6 

1  his  table,  compiled  from  Russian  official  figures, 
shows  how  rapidly  German)'  was  ousting  England 
in  supplying  the  Russian  market.  It  is  equally 
important  to  know  that  Germany  was  making 
very  similar  gain  over  England  as  a  customer. 
Russia's  exports  consisted  mainly  of  raw  materials 
and  foodstuffs,  grain  products  alone  amounting  to 

'Compiled  from  figures  cited  l»y  Professor  Goldstein,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
2^-26,  also  his  pamphlet,  America's  Opportunities  for  Trade  and 
I     cstmcnl  in  Russia. 


158    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

43  per  cent,  of  the  total  exports  for  the  five  years 
1909-13.  Her  imports  consisted  chiefly  of  ma- 
chinery, tools,  appliances,  metals  and  metal  prod- 
ucts, and  cotton.  In  1908  her  exports  to  Germany 
were  valued  at  278,900,000  rubles,  and  to  England 
at  220,100,000  rubles.  In  1913  her  exports  to 
Germany  were  valued  at  452,600,000  rubles,  and  to 
England  at  226,800,000  rubles.  Thus  English  im- 
ports from  Russia  increased  by  6,700,000  rubles, 
while  in  the  same  period  Germany's  imports  from 
Russia  increased  173,700,000  rubles.  In  1911-12, 
46  per  cent,  of  Russia's  total  volume  of  exports 
went  to  Germany,  while  45  per  cent,  of  her  total 
imports  were  from  Germany.  It  will  be  seen, 
therefore,  that  nearly  one-half  of  Russia's  foreign 
trade  was  controlled  by  Germany  shortly  before 
the  war.  Moreover,  her  control  was  steadily 
increasing. 


TABLE  E 

value  of  Russia's  trade  with  various  countries,  1908-13 
(In  Rubles) 


Country 


Germany 

England 

Holland 

France 

Austria-Hungary 

Italy 

Belgium 

Denmark 

Turkey 

Sweden 

Norway 


Exports   To 


1908 
278,900,000 
220,100,000 
93,500,000 
64,600,000 
49,000,000 
29,900,000 
34,400,000 
31,500,000 

2I:500,000 

4,7oo;ooo 
5,800,000 


1913 

452,600,000 
226,800,000 
177,400,000 

I  OO;  800,000 
65,200,OOC 
73,600,000 
64,6O0,OO0 
35,700,000 
34400,000 
11,400,000 
8,600,000 


Imports  From 


1908 

331,800,000 

1 19,900,000 

11,500,000 

35,700,000 

26,400,000 

1 2,900.000 

8,100,000 

8,700,000 

7,100,000 

10,100,000 

8.700,000 


1913 

642,700,000 

170,300,000 

21,500,000 

56,000,000 

34,600,000 

16,700,000 

8,600,000 

12,800,000 

16,900,000 

16,100,000 

9,800,000 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY    139 

VI 

The  foregoing  statistics  show  conclusively  that 
when  the  World  War  began  Germany  possessed  a 
strangle-hold  upon  the  life  of  the  great  Russian 
Empire.  The  story  we  have  outlined  is  almost 
without  a  parallel  in  modern  history.  Other  great 
nations  have  been  subject  to  conquest,  both  eco- 
nomically and  politically.  China  is  a  case  in  point. 
Nowhere,  however,  do  we  find  a  great  nation  pos- 
sessing vast  human  and  material  resources,  aggres- 
sive in  extending  its  dominions,  yet  helplessly  sub- 
ject to  slow  but  steady  and  certain  strangulation 
at  the  hands  of  a  nation  much  poorer  in  natural 
resources  and  possessing  less  than  half  its  popula- 
tion. The  cold-blooded,  relentless  manner  in  which 
Germany  encompassed  Russia  on  every  side,  in 
Asia  and  in  Europe;  the  systematic  manner  in 
which  she  debauched  and  weakened  the  govern- 
ment of  her  victim  and  exploited  her  economically, 
suggest  the  crushing  of  Laocoon  and  his  sons^by 
the  serpents.  The  Trojan  victims  were  not  more 
helpless  in  the  deadly  coils  of  the  monsters  than 
was  Russia  under  the  hands  of  Germany. 

It  is  quite  true  that  the  German  succeeded  in 
the  foreign  market  very  often  because  his  methods 
were  better  adapted  to  the  market  than  were  those 
of  his  competitors.  He  made  cheaper  goods,  of 
inferior  quality,  of  course,  because  the  people  among 
whom  he  traded  demanded  low-priced  goods.  He 
made  price  and  not  quality  his  concern.  If  people 
could  only  afford  "cheap  and  nasty"  wares,  why 
should  he  try  to  sell  wares  of  quality?     He  followed 


1 4o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

the  customs  of  the  country  in  which  he  was  trading 
in  the  matter  of  extending  credits,  in  packing  goods, 
and  so  on.  His  catalogues  were  printed  in  the 
language  of  the  country  with  which  he  was  trading, 
his  business  correspondence  was  in  that  language, 
and  it  was  spoken  by  his  agents  and  salesmen. 
These  things  meant  much  in  Russia,  just  as  they 
did  in  the  South  American  countries.  The  advan- 
tages derived  from  such  enterprise  were  fairly  and 
creditably  won. 

German  competition  did  not  limit  itself  to  such 
creditable  and  honorable  methods  as  these,  how- 
ever. A  common  device  was  to  usurp  the  prestige 
enjoyed  by  rivals  through  fraudulent  marking  of 
German-made  goods  as  "English,"  "Swedish," 
"French,"  and  so  on.  This  was  not  commercial 
competition,  as  that  term  has  been  understood  by 
other  nations,  but  a  cowardly  and  odious  form  of 
economic  warfare.  And  the  system  of  export 
bounties  can  only  be  described  as  economic  warfare. 
But  we  shall  miss  the  significance  of  Germany's 
policy  toward  Russia,  and  the  real  menace  of  Ger- 
many to  that  nation  and  to  all  the  world,  if  we 
do  not  grasp  the  fact  that  the  whole  structure  of 
her  imperialism  was  involved.  That  rested  upon 
a  close  co-ordination  of  political  and  financial 
interests.  Nowhere  in  the  world  was  there  such  a 
highly  organized  co-ordination  of  finance,  industry, 
and  diplomacy.  We  see  German  finance  in  Russia 
governed  by  a  scientifically  calculated  regard  for 
German  industry.  Instead  of  fostering  Russian 
industrial  development,  it  took  care  to  use  every 
opportunity   to   foster    Russia's   dependence   upon 


RUSSIA'S  SUBJECTION  TO  GERMANY   141 

Germany's  industrial  production  and  to  secure  for 
the  latter  an  ever-increasing  share  of  Russia's  raw 
materials.  The  German  Foreign  Office  was  the 
link  binding  the  financiers  and  the  industrial  capi- 
talists together  in  a  common  purpose.  Like  a 
mighty  machine,  the  whole  vast  system — diplo- 
macy, army  and  navy,  finance,  industrialism — was 
directed  to  the  achievement  of  that  purpose. 
German  capital  invested  abroad  must  directly 
serve  home  industries.  German  foreign  policy 
must  find  and  preserve  markets  for  German  goods. 
No  other  nation  in  history  has  achieved  anything 
like  such  a  synergy.  Japan  is  the  only  other 
modern  nation  which  has  seriously  attempted  to 
do  so. 


IV 

japan  as  Germany's  successor 


IN  recent  years  it  has  become  the  habit  of  writers 
on  the  Far  Eastern  question  to  present  Japan 
as  another  Prussia.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  there 
is  a  certain  fitness  and  justness  in  the  characteriza- 
tion of  the  Island  Empire  of  the  Orient  as  the 
"Asiatic  Prussia."  Since  the  fall  of  the  Shogunate 
and  the  restoration  of  the  Emperor — 1867-69 — 
and  the  introduction  of  Occidentalism  Japan  has 
developed  her  government,  her  industry  and  com- 
merce, her  foreign  policy,  and  her  military  organi- 
zation upon  lines  curiously  similar  to  those  upon 
which  modern  Germany  developed  under  the 
leadership  of  Prussia.  There  has  been  the  same 
arrogant  and  aggressive  attitude  toward  other 
nations;  the  same  unscrupulous  expansion  through 
the  war;  the  same  exaggerated  nationalism.  Pan- 
Germanism  has  its  parallel  in  Pan-Nipponism. 
Precisely  as  Germany  sought  to  attain  the  hegemony 
of  Europe,  so  Japan  has  aimed  at  the  hegemony 
of  Asia.  Moreover,  her  actions  since  the  war  with 
China,  in  1894-95,  have  made  it  quite  clear  that 
her  foreign  policy  aimed  at  the  exclusion  of  western 
nations  from  the  exercise  of  political  or  economic 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S   SUCCESSOR     143 

influence  in  Asia.  To  that  end  all  her  energies 
have  been  consciously  bent.  It  was  for  the  purpose 
of  overcoming  western  power  that  she  adopted 
western  methods. 

From  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century 
until  the  coming  of  Commodore  Perry,  Japan 
lived  in  seclusion,  an  artificial  seclusion.  Perry 
brought  flattery  and  gifts  together  with  a  sufficient 
number  of  thirty-two-pounders  to  enforce  accept- 
ance of  the  proffered  friendship.  It  was  essentially 
a  case  of  "Shake  hands  and  be  friends  or  I  will 
knock  your  teeth  out."  Thus  the  first  breach 
was  made  in  the  wall  of  seclusion.  In  1636  the 
Shogun  Iyemitsu  had  issued  a  decree  forbidding, 
under  penalty  of  death,  any  Japanese  to  leave, 
or  attempt  to  leave,  the  island  of  Japan,  ordering 
the  expulsion  of  all  persons  of  Spanish  blood  and 
forbidding  forever  the  building  of  ocean-going 
ships  in  Japan.  The  next  twenty  years  witnessed 
the  practical  isolation  of  Japan  from  the  rest  of 
the  world,  an  isolation  which  was  to  last  for  two 
hundred  years.  In  1638  an  edict  was  issued  that 
all  Portuguese  ships  coming  into  Japan  should  be 
burned  and  their  crews  put  to  death,  and  when  in 
1640  a  Portuguese  ship  did  arrive  at  Nagasaki 
most  of  the  crew  were  put  to  death.  The  sur- 
vivors were  sent  back  to  their  own  country  with 
this  message,  "So  long  as  the  sun  warms  the  earth, 
any  Christian  bold  enough  to  come  to  Japan,  even 
if  he  be  King  Philip  himself  or  the  God  of  the 
Christians,  shall  pay  for  it  with  his  head."  1  It 
is  only  just  to  Japan  to  recognize  the  fact  that 
1  Porter,  op.  cit.,  p.  77. 


i44    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

this  bitter  and  brutal  intolerance  was  a  complete 
reversal  of  her  previous  policy,  a  violent  reaction 
brought  about  by  the  intolerant  fanaticism  of  the 
Christian  missionaries  and  their  political  intrigues. 

After  the  opening  up  of  Japan  to  foreign  trade, 
following  the  successful  enterprise  of  Commodore 
Perry  and  the  commercial  treaties  with  the  United 
States  and  the  principal  European  nations  which 
Townsend  Harris  made  possible,  it  was  quite  impos- 
sible for  the  Shogunate  to  long  survive.  With  the 
reorganization  came  a  new  era.  Japan  under  the 
new  regime  entered  upon  a  policy  of  Europeaniza- 
tion.  Experts  were  obtained  from  the  principal 
western  nations  and  placed  in  charge  of  the  reor- 
ganization of  the  nation's  jurisprudence,  education, 
military  and  naval  forces,  commerce,  and  so  on. 
At  first  the  greatest  influence  was  that  of  France. 
The  new  educational  system  was  patterned  after 
the  French  system,  and  so  was  the  criminal  law. 
The  army  was  patterned  after  the  French  model 
and  placed  under  French  military  instructors.  It 
will  be  seen  at  once  how  powerful  and  far-reaching 
French  influence  was  at  the  inception  of  the  new 
order. 

There  was  one  very  powerful  Anglo-Saxon  in- 
fluence, namely,  the  English  language.  Because 
England  was  pre-eminent  in  trade  with  the  Orient, 
English  was  a  vital  necessity  to  a  nation  situated 
as  Japan  was.  Therefore  the  study  of  the  English 
language  was  made  compulsory  in  Japanese  uni- 
versities and  colleges.  Thus  there  was  established 
a  means  of  communication  with  the  Occident 
especially  advantageous  to  the  great  Anglo-Saxon 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     145 

nations,  England  and  the  United  States.  Yet, 
notwithstanding  this  great  advantage,  these  nations 
influenced  the  political  and  economic  development 
of  Japan  during  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century  far  less  than  Germany  did. 

After  the  end  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  in 
1 87 1,  Japan  turned  to  Germany  for  inspiration 
and  for  expert  guidance.  Changes  were  made  in 
the  educational  system  in  1873,  1879,  and  1886, 
all  of  them  increasing  German  influence  and  lessen- 
ing that  of  the  French.  The  German  language 
rapidly  took  the  place  of  the  French,  the  teaching 
of  English  remaining  compulsory,  however.  The 
universities  and  the  normal  and  intermediate 
schools  were  dominated  by  Germans.  So,  too, 
were  the  medical  and  engineering  schools.  The 
whole  body  of  commercial  law  was  patterned  after 
that  of  Germany,  and  German  technical  experts 
were  employed  in  large  numbers  in  developing 
Japanese  industry  and  commerce.  Furthermore, 
the  army  was  reorganized  upon  German  lines  and 
placed  under  the  direction  of  noted  Prussian  officers. 
From  1873  to  1903  the  Europeanization  of  Japan 
meant  its  Germnnization.  It  is  scarcely  an  exag- 
geration to  say  that  the  whole  national  spirit  of 
Japan  was  thoroughly  Prussianized  during  this 
period. 

It  is  fairly  easy  to  understand  the  eager  readiness 
with  which  the  Japanese  accepted  Prussian  leader- 
ship, with  its  militarism,  its  unscrupulousness  in 
dealing  with  other  nations,  and  its  low  cunning  in 
diplomacy  and  in  commercial  relations.  Japan  had 
with  good   reason  become  thoroughly  alarmed  at 


146    RUSSIA  AS   AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

the  menace  of  European  domination.  The  allied 
war  upon  China  had  done  much  to  stimulate  that 
alarm  and  to  create  a  passionate  determination  to 
establish  a  strong  army.  The  sweeping  victory 
of  Prussia  over  France,  and  the  immense  gains  in 
territory  and  money  which  the  victors  derived 
from  that  struggle,  induced  the  Japanese  to  regard 
the  conquerors  with  envious  admiration.  It  was 
quite  natural  that  Japan  should  want  her  army 
to  be  trained  by  the  Germans.  It  was  equally 
natural  that  the  Germans  should  extend  their 
influence  into  every  department  of  Japanese  life. 
There  is  another  and  more  fundamental  reason 
for  the  rapid  assimilation  of  German  methods  by 
Japan,  namely,  the  marked  similarity  of  their 
relation  to  other  nations.  Germany,  like  Japan, 
was  still  essentially  a  feudalistic  empire.  It  was 
meeting  with  astonishing  success  in  its  attempt  to 
unite  the  divine  right  of  kings  and  other  feudalistic 
principles  to  modern  science  and  industry,  which 
was  precisely  what  the  rulers  of  Japan  wanted  to 
accomplish.  There  is  a  close  relationship  between 
the  theocracy  of  Japan  with  its  god-king  and  the 
German  system.  Neither  Germany  nor  Japan 
wanted  that  growing  responsiveness  of  the  govern- 
ment to  the  freely  expressed  will  of  the  people 
which  characterized  other  great  western  nations. 
We  must  remember,  too,  that  the  birth  of  the  new 
Japan  was  practically  simultaneous  with  the  birth 
of  modern  Germany.  What  Japan  saw,  therefore, 
was  a  nation  reborn  at  the  same  time  as  herself, 
surrounded  by  powerful  nations,  overcoming  every 
obstacle  and  every  disadvantage  due  to  her  late 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     147 

entrance  into  the  family  of  nations  and  forging 
rapidly  ahead.  It  was  natural,  therefore,  that 
the  Japanese  should  feel  great  admiration  for  the 
Germans,  and  that  they  should  feel  a  certain 
kinship  with  the  western  nation.  Their  problem 
was  in  many  respects  like  that  of  Germany.  They 
wanted  "a  place  in  the  sun,"  and  Germany's  great 
military  and  political  prestige,  so  rapidly  acquired, 
led  them  to  believe  in  and  to  idealize  German 
methods.  The  result  was  the  adoption  by  Japan 
of  the  German  political  system,  the  German  phi- 
losophy of  world  power,  German  methods  of  diplo- 
macy, and  German  military  organization. 

This  is  not  the  unfriendly  judgment  of  a  mind 
equally  prejudiced  against  Germany  and  Japan. 
It  is  recognized  by  many  of  the  most  capable 
thinkers  in  Japan.  An  influential  Japanese  publi- 
cist said  to  the  present  writer  in  the  early  summer  of 
1918,  when  German  triumph  seemed  imminent: 
''We  Japanese  have,  unfortunately,  been  too  com- 
pletely Germanized  in  all  our  ways,  especially  in 
our  political  thinking.  Whether  Germany  triumphs 
in  this  war  or  loses,  the  greatest  task  before  Japan 
will  be  the  undoing  of  this  great  mischief.  We 
must  un-Germanize  Japan  if  we  are  to  live  happily 
and  at  peace  with  the  world."  Dr.  Yujiro  Miyake, 
a  patriotic  Japanese  publicist  of  large  influence, 
wrote  in  December,  1918:  "The  Japanese  army 
was  organized  in  accordance  with  the  German 
system.  So  with  Japanese  politics,  laws,  science, 
and  everything  else.  The  admirers  of  the  German 
military  system  were  apt  to  think  that  the  German 
political   system  would   be  the  best  in  the  world, 


i48    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

just  as  her  military  system  was.  The  followers 
of  the  German  science,  on  the  other  hand,  blindly 
declared  that  Japan  should  follow  Germany  in  all 
departments  of  her  national  activity."  l 

It  may  fairly  be  urged  in  defense  of  Japan  that 
her  aggressive  policy  of  imperialist  expansion  was 
forced  upon  her  by  the  extreme  pressure  of  popula- 
tion upon  the  too  meager  means  of  subsistence. 
Supersaturation  and  overpopulation  are  very  real 
and  very  serious  facts  for  Japan.  For  fifty  years 
her  population  has  been  increasing  at  the  rate  of 
400,000  a  year.  In  1917  the  increase  was  800,000. 
There  were  33,000,000  Japanese  fifty  years  ago; 
to-day  there  are  about  55,000,000,  excluding  Korea, 
Formosa,  and  Japanese  Saghalien  and  counting 
only  the  inhabitants  of  Japan  proper — that  is,  of 
the  islands  constituting  the  Japanese  mainland. 
The  following  figures  show  the  rapid  and  steady 
growth  of  the  population: 

Year  Population 

1S72 33,110,796 

1891 40,718,677 

1899 44,260,652 

1903 46,732,876 

1908 49,588,804 

1910 50,984,844 

I9I52 54,282,898 

This  population  is  crowded  upon  an  area  of  only 
148,756  square  miles,  the  area  of  Japan  proper, 
the  density  of  population  being  about  357  per 
square  mile.     This  is  indeed  below  the  density  of 

1  Nihon    Yitjiro  Nihomjin,   December,    1918.     Quoted    by   Millard, 
Democracy  and  the  Eastern  Question,  p.  44. 

2  Estimated.     See  F.  Iladland  Davis,  op.  cit.,  p.  300. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     149 

population  in  Belgium,  Holland,  and  Great  Britain, 
while  higher  than  that  of  Italy,  Germany,  and 
France.  It  should  be  remembered,  however,  that 
less  than  16  per  cent,  of  Japanese  land — 15,00x3,000 
acres— is  arable.1  Other  nations  with  densely 
crowded  populations  have  secured  large  colonial 
possessions  to  absorb  some  of  their  surplus  popula- 
tion and  to  provide  raw  materials  and  foodstuffs. 
Thus  in  1914,  when  the  war  broke  out,  Belgium 
possessed  900,000  square  miles  of  colonial  territory, 
Germany  more  than  1,000,000  square  miles,  Holland 
almost  as  much.  Japan's  recent  annexations  bring 
her  colonial  territories  up  to  about  96,000  square 
miles,  but  for  the  most  part  these  are  quite  thickly 
populated.  Moreover,  the  European  nations  have 
always  enjoyed  the  great  advantage  of  emigration 
to  other  lands,  whereas  the  amount  of  relief  to 
Japan  through  emigration  has  been  very  small. 
The  Japanese  possessions  have  afforded  very  little 
opportunity  to  relieve  the  mainland  from  the  ter- 
rible pressure  of  its  teeming  millions  of  surplus 
population.  Formosa  and  even  Korea  are  already 
quite  densely  populated  and  afford  very  little 
room  for  colonists,  their  population  amounting  to 
almost  190  persons  per  square  mile. 

The  Japanese  have  been  under  the  very  distinct 
disadvantage  that  many  countries  discriminate 
against  Japanese  immigration.  The  surplus  popu- 
lation of  England,  Belgium,  Germany,  and  other 
crowded  countries  can  find  a  place  in  the  United 
States,  Canada,  Australasia,  and  South  Africa, 
whereas  these  countries  have  either  prohibited  Jap- 

1  I'ortcr,  op.  '■;.,  p.  269;   Woodruff,  The  Expansion  of  Race.',  p.  44. 
11 


ISO    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

anese  immigration  entirely  or  so  greatly  restricted 
it  as  to  make  it  of  small  importance  so  far  as  the 
Japanese  problem  was  concerned.  It  is  quite  easy, 
therefore,  to  understand  the  economic  motivation 
of  Japan's  aggressive  policy  of  territorial  expansion. 
She  must  expand  or  degenerate  and  decay.  One 
may  appreciate  this  fact,  however,  without  accept- 
ing it  as  a  sufficient  justification  of  her  intrigues 
and  her  imperialistic  aspiration  to  the  hegemony 
of  Asia. 

II 

It  is  said  that  in  tne  latter  part  of  the  sixteenth 
century  the  famous  Great  Councilor,  Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi,  said  to  the  Regent  Nobunaga:  "When 
Kyushu  is  ours,  if  you  will  grant  me  the  revenue 
of  that  island  for  one  year,  I  will  prepare  ships  of 
war,  and  purchase  provisions,  and  go  over  and  take 
Korea.  Korea  I  shall  ask  you  to  bestow  on  me 
as  a  reward  for  my  services,  and  to  enable  me  to 
make  still  further  conquests;  for  with  Korean 
troops,  aided  by  your  illustrious  influence,  I  intend 
to  bring  the  whole  of  China  under  my  sway.  When 
that  is  effected,  the  three  countries  (China,  Korea, 
and  Japan)  will  be  one.  I  shall  do  it  as  easily  as  a 
man  rolls  up  a  piece  of  matting  and  carries  it  under 
his  arm." 

This  vision  of  the  great  "Japanese  Napoleon" 
still  dominates  the  foreign  policy  of  Japan.  Korea, 
the  troublesome  little  kingdom  so  inappropriately 
named  "The  Land  of  Morning  Calm,"  from  the 
time  of  Hideyoshi's  invasion  in  1592  down  to  the 
present    has    been    in    constant    turmoil.     During 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     151 

almost  the  whole  period  from  Hideyoshi's  brutal 
invasion  down  to  the  Chinese-Japanese  war  Korea 
was  subject  to  infamous  treatment  by  Japan  and 
looked  upon  China  as  a  protector.  Although 
Korea  continued  to  pay  tribute  to  Japan  and  so  to 
acknowledge  the  latter's  suzerainty  over  her  down 
to  1875,  the  treaty  she  signed  with  Japan  in  Febru- 
ary, 1876,  declared  her  to  be  "an  independent 
state"  enjoying  "the  same  sovereign  rights  as 
Japan."  In  1894  there  was  a  great  uprising  in 
Korea,  and  it  is  notorious  that  both  Japan  and 
Russia  had  a  share  in  its  instigation.  In  spite  of 
the  Treaty  of  Tientsin,  China  sent  an  army  to 
Korea,  at  the  request  of  the  Korean  government, 
to  quell  the  uprising,  and  in  notifying  Japan  said, 
"It  is  in  harmony  with  our  constant  practice  to 
protect  our  tributary  states  by  sending  troops  to 
protect  them."  Japan  seized  upon  this  use  of  the 
term  "tributary  states"  as  constituting  a  declara- 
tion of  Chinese  suzerainty  over  Korea  and  war 
became  imminent.  Japan  tried  to  get  China  to 
agree  to  conjoint  action  in  Korea,  but  China  refused 
on  the  ground  that  the  Koreans  must  be  left  to 
work  out  their  own  problems.  Then  Japan  tried 
by  means  of  an  armed  force  to  compel  the  Korean 
government  to  adopt  various  reforms,  which  the 
Korean  government,  supported  by  China  and 
Russia,  declined  to  consider,  at  the  same  time 
demanding  the  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese  troops. 
On  July  25,  1894,  without  the  formality  of  a  dec- 
laration of  war,  Japan  began  hostilities  by  sinking 
a  transport  laden  with  Chinese  soldiers  bound  for 
Korea. 


152    RUSSIA  AS   AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

By  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki  China 
recognized  the  independence  of  Korea.  This  was 
a  prelude  to  Japanese  annexation  of  Korea.  It 
meant  that  China  formally  renounced  any  special 
interest  in  the  Land  of  Morning  Calm  and  would 
not  interfere  with  Japanese  policy  there.  Japan 
wanted  the  Korean  peninsula,  not  only  because 
of  the  strategic  value  of  its  harbors,  but  also  because 
in  its  82,000  square  miles  are  considerable  deposits 
of  coal  and  iron,  so  much  needed  by  Japan,  as  well 
as  gold  and  copper.  As  we  have  seen,  her  triumph 
was  short-lived.  Russia  wanted  Korea  herself 
and  was  not  willing  to  see  it  virtually  annexed 
by  Japan.  Acting  in  concert  with  Germany  and 
France,  she  compelled  Japan  to  renounce  her 
claims  to  Korea.  Japan  was  obliged  to  submit, 
but  she  obtained  her  revenge  and  took  another 
great  step  toward  her  goal  when,  in  1905,  just  ten 
years  later,  she  forced  Russia  to  recognize  her 
suzerainty  over  Korea. 

Five  years  after  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of 
Portsmouth  Korea  was  formally  annexed  by  Japan. 
The  steps  leading  to  that  end  are  very  interesting. 
On  August  12,  1905,  an  agreement  was  reached 
between  Great  Britain  and  Japan  by  which  the 
former  agreed  to  recognize  the  special  interest 
of  the  latter  in  Korea  and  acknowledging  her 
right  to  control  Korea's  foreign  policy.  On  the 
other  hand,  Japan  agreed  to  guarantee  the  integrity 
of  Korea  and  to  maintain  the  Korean  dynasty. 
The  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  three  weeks  later  im- 
posed substantially  the  same  agreement  upon 
Russia,     There    was    a    great    native    protest    in 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     153 

Korea  against  being  placed  under  the  suzerainty  of 
Japan,  the  traditional  enemy,  and  many  riots  took 
place  which  the  Japanese  put  down  by  force  of 
arms.  In  1907  the  Korean  government  sent  a 
delegation  to  the  Hague  Conference  to  protest 
against  Japanese  oppression.  In  the  summer  of 
that  year  there  were  great  uprisings  in  Korea 
against  the  Japanese  and  the  latter  insisted  upon 
the  disbanding  of  the  Korean  arm}*.  In  1907  a 
Japanese  Resident-General  was  established  in  Korea 
with  instructions  to  hasten  annexation,  and  in 
August,  1910,  the  Korean  emperor  surrendered  his 
crown  and  his  throne  and  Korea  became  a  part 
of  the  Japanese  Empire.  Up  to  the  present  her 
rule  in  Korea  has  been  extremely  brutal  and  op- 
pressive. 

The  story  thus  hastily  sketched  in  its  broad  out- 
lines admirably  illustrates  the  unscrupulous  methods 
of  Japan  in  dealing  with  a  weaker  nation.  She 
fomented  strife  and  civil  war  in  Korea  and  then 
made  the  resulting  disturbances  her  pretext  for 
seizing  the  nation  by  the  throat  and  destroying 
its  independence.  Of  course,  this  is  not  an  uncom- 
mon practice  for  nations  to  indulge  in.  Russia 
under  the  bureaucracy  also  fished  in  troubled 
waters,  for  example,  and  intrigued  in  Korea  with 
a  view  to  ultimate  annexation  of  the  kingdom  to 
the  Russian  Empire.  The  Japanese  methods,  how- 
ever, were  particularly  brutal  and  ruthless  and 
quite  Prussian  in  their  disregard  of  both  law  and 
morality. 

The  parallel  between  Japanese  imperialism  and 
Prussianism  can  be  readily  seen  by  comparing  the 


154    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

policy  which  Japan  has  pursued  toward  China 
with  that  which  Germany  pursued  toward  Russia. 
In  the  latter  case  there  was  a  vast  territory,  the 
Russian  Empire,  possessing  an  abundance  of 
natural  resources  and  capable  of  very  great  indus- 
trial development.  Prussianized  Germany  made 
it  a  cardinal  principle  of  her  foreign  policy  to 
hamper  and  impede  Russia's  economic  and  politi- 
cal development,  and  to  that  end  used  every  device 
which  a  perverted  political  genius  could  suggest. 
She  corrupted  the  government  of  Russia,  fomented 
dissensions  and  plots  within  the  Russian  Empire, 
and  on  every  possible  occasion  involved  her  in  dif- 
ficulties with  other  nations.  Japan's  policy  toward 
China  was  practically  identical,  and  so  were  the 
reasons  which  prompted  it.  She  wanted  to  prevent 
China  from  becoming  a  great  industrial  nation. 
She  wanted  China  to  be  economically  her  vassal — 
a  vast  market  for  her  goods  and  a  provider  of  an 
almost  unlimited  supply  of  raw  materials.  More- 
over, just  as  Germany  aimed  at  European  hege- 
mony so  Japan  aimed  at  the  hegemony  of  Asia. 

All  this  was  quite  clearly  evidenced  by  the 
Chinese-Japanese  war.  It  was  even  more  apparent 
from  1905  onward.  "By  every  device  known  to 
industry  and  commerce  Japan's  trade  with  the 
Eighteen  Provinces l  was  encouraged.  Heavily 
subsidized  steamers  plied  the  waters  of  the  Yangtse 
and  its  tributaries;  Japanese  post-offices  and  con- 
sulates were  opened  in  the  main  treaty  ports; 
Japanese  merchants  came  in  by  the  hundreds; 
and  Japanese  teachers  were  to  be  found  in  Chinese 

1  A  name  given  to  China  proper. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     155 

government  schools.  Since  1901  Chinese  students 
had  flocked  to  Japan  by  the  thousands,  finding  in 
Tokio  a  nearer  and  less  expensive  source  of  western 
learning  than  the  university  centers  of  the  Occident. 
Returning,  they  had  given  a  decidedly  Japanese 
flavor  to  the  reform  movement  in  their  home  land."  x 
Coming  from  a  well-known  Japanese  apologist, 
this  description  cannot  be  set  aside  as  the  exag- 
gerated account  of  an  unfriendly  critic. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  description  gives  only 
the  barest  intimation  of  the  extent  to  which  the 
Japanese  were  intrenching  themselves  in  China. 
Not  only  were  they  using  the  German  weapon  of 
export  bounties  and  trade  subsidies,  but  they  were 
also,  as  befitted  pupils  of  Germany,  corrupting 
and  weakening  Chinese  government  and,  at  the 
same  time,  fostering  revolution  against  it.  Even 
the  German  corruption  of  the  Russian  bureaucracy 
did  not  equal  the  corruption  of  the  Chinese  govern- 
ment by  Japan.  Agents  of  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment prepared  elaborate  lists  of  Chinese  officials, 
civil  and  military,  their  habits,  debts,  financial 
interests,  and  so  on.  If  a  Chinese  official  needed 
money  for  any  purpose  he  was  almost  certain  to 
be  approached  by  a  Japanese  agent,  or  some 
Chinese  intermediary,  suggesting  how  the  neces- 
sary money  could  be  readily  obtained.  Sometimes 
this  took  the  form  of  a  bribe  disguised  as  a  per- 
sonal "loan."  Sometimes  a  contract  would  be  let 
in  such  a  manner  that  the  impecunious  official  was 
made  a  nominal  partner  and  enabled  to  draw  big 

'  Kenneth  Scott  I-atourette,  The  Development  of  Japan,  pp.  189-190. 
[talks  arc  mine. —J.  S. 


156    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

dividends.  In  other  cases  the  contractor  had  to 
pay  rich  commissions  to  the  official  acting  as 
"agent"  for  the  Japanese  corporation  in  whose 
name  the  contract  was  made.  One  of  the  most 
common  methods  was  to  induce  public  officials 
to  raise  large  loans  in  Japan  for  public  works, 
giving  local  revenues  or  concessions  as  security, 
and  to  appropriate  large  sums  for  themselves. 
In  this  way  not  only  was  China  undermined 
through  the  corruption  of  her  officials,  but,  at  the 
same  time,  Japan  secured  control  of  immense 
economic  interests  in  China,  a  veritable  mortgage 
upon  her  future.1 

A  most  sinister  feature  of  this  last-named  form 
of  financial  debauchery  was  the  fact  that  it  became 
the  method  whereby  Japan  financed  and  fostered 
revolts  and  factional  strife  in  China.  That  this 
grave  charge  is  true  there  can  be  no  rational  doubt, 
for  it  was  tacitly  admitted  by  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Office  soon  after  the  O'Hara  Ministry  took  office. 
No  one  who  is  at  all  familiar  with  the  subtleties 
generally  employed  in  Japanese  official  statements 
will  fail  to  understand  the  confession  implicit  in 
this  statement,  issued  by  the  Foreign  Office  in 
December,  191 8: 

Mischievous  reports  of  Japanese  activities  in  China,  more 
particularly  with  regard  to  the  granting  of  loans,  have  for  some 
time  past  been  in  circulation  and  have  imputed  to  the  Japanese 
government  intentions  which  are  entirely  foreign  to  them. 
For  obvious  reasons,  the  Japanese  government  cannot  under- 
take   to    discourage    financial    and    economic    enterprises    of 

1  This  whole  question  is  discussed  in  great  detail  by  Millard,  Democ- 
racy and  the  Eastern  Question,  pp.  174-2^0 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     157 

their  nationals  in  China,  so  long  as  those  enterprises  are  the 
natural  and  legitimate  outgrowth  of  special  relations  between 
the  two  neighboring  and  friendly  nations.  Nor  is  the  Japanese 
government  at  all  receding  from  its  readiness  to  render  needed 
financial  assistance  to  China,  consistently  with  the  terms  of  the 
declarations  and  engagements  to  which  it  is  a  party,  should 
the  general  security  and  welfare  of  China  call  for  such 
assistance. 

At  the  same  time,  it  fully  realizes  that  loans  supplied  to  China, 
under  the  existing  conditions  of  domestic  strife  in  that  country, 
are  liable  to  create  misunderstandings  on  the  part  of  either  of  the 
contending  factions,  and  to  interfere  with  the  re-establishment 
of  peace  and  unity  in  China,  so  essential  to  her  own  interests  as 
well  as  to  the  interests  of  foreign  powers. 

Accordingly,  the  Japanese  government  has  decided  to  with- 
hold such  financial  assistance  to  China  as  is  likely,  in  its  opinion, 
to  add  to  the  complications  in  her  internal  situation,  believing 
that  this  policy  will  be  cordially  participated  in  by  all  the 
powers  interested  in  China.1 

According  to  Prof.  J.  B.  Powell,  than  whom 
there  are  few  more  competent  authorities  upon 
this  subject,  the  greater  part  of  the  Japanese  loans 
to  China  have  been  used  for  purposes  of  internal 
warfare  in  China.  At  the  same  time  as  she  was 
weakening  her  big  neighbor  Japan  was  obtaining 
mortgages  upon  practically  everything  China  pos- 
sessed.    He  says: 

Between  January  I,  1909,  and  June  30,  1918,  Japanese 
bankers  have  advanced  to  China  yen  178,770,000  and,  in 
addition,  three  other  loans  to  the  amount  of  yen  106,000,000 
have  practically  been  agreed  upon,  and  probably  will  be  signed 
before  the  end  of  July.  Of  the  yen  178,770,000  already  ad- 
vanced, yen  164,100,000  has  been  advanced  since  May  I,  1915, 
showing  that  Japanese  activity  in  the  Chinese  field  really  did 
not  begin  until  eight  months  after  the  opening  of  hostilities 

1  Japan  Advertiser,  December,  191S, 


158    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

in  Europe.  Outside  of  a  comparatively  small  part  of  the  yen 
164,100,000  which  was  used  for  purposes  of  flood  relief  and  to 
combat  the  plague  last  winter,  most  of  the  money  has  been 
used  in  internal  warfare  in  China.  About  twelve  million  yen 
has  been  advanced  to  the  southern  Chinese  provinces,  pre- 
sumably for  military  use  on  the  southern  side,  and  the  rest  has 
been  used  by  the  northern,  or  Peking,  government  for  similar 
purposes.  To  pay  for  these  loans  China  has  mortgaged  rail- 
way lines,  gold,  coal,  antimony,  and  iron  mines.  She  has 
mortgaged  the  government  printing-office  at  Peking,  the 
Hankow  electric  light  and  waterworks,  and  native  forests  in 
various  parts  of  the  country.  There  is  a  clause  in  each  of  these 
loan  agreements  to  the  effect  that  the  Chinese  authorities 
shall  not  obtain  additional  funds  upon  these  securities  unless 
the  consent  of  the  Japanese  bankers  first  has  been  obtained. 
As  to  the  expenditure  of  this  money,  so  far  as  is  known  the 
Japanese  bankers  have  placed  no  restrictions  whatever  upon 
the  uses  to  which  the  money  was  to  be  put.  For  example, 
the  Chinese  authorities  make  a  loan  agreement  with  the 
Japanese  bankers  to  extend  a  railroad,  develop  a  coal  or  iron 
mine,  or  to  construct  telegraph  lines.  After  the  money  has 
been  obtained  and  the  bankers  and  negotiators  receive  their 
commissions,  the  rest  of  the  loan  is  apportioned  out  among 
various  military  governors,  who  use  it  to  pay  their  soldiers 
and  keep  them  loyal.1 


Ill 

Anything  like  a  comprehensive  surve)r  of  Japanese 
relations  with  China  would  take  us  too  far  afield. 
At  the  same  time,  the  attitude  of  Japan  toward 
her  neighbor  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the 
serious  student  of  the  great  problem  of  Russia's 
reconstruction  and  future  development.  Obvi- 
ously, if  Russia  is  to  have  extensive  political  and 
economic   relations  with  Japan,   and  perhaps  fall 

1  Millard's  Review,  July  20,  1918. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     159 

under  her  control,  the  character  of  Japan  becomes 
a  matter  of  very  great  moment  to  Russia  and  to 
students  of  Russian  affairs.  And  nothing  better 
illustrates  the  character  of  Japan  as  a  world  power 
than  her  foreign  policy  as  it  relates  to  China. 

There  is  much  food  for  thought  in  the  brief 
sequence  of  dates  marking  the  entrance  of  these 
two  nations  into  the  World  War.  On  August  1, 
1914,  Germany  declared  war  on  Russia  and  France. 
On  August  4th,  Great  Britain  declared  war  on 
Germany.  Eleven  days  later,  August  15th,  Japan 
sent  an  ultimatum  to  Germany  and  on  August 
23d  declared  war  against  her.  It  was  not  until 
August  14,  1917,  that  China  declared  war  against 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  in  the  three  years  of  bitter  struggle 
the  Entente  Allies  had  been  very  hard  pressed, 
and  that  there  were  times  when  it.  seemed  that  the 
entrance  of  China  on  their  side  would  have  a 
beneficial,  and  perhaps  a  determinative,  effect. 

In  considering  these  dates  two  principal  ques- 
tions arise,  namely,  why  did  Japan  enter  the  war 
when  and  how  she  did,  and  why  did  China  keep 
out  of  the  war  so  long?  Germany  had  not  made  any 
attack  upon  Japan  nor  any  threat  against  her. 
On  the  contrary,  there  were  evidences  that,  for 
reasons  which  are  obvious,  Germany  courted 
Japan's  friendship  at  this  time.  On  the  day  of 
Germany's  declaration  of  war  against  Russia  there 
was  an  enormous  pro-Japanese  demonstration  in 
Berlin.  Clearly,  then,  Japan  did  rot  enter  the 
war  because  of  any  provocative  act  by  German)-. 
The  Japanese  official  pretext  was  that  Japan  was 


i6o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

obliged,  under  the  terms  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Agreement,  first  made  in  1902  and  subsequently 
extended,  to  enter  the  war  as  the  ally  of  Great 
Britain.  This  view  is  indeed  set  forth  in  the 
Imperial  Rescript  of  the  Emperor  Yoshihito  de- 
claring war: 

We,  by  the  Grace  of  Heaven,  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  on  the 
throne  occupied  by  the  same  Dynasty  from  time  immemorial, 
do  hereby  make  the  following  proclamation  to  all  Our  loyal 
and  brave  subjects: 

We,  hereby,  declare  war  against  Germany  and  We  command 
Our  Army  and  Navy  to  carry  on  hostilities  against  that  Empire 
with  all  their  strength,  and  We  also  command  all  Our  com- 
petent authorities  to  make  every  effort  in  pursuance  of  their 
respective  duties  to  attain  the  national  aim  within  the  limit 
of  the  law  of  nations. 

Since  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  in  Europe,  the  calami- 
tous effect  of  which  We  view  with  grave  concern,  We,  on  Our 
part,  have  entertained  hopes  of  preserving  the  peace  of  the 
Ear  East  by  the  maintenance  of  strict  neutrality,  but  the 
action  of  Germany  has  at  length  compelled  Great  Britain, 
Our  Ally,  to  open  hostilities  against  that  country,  and  Ger- 
many is  at  Kiaochau,  its  leased  territory  in  China,  busy  with 
warlike  preparations,  while  her  armed  vessels,  cruising  the  seas 
of  Eastern  Asia,  are  threatening  Our  commerce  and  that  of 
Our  Ally.     The  peace  of  the  Far  East  is  thus  in  jeopardy. 

Accordingly.  Our  Government,  and  that  of  His  Britannic 
Majesty,  after  a  full  and  frank  communication  with  each 
other,  agreed  to  take  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  for 
the  protection  of  the  general  interests  contemplated  in  the 
Agreement  of  Alliance,  and  We,  on  Our  part,  being  desirous  to 
attain  that  object  by  peaceful  means,  command  Our  Govern- 
ment to  offer,  with  sincerity,  an  advice  to  the  Imperial  German 
Government.  By  the  last  day  appointed  for  the  purpose, 
however,  Our  Government  failed  to  receive  an  answer  accept- 
ing their  advice. 

It  is  with  profound  regret  that  We,  in  spite  of  Our  ardent 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     161 

devotion  to  the  cause  of  peace,  are  thus  compelled  to  declare 
war,  especially  at  this  early  period  of  Our  reign  and  while  We 
are  still  in  mourning  for  Our  lamented  Mother. 

It  is  Our  earnest  wish  that,  by  the  loyalty  and  valor  of  Our 
faithful  subjects,  peace  may  soon  be  restored  and  the  glory 
of  the  Empire  be  enhanced. 

On  the  other  hand,  various  Japanese  statesmen 
and  publicists  have  declared  that  Japan  did  not 
enter  the  war  because  of  any  obligation  imposed 
by  her  alliance  with  Great  Britain.  Many  have 
contended  that  the  terms  of  the  alliance  could  not 
be  fairly  interpreted  as  imposing  such  an  obligation. 
No  less  responsible  a  statesman  than  Viscount 
Ishii,  head  of  the  special  mission  sent  by  Japan  to 
America  in  1917,  declared  in  Boston,  on  the  Fourth 
of  July  of  that  year,  that  Japan  did  not  enter  the 
war  on  account  of  her  alliance  with  Great  Britain, 
that  the  terms  of  that  alliance  placed  no  such 
obligation  upon  her.  Japan  had  entered  the  war, 
he  said,  because  she  recognized  how  seriously  the 
whole  civilized  world  would  be  menaced  by  a 
victorious  Germany.  In  short,  her  motives  were 
identical  with  those  of  the  United  States.1 

Certainly  it  is  difficult  for  the  lay  mind  to  inter- 
pret the  text  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  other 
than  as  Viscount  Ishii  did  in  the  speech  referred 
to.  The  Anglo-Japanese  offensive  and  defensive 
alliance  set  forth  that  the  two  governments  were 
interested  in  maintaining  "the  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China  and 
the  Empire  of  Korea."  That  pledge  had  already 
been  broken  by  Japan  and  treated  as  "a  scrap  of 
1  fide  Associate!  Pfss  rc-porr  of  the  speech, 


1 62    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

paper."  The  layman  reading  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty  of  Alliance  is  forced  to  conclude  that 
either  party  was  bound  to  come  to  the  assistance 
of  the  other  in  the  event  of  its  being  attacked  by  two 
or  more  powers.  Only  the  diplomatic  mind  is 
capable  of  so  interpreting  the  events  of  July  and 
August,  1914,  as  to  make  it  appear  that  Great 
Britain,  Japan's  ally,  had  been  so  "attacked." 
Nevertheless  the  Imperial  Rescript  declaring  war 
and  the  speeches  and  statements  of  Count  Okuma 
made  it  appear  that  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 
was  the  only  reason  for  Japan's  entrance  into  the 
war.  Certain  it  is  that  the  British  Foreign  Office 
had  urged  that  action  upon  Japan. 

Why  any  friend  of  Japan  should  see  in  her  course 
of  action  anything  like  an  honorable  fulfilment  of  a 
solemn  obligation  it  is  difficult  to  discern.  If  she 
was  bound  to  enter  the  war  on  the  side  of  her  ally, 
automatical!}',  then  her  ultimatum  to  Germany  on 
August  15,  1914,  was  a  piece  of  treachery.  Why 
an  "ultimatum"  at  all  if  Japan  had  no  choice? 
Why  offer  terms  the  fulfilment  of  which  by  Ger- 
many would  have  kept  her  out  of  the  war  despite 
the  treaty?  Japan  demanded  that  Germany  with- 
draw her  ships  from  Chinese  and  Japanese  waters 
and  surrender  Kiaochau  with  a  view  to  its  eventual 
restoration  to  China,  and  allowed  one  week  for 
reply.  By  all  the  laws  of  nations  and  by  every 
moral  code,  had  Germany  agreed  to  these  demands 
and  proceeded  to  fulfil  them  Japan  would  have 
to  stay  out  of  the  war  or  find  some  other  pretext 
for  entering  it.  As  the  record  stands,  then,  if  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  did  obligate  her  to  enter 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     163 

the  war  as  England's  ally,  Japan  was  willing  to 
repudiate  that  obligation  for  a  consideration.  If 
it  did  not  so  obligate  her,  then  her  real  motives 
for  entering  the  war  were  not  those  which  she 
avowed. 

The  plain  and  unvarnished  truth  is  that  Japan 
was  very  little  influenced  by  the  treaty  with  Great 
Britain.  She  had  already  flagrantly  violated  it  in 
connection  with  Korea.  Her  ultimatum  to  Ger- 
many shows  that  a  price  would  have  kept  her  from 
joining  with  her  ally.  Japan  was  actuated  by  two 
motives,  revenge  and  aggrandizement.  The  ter- 
minology of  her  ultimatum  to  German}^  was 
obviously  suggested  by  a  rankling  memory  of  the 
note  presented  to  her  by  the  German  Minister  at 
Tokio  in  April,  1895.  Just  as  she  had  bided  her 
time  and  then  settled  the  score  with  Russia,  so 
she  had  bided  her  time  and  was  now  about  to 
settle  with  Germany,  the  worst  offender  of  all. 
It  was  a  very  human  motive. 

Her  other  motive  was  less  sentimental,  even 
though  it  was  shot  through  with  an  exaggerated 
national  pride,  a  passionate  Pan-Nipponism,  an 
Asiatic  parallel  to  Pan-Germanism.  In  the  first 
place,  she  wanted  the  leased  territory  of  Germany 
in  China,  the  Shantung  Peninsula.  She  also 
wanted  the  South  Pacific  islands  belonging  to 
Germany.  From  the  point  of  view  of  Japanese 
imperialism  it  was  most  important  that  none  of 
the  Entente  nations  should  be  permitted  to  dis- 
place Germany,  either  at  Shantung  or  in  the 
Marshall  and  Caroline  islands.  These  latter  were 
and     are    practically    worthless    for    purposes    of 


i64    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

colonization.  Germany  had,  indeed,  called*  them 
"colonies,"  but  that  was  a  misnomer.  The  total 
population  of  both  groups  at  the  opening  of  the 
war  was  only  about  26,000  and  the  European 
population  less  than  250. 

These  figures  show  clearly  enough  that  it  was  not 
for  purposes  of  colonization  that  Japan  wanted 
the  islands.  They  at  least  offered  no  relief  from 
overcrowding  in  Japan.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
Japan  wanted  them  for  the  same  reasons  as  led 
Germany  to  acquire  them,  namely,  for  strategical 
purposes  and  for  the  economic  value  of  the  great 
deposits  of  potash.  The  islands  possess  a  very 
considerable  value  as  naval  bases  and  wireless 
stations.  Their  deposits  of  potash  are  large  and 
Japan  is  a  great  consumer  of  phosphates,  for  which 
she  has  largely  depended  upon  Germany.  The  poor 
quality  of  much  of  her  soil  makes  high  fertilization 
necessary  for  profitable  rice-culture.  The  islands 
are  also  rich  in  copra  and  other  tropical  products. 

The  Japanese  imperialists  wanted  Shantung 
and  the  South  Pacific  islands.  They  realized  per- 
fectly well  that  in  a  short  time  these  would  be 
taken  by  the  British  navy  and  in  all  probability 
become  British  holdings.  This  Japan  wanted  to 
prevent.  It  was  no  part  of  the  Japanese  scheme 
to  sit  back  and  watch  Great  Britain  increase  her 
hold  upon  China  and  the  Pacific.  In  reality,  her 
entrance  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Entente 
Allies  was  a  shrewd  move  against  the  principal 
Entente  nation.  Her  plan  and  purpose  was  to 
take  possession  of  the  German  holdings  in  China 
and   the   Pacific   before   they   could   be   taken   by 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     165 

Great  Britain.  It  was  a  policy  subtly  directed 
against  England  as  well  as  Germany.  It  was, 
moreover,  part  of  a  well-conceived  plan  to  increase 
Japanese  control  of  China,  as  subsequent  events 
proved.  The  demand  made  upon  Germany  to 
deliver  the  territory  of  Kiaochau  to  Japan,  "with 
a  view  to  the  eventual  restoration  of  the  same  to 
China,"  scarcely  veiled  the  real  purpose  of  Japan, 
which  was  annexation. 

It  is  very  well  known  that  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  China  tried  hard  to  protect  herself  against 
being  drawn  into  the  conflict.  President  Yuan 
seemed  from  the  first  to  realize  that,  owing  to 
Japan's  well-known  policy  of  "fishing  in  troubled 
waters,"  China  had  every  reason  to  fear  her  neigh- 
bor. He  proposed,  therefore,  that  all  the  terri- 
tories in  China  leased  to  belligerent  nations  should 
be  declared  neutralized  and  placed,  for  the  duration 
of  the  war,  under  China's  control.  Under  this 
arrangement,  the  British-leased  territories,  Kowloon 
and  Wci-hai-wei,  would  have  been  neutralized  as 
well  as  Kiaochau.  Because  Japan  was  then  a 
neutral,  China  sought  her  "friendly  offices"  as 
well  as  those  of  the  United  States  of  America. 
Yet,  as  all  the  world  knows,  Japan  opposed  the  plan 
and  defeated  it.  The  terms  of  the  Japanese  ulti- 
matum to  Germany  show  that  she  was  determined 
that,  instead  of  China  controlling  her  own  national 
domain,  that  control,  throughout  the  German- 
leased  territory,  should  be  exercised  by  Japan.  In 
point  of  fact,  her  ultimatum  virtually  asserted  a 
suzerainty  over  China. 

President   Yuan's   next   step   was   to   propose    a 


166    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

plan  for  limiting  military  operations  against  Tsing- 
tau  to  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochau.  In  this 
Yuan  failed,  again  owing  to  Japan.  The  reason 
for  Japan's  opposition  appeared  later  on  when, 
in  the  Tsingtau  expedition,  Japan  actually  spread 
her  troops  over  a  wide  region  outside  the  German- 
leased  territory  and  seized  the  Tsingtau-Tsinan 
railway.  As  a  final  effort,  President  Yuan  pro- 
posed that  China  should  join  the  Entente  Allies 
in  declaring  war  against  Germany,  that  with  such 
forces  as  she  cou!4  command  she  should  join  in 
expelling  the  Germans  from  the  Kiaochau  territory, 
being  assisted  by  Japan  and  other  Allies  who 
should  withdraw  as  soon  as  the  Germans  were 
expelled,  leaving  China  in  control  of  her  original 
domain.  It  was  also  provided  that  any  military 
measures  to  be  taken  in  China  outside  of  the 
German-leased  territory  should  be  by  Chinese 
troops  only.  This  proposal  was  first  made  in  the 
middle  of  August  to  the  British  Minister  at  Peking, 
Sir  John  Jordan.  It  was  rejected,  doubtless  at  the 
instigation  of  Japan. 

In  August,  191 5,  President  Yuan  again  proposed 
that  China  should  enter  the  war  on  the  side  of  the 
Entente  Allies  upon  certain  conditions.  These 
were  (1)  that  the  Allies  would  agree  to  protect 
China  against  any  attempted  German  reprisals 
later  on;  (2)  that  the  German  leasehold  and  Ger- 
man concessions  in  China  should  revert  to  China; 
(3)  that  the  Allied  governments  would  agree  to 
hand  over  to  China  revolutionary  plotters  who 
were  operating  against  China  from  the  safe  shelter 
of  the  foreign  settlements  in  China.     Japan  again 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     167 

blocked  this  effort,  which  might  have  brought  an 
end  to  the  war  so  much  earlier  than  was  the  case. 
It  is  a  fact  that  in  November,  191 5,  the  British, 
French,  and  Russian  Ministers  at  Tokio  called 
upon  the  Japanese  Foreign  Minister,  Viscount 
Ishii,  to  formally  request  on  behalf  of  their  govern- 
ments that  Japan  join  in  inviting  China  to  enter 
the  war.  Viscount  Ishii  demurred  and  protested 
that  "Japan  could  not  regard  with  equanimity  the 
organization  of  an  efficient  Chinese  army  such  as 
would  be  required  for  her  active  participation  in 
the  war,  nor  could  Japan  fail  to  regard  with  uneasi- 
ness a  liberation  of  the  economic  activities  of  a  nation 
of  400,000,000  people." 

It  will  be  seen  that  throughout  the  first  fifteen 
months  Japan  set  her  own  imperialistic  interests 
above  the  Allied  cause  and  that  she  virtually 
dominated  the  Entente  so  far  as  its  policies  were 
concerned  with  the  Far  East.  When,  on  August 
14,  1917,  influenced  by  the  United  States,  China 
entered  the  war  it  was  in  the  face  of  Japanese 
opposition.  This  is  the  fact,  notwithstanding 
official  statements  of  the  Japanese  government 
which  practically  attributed  China's  action  to  the 
persuasion  of  Japan.  Chinese  statesmen  and  pub- 
licists were  not  very  enthusiastic  about  entering 
the  war  in  the  summer  of  1917,  when  the  military 
situation  was  so  discouraging.  America  had  not 
yet  developed  any  military  force,  and  it  was  by  no 
means  certain  that  she  could  do  so  in  time.  The 
Chinese  were  morally  certain  that  there  existed 
secret  agreements  between  Japan  and  England, 
Russia  and  France,  whereby  the  three  great  Entente 


1 68    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

powers  were  pledged  to  uphold  Japan  in  her  designs 
upon  China  and  acknowledging  her  paramountcy 
there.  Only  her  confidence  that  the  United  States 
would  disavow  such  agreements  and  champion 
Chinese  independence  and  sovereignty  induced 
China  to  enter  the  war  at  last. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Japan  would  greatly  have 
preferred  China  to  have  entered  the  war,  if  at  all, 
on  the  other  side.  That  would  have  given  her  a 
splendid  pretext  for  occupying  China.  There  was 
indeed  much  pro-German,  or  rather  anti-Entente, 
sentiment  in  China,  carefully  fostered,  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe,  by  Japanese  agents. 
There  is  no  doubt  at  all  that  Japanese  agents, 
plentifully  supplied  with  money,  had  instigated  no 
small  part  of  the  unrest  in  China  in  the  period 
between  China's  severance  of  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany  and  her  declaration  of  war  six 
months  later. 

We  know  now  that  as  soon  as  it  became  apparent 
that  China  was  drifting  on  toward  war  on  the  side 
of  the  Allies  Japan  tried  to  get  assurances  from 
England,  France,  and  Russia  that  in  return  for 
the  withdrawal  of  her  opposition  to  China's  en- 
trance into  the  war  they  would  uphold  her  claims 
to  Shantung  and  the  South  Pacific  islands  and 
acknowledge  her  special  interest  in  China.  This 
request  was  made  also  of  the  United  States  govern- 
ment, and  in  February,  1917,  the  Japanese  Ambas- 
sador at  Washington  told  Secretary  of  State 
Lansing  that  his  predecessor,  Secretary  W.  J. 
Bryan,  had  actually  given  such  a  promise!  We 
know,  thanks  to  the  publication  of  Russia's  secret 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     169 

diplomatic  correspondence  by  the  Bolshevist  gov- 
ernment, that  negotiations  for  such  an  agreement 
by  Russia  were  proceeding  when  the  Russian 
Revolution  took  place.  On  the  8th  of  February, 
1917,  M.  Krupensky,  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Tokio,  wrote  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Office  an 
account  of  a  conversation  with  Baron  Motono, 
the  Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which 
the  following  passages  occur: 

The  minister  pointed  out  the  necessity  for  him,  in  view  of 
the  attitude  of  Japanese  public  opinion  on  the  subject,  as  well 
as  with  a  viezu  to  safeguard  Japan  s  position  at  the  future  peace 
conference,  if  China  should  be  admitted  to  it,  of  securing  the 
support  of  the  Allied  powers  to  the  desires  of  Japan  in  respect 
of  Shantung  mid  the  Pacific  islands.  These  desires  are  for  the 
succession  to  all  the  rights  and  privileges  hitherto  possessed 
by  Germany  in  the  Shantung  province  and  for  the  acquisition 
of  the  islands  to  the  north  of  the  equator  which  are  now  occu- 
pied by  the  Japanese. 

Motono  plainly  told  me  that  the  Japanese  government 
would  like  to  receive  at  once  the  promise  of  the  Imperial 
government  to  support  the  above  desires  of  Japan.  In  order 
to  give  a  push  to  the  highly  important  question  of  a  break 
between  China  and  Germany,  /  regard  it  as  very  desirable  that 
the  Japanese  should  be  given  the  promise  they  ask.  This  the  more 
so  as,  so  far  as  can  he  seen  here,  the  relations  between  Great 
Britain  and  Japan  have  of  late  been  such  as  to  justify  a  surmise 
that  the  Japanese  aspirations  zcould  not  meet  with  any  objections 
on  the  part  of  the  London  Cabinet.1 

IV 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  the  subjection  of 
China    by   Japan    it    is    necessary   to   go    back    to 

1  1  or  tin-  full  t<xt  us  published  by  the  Bolshevist  government,  sec 
Appendix  1)  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


i7o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

August,  1914,  and  review  the  development  of 
Japanese  relations  with  China  during  the  period 
of  the  international  negotiations  above  described. 
As  we  have  already  seen,  Japan  on  entering  the 
war  professed  that  she  only  wanted  to  take  Kiao- 
chau  from  Germany  in  order  to  give  it  back  to 
China,  from  which  it  had  been  wrested.  On  the 
very  day  of  the  Japanese  ultimatum  to  Germany 
Count  Okuma  sent  a  telegram  to  the  American 
press  in  which  he  said,  "Japan  has  no  territorial 
ambitions  and  hopes  to  stand  as  the  protector  of 
the  peace  in  the  Orient."  On  August  24,  1914, 
Count  Okuma  telegraphed  to  The  New  York  hide- 
pendent  as  follows: 

As  Premier  of  Japan,  I  have  stated  and  I  now  state  to  the 
people  of  America  and  of  the  world  that  Japan  has  no  ulte- 
rior motive,  no  desire  to  secure  more  territory,  no  thought  of 
depriving  China  or  other  peoples  of  anything  which  they  now 
possess.  My  government  and  my  people  have  given  their 
pledge,  which  will  be  as  honorably  kept  as  Japan  always  keeps 
promises.1 

In  December,  Baron  Kato,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  was  asked  in  the  Japanese  Parliament  if 
Kiaochau  would  be  returned  to  China,  and  replied 
that  the  question  was  unanswerable  and  that 
Japan  had  never  committed  herself  to  return  Kiaochau 
to  China: 

On  January  18,  191 5,  the  Japanese  Minister  at 
Peking,  Mr.  Hioki,  served  upon  China  the  infamous 
Twenty-one  Demands,  demanding  hasty  com- 
pliance and  absolute  secrecy.  On  several  occasions 
efforts  were  made  to  force  China  to  a  decision  and 


1  Italics  mine. — J.  S. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     171 

frequent  warnings  were  given  to  keep  the  entire 
matter  secret.  When  articles  appeared  in  the 
newspapers  to  the  effect  that  such  demands  had 
been  presented  to  China  by  Japan  the  Japanese 
government  made  official,  categorical  denial. 
Japanese  diplomatic  representatives  everywhere 
were  ordered  to  make  similar  denials  on  behalf 
of  their  government,  and  when  the  Ministers  of 
various  governments  at  Peking  made  official 
inquiries  of  the  Japanese  Minister  there  he  posi- 
tively denied  that  any  demands  whatever  had  been 
made  on  China  by  Japan.  Then,  after  copies  of 
the  demands  had  been  furnished  to  the  representa- 
tives of  the  various  foreign  governments  by  China, 
the  Japanese  government  coolly  denied  the  au- 
thenticity of  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  but  ad- 
mitted that  she  had  made  demands,  eleven  in 
number,  which  she  published  with  a  show  of  virtu- 
ous indignation. 

Now,  what  were  the  things  aimed  at  by  Japan? 
The  following  summary  by  Professor  Wheeler,  of 
Hangchow  College,  is  as  fair  and  concise  as  any 
that  has  been  made: 

First,  to  succeed  Germany  in  its  position  and  possessions  in 
Shantung;  second,  to  consolidate  the  Manchurian  territory 
won  in  the  war  with  Russia  and  to  add  to  it  a  part  of  Mongolia; 
third,  to  gain  a  controlling  share  in  the  iron  output  of  China; 
fourth,  to  secure  the  military  safety  of  Japan  by  rendering 
impossible  the  lease  of  any  of  China's  ports  or  coastal  islands; 
fifth,  if  possible,  to  enter  into  such  close  economic,  military, 
and  political  relations  with  China  as  to  make  it,  with  all  its 
vast  resources,  tributary  to  Japan.1 

1  R.  \V.  Wheeler,  China  and  the  World  War,  p.  u. 


172    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

The  Twenty-one  Demands  were  grouped  into 
five  groups.  The  first  group  related  to  Shantung, 
the  second  to  southern  Manchuria  and  eastern 
Mongolia,  the  third  to  a  proposed  agreement 
between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping  Company, 
the  fourth  to  the  non-alienation  by  China,  through 
leases  or  cessions  of  coastal  territory,  and  the  fifth — 
the  most  objectionable  of  all— to  various  matters 
of  internal  administration  of  such  a  character  that 
compliance  with  them  would  have  been  equivalent 
to  a  total  abandonment  of  her  sovereignty  by 
China.1 

On  April  26th  Japan  presented  a  revised  list  of 
demands,  twenty-four  in  number,  modified  in 
form,  but  not  essentially  different  from  the  original 
demands.  At  the  same  time  China  was  informed 
that  Kiaochau  would  be  returned  to  China  only 
upon  condition  that  the  Japanese  demands  were 
accepted.  On  May  1,  191 5,  the  Chinese  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  presented  a  reply  making  sub- 
stantial concessions,  but  urging  modification  of 
the  terms.  On  May  7th  Japan  presented  an 
ultimatum,  demanding  complete  acceptance  of  all 
the  demands  in  the  first  four  groups  and  a  con- 
tinuance of  negotiations  concerning  the  fifth  group. 
China  was  given  forty-eight  hours  in  which  to 
decide.  The  ultimatum  ended  in  these  words, 
"It  is  hereby  declared  that  if  no  satisfactory  reply 
is  received  before  or  at  the  designated  time,  the 
Imperial  government  will  take  steps  they  may 
deem  necessary." 

With    regard    to    Kiaochau   the    ultimatum    de- 

1  The  full  text  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  is  given  in  Appendix  E. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     173 

clared,  "From  the  commercial  and  military  points 
of  view  Kiaochau  is  an  important  place,  in  the 
acquisition  of  which  the  Japanese  Empire  has 
sacrificed  much  blood  and  money,  and,  after  the 
acquisition,  the  empire  incurs  no  obligation  to  re- 
store it  to  China."  1  On  May  8th  China,  intimi- 
dated by  an  unmistakable  show  of  force,  accepted 
the  inevitable  and  a  week  later  signed  the  agree- 
ment which  Japan  dictated.  Thanks  to  the  open 
intervention  of  the  United  States  of  America  and, 
it  is  believed,  Great  Britain's  friendly  remon- 
strances, the  fifth  group  of  Japan's  demands  was 
dropped  and  China  retained  at  least  something 
approaching  sovereignty.  The  outcome  of  the 
whole  infamous  business  was  that  Japan  had, 
through  almost  unparalleled  treachery  to  her 
allies,  greatly  extended  her  power  over  China  and 
become  the  mistress  of  Asia.  Doctor  Hornbeck 
thus  sums  up  her  achievements: 

Whatever  her  intentions,  Japan  has  accomplished  in  regard 
to  China  at  least  rive  things:  she  has  consolidated  her  own 
position  in  her  northern  sphere  of  influence,  Manchuria;  she 
has  driven  the  Germans  out  of  their  former  sphere  of  influence, 
Shantung,  and  has  constituted  herself  successor  to  Germany's 
rights;  she  has  given  warning  that  she  considers  Fukien 
Province  an  exclusive  sphere  for  Japanese  influence;  she  has 
undertaken  to  invade  the  British  sphere  of  influence;!  and 
she  stands  in  a  position  to  menace  and  to  dictate  to  the  Peking 
government.  A  glance  at  the  map  of  North  China  will  show 
how  completely  Peking  is  at  Japan's  mercy.  In  control  of 
Port  Arthur  and  of  the  Shantung  Peninsula,  Japan  commands 
the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  of  Pechili,  which  is  the  doorway  by 
.sea  to   I  ien-tsm  and  Ncwchwang.     In  possession  of  Tsing-tao, 

1  Italics  mine.     'I'm:  Author. 


i74    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Daricn,  and  (virtually)  of  Antung  and  Newchwang,  Japan 
thus  commands  every  important  port  and  harbor  of  the 
Yangtse.  With  the  Manchurian  railways  penetrating  the 
heart  of  Manchuria  and  the  Shantung  Railway  extending  to 
the  heart  of  Shantung — and  with  the  right  to  extend  the 
latter  line  to  join  the  Peking-Hankow  line — Japan  is  in  a 
position,  should  she  so  choose,  at  any  moment  to  grind  Peking 
between  the  millstones  of  her  military  machine.  So  far  as 
strategy  is  concerned,  Japan  has  North  China  commercially, 
militarily,  and  politically  at  her  mercy.1 

On  November  2,  1917,  the  famous  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement  was  signed  at  Washington.  By 
the  terms  of  that  agreement  "the  government  of 
the  United  States  recognizes  that  Japan  has  special 
interests  in  China,  particularly  in  that  part  to 
which  her  possessions  are  contiguous."  At  the 
same  time  it  is  stated  that,  "The  territorial  sover- 
eignty of  China,  nevertheless,  remains  unimpaired, 
and  the  government  of  the  United  States  has  every 
confidence  in  the  repeated  assurances  of  the  Im- 
perial Japanese  government  that,  while  geographi- 
cal position  gives  Japan  such  special  interests, 
they  have  no  desire  to  discriminate  against  the 
trade  of  other  nations  or  to  disregard  the  com- 
mercial rights  heretofore  granted  by  China  in 
treaties  with  other  powers."  Finally,  Japan  was 
once  more  bound  to  the  "open-door"  policy,  both 
governments  agreeing  to  "always  adhere  to  the 
principle  of  the  so-called  'open  door,'  or  equal 
opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry  in  China." 

On  the  part  of  the  United  States  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement  represented  extreme  friendliness 
to    China.      The    "open-door"    policy,    honorably 

1  S.  K.  Hornbeck,  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East,  p.  346. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     175 

observed,  would  protect  her  from  that  economic 
vassalage  and  political  subjection  which  Japan 
had  attempted  to  force  upon  her,  especially  in  the 
fifth  group  of  the  famous  Twenty-one  Demands. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  recognition  by  the  United 
States  "that  Japan  has  special  interests  in  China" 
was  a  most  unfortunate  surrender  to  Japanese 
diplomacy.  By  "special  interests  in  China"  Japan 
means,  and  has  again  and  again  forced  China  to 
recognize  that  she  means,  something  far  more 
serious  than  mere  special  concern  and  interest 
arising  from  geographical  proximity,  as  suggested 
by  the  phrase  in  the  agreement  "territorial  propin- 
quity creates  special  relations  between  countries." 
Japan  had  been  contending  all  along,  and  now 
claims  the  sanction  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement 
for  the  contention,  that  she  has  a  preferential 
position  in  China  practically  amounting  to  a 
suzerainty  over  her.  It  is  quite  safe  to  assert  that 
China,  had  she  been  consulted,  would  not  have 
given  willing  consent  to  the  recognition  of  Japan's 
"special  interests"  in  this  sense. 

Among  the  diplomatic  documents  published  by 
the  Bolsheviki  after  the  Bolshevist  coup  d'Hat  in 
Russia  is  some  confidential  correspondence  from 
the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Tokio  to  the  Russian 
Foreign  Office,  from  which  we  may  gather  an 
inside  view  of  the  sinister  diplomacy  of  Japan  at 
this  time.  Writing  on  October  22,  1917,  of  the 
Lansing-Ishii  negotiations,  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador said:  "The  Japanese  are  manifesting  more 
and  more  clearly  a  tendency  to  interpret  the  special 
position  of  Japan  in  China,  inter  alia,  in  the  sense 


1 76    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

that  other  powers  must  not  undertake  in  China  any 
political  steps  without  previously  exchanging  views 
with  Japan  on  the  subject — a  condition  that  would 
to  some  extent  establish  a  Japanese  control  over 
the  foreign  affairs  of  China.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Japanese  government  does  not  attach  great  im- 
portance to  its  recognition  of  the  principle  of 
the  open  door  and  the  integrity  of  Chinay  regarding 
it  as  merely  a  repetition  of  the  assurances  repeatedly 
given  by  it  earlier  to  other  powers  and  implying 
no  new  restrictions  for  the  Japanese  policy  in 
China.  .  .  .  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  again 
confirmed  to-day  in  conversation  with  me  that 
in  the  negotiations  by  Viscount  Ishii  the  question 
at  issue  is  not  some  special  concession  to  Japan 
in  these  or  other  parts  of  China,  but  Japan  s  special 
position  in  China  as  a  whole."  On  November  I, 
191 7,  he  wrote  again  to  the  Foreign  Office,  "I  gain 
the  impression  from  the  words  of  the  Minister 
(Viscount  Motono)  that  he  is  conscious  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  misunderstandings  also  in  the  future, 
but  is  of  opinion  that  in  such  a  case  Japan  would 
have  better  means  at  her  disposal  for  carrying  into 
effect  her  interpretation  than  the  United  States."  * 

The  "open-door"  policy  in  China  is  generally 
associated  with  the  name  of  Secretary  Hay,  who 
used  the  phrase  in  the  ultimatum  to  Spain  on 
November  21,  1898.  The  principle  was,  however, 
quite  clearly  implied  in  the  first  treaty  of  Great 
Britain  with  China  in  1842,  and  in  general  British 
policy  in  China  has  been  based  on  that  principle 
of  equal    opportunity.     It   was    also   favored    by 

1  Italics  arc  mine. — The  Author. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     177 

Anson  Burlingame,  the  first  American  Minister 
to  China,  and  dominated  practically  all  our  sub- 
sequent relations  with  the  Chinese  Empire.1  Even 
in  the  "spheres  of  interest"  into  which  China  was 
divided  this  principle  was  maintained  by  agree- 
ments between  the  great  powers,  Russia  alone 
making  certain  reservations  regarding  her  vast 
Chinese  holdings.  Russia  nominally  recognized 
China's  sovereignty,  but  in  practice  ignored  it. 
By  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  she  recognized  Ja- 
pan's "paramount  political,  military,  and  economic 
interests  in  Korea,"  and,  it  must  be  understood,  ac- 
cepted the  Japanese  interpretation  of  "paramount 
interests."  In  1913  Russia  attempted  to  establish 
a  protectorate  over  outer  Mongolia  and  did  force 
China  to  grant  her  practically  an  exclusive  politi- 
cal and  economic  control  there. 


After  the  Russo-Japanese  War  both  Russia  and 
Japan  flouted  the  "open-door"  agreements  and 
asserted  exclusive  privileges  and  rights  in  China. 
There  was  a  quick  resumption  of  amicable  relations 
between  the  two  governments,  whose  conflicting 
interests  and  rivalry  never  could  hide  from  serious 
students  of  the  great  conflicts  in  the  Far  East  the 
fact  that  they  were  very  closely  related.  The 
principles  upon  which  both  these  bureaucracies 
rested  were  essentially  the  same,  though  the 
Japanese  bureaucracy  was  far  superior  to  the  Rus- 
sian in  efficiency  and  patriotism. 

'Wheeler,  op.  cil.,  pp.  I02?t-I03«. 


1 78    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

By  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  Japan  acquired 
from  Russia  the  southern  section  of  the  Man- 
churian  Railway,  from  Port  Arthur  to  Kwang- 
chengtse,  together  with  all  rights  appertaining 
thereto,  including  the  coal-mines  in  the  region 
which  belonged  to  or  were  operated  in  connection 
with  the  railway.  It  was  also  provided  in  the 
treaty  that  both  Japan  and  Russia  should  engage 
to  develop  and  use  their  railways  in  Manchuria 
"exclusively  for  commercial  and  industrial  pur- 
poses and  in  no  wise  for  strategic  purposes."  There 
was  a  period  of  two  years — until  March,  1907 — 
allowed  for  evacuation,  so  that  the  two  nations, 
Japan  and  Russia,  were  thus  given  the  right  to 
two  years'  military  administration  of  Manchuria. 
During  this  period  both  nations  violated  the 
"open-door"  policy  and  their  pledges  to  respect 
the  "integrity  of  China." 

In  this  period,  also,  the  governments  of  Russia 
and  Japan  undoubtedly  grew  closer  together,  as 
the  agreement  which  they  signed  on  July  30,  1907, 
amply  proves.  That  was  the  beginning  of  a  period 
of  close  co-operation  between  the  two  nations  in 
pursuit  of  a  policy  which  had  for  its  aim  the  divi- 
sion of  Manchuria  between  themselves,  the  effec- 
tive exclusion  of  other  nations  from  that  vast  and 
profitable  field,  and  mutual  support  and  defense 
against  any  possible  interference.  The  Conven- 
tion of  July  30,  1907,  was  quite  inoffensive.  The 
secret  agreements  of  1910  and  191 2  bound  the  two 
nations  still  closer.  On  July  3,  1916,  the  famous 
Secret  Treaty  was  signed  and  the  event  was  hailed 
with  great  rejoicing  in  Japanese  circles.     A  version 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     179 

of  this  treaty  published  in  the  press  of  the  two 
countries  at  the  time  is  now  known  to  have  been 
a  piece  of  deception.  This  published  version  read 
as  follows: 

1  he  Imperial  Russian  government  and  the  Imperial  Japanese 
government,  having  decided  to  unite  their  efforts  for  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  in  the  Far  East,  agree  as  follows: 

Article  i.  Russia  will  not  participate  in  any  agreement 
or  political  combination  directed  against  Japan,  and  Japan 
will  not  participate  in  any  agreement  or  political  combination 
directed  against  Russia. 

Article  2.  In  the  event  of  any  menace  to  territorial  rights 
or  any  special  interests  in  the  Far  East  of  any  of  the  two  con- 
tracting parties,  recognized  by  the  other  contracting  party, 
Russia  and  Japan  shall  come  to  an  agreement  concerning  the 
measures  which  they  will  undertake  to  give  each  other  aid 
and  co-operation  for  the  preservation  and  defense  of  the  afore- 
said rights  and  interests. 

In  testimony  whereof  the  undersigned  plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  this  convention  in  the  name  of  their  respective 
governments  and  have  fixed  their  seals. 

Done  in  Petrograd,  June  20  (July  3d),  1916,  which  cor- 
responds to  the  third  day  of  the  seventh  month  of  the 
fifth  year  of  Taicio. 

[Signed]  Sazonov  (M.P.). 

Motono  (M.P.). 

Even  in  the  form  in  which  it  was  published  this 
treaty  gave  great  anxiety  to  the  nations  most 
directly  concerned.  It  was  quite  evident  that 
Japan  and  Russia  had  agreed  to  share  the  domina- 
tion of  China  and  that  the  treaty  was  really  a 
piece  of  belligerent  imperialism.  It  was  not  against 
China  that  they  were  joining  hands,  for  neither 
nation  was  in  any  more  danger  from  China  than 
from  Santo  Domingo.     It  was  not  until  after  the 


i8o    RUSSIA  AS   AN   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Bolsheviki  published  the  diplomatic  documents 
of  the  old  regime  that  the  world  learned  the  real 
nature  of  the  treaty  entered  into  by  Japan  and 
Russia  in  secrecy,  behind  the  backs  of  their  allies, 
and  hidden  by  a  cunning  trick.  The  secret  treaty 
read : 

RUSSO-JAPANESE  TREATY 

The  Russian  Imperial  government  and  the  Japanese  Imperial 
government,  aiming  to  strengthen  the  firm  friendship  between 
them,  established  through  the  secret  agreements  of  July 
17-30,  1907,  June  21,  July  4,  1910,  and  June  25,  July  8,  191 2, 
have  agreed  to  supplement  the  aforesaid  secret  agreements 
with  the  following  articles: 

ARTICLE    I 

Both  the  high  contracting  parties  recognize  that  the  vital 
interests  of  one  and  the  other  of  them  require  the  safeguarding 
of  China  from  the  political  domination  of  any  third  Power  what- 
soever, having  hostile  designs  against  Russia,  or  Japan:  and 
therefore  mutually  obligate  themselves,  in  the  future  at  all 
times  when  circumstances  demand,  to  enter  into  open-hearted 
dealings,  based  on  complete  trust,  in  order  to  take  necessary 
measures  with  the  object  of  preventing  the  possibility  of 
occurrence  of  said  state  of  affairs. 


ARTICLE   2 

In  the  event,  in  consequence  of  measures  taken  by  mutual 
consent  of  Russia  and  Japan,  on  the  basis  of  the  preceding 
article,  a  declaration  of  war  is  made  by  any  third  power,  con- 
templated by  Article  I  of  this  agreement,  against  one  of  the 
contracting  parties,  the  other  party,  at  the  first  demand  of 
its  ally,  must  come  to  its  aid.  Each  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  herewith  covenants,  in  the  event  such  a  condition 
arises,  not  to  conclude  peace  with  the  common  enemy,  without 
preliminary  consent  therefor  from  its  ally. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     1S1 

ARTICLE   3 

The  conditions  under  which  each  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  will  lend  armed  assistance  to  the  other  side,  by  virtue 
of  the  preceding  article,  as  well  as  the  means  by  which  such 
assistance  shall  be  accomplished,  must  be  determined  in  com- 
mon by  the  corresponding  authorities  of  one  and  the  other 
contracting  parties. 

article  4 

It  is  requisite  to  have  in  view  that  neither  one  nor  the  other 
of  the  high  contracting  parties  must  consider  itself  bound  by 
Article  2  of  this  agreement  to  lend  armed  aid  to  its  ally,  unless 
it  be  given  guaranties  by  its  allies  that  the  latter  will  give  it 
assistance  corresponding  in  character  to  the  importance  of  the 
approaching  conflict. 

article  5 

The  present  agreement  shall  have  force  from  the  time  of  its 
execution,  and  shall  continue  to  be  in  force  until  July  1-14, 
of  the  year  1921. 

In  the  event  the  other  of  the  high  contracting  parties  does 
not  deem  it  necessary  twelve  months  prior  to  the  end  of  said 
period  to  declare  its  unwillingness  to  continue  the  present 
agreement  in  force,  then  the  said  agreement  shall  continue 
in  force  for  a  period  of  one  year  after  the  declaration  of  one 
of  the  contracting  parties  disclaiming  the  said  agreement. 

article  6 

The  present  agreement  must  remain  profoundly  secret  except 
to  both  of  the  high  contracting  parties. 

In  witness  whereof  the  persons  invested  with  full  power  by 
both  parties  have  signed  and  affixed  their  seals  to  the  present 
agreement  at  Petrograd  on  the  20th  of  June-July  3,  of  the  year 
1 916,  which  corresponds  in  the  Japanese  calendar  to  the  third 
day  of  the  seventh  month  of  the  fifth  year  of  the  reign  of 
Tais. 

(Signature:,] 

Sazonoff. 
1::  Motono. 


182    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Had  it  not  been  for  the  war  In  progress  at  the 
time  it  would  have  been  natural  to  believe  that 
the  third  power  against  which  this  treaty  was 
directed  was  Germany.  In  the  circumstances, 
Russia  and  Japan  being  already  allied  with  Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  other  smaller  nations 
against  Germany,  that  obviously  is  not  a  tenable 
theory.  Against  what  other  power  was  this  secret 
treaty  directed,  then  ?  What  power  would  be  likely 
to  attempt  anything  suggestive  of  a  "political 
domination"  of  China?  Certainly  not  France  or 
Italy  in  any  conceivable  turn  of  events.  England, 
alone  of  the  great  European  powers,  because 
of  her  vast  interests  and  possessions  in  Asia,  in 
certain  circumstances,  might  be  led  to  attempt 
such  a  domination  of  China.  She  could  not,  how- 
ever, make  any  effort  in  that  direction  while  still 
engaged  in  the  deadly  struggle  with  Germany, 
nor,  in  the  best  circumstances  conceivable,  for  a 
long  time  afterward.  These  facts  alone  would 
seem  to  preclude  any  rational  belief  that  Great 
Britain  was  the  nation  feared  by  Japan.  More- 
over, Japan  and  Great  Britain  were  already  allied 
by  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  and  at  the  same 
time  as  the  treaty  was  made  with  Russia  Japan 
had  negotiated,  or  was  negotiating,  a  secret  treaty 
with  Great  Britain  which  gave  to  Japan  the  German 
possessions  in  the  Pacific  Ocean.  It  is  almost 
impossible  to  contest  the  conclusion  that  the 
"third  power"  referred  to  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
Treaty,  and  against  which  that  secret  agreement 
was  directed,  was  the  United  States  of  America.1 

1  Sec  Millard,  op.  cit.,  p.  67. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     183 

Not  only  was  the  friendship  of  America  for  China 
well  known,  but  it  was  also  well  known  that  this 
friendship  was  likely  to  become  a  matter  of  practi- 
cal importance,  owing  to  the  naval  program  of 
that  year. 

If  this  conclusion  is  to  be  accepted  at  all,  it  can 
only  be  accepted  upon  the  hypothesis  that  the 
Russian  diplomats  had  been  tricked  by  Japan  into 
a  false  position.  Certainly  no  one  who  knows 
anything  of  Russian  political  affairs  can  believe 
that  Russia,  even  under  the  old  regime,  had  any 
hostile  intention  toward  the  United  States  of 
America.  Bad  as  the  bureaucracy  was,  it  was 
still  Russian.  However  incompetent  and  corrupt 
it  might  be,  it  was  never  guilty  of  harboring  evil 
designs  against  the  nation  which  Russians  of  every 
class  regarded  with  particular  friendliness  and  trust. 
There  was  no  likelihood  of  Russia's  foreign  policy 
involving  her  in  trouble  with  America  such  as 
Japan  has  had  constantly  to  face.  If  the  treaty 
was  directed  against  the  United  States  of  America, 
Russian  diplomacy  was  undoubtedly  the  victim 
of  Japanese  cunning.  In  this  connection  it  should 
be  said  that  there  is  good  reason  for  believing 
that  even  the  text  of  the  secret  treaty  published 
by  the  Bolsheviki  does  not  tell  the  whole  story; 
that  there  was  yet  another  secret  agreement  con- 
cluded at  the  same  time.  Such  authorities  on 
Russo-Japanese  affairs  as  Dr.  S.  G.  Eliseyev,  of 
the  University  of  Petrograd,  and  Prof.  N.  M. 
Popov,  lecturer  on  the  Japanese  language  in  the 
Petrograd  Academy  of  Eastern  Languages,  have 
collated  a  voluminous  mass   of  evidence  to  show 


i84    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

that  there  was  another  agreement  by  which  Russia 
conceded  to  Japan  part  of  the  branch  of  the  Man- 
churian  Railway  from  Sungari  to  Kuan-Chen-Tzei, 
a  stretch  of  107  miles,  for  a  payment  of  70,000,000 
yen.  Other  valuable  economic  concessions  made 
to  Japan,  according  to  the  same  authorities,  were 
the  right  of  Japanese  to  settle  in  eastern  Siberia  and 
to  engage  in  trades,  industry,  and  commerce;  the 
right  of  shipping  on  the  Sungari;  the  extension  of  the 
rights  of  the  Japanese  in  the  fisheries  of  the  Amur, 
northern  Saghalien,  and  the  Maritime  Province. 

When  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement  was  signed 
on  November  2,  191 7,  the  secret  agreements  made 
in  February  and  March  of  that  year  between 
Japan  and  the  British,  French,  Russian,1  and 
Italian  governments,  giving  to  Japan  the  German 
rights  in  Shantung,  can  hardly  have  been  known  to 
the  American  government.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  can  hardly  be  believed  that  the  agreements 
referred  to  remained  a  profound  secret  to  our 
Department  of  State  throughout  the  war  and 
became  known  only  at  Versailles. 

Whatever  the  facts  as  to  that  may  be,  Japan 
triumphed,  and  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  it  is 
written,  "Germany  renounces,  in  favor  of  Japan, 
all  her  rights,  titles,  and  privileges — particularly 
those  concerning  the  territory  of  Kiaochau,  rail- 
ways, mines,  and  submarine  cables — which  she 
acquired  in  virtue  of  the  treaty  concluded  by  her 
with  China  on  March  6,  1898,  and  of  all  other 
arrangements  relative  to  the  province  of  Shantung." 

1  See  pp.  236-237.     The  Revolution  prevented  the  formal  ratifica- 
tion by  Russia  of  the  agreement  which  had  been  actually  made. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     185 

VI 

So  much  has  been  written  about  the  "Shantung 
Question"  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  do  more  in 
this  study  than  sketch  the  main  outlines  of  the 
political,  military,  and  economic  gains  accruing 
to  Japan  under  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  At  the 
outset  we  must  fix  well  in  our  minds  the  fact 
that  Japan  already  possessed,  by  "lease,"  Port 
Arthur  and  Dalny,  giving  her  control  and  mastery 
of  the  Gulf  of  Pechili,  as  a  glance  at  the  map  will 
show.  By  possessing  Kiaochau  Bay  she  is  enabled 
to  cut  the  communication  between  Peking  and 
Shanghai  on  the  sea,  and  thus  to  throttle  at  a 
moment's  notice  almost  the  life  of  a  vast  and 
vitally  important  area  of  China.  Moreover,  as 
the  Gulf  of  Pechili  borders  Shantung  on  the  north 
and  Kiaochau  Bay  leads  to  its  very  heart,  it  is  quite 
evident  that  the  whole  Shantung  Province,  and  not 
merely  the  former  German  concession,  becomes 
subject  to  Japan's  mercy.  Thus  Japan  not  only 
gets  rid  of  a  powerful  and  dangerous  rival,  Ger- 
many, whose  establishment  at  Kiaochau  was 
always  a  potential  menace  to  her  control  of  the 
Gulf  of  Pechili,  but  she  also,  at  the  same  time, 
greatly  weakens  China's  power  of  self-defense  and 
adds  to  her  economic  mastery  of  China.  Kiaochau 
Bay  has  the  only  ice-free  harbor  and  port  on  the 
Yellow  Sea  left  to  China  free  from  foreign  control, 
all  the  others  being  possessed  by  foreign  nations. 
The  Shantung  Settlement  therefore  took  from 
China  her  only  chance  to  maintain  a  naval  base 
on  the  Yellow  Sea  for  her  coast  defense. 


i86    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

It  is  quite  evident,  therefore,  that  by  acquiring 
the  territorial  "leasehold"  of  Germany  Japan 
really  acquired  a  great  deal  more  than  the  two 
hundred  square  miles  of  territory  which  Germany 
had  forced  from  China,  and  strategic  advantages 
far  greater  than  Germany  had  possessed  through 
holding  that  territory.  The  union  of  the  military 
and  economic  advantages  of  the  German  "lease- 
hold" at  Kiaochau  united  to  those  of  Japan  on  the 
Gulf  of  Pechili  obviously  results  in  a  very  great 
increase  of  Japan's  power  over  China  and,  it  must 
not  be  forgotten,  of  her  power  to  realize  the  great 
imperial  vision  of  becoming  the  ruler  of  con- 
tinental Asia. 

It  is  notoriously  well  known  that  from  the  mo- 
ment of  her  occupation  of  the  Kiaochau  territory 
Japan  has  energetically  pursued  a  policy  of  econom- 
ic interpenetration  with  regard  to  the  rest  of  the 
Shantung  Province.  She  violated  Chinese  sover- 
eignty by  establishing  Japanese  administration 
outside  of  the  leased  territory.  At  first  the  pre- 
text of  "military  necessity"  was  used  and  the 
administration  was  by  military  agencies.1  Later 
on  Japanese  civil  administration  was  substituted. 
By  the  use  of  force  and  terrorism  the  Chinese  were 
compelled  to  sell  their  lands  to  Japanese  buyers. 
Even  though  the  Chinese  landowner  did  not  want 
to  sell  at  all,  he  was  compelled  to  sell  to  Japanese 
buyers,  whose  demands  were  backed  up  by  the 
Japanese  military  authorities.  This  was  done 
especially  in  the  case  of  mining  lands.     All  sorts 

1  Memorial  published  by  the  Shantung   People's   Association,   No- 
vember, 1917. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     187 

of  enterprises,  subsidized  by  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment, were  established,  despite  the  fact  that  they 
could  not  possibly  be  profitably  carried  on,  the 
object  being  to  ''colonize"  and  "permeate"  not 
the  leased  territory  alone,  but  the  whole  province.1 
An  enormous  trade  in  morphia  has  been  carried 
on  with  the  direct  approval  and  support  of  the 
Japanese  government  Notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  Japan  is  signatory  to  the  agreement  which 
forbids  the  importation  of  morphia  into  China  or 
of  the  means  of  manufacturing  it,  this  diabolical 
trade  has  been  carried  on  to  a  most  astonishing 
extent  under  the  direction  of  the  Bank  of  Japan. 
Tsingtao,  the  Kiaochau  port,  is  the  chief  center 
of  a  trade  amounting  to  tens  of  millions  of  yen 
annually.  A  sinister  light  is  thus  thrown  upon 
Japan's  insistence  in  the  "Agreement"  of  191 5 
that  the  important  Chinese  customs  offices  should 
be  principally  directed  by  Japanese  officials.  All 
through  Manchuria,  as  well  as  the  Shantung 
Province,  Japanese  drug  dealers  and  peddlers 
freely  sell  morphia  with  impunity,  protected  by  the 
Japanese  authorities.2  The  exposures  of  this  busi- 
ness by  various  foreign  newspapers  published  in 
China  and  Japan,  by  religious  and  civic  bodies  in 
Shantung,  and  the  reports  made  to  various  foreign 
governments  -  -  including  our  own — by  their  resident 
officials,  led  the  Japanese  government  to  deny 
complicity  in  or  responsibility  for  the  illicit  morphia 
tr;ule.     The  fact  remains,  however,  that  the  trade 

1  Sir  Millard';  R,   ■■•:;■,  January  iq,  1919. 

-  I  his  whole  nefarious  trade  was  exhaustively  exposed  in  Thr   V  ■".'/; 
C       .  Daily  Xr:c  ,  Shanghai,  in  Decemlur,  [91H 


iSS    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

is  carried  on  by  Japanese  capital,  by  Japanese 
agents,  through  Japanese  channels,  protected  by 
Japanese  officials. 

The  Japanese  make  much  of  the  fact  that  they 
have  pledged  themselves  to  return  the  Kiaochau 
territory  to  China.  Assuming  that  they  fulfil 
that  pledge,  it  is  quite  evident  from  the  agreements 
of  1915  dad  19 1 S,  which  were  signed  by  China 
under  duress,  that  the  Chinese  are  right  in  saying, 
"Japan  will  keep  the  oyster  and  return  to  us  only 
the  shell."  Japan  will  retain  practical  sovereignty 
over,  and  complete  economic  mastery  of,  the 
Shantung  Province  with  its  56,000  square  miles 
of  territory  and  its  population  of  nearly  40,ooo,ooo.1 
The  conditions  for  the  "return"  of  Kiaochau  to 
China  include  the  stipulation  that  there  is  to  be  a 
permanent  Japanese  settlement  to  be  designated 
by  the  Japanese  government.  This  is  to  be  at 
Tsingtau,  the  port  of  Kiaochau  Bay,  and  the 
entrance  to  the  entire  Province  of  Shantung.  The 
Japanese  will  thus  have  all  the  port  facilities  and 
the  greater  part  of  the  town.  Furthermore,  Japan 
will  have,  under  the  terms  of  the  agreement  of 
101S  approved  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  control 
of  the  railway  system  of  Shantung  and  of  practi- 
cally all  the  mine  - 

The  Kiaochau- Tsi nan  Railway,  which  now  falls 
to  Japan,  was  used  by  Germany  to  draw  almost 
the  entire  trade  of  Shantung  to  Kiaochau  and 
made  Tsingtau  the  most  important  port  in  the 
Orient  for  German  trade.    The  comrr  -  shipped 

1  through  3  in   iq i-  were  valued  at  over 


JAPAN  AS  GI  TS   SUCCESS         :-. 

zil.zcc.zcc.     In    \y.':    this    rose   to    H-vocc,ooc. 

In  that  vear  the  Kiaochau-Tsinan  ?.i.' •  -  .   --,--- 


-dJXICU 


over    i    million    passengers    and    900,00c    tons    of 

freight.     The    receipts    in    1912    were    $2,400,000 

and  the  ezpen  d:t -res  £1,200.00:..-     Japan  not  only 

this  railway,  but  also  the  right  tc    construct 

1  sinan-^nunteh    line,    whicn    wiJ    extend    ner 

economic    ar  I  tary    influence    right    into    the 

hean  of  China,  and  the  line  from  Kaomi  to  Hsu- 

tance  of  j"x  miles,  which   will  extend 

tr.it   influence    southward   to    Kiangsu.     Japai 

thus  given  control   of  two  of  the  three  principal 

the   sea   and  the    Hentsin-Pukow  line   of  railwav. 


a    position 


She  is   i'-:   placed 

strike  it  the  tr.irci  way,  the  rai-ros  1  between  Peking 

and  the  Y'angtse  Valley. 


a  con7ide7ahTc"'ti'^e  before'  the  wa?  the  G* 


iqo    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

monopolization  by  Japan  of  the  rich  mining  rights 
of  Shantung.  How  important  these  are  is  indi- 
cated by  the  following  figures  of  coal  output,  which, 
it  should  be  remembered,  represent  a  very  unde- 
veloped state  of  the  mines: l 

Yearly 

Coal  Mines  at  Output  Year 

Tons 

Poshan 414,000  1913 

Weishien 199,000  1913 

Hungsan 410,000  1914 

Fangtse 200,000  1914 

Yihsien 198,000  1914 

Tawenkow 72,000  I9H 

Ichow 30,000  1914 

Total 1,523,000 

In  addition  to  coal,  there  are  the  great  iron-ore 
deposits  at  Clinlinchen,  the  rich  ore  yielding  66.4 
per  cent,  of  iron,  and  the  gold-mines  at  Fengkai 
and  Kiaochau.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  mining 
rights  which  Japan  has  acquired  are  of  enormous 
value  and  will  go  far  toward  supplying  her  with 
the  coal  and  iron  she  needs.  For  while  Japan 
produces  a  considerable  quantity  of  coal,  it  is  of 
poor  quality  and  cannot  be  used  for  coke,  which 
is  essential  to  the  manufacture  of  steel.  As  to 
iron,  the  amount  produced  in  Japan  is  pitifully 
small  as  compared  with  the  amount  used.  The  total 
iron-ore  production  of  Japan  and  Korea  combined 
amounted,  in  1917,  to  something  like  324,000  tons, 
representing  a  pig-iron  equivalent  of  160,000  tons. 
In  the  same  year  the  pig-iron  and  steel  used  by 

1  Christian  Science  Monitor.,  September  17,  1919. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     191 

Japan  amounted  to  1,300,000  tons.  When  we 
note  the  enormous  deficiency  of  1,140,000  tons, 
in  a  total  of  1,300,000  tons  used,  we  see  at  once  the 
incentive  of  Japan's  policy  of  securing  by  any 
means  available,  whether  foul  or  fair,  a  monopoly 
of  the  Shantung  mines.1  To  possess  the  great 
sources  of  iron  and  coal  in  China  "untrammeled 
by  the  obstacles  of  China's  domestic  and  foreign 
politics"  has  been  the  aim  of  Japanese  statesmen 
during  the  past  quarter  of  a  century. 

In  Shantung,  as  in  Manchuria,  Japan  has  pursued 
a  policy  of  aggressive  economic  imperialism  which 
surpasses  even  the  economic  imperialism  of  Ger- 
many. Neither  in  Russia  nor  in  China  did  Ger- 
many ever  go  so  far  as  Japan  has  gone  in  her 
subjection  of  China.  Germany  systematically  cor- 
rupted the  Russian  bureaucracy,  but  her  work  in 
that  direction  did  not  even  approach  that  of  Japan 
in  China.  Both  in  Russia  and  in  China  Germany 
resorted  to  trade  methods  which  were  ruthless, 
unfair,  and  dishonest,  as  we  have  seen  in  an  earlier 
chapter.  There  is  nothing  in  Germany's  record, 
bad  as  that  is,  which  parallels  Japan's  use  of  the 
parcel-post  system,  which  she  controls,  to  send 
merchandise  into  China,  evading  the  heavy  customs 
duties,  and  so  enabling  her  merchants  to  drive 
their  European  and  American  competitors  from 
the  field.  The  following  account  of  this  method 
is  quite  typical  and  could  easily  be  supported  by 
the    testimony    of    many    other    observers.     Mr. 

1  See  "Japan's  Economic  Interests  in  Shantung,"  by  K.  K.  Kawakami, 
.■Is '.ii,  September,  1919,  pp.  903-906.  Also  the  same  writer's  Japan 
and  World  Peace,  Chapter  X. 


192    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

Charles  Hodges,  a  well-known  authority  on  the 
Far  East,  says: 

The  Chinese  Maritime  Customs  is  an  organization  for  the 
collection  of  import  and  export  duties  built  up  with  a  foreign 
and  Chinese  personnel,  functioning  at  all  the  treaty  ports. 
In  the  case  of  Manchuria,  it  was  notorious  that  at  the  close 
of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in  1905  Japanese  business  had 
secured  an  inestimable  grip  on  a  disorganized  market,  because 
goods  went  forward  for  distribution  as  "military  stores." 
Not  only  were  the  customs  thus  evaded,  but  foreign  merchants 
were  unable  to  get  into  the  markets  at  all. 

When  I  was  in  Shantung  I  found  that  the  Japanese  military 
administration  was  again  using  this  scheme  to  introduce 
Japanese  goods  into  the  markets  of  this  great  Chinese  province. 
American  and  other  products  were  forced  to  pay  duty,  while 
the  Japanese  in  many  instances  were  merely  merchandizing 
Manchuria  from  so-called  military  supplies.  When  I  went 
northward  into  Manchuria  I  found  that  Japan  was  using  her 
parcel-post  system  to  evade  the  Chinese  customs.  I  saw 
vans  from  the  Japanese  post-office  go  up  to  the  retail  stores 
of  Mukden  and  unload  Japanese  goods  which  could  not  be 
touched  by  the  Chinese  authorities  because  of  the  Japanese 
postal  system,  which  is  being  steadily  extended  throughout 
China.  It  is  true  that  other  nations  have  established  certain 
post-offices,  but  no  country  has  used  them  for  the  merchandiz- 
ing of  the  markets  to  the  prejudice  of  the  commerce  of  other 
nations  and  the  Chinese  nation.1 

By  smuggling  upon  a  wholesale  scale,  through 
the  post-offices  and  through  the  arrangement 
forced  upon  China  whereby  Japanese  are  in  control 
of  her  principal  customs  stations,  China  is  robbed 
of  an  enormous  amount  of  revenue  and  Japanese 
commerce  flourishes  at  the  expense  of  other  nations. 
Preferential   shipping    is    another   favorite   device 

1  Quoted  by  The  Christian  Science  Monitor,  September  2,  1919. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     193 

by  which  Japan  gains  undue  economic  advantage 
and  power.  This  has  been  particularly  true  since 
the  World  War  reduced  the  number  of  British 
ships  and  gave  Japan  the  leadership  in  the  Pacific 
shipping  trade.  Not  only  do  Japanese  traders 
get  priority  in  tonnage,  lower  shipping  rates  for 
their  cargoes,  and  other  special  privileges,  but  after 
the  goods  have  entered  the  Japanese  port  of  Kobe, 
the  Japanese  are  again  privileged  to  such  an  extent 
that  successful  competition  with  them  becomes 
practically  impossible.  The  Japanese  goods  are 
forwarded  without  delay,  but  the  goods  of  foreign 
merchants  are  held  up  and  delayed,  often  for  weeks, 
"freight  congestion,"  "car  shortage,"  and  similar 
excuses  being  offered  by  the  Japanese  railway 
officials.     Says  Mr.  Hodges  again: 

Just  as  the  Japanese  have  been  discriminating  in  the  matters 
of  cargo  space  and  promptness  of  delivery  against  their  foreign 
competitors,  so  have  they  used  their  position  in  north  China 
and  Manchuria  to  hamper  foreign  business  effectively.  Japan, 
of  course,  controls  the  railway  connection  in  Manchuria,  south 
of  the  Russian  sphere,  through  which  the  Trans-Siberian 
Railway  makes  a  short  cut  to  Vladivostok. 

Let  us  follow  a  shipment  of  goods  entering  Manchuria  from 
the  port  of  Darien.  American  firms  have  found  that  consign- 
ments are  frequently  held  up  at  this  and  other  ports  of  entry, 
through  the  connivance  of  Japanese  officials.  These  goods 
may  be  delayed  by  some  matter  concerning  their  entry,  or  by 
the  alleged  inability  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railroad  to 
supply  cars. 

American  firms,  as  well  as  British  and  other  foreign  houses, 
have  repeatedly  complained  that  they  cannot  get  shipment 
of  their  goods  northward  while  their  Japanese  competitors 
are  securing  all  the  cars  necessary  in  a  competing  business. 

Empties  may  be  lying  along  the  siding  in  the  Mukden  yards 


i94    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

while  foreign  business  is  clamoring  to  secure  rolling-stock. 
Although  one  has  great  difficulty  in  securing  the  documentary 
evidence  regarding  railway  rebating  in  favor  of  the  Japanese 
shippers,  investigation  in  Manchuria  and  elsewhere  convinces 
me  that  a  veiled  system  of  preferential  rates  working  exclu- 
sively against  foreign  concerns  is  in  operation.1 

In  such  circumstances  the  "open  door"  in  China 
becomes  a  meaningless  phrase.  As  we  have  seen, 
Japan  has  more  than  once  flagrantly  violated  the 
"open-door"  agreements  by  insisting  upon  eco- 
nomic rights  and  trading  privileges  which  violate 
the  "principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  com- 
merce and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China."  Even 
when  she  outwardly  seems  to  observe  this  prin- 
ciple, which  she  has  repeatedly  pledged  herself  to 
uphold,  by  methods  such  as  those  described,  she 
has  set  it  aside  and  pursued  a  policy  quite  contrary 
to  it. 

VII 

The  story  of  Japan's  aggression  in  China,  of 
which  the  foregoing  is  only  a  bare  outline,  shows 
how  fully  she  has  earned  the  title  "the  Prussia  of 
the  Far  East."  Taking  advantage  of  the  World 
War  and  the  preoccupation  and  peril  of  her  allies, 
she  used  the  most  unscrupulous  means  of  advancing 
her  own  imperialistic  aim  to  establish  her  hegemony 
in  Asia.  She  has  succeeded  to  a  degree  which 
brings  the  world  face  to  face  with  a  new  peril, 
Pan-Nipponism,  which  is,  potentially  at  any  rate, 
far  more  dangerous  to  the  whole  civilized  world 
than  its  prototype,  Pan-Germanism,  ever  was. 

1  Christian  Science  Monitor,  August  30,  1919. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     195 

Japan  has  expanded  into  continental  Asia,  so 
that  she  is  no  longer  merely  an  island  empire.  In 
Manchuria,  northern  China,  and  Shantung  she  is 
firmly  intrenched  in  military  and  economic  power. 
Just  as  Russia  was  in  the  way  of  being  made  a 
German  colony  in  all  but  name,  so  China  is  becom- 
ing, if  she  has  not  already  become,  a  Japanese 
colony  in  all  but  name,  to  be  mercilessly  exploited. 
By  a  close  co-ordination  of  political,  military,  and 
financial  functions,  taught  her  by  her  German 
tutors,  Japan  has  established  over  the  political 
and  economic  life  of  China  and  her  350  millions  of 
people  a  degree  of  control  and  mastery  which  has 
all  the  important  essentials  of  sovereignty,  China 
possessing  only  the  mocking  semblance  of  inde- 
pendence. She  has  taken  the  oyster  and  left  China 
only  the  shell. 

A  study  of  the  map  of  Asia  and  eastern  Europe 
in  the  light  of  the  enormous  growth  of  Japan's 
power  and  influence  since  1905,  and  especially 
since  1914,  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  a  political 
reorientation  is  inevitable.  The  Japanese  are 
already  talking  of  'ka  Monroe  Doctrine  for  Asia," 
and  the  cry  "Asia  for  the  Asiatics"  is  being  raised 
from  Aden  to  Hongkong,  from  Tokio  to  Trebizond. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  much  of  this  Pan-Asian 
agitation  is  stimulated  by  Japanese  money,  for 
very  obvious  reasons.  Just  as  Mittel  Europa  to 
the  Germans  meant  Pan-Germanism,  so  to  the 
Japanese  Pan-Asianism  is  synonymous  with  Pan- 
Nipponism.  This  is  quite  a  natural  consequence 
of  Japan's  unquestioned  pre-eminence.  Certainly 
there  is  no  other  nation  in  Asia  possessing  qualities 


i96    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

of  leadership  in  any  degree  comparable  to  those 
possessed  by  Japan.  Not  for  many  years  can 
any  nation  in  Asia  be  expected  to  become  effective 
in  checking  Japan. 

In  191 5,  at  the  time  when  China  was  struggling 
against  Japan's  attacks  upon  her  sovereignty  and 
independence,  in  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  a 
Japanese  diplomat  remarked,  it  is  said,  that  the 
Demands  were  really  part  of  the  Great  Asia  pro- 
gram, China  being  the  primary  step.1  Some  of 
the  Chinese  revolutionists,  including  the  "Social- 
ist," Sun  Yat-sen,  espoused  the  policy.  One  of  the 
revolutionary  leaders,  Tang-Shao-yi,  declared  that 
the  fulfilment  of  India's  aspirations  for  indepen- 
dence depends  upon"  a  strong,  united  Sino-Japanese 
Alliance."  2  That  Japanese  money  has  been  freely 
used  to  foment  nationalist  agitation  in  India, 
even  during  the  World  War,  just  as  it  was  used  to 
foster  revolutionary  movements  in  China,  is  com- 
monly believed.3  It  is,  as  H.  M.  Hyndman  points 
out,4  one  of  the  grim  ironies  of  the  Asiatic  situation 
that  England  has  had  to  rely  for  the  protection  of 
Hindustan  upon  Japan,  the  aggressive  nation  whose 
avowed  mission  is  to  lead  the  Far  East  against 
European  influence,  under  the  banner  of  "Asia 
for  the  Asiatics."  Very  pertinently,  this  great 
student  of  Asiatic  affairs  asks,  "When  she  is  called 
upon  to  help  white  men  against  her  Asiatic  brethren, 
what  is  Japan  going  to  do?" 

1  Quoted  by  G.  Charles  Hodges,  in  The  League  of  Nations  Magazine, 
April,  1919,  p.  252.  -  Idem. 

3  This  was  in  fact  definitely  reported  to  at  least  one  of  the  Alhed 
governments. 

4  Hyndman,  The  Awakening  of  Asia,  pp.  272-273. 


JAPAN  AS  GERMANY'S  SUCCESSOR     197 

It  is  quite  certain  that  no  considerable  advance 
toward  the  realization  of  the  Great  Asia  ideals 
under  the  Japanese  hegemony  can  be  made  with- 
out involving,  in  the  most  serious  manner,  the 
interests  of  Russia.  The  fact  that  Russia  and 
China  have  a  conterminous  frontier  for  some  six 
thousand  miles  would  of  itself  insure  that.  The 
whole  of  southern  Siberia,  from  the  Ural  Mountains 
to  the  Sea  of  Japan,  and  the  northern  half  of 
Saghalien  Island  afford  the  most,  natural  and  easy 
opportunities  for  the  expansion  of  Japanese  domin- 
ion iii  the  near  future.  Here  is  an  immense  terri- 
tory, capable  of  sustaining  hundreds  of  millions 
of  people,  richly  supplied  with  iron,  copper,  coal, 
gold,  silver,  graphite,  petroleum,  salt,  timber,  and 
other  raw  materials  of  vital  importance  to  an 
industrial  nation.  Saghalien,  the  Amur  territory, 
and  the  Trans-Baikal  could  be  brought  under 
Japanese  rule.  Vladivostok  is  less  than  450  miles 
from  Hakhodate,  less  than  500  from  Nugata.  From 
Manchuria,  where  Japan  is  intrenched,  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway  can  be  easily  attacked  and  cut. 
From  Vladivostok  to  Khabarovsk  and  thence  to 
Irkutsk,  one  of  the  richest  territories  anywhere  in 
the  world,  Siberia  is  easily  vulnerable  now  that  Rus- 
sia has  been  weakened  by  years  of  war  and  revolu- 
tion. An  invading  army  could  practically  live 
upon  the  country  during  the  war  of  conquest. 

That  Japan  is  fully  alive  to  the  great  opportunities 

for  expansion  in  Siberia  is  quite  certain.     To  add 

southeastern   Siberia    to    her   empire   would    be    a 

tremendous    step    toward    the    fulfilment    of    her 

program  ot  imperialist  expansion  and,  at  the  same 
1 1 


198    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

time,  a  great  check  to  the  spread  of  European 
influence  in  Asia.  It  would,  moreover,  enable 
Japan  to  prevent  Russia  from  ever  sending  troops 
by  way  of  the  Pacific  to  join  with  the  forces  of  any 
other  nation  or  nations. 


JAPAN   AND   SIBERIA 


AS  far  back  as  the  eleventh  century  there  were 
>  brave  attempts  at  Russian  colonization  in 
the  great  land  east  of  the  Urals.  The  Novgorodians 
in  quest  of  sables  and  other  furs  occasionally  pene- 
trated quite  far  into  the  lowlands  beyond  the 
Urals.  It  was  not  until  near  the  end  of  the  six- 
teenth century,  however,  that  the  conquest  of 
Siberia  really  became  a  settled  policy  of  the  czars. 
To  take  the  vast  territory  from  the  Urals  to  the 
Amur  and  the  Pacific  Ocean  took  barely  eighty 
years.  Tatars,  Turks,  and  Chinese  gave  way 
before  the  Slav  power.  They  were  widely 
scattered  over  a  vast  territory,  divided  into 
warring  tribes,  and  therefore  unable  to  set  up 
any  very  formidable  defense  against  the  Russian 
hunters  and  adventurers  and  the  military  forces 
backing  them.  The  conquest  of  Siberia  was 
effected  with  very  little  sacrifice  on  the  part  of 
the   Russians. 

By  the  people  of  western  Europe  and  America 
Siberia  has  been  known  almost  wholly  by  its 
sinister  reputation  as  a  great  penal  colony.     The 


2oo    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

popular  imagination  has  been  deeply  impressed 
by  such  books  as  George  Kennan's  Siberia  and  the 
Exile  System,  so  that  the  average  man  thinks  of 
Siberia  as  a  vast  bleak  and  inhospitable  territory 
to  which  unnumbered  thousands  of  the  best  of 
Russia's  sons  and  daughters  were  sent  to  a  linger- 
ing death  by  a  cruel,  despotic  government.  We 
think  of  miserable  prison-camps  ruled  by  brutal 
Cossacks,  ravaged  by  disease  and  famine,  and  of 
tortured  exiles  dying  on  the  way,  their  bleached 
bones  marking  the  most  tragic  via  dolorosa  in  the 
history  of  the  modern  world. 

This  sinister  reputation  dates  from  the  years 
immediately  following  the  conquest  of  the  country 
by  Russia.  To  hold  Siberia  it  was  necessary  to 
colonize  it.  Even  before  the  conquest  was  effected, 
during  the  struggle,  the  Russian  government  had 
realized  this  necessity.  When  the  hunters  and 
adventurers  poured  into  the  great  land  beyond 
the  Urals  the  government  supported  them  by 
erecting  forts  and  garrisons  at  strategic  points. 
To  supply  the  military  forces  with  food  and  service 
peasants  were  settled  around  the  military  posts. 
The  first  attempts  at  colonizing  the  country  were 
thus  incidental  to  the  establishment  of  military 
protection  for  the  thousands  of  hunters  and  traders 
who,  attracted  by  the  rich  furs,  explored  the 
country,  made  its  first  rude  roads,  and  built  the 
first  houses  in  its  bleak  wilderness.  It  is  quite 
natural  that  the  government  of  the  czars,  anxious 
to  colonize  the  immense  territory,  should  send 
thither  as  many  of  its  troublesome  subjects  as, 
possible, 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  201 

In  the  second  half  of  the  seventeenth  century- 
there  were  religious  persecutions  which  took  the 
form  of  exile  to  Siberia.  The  Raskolniks,  or  non- 
conformists, were  exceedingly  troublesome,  and 
thousands  of  them  were  sent  into  Siberia,  suffering 
indescribable  hardships.  The  great  protopope. 
Avvakum,  who  is  still  the  hero  of  Russian  non- 
conformists, was  sent  in  chains  to  the  Amur  dis- 
trict in  1658,  in  the  rear  of  an  exploring  party. 
Peter  the  Great  had  a  new  form  of  unrest  and 
revolt  to  deal  with  in  the  rebellions  of  his  Stryeltsyy 
or  imperial  guards.  Whenever  any  of  these  gave 
trouble  Peter  the  Great  sent  them  to  Siberia  to 
the  garrisons  which  had  been  established  there, 
an  exile  which  was  greatly  dreaded.  Embittered 
by  their  exile,  and  driven  almost  to  madness  by 
solitude  and  drinking,  these  wretched  men  were 
soon  brutalized  and  treated  the  unfortunate  colo- 
nists with  great  savagery.  Catherine  II  exiled  the 
Polish  Confederates  to  Siberia  from  1768  to  1793. 
Nicholas  I  treated  the  Decembrists  of  1825  in  the 
same  way,  a  hundred  of  the  choicest  souls  in  Russia 
being  exiled.  In  183 1,  under  Alexander  I,  and  in 
1863,  under  Alexander  II,  the  Polish  insurrections 
were  suppressed  with  brutal  fury  and  thousands  of 
Poles  sent  into  Siberia.  It  is  said  that  after  the 
insurrection  of  1863  fully  fifty  thousand  Poles 
were  thus  exiled,  many  of  them  dying  on  the 
way. 

The  Socialist  agitation  which  followed  the  pro- 
found disappointment  of  the  hopes  centered  in  the 
emancipation  of  the  serfs  was  met  as  all  other  dis- 
turbing protests  had  been.     Tchernyshevsky  was 


202    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

sent  into  Siberian  exile  in  1863,  and  for  the  next 
fifty  years,  until  the  very  eve  of  the  World  War, 
thousands  of  revolutionists  were  similarly  exiled. 
The  noblest  men  and  women  of  Russia  were  thus 
sent  into  Siberia,  with  the  result  that  through  their 
influence  the  level  of  culture  attained  in  many 
Siberian  villages  was  very  much  higher  than  in 
Russia.  The  great  strength  of  the  co-operative 
movement  in  Siberia  is  in  large  part  due  to  that 
influence. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  only  political 
offenders  such  as  those  described  were  thus  exiled. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  from  the  latter  part  of  the 
eighteenth  century  to  1900  common-law  convicts, 
ordinary  criminals,  were  exiled  to  Siberia  to  a 
much  larger  number  than  political  offenders.  For 
many  years  the  number  of  such  criminals  sent  to 
Siberia  exceeded  an  average  of  twenty  thousand 
per  annum.  It  was  a  common  practice  to  sentence 
criminals  to  a  definite  period  of  hard  labor  in  the 
mines  or  on  the  railways  of  Siberia,  and  then, 
after  the  expiration  of  the  prison  sentence,  to  treat 
them  as  exiles  rather  than  as  prisoners.  This 
meant  that  they  were  compelled  to  settle  in  Siberian 
villages  as  permanent  colonists.  Partly  on  account 
of  the  character  of  the  country,  and  partly  on 
account  of  the  failure  of  the  Imperial  government 
to  make  adequate  provision  for  them,  the  con- 
dition of  these  ''free"  exiles  was  often  wretched 
in  the  extreme.  Thousands  became  wandering 
tramps  and  outlaws,  striving  always  to  make 
their  way  back  to  Russia. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  almost  exclusively 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  203 

the  forcible  colonization  of  Siberia  by  soldiers, 
political  offenders,  and  criminals.  Important  as 
these  elements  were,  numerous  as  their  aggregate 
number  was,  they  did  not  equal  the  number  of 
those  who  voluntarily  settled  in  Siberia.  Free 
colonization  has  been  far  more  extensive  than  is 
generally  recognized.  In  addition  to  the  Cossacks 
and  other  military  forces,  and  the  Yamshiks,  the 
special  organization  maintained  along  the  postal 
route  to  supply  horses,  many  thousands  of  peasants 
were  induced  by  government  subsidies  to  settle  in 
particular  places  along  the  Amur  designated  by 
the  government.  This  subsidized  colonization  was 
tried  upon  quite  a  large  scale  over  a  long  period  of 
time,  but  was  not  particularly  successful.  Much 
more  successful  was  the  wholly  unassisted,  and 
often  illegal,  colonization  by  people  relying  upon 
their  own  initiative  and  energy.  In  the  years 
immediately  preceding  the  Emancipation  Act  thou- 
sands of  serfs  fled  from  Russia  into  Siberia,  building 
up  villages  in  the  most  remote  and  inaccessible 
places.  After  the  Emancipation  Act  thousands  of 
freed  serfs,  finding  life  in  Russia  intolerable,  crossed 
the  Urals.  It  was  not  at  all  uncommon  for  the 
peasants  of  a  Russian  village  to  emigrate  to  Siberia 
en  masse.  Religious  persecutions  and  conscription 
have  also  caused  many  thousands  of  peasants  to 
migrate  from  Russia  to  Siberia.  Between  1870 
and  1905  more  than  two  million  free  immigrants 
entered  the  country.  Colonization  by  the  govern- 
ment established  important  but  widely  scattered 
villages;  free  colonization  strengthened  these  and 
linked  them  together. 


2o4    RUSSIA  AS  AN   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

ii 

Siberia  is  an  immense  country.  It  stretches 
from  the  Ural  Mountains  on  the  west  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean  on  the  east,  a  distance  of  about 
5,500  miles,  and  from  the  Arctic  Ocean  on  the  north 
to  the  Chinese  frontier  on  the  south,  a  distance  of 
about  2,700  miles.  The  total  area  is  approximately 
5,300,000  square  miles,  which  is  almost  three- 
quarters  of  the  combined  area  of  the  United  States 
and  Canada.  In  1912  the  population  of  this 
immense  territory  was  estimated  by  the  Russian 
census  authorities  as  being  about  10,000,000,  as 
against  6,740,600  in  19/36.  According  to  the  Rus- 
sian Year-Book,  the  population  on  January  I,  1913, 
was  10,714,300.  Since  1912  the  population  has 
grown  more  rapidly  than  during  any  similar  period 
in  its  history.  Many  towns  have  doubled  their 
population.  It  is  believed  that  the  present  popula- 
tion of  the  country  cannot  be  much,  if  at  all,  less 
than  i4,ooo,ooo.1 

This  unprecedented  growth  is  the  result  of  im- 
migration from  Russia  and  Japan.  The  natural 
rate  of  increase  of  population  is  very  slow,  not 
exceeding  eight  per  thousand  annually.  This  is 
due  mainly  to  the  fact  that  the  birth-rate  is  con- 
siderably lower  than  in  Russia,  while  the  infant 
mortality  is  very  high.  The  extraordinary  increase 
of  population  in  recent  years  is  due  entirely  to 
immigration.  A  large  number  of  Japanese  have 
settled   in   Siberia   since  the   Revolution  of   1917, 

1  fide  Weekly  Bulletin,  Canadian  Department  of  Trade  and  Com- 
merce, Ottawa,  June  <),  1919. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  205 

many  of  them  being  subsidized  by  the  Japanese 
government.  In  the  same  period  many  thousands 
of  German  and  Austrian  prisoners  of  war,  who 
have  been  kept  in  Siberian  prison-camps,  have 
elected  to  settle  there,  forming  quite  large  colonies 
which  may  have  an  important  influence  upon  the 
future  development  of  the  country,  politically  and 
economically.  1  he  student  of  Russian  history 
recalls  the  German  colonists  introduced  into  Russia 
by  Catherine  the  Great,  whose  descendants,  the 
German-Russians  of  the  Lower  Volga,  numbered 
three-quarters  of  a  million  at  the  time  of  the 
Revolution  in  1917.  He  remembers  the  other 
colonies  of  these  German-Russians  in  Volhynia, 
about  Odessa  and  Rostov  and  in  the  Caucasus, 
numbering  nearly  three  million  more,  and  how 
many  of  them  responded  to  the  doctrine  of  ever- 
lasting loyalty  to  German  Kultur  preached  by  the 
agents  of  the  Pan-German  propaganda.  German 
colonies  in  Siberia  may  prove  highly  dangerous  in 
days  not  far  distant.1 

Like  the  ubiquitous  and  alert  Japanese,  these 
Germans  who  have  elected  to  remain  in  Siberia 
have  been  quick  to  perceive  and  seize  upon  the 
economic  advantages  which  are  so  numerous  in 
this  great  land  of  unexploited  treasure.  They 
have  acquired  lands,  mining  rights,  timber-lands, 
and  water  rights  and  have  gone  into  business  of 
various  kinds.  The  leading  Japanese  and  Russian 
journals,  as  well  as  the  consular  reports  of  various 
nations,    frequently    contain    items    indicating   the 

1  Ross,  dp,  dr.,  pp.  $8-41,  lias  some  interestinq  observations  on  tin: 
(ierman-I'ussian  colonies  of  Russia  ilium"  the  war. 


206    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

progress  of  both  Japanese  and  German  economic 
penetration  and  infiltration  in  Siberia,  the  former 
generally  in  eastern  Siberia,  the  latter  in  the 
western  portion. 

The  greatest  increase  of  population  during  the 
last  five  years  has  come  from  European  Russia. 
Immigration  from  this  source  has  long  been  the 
principal  factor  in  the  growth  of  the  population  of 
Siberia  and  has  naturally  been  greatly  augmented 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  by  a  stream  of 
refugees  fleeing  from  the  foreign  invader.  The 
Bolshevist  terrorism  and  other  evils  of  the  aftermath 
of  the  war  added  greatly  to  the  number  of  these 
refugees.  Great  masses  of  such  refugees  have 
taken  up  their  abode  in  Siberia,  and  while  a  large 
part  of  these  will  return  to  Russia  as  soon  as  order 
is  restored  and  they  can  safely  do  so,  a  very  large 
percentage  will  doubtless  remain  as  permanent 
settlers. 

Of  the  total  population  in  1912  it  was  estimated 
that  about  85  per  cent,  were  Russians,  7  per  cent. 
Mongolians,  6  per  cent.  Turko-Tatars,  the  remain- 
der being  composed  of  the  remnants  of  various 
native  tribes.  The  population  is  overwhelmingly 
rural  and  agricultural,  not  less  than  92  per  cent, 
of  the  whole  being  so  classified.1  This  is  due  to 
the  very  slight  development  of  manufacturing  and 
other  forms  of  industrial  production.  There  has 
been  a  very  remarkable  growth  of  population  in 
some  of  the  Siberian  towns,  however,  as  the  fol- 
lowing table  clearly  shows: 

1  Golovachev,  Economic  Geography  of  Siberia,  1914. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA 

TABLE  A 


207 


Towns 

Barnaul 

Blagovestchensk.  .  . . 

Irkutsk 

Khabarovsk 

Krasnoyarsk 

Nikolsk-Ussuriisk.  .  . 
Novonikolaievsk.  .  . . 

Omsk 

Petropavlovsk 

Semipalatinsk 

Tchita 

Tobolsk 

Tomsk 

Tyumen 

Vladivostok 


1897 

1909-11 

{Estimated) 

29,408 

46,000 

32,606 

77,000 

51.484 

113,000 

14,932 

50,000 

26,653 

62,000 

8,932 

52,000 

8,473 

70,000 

37,47o 

128,000 

21.749 

43,000 

26,353 

39,000 

11,480 

73,000 

20,427 

38,000 

S2.430 

108,000 

29.5SS 

51,000 

28,986 

I  20,0002 

A  few  additional  figures  illustrative  of  the  growth 
of  some  of  these  Siberian  towns  may  be  of  interest. 
From  i860  to  1897  the  population  of  Omsk  in- 
creased 94.5  per  cent,  and  from  1897  to  1910  it 
increased  210.4  Per  cent-  The  increase  from  i860 
to  1 9 10  was  503.5  per  cent.  From  i860  to  1897 
Krasnoyarsk  increased  208.7  Per  cent,  and  168.2 
per  cent,  from  1897  to  1910.  From  i860  to  1910 
the  increase  was  727.7  per  cent.  Tomsk  increased 
by  102.2  per  cent,  in  the  period  1860-97  anc'  DY 
almost  exactly  the  same  percentage,  102.3,  m  trie 
period  1897-1910.  From  i860  to  1910  the  increase 
was  309.0  per  cent.  Petropavlovsk  increased  168.2 
per  cent,  from  i860  to  1897  and  94.2  from  1897  to 
1910,  the  increase  from  i860  to  1910  being  420.8 

1  <  Jolovachcv,  op.  cil. 

2  The  population  ot  Vladivostok  in  1918  was  over  200,000. 


2o8    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

per  cent.  Semipalatinsk  increased  22.0  per  cent, 
in  the  period  1897-1910,  and  239.7  in  the  fifty- 
year  period  1860-1910. 

The  remarkable  growth  of  urban  population  is 
not  a  sign  of  increasing  industrialism.  It  is  a  sign 
of  commercial  development  only.  The  economic 
life  of  Siberia  centers  in  towns  on  or  near  the 
Trans-Siberian  Railway  and  in  the  river  ports. 
During  five  recent  years  the  expenditures  of  twenty 
Siberian  towns  more  than  doubled,  the  figures 
being  from  4,042,900  rubles  to  8,974,800  rubles. 
In  the  same  period  the  budgets  of  826  towns  of  all 
Russia  increased  only  50  per  cent.1  The  following 
table  showing  the  municipal  expenditures  of  a 
number  of  Siberian  towns  in  1904  and  1910  affords 
ample  evidence  of  great  municipal  development 
in  the  period  just  before  the  war. 


TABLE  B 

GROWTH   OF   MUNICIPAL   EXPENDITURES    IN   SIBERIA 


Towns 


Barnaul 

Uiisk 

Blagovetitdiensk 

Irkutsk 

Krasnoyarsk.  .  . 

Kurgan 

Novonikolaievsk 

Tchita 

Tobolsk 

Tomsk 

Vladivostok.  .  .  . 


1904 


1910 


Rubles 

Rubles 

100,000 

560,000 

47,000 

200,000 

267,000 

760,300 

1,039,800 

2,100,500 

183,300 

480,500 

105,800 

170.000 

70,900 

614,400 

117,500 

430,000 

126,400 

240,500 

641,500 

1,205,200 

403,200 

980,000 

1  Golovachcv,  op.  cit. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  209 

The  population  of  Siberia  is  mainly  distributed 
along  the  railways  and  rivers  and  in  the  great 
fruitful  plains  of  the  central  portion  of  western 
Siberia.  All  the  rest  of  the  country  is  very  sparsely 
settled  and  its  resources  unexplored.  The  entire 
country  is  well  supplied  with  inland  waterways 
which  make  navigation  easy  from  west  to  east  and 
from  north  to  south.  The  principal  rivers  all  empty 
into  the  Arctic  Ocean,  except  the  Amur,  which, 
with  its  great  tributary,  the  Sungari,  empties  into 
the  Pacific.  These  inland  waterways  extend  some 
87,000  miles,  of  which  63,000  are  used  in  navigation 
for  some  part  of  the  year,  those  in  the  southern 
portion  being  open  little  more  than  half  the  year. 
Thus,  at  Krasnoyarsk  the  Yenisei  is  navigable  for 
196  days  in  the  year  on  an  average.  Some  17,000 
miles  of  these  waterways  are  plied  by  steamboats 
engaged  in  passenger  traffic.  As  we  have  already 
noted,  there  has  long  been  under  contemplation  a 
plan  to  link  these  Siberian  waterways  to  those  of 
European  Russia  right  up  to  the  Baltic  coast.1 

In  order  to  understand  the  place  of  Siberia  in 
world  politics  it  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind  that 
geographically  and  politically  the  country  naturally 
divides  itself  into  three  great  divisions.  Western 
Siberia  had  on  January  1,  1 91 3,  a  population  of 
7,533,000;  central  Siberia  had  a  population  of 
1,461,000,  and  eastern  Siberia  of  i,720,ooo.2  It 
will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  of  the  total  population 
of  10,714,300  approximately  70  per  cent,  are  settled 
on  the  agricultural  lands  of  the  western  division. 
Western  Siberia  is  made  up  of  the  provinces  of 
1  See  p.  4?..  -  Vide  Russian  Y ear-Book. 


210    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Tobolsk  and  Tomsk  and  the  districts  of  Akmolinsk 
and  Semipalatinsk.  From  north  to  south  this 
section  of  Siberia  can  be  marked  off  into  several 
zones.  In  the  far  north  are  the  barren  stretches 
of  Arctic  waste  lands  and  to  the  south  of  these 
is  a  great  belt  of  forest.  Near  the  fifty-sixth  degree 
of  latitude  this  forest  belt  merges  almost  imper- 
ceptibly into  the  arable  zone,  a  great  black-earth 
belt  which  is  a  continuation  of  the  black-earth 
region  of  southern  Russia.  It  was  here  that  the 
bulk  of  the  free  immigrants  from  Russia  settled, 
and  up  to  the  present  time  this  had  been  the  most 
important  part  of  the  country  economically.  To 
the  fifty-third  degree  of  latitude  and  extending 
to  the  Altai  Mountain  chain,  which  forms  the 
southern  boundary,  are  the  dry  steppes  suitable 
only  for  grazing.  These  lands  have  supported 
large  herds  of  cattle  and  horses  and  are  easily 
capable  of  supporting  a  vastly  greater  number. 

Central  Siberia  comprises  the  provinces  of 
Yenisei  and  Irkutsk  and  extends  from  the  west 
bank  of  the  Yenisei  River  to  Lake  Baikal.  A 
large  part  of  this  section  consists  of  forest-lands. 
To  the  north  are  great  stretches  of  Arctic  wastes. 
In  the  south  the  rolling  downs  and  semi-moun- 
tainous country  contains  a  good  deal  of  admirable 
grazing-land  and  much  forest-land.  The  valleys 
contain  a  good  deal  of  arable  land  of  a  high  grade. 
Central  Siberia  has  been  greatly  hindered  in  its 
development  by  its  long  distance  from  the  great 
export  markets.  This  fact  will  probably  con- 
tinue to  retard  its  economic  development  for  a 
long  time  to  come.     The  long  distance  to  either 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  211 

the  Pacific  or  the  Baltic  seaboard,  involving  very 
costly  transportation,  adds  too  much  to  the  cost 
of  the  products  of  this  region  to  promise  any  great 
development  in  the  near  future. 

Eastern  Siberia  is  that  great  stretch  of  territory 
from  Lake  Baikal  eastward  to  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
This  is  the  Russian  Far  East  which  has  held  such 
an  important  place  in  Russia's  foreign  policy.  It 
comprises  the  provinces  of  Trans-Baikalia,  Amur, 
Maritime,  Yakutsk,  Kamchatka,  and  Saghalien. 
Eastern  Siberia  has  always  been  quite  distinct 
from  the  rest  of  the  country  economically,  a  fact 
easily  accounted  for  by  her  geographical  position. 
The  western  and  central  portions  of  Siberia  have 
carried  on  their  trade  through  European  Russia, 
Moscow  being  their  trade  center.  Their  exports 
and  imports  have  been  transported  overland  by 
rail  through  Russia.  Eastern  Siberia,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  carried  on  its  trade  through  the  great 
seaport  of  Vladivostok.  It  has  thus  been  brought 
into  closer  relations  with  Japan  and  has  been  less 
controlled  from  Moscow. 

Although  its  economic  development  has  been 
retarded,  partly  in  consequence  of  political  policy, 
eastern  Siberia  is  probably  the  richest  part  of  the 
country  in  easily  available  resources.  Its  forests 
are  very  large  and  easily  accessible;  its  mineral 
resources  are  varied  and  extremely  rich;  its  fish- 
eries are  important  and  its  agricultural  possibilities 
can  hardly  be  overestimated.  The  Tchita  district 
of  Trans-Baikalia  is  a  great,  well-sheltered  valley 
with  soil  of  wonderful  fertility.  The  valley  of 
the   Amur,   sheltered    from    the   cold    north   winds 


2i2    RUSSIA  AS   AN   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

by  the  Yablovny  Mountains  and  watered  by  the 
Zeia  and  Burea  rivers,  is  splendidly  adapted  to 
the  production  of  grain,  as  is  also  the  Ussuri  valley, 
which  runs  north  from  Vladivostok  to  Khabarovsk, 
a  distance  of  some  four  hundred  miles,  separated 
from  the  Pacific  coast  by  a  range  of  mountains, 
but  of  easy  access  to  the  main  railway  line. 


in 

Tt  is  eastern  Siberia  which  Japan,  wants  to  domi- 
nate and  control.  Annexation  is  not,  except  in 
certain  circumstances,  an  essential  part  of  her 
Pan-Asian  scheme.  Japan's  policy  in  Siberia  is 
dictated  by  economic  and  political  considerations, 
the  latter  being  of  primary  importance.  Indeed, 
it  is  probably  safe  to  say  that  whatever  economic 
motives  she  has  are  mainly  important  to  her  and 
to  the  rest  of  the  world  in  their  political  setting. 
It  is  quite  easy  to  understand  that  the  very  real 
problem  of  over-population  which  confronts  her 
makes  it  necessary  for  Japan  to  find  new  sources 
of  food-supply.  Her  determination  to  secure  con- 
trol of  the  fishing  rights  of  the  Russian  Far  East, 
for  example,  can  be  readily  appreciated  with  a 
certain  degree  of  sympathy.  Selfish,  cruel,  and 
unscrupulous  as  her  policy  in  this  matter  has  been, 
there  is  a  certain  extenuation  in  the  fact  that  she 
has  been  acting  under  the  urge  of  the  greatest 
force  in  human  life,  the  fear  of  starvation. 

It  is  also  easy  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  Japan's 
need  for  coal  and  iron  and  other  raw  materials  of 
industry  is  almost  as  vital  as  the  need  for  food. 


JAPAN  AND   SIBERIA  213 

As  an  industrial  nation  she  must  acquire  somehow 
the  basic  raw  materials  of  industry.  Putting  aside 
every  other  consideration,  and  taking  into  account 
only  her  industrial  dependence  upon  sources  of 
supply  controlled  by  powerful  competitors,  we  can 
understand  why  she  should  desire  to  possess  the 
immense  resources  of  Russian  Saghalien  and  of 
Siberia  east  of  the  Baikal.  The  great  deposits  of 
high-grade  coal  in  northern  Saghalien  and  the 
Maritime  Province;  the  rich  oil-lands  of  northern 
Saghalien;  the  important  iron  deposits  of  Trans- 
Baikal,  the  basin  of  the  Zeia  in  the  Amur  district 
and  the  Maritime  Province;  the  copper,  zinc,  tin, 
and  lead  of  Trans-Baikal  and  the  Maritime  Prov- 
ince— all  these  fundamental  requisites  of  indus- 
trialism, which  are  so  favorably  situated  as  regards 
transportation,  make  eastern  Siberia  a  treasure- 
store  to  which  Japan  naturally  turns  with  pas- 
sionately hungry  longing. 

When  all  this  has  been  frankly  recognized  the 
fact  remains  that  it  is  not  a  full  explanation  of 
Japan's  interest  in  Siberia.  To  a  very  large  degree 
her  primary  economic  needs  have  been  met  by  the 
political  and  economic  control  she  has  already 
established  over  China.  Her  economic  interests 
in  eastern  Siberia  are  not  at  all  of  the  elemental 
kind  we  have  been  discussing;  they  are,  in  fact, 
subtly  interwoven  with  her  imperialistic  policies 
and  form  an  important  part  of  her  military  and 
political  program.  It  is  precisely  this  fact  which 
makes  them  a  menace  to  ourselves.  Paradoxical 
as  it  may  seem  when  thus  baldly  stated,  the  fact 
that  her  control  over  China  affords  the  means  of 


2i4    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

satisfying  her  fundamental  economic  needs  increases 
her  desire  to  control  the  economic  resources  of 
eastern  Siberia.  In  other  words,  the  Siberian 
problem — and  therefore  the  entire  Russian  problem 
— is,  so  far  as  Japan  is  concerned,  part  and  parcel 
of  the  Chinese-Japanese  problem. 

When  the  World  War  broke  out  Japan  was 
already  supreme  in  southern  Manchuria.  By  her 
victory  over  Russia  in  1905  she  had  acquired  the 
Liaotung  Peninsula  with  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny 
and  the  lease  of  the  Manchurian  Railway  as  far 
north  as  Chang  Chun.  She  possessed  the  railroad 
from  Mukden  southeast  to  the  Korean  frontier  at 
Antung.  A  formal  agreement  with  Russia  in 
July,  1910,  concerning  the  respective  interests  of 
the  two  countries  in  Manchuria  reduced  the  sover- 
eignty of  China  over  that  vast  territory  to  a  mere 
fiction.  Both  governments,  while  professing  to 
accept  the  "open-door"  policy,  and  being  solemnly 
pledged  to  its  observance,  in  practice  flouted  it 
in  the  most  flagrant  manner  imaginable.  Within 
her  "sphere  of  influence"  in  Manchuria,  in  viola- 
tion of  every  agreement  and  understanding,  Japan 
asserted  exclusive  rights  as  against  every  other 
nation.  She  effectually  excluded  foreign  participa- 
tion in  railroad-building  and  mining,  defeating, 
for  example,  the  proposed  concession  for  a  railroad 
to  be  built  by  American  capital  through  western 
Manchuria  to  Aigun.  She  blocked  Secretary 
Knox's  efforts  in  1910  to  neutralize  the  Manchurian 
and  Chinese  railroads.  Through  her  possession  of 
Dalny  and  her  control  of  important  branches  of 
the  railway  system  she  was  able  to  make  commercial 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  215 

war  upon  other  nations.  Previous  to  1905  the 
United  States  possessed  a  major  portion  of  the 
trade  of  Manchuria,  especially  in  cotton  goods, 
but  by  the  time  the  World  War  broke  out  this 
American  trade  had  been  destroyed  almost  com- 
pletely.1 

Between  1905  and  1914  Russia  had  built  up  an 
enormous  power  in  northern  Manchuria.  Harbin 
grew  from  a  Chinese  hamlet  to  a  great  cosmo- 
politan city  with  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  million 
inhabitants.  Back  of  this  development  in  Man- 
churia was  a  constantly  growing  military  power 
in  Siberia,  along  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway,  which 
might  well  cause  the  imperialists  of  Japan  to  fear 
that  their  aims  could  never  be  attained.  The 
weaker.ing  of  Russia  by  the  war,  her  military  col- 
lapse, and  the  Revolution  gave  Japan  the  chance 
her  imperialists  needed.  Seeing  Russia  disintegrate 
into  a  number  of  small  independent  revolutionary 
governments,  the  military  party  in  Japan  saw  a 
chance  to  succeed  to  the  Russian  position  in  north- 
ern Manchuria  and  outer  Mongolia.  Not  only 
that,  but  as  the  tragedy  of  Russia  developed  it 
brought  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  the  pros- 
pect, heretofore  a  wild  dream,  of  separating  Siberia 
from  Russia  and  making  it  dependent  upon  Japan. 
At  all  events,  Siberia  east  of  Baikal  might  so  be 
separated.  The  Bolsheviki  played  into  the  hands 
of  the  unscrupulous  military  imperialists  of  Japan. 

Japan  now  controls  practically  the  whole  of 
northern   China.     She   can    do   with    China   what 

1  See  "Japan  As  Our  Ally  in  Siberia,"  by  David  P.  Barrows,  Asia, 
September,  1919. 


216    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

she  pleases.  China's  sovereignty  over  her  great 
territory  is  ended  to  all  intents  and  purposes. 
This  is  a  fact  which  greatly  increases  Japan's  poten- 
tial military  strength.  She  now  has  immediate 
and  uninterrupted  access  to  China's  great  resources 
of  coal,  iron,  copper,  and  other  minerals,  without 
which — -especially  the  metals — she  could  not  carry 
on  a  war  against  any  great  modern  power.  She 
can  also  obtain  all  the  minerals  and  most  of  the 
other  raw  materials  needed  for  manufacturing  pur- 
poses. She  has  little  except  tea  and  silk  to  export 
in  return  for  the  great  mass  of  imports  she  needs, 
so  she  must  rely  upon  a  great  development  of  her 
manufactures.  In  China  she  now  possesses  an 
abundance  of  raw  materials  as  well  as  the  possi- 
bility of  securing  a  great  supply  of  foodstuffs. 
For  the  latter  there  are  great  areas  of  China, 
already  under  Japanese  control,  to  be  developed 
and  exploited.  Finally,  China  affords  her  an  almost 
inexhaustible  supply  of  cheap  and  efficient  labor. 

While  all  this  means  that  Japan  has  solved  one 
great  problem,  or,  more  accurately,  one  set  of 
problems,  it  is  an  ironical  fact  that  it  equally  means 
that  she  has  created  for  herself  another  problem, 
or  set  of  problems,  equally  great  and  important. 
As  The  Far  Eastern  Review  recently  pointed  out, 
while  China  will  enable  Japan  to  develop  industrial 
production  upon  a  very  large  scale,  there  is  no 
immediate  prospect  that  she  will  be  a  great  cus- 
tomer for  the  products  of  Japanese  manufacture.1 
Potentially,  of  course,  China  with  her  350,000,000 
people  is  a  great  market.     The  purchasing  power 

*  far  Eastern  Review,  August,  1919,  pp.  540-543. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  217 

of  this  great  nation  ought  to  be,  and  may  become, 
enormous.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  recent  years 
China's  foreign  trade  only  slightly  exceeds  that  of 
little  Switzerland.  Before  she  can  become  a  great 
market  the  purchasing  power  of  the  people  must 
be  very  greatly  increased.  That  can  hardly  be 
brought  about  upon  a  scale  large  enough  to  solve 
Japan's  problem  of  finding  a  market  for  goods  so 
long  as  her  resources  are  controlled  and  exploited 
by  Japan.  In  other  words,  so  long  as  China's 
resources  are  parasitically  used  by  Japan  she  will 
remain  too  poor  to  buy  the  goods  manufactured 
from  her  raw  materials  and  with  the  aid  of  her 
labor-power.  Japan  can  only  find  in  China  the 
market  she  needs  by  restoring  to  China  the  eco- 
nomic birthright  stolen  from  her.  Even  if  we  dis- 
regard entirely  the  resentment  of  China  and  the 
possibilities  of  a  systematic  boycott  of  Japanese 
goods  by  the  Chinese,1  the  difficulty  confronting 
Japan  is  none  the  less  obvious. 

Only  when  we  bear  the  real  character  of  the 
Japanese  domination  of  the  economic  life  of  China 
in  mind  does  the  Siberian  situation  become  intel- 
ligible. Japan  wants  the  great  mineral  and  other 
resources  of  Siberia,  both  for  military  and  indus- 
trial reasons.     What  she  wants  far  more  than  this, 


1  I  he  wide-spread  boycott  of  Japanese  goods  in  China  is  a  move- 
ment of  very  great  significance.  Since  19 15  many  thousands  of  the 
most  intelligent  Chinese  have  quietly  boycotted  Japanese  goods. 
'I  hroughout  the  Yangtse  Valley,  for  example,  Chinese  capital  has 
erected  numerous  spinning  and  weaving  mills  to  obviate  the  necessity 
of  using  Japanese  goods.  At  Shanghai,  Peking,  Nanking,  Hankow, 
Hangchow,  and  other  cities  organized  boycotting  of  Japanese  gooJs 
has  made  gieat  headway. 


218    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

however,  is  a  great  market  for  her  goods.  Control 
of  Siberia  would  give  her  far  more  than  the  oppor- 
tunity to  supply  the  immense  amount  of  machinery 
and  agricultural  implements  needed  for  the  develop- 
ment of  eastern  Siberia;  it  would  enable  her  also 
to  extend  her  trade  to  western  Siberia,  and  perhaps 
into  European  Russia.  For  a  good  many  years  to 
come,  at  least,  the  advantage  due  to  having  an 
almost  unlimited  supply  of  cheap  labor  where  the 
raw  materials  are  would  more  than  offset  the  dis- 
advantage incidental  to  long-distance  transporta- 
tion, and  place  her  in  an  enviable  position  as  com- 
pared wTith  the  western  nations  with  whom  she 
must  compete  in  the  Russian  market. 

There  is  another  very  important  reason  why 
Japan  should  seek  to  control  Siberia  politically 
as  well  as  economically.  As  we  have  already 
observed,  Russia,  under  the  old  regime,  systemat- 
ically flouted  the  "open-door"  policy  in  China 
and  persistently  encroached  upon  China's  sover- 
eignty. Japan  is  now  the  only  power  in  the  world 
which  is  pursuing  this  predatory  policy  in  China 
and  seeking  to  accomplish  its  imperialistic  and 
economic  aims  through  a  policy  based  on  special 
rights,  exclusive  privileges,  and  concessions.  Rus- 
sia still  holds  by  treaties  entered  into  at  various 
times  prior  to  the  Revolution  of  1917  more  special 
rights  and  privileges  than  any  other  nation,  if  we 
exclude  those  recently  acquired  so  dishonorably 
by  Japan.  To  those  Russian  "rights"  in  China 
Japan  greedily  aspires. 

This  is  in  fact  the  foundation  of  a  very  shrewdly 
conceived  policy.     It  explains  why  Japan  has  done 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  219 

all  in  her  power  to  prevent  the  successful  establish- 
ment of  a  liberal  government  in  Siberia  based  upon 
self-government  and  national  integrity;  why  she 
has  done,  and  is  still  doing,  everything  in  her  power 
to  bring  about  the  re-establishment  of  a  reactionary 
regime  in  Siberia  and  throughout  Russia.  Japan 
does  not  want  a  liberal,  democratic  government  in 
Siberia.  She  would  greatly  prefer  a  reactionary 
militarist  monarchy. 

It  requires  no  special  powers  of  penetration  to 
see  this:  Under  any  imaginable  conditions,  even 
if  the  monarchical  regime  should  be  restored  in 
Russia,  it  will  be  impossible  for  Russia  to  utilize 
the  rights  she  holds  in  China  by  treaty  at  any  time 
in  the  near  future.  In  return  for  military  and 
other  assistance,  any  reactionary  government  set 
up  in  Russia  would  be  willing  to  cede  those  rights 
to  Japan.  China  could  not  prevent  this  without, 
in  effect,  abrogating  treaties  made  in  good  faith, 
treaties,  moreover,  which  cannot  be  said  to  have 
been  entered  into  under  duress.  It  would  be  dif- 
ficult indeed  for  China  to  secure  the  military  sup- 
port of  the  western  nations  for  such  a  policy.  Even 
if  she  did,  she  and  her  allies  would  be  placed  in  the 
position  of  fighting  an  offensive  war  to  break  lawful 
and  freely  made  agreements.  Thus  Japan  would 
have  at  the  outset  a  great  moral  advantage,  in 
addition  to  which  she  would  have  a  decided  military 
advantage.  Not  only  would  she  be  allied  with 
Russia,  thereby  presenting  an  offensive  power 
which  could  only  be  met  by  an  alliance  of  several 
great  western  powers,  but  her  strategical  position 
would  be  almost  impregnable. 


220    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

On  the  other  hand,  a  liberal  regime  in  Russia 
would  be  almost  certain  to  give  its  support  to  the 
integrity  of  China  and  to  uphold  the  "open-door" 
policy  of  equal  opportunity.  It  would  be  unable 
to  utilize  the  concessions  in  China  obtained  by  the 
old  regime  and  would  certainly  not  transfer  them 
to  Japan.  Such  a  liberal,  democratic  government 
would  undoubtedly  seek  to  ally  Russia  with  the 
democratic  group  of  nations,  both  economically 
and  politically.  Japan  would  in  that  case  be 
isolated  as  a  military  power,  and  would  be  unable 
to  acquire  the  Russian  concessions  in  China  with- 
out taking  the  responsibility  of  a  dangerously 
offensive  policy  opposed  by  all  the  great  powers. 

This  is  the  real  issue  that  is  at  stake  in  Siberia. 
It  is  essentially  a  question  of  world  politics  in  the 
widest  sense  of  that  term,  and  upon  its  determina- 
tion will  depend  not  the  future  of  Siberia  alone, 
but  the  whole  relation  of  the  civilization  of  the 
Orient  to  that  of  the  Occident.  It  is,  therefore, 
not  a  matter  of  indifference  to  the  United  States. 
We  cannot  with  safety  to  ourselves  indulge  the 
vain  hope  of  maintaining  an  isolation  from  the 
great  struggle.  In  common  with  all  the  western 
nations — and  particularly  the  great  English-speak- 
ing peoples — our  interest  lies  in  the  union  of  a  pro- 
gressive and  democratically  governed  Russia  with 
the  civilization  of  the  Occident,  as  against  the  union 
of  a  reactionary,  militaristic  Russia  with  the  civili- 
zation of  the  Orient  under  the  leadership  of  Japan. 
Given  a  union  of  Russia  free  and  enlightened  with  the 
democratic  nations  of  the  western  world,  the  military 
imperialism  of  Japan  will  be  relatively  powerless. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  221 

Such  a  union  as  this  would  involve  no  menace 
or  danger  to  Japan  or  any  other  Oriental  nation, 
be  it  observed.  It  does  not  imply  any  subjection 
of  the  Orient  by  the  Occident.  Nothing  could  be 
more  disastrous  for  Japan,  in  the  long  run,  than 
for  her  military  party  to  succeed  in  attaining  its 
imperialistic  ends.  It  would  be  as  disastrous  for 
the  people  of  Japan  as  for  the  people  of  Russia 
and  the  western  nations.  The  success  of  the  mili- 
tary party  of  Japan  in  its  efforts  would  not  only 
impose  a  terrible  burden  of  armaments  upon  the 
Japanese  people  for  many  years  to  come,  just  as 
it  would  force  a  similar  burden  upon  the  peoples 
of  Europe  and  America,  but  it  would  almost  inevi- 
tably bring  about  a  titanic  struggle  between  East 
and  West,  a  war  of  races  more  extensive  and  more 
terrible  than  that  which  has  so  recently  brought 
the  Western  World  so  near  to  irretrievable  ruin. 
Pan-Asianism  is  as  dangerous  to  the  free  develop- 
ment of  the  peoples  of  Asia  as  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 

In  the  event  of  war  with  any  of  the  democratic 
nations  of  the  west  Japan  would  still  want  to  con- 
trol, and  perhaps  even  to  possess,  that  portion  of 
Siberia  lying  between  Lake  Baikal  and  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  The  considerations  of  military  strategy 
which  lead  to  this  conclusion  are  quite  easy  of 
explanation  and  understanding.  In  any  conflict 
in  which  Japan  might  be  involved  with  western 
nations,  whether  through  the  League  of  Nations  or 
otherwise,  it  would  be  to  her  interest  to  prevent  a 
powerful  Russian  army  from  reaching  the  Pacific. 
A  study  of  the  map  will  quickly  reveal  the  fact 
that  the  naval  bases  of  the  United  States  and  Eng- 


222    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

land — Hawaii,  the  Philippines,  Hongkong,  and 
Wei-hai-wei — are,  under  the  conditions  of  modern 
naval  warfare,  perilously  far  from  Japan  for  offen- 
sive naval  operations.  Submarines  and  mines 
would  make  it  easy  to  close  the  Straits  of  Formosa 
and  the  Korean  Strait.  The  Sea  of  Japan,  and 
perhaps  even  the  Yellow  Sea,  might  also  be  effec- 
tively closed  by  Japan  with  little  trouble.  Her 
position  would  be  enormously  strengthened  if  she 
could  prevent  the  Pacific  ports  of  Russia  being 
used  as  naval  and  military  bases  by  the  enemy, 
and  particularly  if  she  could  prevent  the  use  of  a 
large  Russian  army  against  her. 

These  ends  might  be  accomplished  in  either  of 
two  ways.  The  easier  way  is  through  the  exercise 
of  such  a  predominant  political  influence  over 
Siberia  as  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  danger  from 
that  quarter.  The  other  way  is  through  military 
action  directed  to  cutting  off  eastern  Siberia  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  prevent  the  passage  of  a 
Russian  army  beyond  Lake  Baikal.  The  almost 
impassable  mountain  ranges  of  the  Baikal  district 
make  it  easy  for  a  very  small  force  to  prevent  the 
passage  of  a  large  army  from  Russia  to  the  Far 
East.  By  cutting  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  in 
the  narrow  passage  between  the  mountains  Japan 
would  be  able  to  exercise  complete  military  control 
east  of  the  Baikal. 

IV 

During  the  past  three  years  there  has  been  a 
great  deal  of  Japanese  colonization  in  eastern 
Siberia,   most   of  it   subsidized   by   the   Japanese 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  223 

Imperial  government.  The  principal  hotels  in 
Vladivostok  and  other  towns  of  eastern  Siberia 
have  been  acquired  by  Japanese.1  The  Japanese 
have  printed  a  special  form  of  currency,  especially 
the  yen,  for  use  in  Siberia  only.  This  Japanese- 
Siberian  currency  is  forced  upon  the  Siberians, 
but  is  refused  when  offered  as  payment  in  Japan. 
Mining  rights  are  being  acquired  by  Japanese  all 
over  eastern  Siberia.  They  have  bought  up  the 
gold-mines  along  the  Zeia  River  at  Blagovestchensk 
and  elsewhere,  the  electric-power  plant  at  Tchita, 
and  flour-mills  at  Khabarovsk  and  other  places.2 
The  river  steamers  plying  the  Amur  and  the  Sun- 
gari  have  largely  passed  into  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese.  A  large  number  of  the  mineral  springs 
and  curative  mud-baths  in  Trans-Baikalia  have 
passed  into  the  control  of  the  Japanese.  In  the 
summer  of  1916  a  group  of  Japanese  capitalists, 
headed  by  a  representative  of  the  Bank  of  Tokio, 
sought  to  obtain  a  monopoly  right  to  exploit  the 
"cures"  and  mineral  springs  of  the  Pri-Amursk 
territory  for  fifty  years. 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  manner 
in  which  the  Japanese  have  steadily  aimed  at  the 
control  of  the  fishing  rights  of  Russia's  Far  East. 
The  fishing  industry  is  of  great  importance  to  the 
economic  development  of  Siberia.  The  fisheries 
of  the  Amursk  and  Kamchatka  yielded  2,500,000 
poods  of  fish  in  1907;  3,000,000  poods  in  1908; 
4,500,000  poods  in  1909;  6,203,346  poods  in  191 2. 
These  figures  cover  only  the  legally  entered   and 

1  Russian  Economist,  June  10,  1 9 1 9. 

-Confidential  report  to  the  writer,  dated  October,  1919. 


224    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

registered  catches  and  do  not  include  the  fish 
consumed  by  the  local  population  or  the  illegal 
catches  of  Japanese  poachers.  It  is  one  of  the 
many  evidences  of  the  shortsightedness  of  the  old 
regime,  and  the  backwardness  of  the  industrial 
development  of  the  country,  that  with  the  most 
abundant  fish-supply  in  the  world  Russia  actually 
imported  an  enormous  amount  of  fish  each  year. 
The  value  of  the  fish  imports  in  the  years  1911-13 
averaged  about  36,000,000  rubles  per  year.1 

By  the  Fishing  Treaty  of  July,  1907,  Russia 
granted  to  Japanese  subjects,  for  a  period  of 
twelve  years,  equal  fishing  rights  to  those  enjoyed 
by  Russian  citizens  along  the  coast  of  Kamchatka 
and  Saghalien.  Certain  reservations  were  made, 
fishing  rights  being  restricted  to  Russian  citizens 
in  the  Bay  of  Peter  the  Great,  Imperial  Haven, 
Vanine  Bay,  Avachin  Bay,  and  in  the  Amur  and 
the  rivers  of  Okhotsk  and  Kamchatka.  In  a 
surprisingly  short  time  the  Japanese  have  almost 
driven  the  Russians  from  this  important  industry. 
For  example,  the  Russian  vice-consul  at  Khakho- 
date  reported  in  1909  that  the  Japanese  were 
using  in  Russian  waters  221  fishing-vessels,  aggre- 
gating 40,000  tons,  whereas  the  Russians  were 
using  only  six  vessels,  aggregating  4,600  tons.  The 
number  of  Japanese  employed  was  about  6,000; 
the  number  of  Russians  only  300.2 

At  the  sales  of  fishing  rights  which  took  place 
in  the  Okhotsk-Kamchatka  district,  March  5,  1910, 
it  was  quite  apparent  that  the  Japanese  had  prac- 

1  Goldstein,  Russia,  Her  Economic  Past  and  Future,  p.  70. 

2  Bogdanov,  The  Condition  of  Our  Fisheries  in  the  Far  Fast. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  225 

tically  driven  the  Russians  from  the  fishing  indus- 
try. Of  the  200  fishing  districts  in  the  Okhotsk- 
Kamchatka  area,  only  two  remained  in  the  hands  of 
Russians,  all  the  others  going  to  the  Japanese.1  In 
spite  of  such  facts  as  these,  Russia  made  a  new 
agreement  with  Japan  in  1916,  giving  Japan  still 
further  fishing  rights  in  Russian  waters,  removing 
the  restrictions  of  the  treaty  made  in  1907,  thus 
giving  Japanese  subjects  full  equality  with  Rus- 
sian subjects,  a  right  not  enjoyed  by  any  other 
nation,  be  it  remembered.  S.  D.  Merkulov,  the 
well-known  Russian  authority  on  the  Far  East, 
relates  that  in  the  spring  of  1916  he  was  in  the 
Pri-Amursk  district  when  rumors  of  the  new  fish- 
ing agreement  filtered  through  by  way  of  Japan, 
and  the  resentment  of  the  population  was  so  great 
that  he,  being  suspected  of  some  sort  of  responsi- 
bility for  the  government's  policy,  was  obliged  to 
flee.2  "The  peaceful  economic  capture  of  the  Pri- 
Amursk  territory  by  the  Japanese  will  deprive 
Russia  of  this  border  province  forever,"  says  this 
authority.''''  He  predicts  that,  instead  of  Russians 
supplying  the  Japanese  market  with  fish,  the  Jap- 
anese will  soon  be  supplying  the  Russian  market 
with  the  fish  caught  by  them  in  Russian  waters. 

In  this  connection  two  paragraphs  from  Russian 
newspapers  are  of  interest.  The  first  is  a  para- 
graph published  in  the  Novoye  Vremia,  December 
II,  1916,  in  a  list  entitled  "New  Law  Projects," 
and  reads,  "The  Ministry  of  Commerce  and  In- 

'  Bogdanov,  op.  cit. 

'-'  Merkulov,  '['he  (Jrfrer,t  Situation  of  the  Russian  Cause  in  the  Far 
Fas  I  (19 10,'  j  '  Htm, 


226    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

dustry  introduced  a  bill  to  allow  the  Japanese  to 
bring  fish  caught  by  them  in  fisheries  hired  from 
Russia  into  our  Pacific  ports  duty  free."  This  law 
was  projected  in  accordance  with  the  agreement 
made  earlier  in  the  year,  at  a  time  when  in  Russian 
waters  there  were  ninety-five  Japanese  to  five 
Russians.  The  second  paragraph  is  taken  from 
the  Russkaya  Folia,  January  10,  1917.  It  is  a 
telegram  from  a  correspondent  of  the  paper  at 
Vladivostok,  and  reads:  "There  are  stocked  at 
present  at  Vladivostok  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
poods  of  fish  freights.  The  approach  of  warmer 
weather  threatens  these  stocks  with  putrefaction 
and  the  ruination  of  the  entire  fishing  business  of 
the  territory  is  imminent.  Foreign  competition 
(i.e.,  Japanese)  united  in  one  syndicate  for  the 
cornering  of  these  products  will  put  the  finishing 
touch  to  this  breakdown." 

According  to  a  report  by  D.  B.  MacGowan, 
United  States  consul  at  Vladivostok,  dated  March 
28,  1919,  the  sealed  bids  for  the  fishing  stations  in 
conventional  waters  betweenVladivostok  and  Bering 
Strait  were  opened  in  January.  There  were  182 
bids,  only  20  of  them  being  from  Russians.  The 
Japanese  got  seventy-six  stations  and  the  Russians 
eighteen.  In  spite  of  the  depreciated  value  of  the 
ruble,  these  stations  brought  only  4,213,275  rubles, 
as  against  12,000,000  rubles  formerly.  When  the  low 
value  of  the  ruble  is  taken  into  account,  the  differ- 
ence is  far  greater  even  than  these  figures  indicate. 
It  is  very  well  understood  that  the  Japanese  combine 
to  force  the  value  of  these  stations  down. 

The  Japanese  have  almost  ousted  the  Russians 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  227 

from  this  very  important  industry  because  Japan 
has  thoroughly  organized  her  industrial  life  on 
German  lines,  and  not  because  of  any  superiority 
of  the  Japanese  fishermen  over  their  Russian 
competitors.  The  report  of  the  Russian  vice- 
consul  at  Khakhodate  already  referred  to  makes 
this  quite  clear.  He  points  out  that  the  Japanese 
fishermen  can  get  on  very  easy  terms  extensive 
credits  from  the  Japanese  banks  supported  by  the 
government.  There  are  various  other  forms  of 
governmental  support,  including  important  sub- 
sidies and  premiums.  The  nine  hundred  thousand 
Japanese  engaged  in  fishing  are  practically  all 
organized  into  business  corporations  or  co-opera- 
tive societies,  whose  methods  are  quite  like  those 
of  the  German  cartels.  They  possess  a  capital  of 
millions  of  yen.  For  example,  the  Maritime  Com- 
mercial Fisheries  of  Tokio  has  a  capital  of  five 
million  yen.  It  has  for  its  sole  object  the  exploita- 
tion of  the  fishing  industry  in  Kamchatka,  Okhotsk, 
and  the  Pri-Amursk.  This  and  similar  Japanese 
organizations,  using  Russian  agents  or  agents 
passing  as  Russians,  started  to  buy  up  all  the  pri- 
vately owned  Russian  fishing-vessels  and  freight- 
ships  as  soon  as  the  war  began  in  1914,  and  soon 
acquired  a  monopoly. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  colonization  and  eco- 
nomic infiltration  which  has  taken  place,  it  can 
safely  be  said  that  Japan's  primary  object  in  Siberia 
is  political  and  military  rather  than  economic. 
The  climate  of  Siberia,  even  in  the  most  favorable 
portions  of  the  Far  East,  is  less  suited  to  extensive 
Japanese   colonization   than   that   of  China.     For 


228      RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

reasons  of  imperial  policy  already  set  forth,  the 
military  party  in  Japan  would  like  to  see  Siberia 
controlled  by  a  reactionary  militarist  government, 
either  as  an  independent  state  or  as  part  of  the 
Russian  Empire  as  formerly.  With  such  a  reac- 
tionary militarist  government  co-operation  on  the 
part  of  Japan  would  be  both  natural  and  easy.  It 
would,  in  last  analysis,  be  dominated  by  Japanese 
bayonets.  In  the  event  of  Siberia  being  con- 
trolled by  a  strong  liberal  democratic  government, 
either  as  an  independent  state  or  as  part  of  a 
united  Russia,  the  military  party  in  Japan  would 
either  annex  the  territory  east  of  Lake  Baikal 
or  be  at  all  times  ready  to  seize  it  and  prevent  its 
use  by  Russia  against  Japan.  In  either  case  the 
colonization  and  economic  infiltration  would  be  of 
enormous  strategic  value  and  importance. 

No  careful  student  of  Japanese  foreign  policy 
since  the  Russo-Japanese  War  can  doubt  that  some 
of  her  most  influential  statesmen  have  long  cherished 
the  hope  that  some  day  Siberia  east  of  Lake  Baikal 
and  the  northern  half  of  Saghalien  might  become 
Japanese  possessions.  As  soon  as  war  broke  out  in 
Europe  in  1914  it  became  apparent  that  the 
Japanese  were  preparing  to  take  advantage  of 
Russia's  preoccupation.  A  host  of  Japanese  sur- 
veyors and  investigators  swarmed  into  the  Rus- 
sian Far  East.  E.  E.  Anert,  the  well-known  Rus- 
sian geologist  and  engineer,  is  authority  for  the 
statement  that  during  the  first  two  years  of  the 
war  there  were  more  Japanese  engineers  on  the 
Maritime  Province  coast  and  in  Russian  Saghalien, 
making  investigations,  than  there  had  been  Rus- 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  229 

sian  engineers  in  twenty  years.1  P.  I.  Polevoy, 
another  Russian  geologist  and  engineer,  member 
of  the  Geological  Commission  of  Russia,  says  that 
as  soon  as  the  World  War  broke  out  Japanese  sur- 
veyors and  investigators  began  to  make  exhaustive 
surveys  of  the  mineral  resources  of  Trans-Baikalia, 
the  Amursk,  and  Kamchatka.2 

In  the  Journal  of  the  Geological  Commission  of 
Russia,  November  8,  1916,  appears  a  report  by  the 
director  of  an  application  made  by  Mr.  Sakurai, 
representative  of  the  Japanese  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce, asking  for  information  concerning  the 
mineral  resources  of  the  Russian  Far  East,  espe- 
cially of  Russian  Saghalien.  The  Japanese  repre- 
sentative had  proposed  that  the  Geological  Com- 
mission of  Russia  and  the  Geological  Institution  of 
Japan  organize  a  joint  expedition  to  the  coast  of 
northern  Saghalien  for  the  purpose  of  verifying 
the  reports  of  Russian  geologists  respecting  the 
oil  and  mineral  wealth  of  that  part  of  the  island. 

1  his  proposal  seemed  innocent  enough  and  was 
supported  by  the  director  of  the  Russian  Geologi- 
cal Commission  on  the  ground  of  its  scientific 
interest.  It  was  vehemently  opposed  by  some 
of  the  members,  however,  among  them  P.  I.  Pole- 
voy, who  declared  that  he  was  "not  willing  to  aid 
the  Japanese  in  their  industrial  adventures  in  our 

Far  East."  One  of  the  leading  geological  experts 
of  Russia  wrote  in  an  official  report  at  the  end  of 

1 9 1 6,    "Our  Mining    Department    and    Geological 

1  Ouofed  in  ;i  confidential  report  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Office, 
wintcn  just  before  t Ik-  Revolution  of  Maul),  10,17,  and  received  alter 
the  Provisional  government  had  been  set  up.  2  Idem. 

10 


23o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

Commission  are  literally  besieged  by  Japanese 
who  are  constantly  asking  for  various  information 
and  are  putting  in  claims."  * 

These  facts  are  of  great  importance  when  they 
are  considered  in  connection  with  the  statement 
of  the  Russian  writer,  N.  M.  Popov,  that  in  the 
summer  of  1916  the  Japanese  press  published  a 
number  of  articles  which  represented  the  Russian 
government  as  being  desirous  of  ceding  to  Japan 
the  northern  half  of  Saghalien,  having  decided  that 
it  was  of  no  value  to  Russia.  Japan,  it  was  said, 
was  unwilling  to  accept  it  as  a  gift  from  Russia  and 
was  therefore  offering  a  small  monetary  compensa- 
tion for  it.2  We  must  remember  that  the  press 
in  Japan  is  very  strictly  regulated  and  must  receive 
the  special  permission  of  the  authorities  before 
publishing  any  news  or  comments  upon  foreign 
affairs.  The  articles  referred  to  could  not  have 
been  published  except  with  the  approval  of  the 
Japanese  government.  Those  familiar  with  the 
methods  of  Japanese  diplomacy  will  recognize  in 
the  publication  of  such  articles  a  characteristic 
way  of  preparing  the  public  for  the  acceptance  of 
an  important  policy.  Under  date  of  August  12, 
1916,  Popov  wrote  that  influential  Japanese  news- 
papers were  asserting  that  Russia  was  ready  "in 
compensation  for  the  freedom  of  action  accorded 
to  her  in  the  west"  to  relinquish,  in  favor  of 
Japan,  her  sovereign  rights  in  the  territories  lying 
east  of  Baikal.  The  Russian  writer  added  this 
comment,  "All  such  statements  in  the  Japanese 

1  Quoted  in  the  confidential  report  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Office 
previously  referred  to.  2  Idem. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  231 

newspapers  and  magazines  have  as  their  object  the 
preparation  of  the  public  opinion  of  Japan  for  the 
new  demands  which  the  government  is  getting  ready 
to  advance,  and  also  to  accustom  the  public  to  the 
idea  that  the  Russian  government  and  public  are 
ready  to  concede  all  these  demands  to  Japan.1 

In  the  light  of  all  these  facts,  and  of  the  policy 
pursued  in  Siberia  by  Japan  during  the  struggle 
against  the[Bolsheviki,  it  is  quite  useless  for  Japan- 
ese apologists  to  deride,  or  attempt  to  deny,  the 
suggestion  that  the  possible  possession  of  eastern 
Siberia  has  seriously  entered  into  the  shaping  of 
Japan's  foreign  policy.  It  is  not  because  of  any 
dislike  of  the  Japanese  or  prejudice  against  them 
that  attention  is  called  to  the  dangers  inherent  in 
the  policy  and  program  of  the  militarists  of  Japan. 
The  occupation  of  eastern  Siberia  by  an  aggressive 
military  power  like  Japan  is  a  serious  matter  for 
the  United  States  of  America.  Kamchatka  is 
dangerously  near  to  Alaska.  Petropavlovsk,  for 
example,  is  much  nearer  to  Alaska  than  to  Tokio. 
Across  the  Bering  Strait,  from  East  Cape  on  the 
Siberian  coast  to  Cape  Prince  of  Wales  on  the 
Alaskan  coast,  is  only  fifty-six  miles.  We  cannot 
in  reason  take  it  for  granted  that  the  military  dif- 
ficulties will  always  be  a  sufficient  safeguard  against 
attack  from  this  quarter.  On  the  score  of  the  con- 
tiguity of  our  own  territory  we  have  a  very  definite 
interest  in  preventing  the  occupation  of  eastern 
Siberia  by  Japan,  the  one  military  power  whose 
foreign  policy  is  generally  conceded  to  hold  im- 
portant elements  of  danger  for  us.     It  is  no  answer 

1  Confidential  report. 


232    RUSSIA   AS  AN   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

to  this  argument  to  tell  us  that  Japan's  occupation 
of  eastern  Siberia  would  be  temporary,  or  that  it 
would  be  pacific  and  involve  no  military  aim  or 
effort.  Japan  has  never  given  up  any  territory 
she  has  once  occupied.  If  she  "surrenders"  Shan- 
tung the  surrender  will  be  pro  forma  merely;  she 
has  already  clearly  manifested  her  intention  to 
keep  the  oyster  when  she  returns  the  shell.  We 
remember  Korea. 

In  addition  to  this  purely  selfish  national  inter- 
est, the  United  States  has  another  and  larger 
interest  in  preserving  Siberia's  integrity  and  free- 
dom from  Japanese  domination.  It  is  by  no  means 
certain  as  yet  that  Germany  has  undergone  any 
real  reform;  that  she  has  permanently  abandoned 
the  aggressive  militarist  spirit  which  made  her  a 
menace  to  the  whole  civilized  world.  Even  if 
she  does  not  return  to  monarchism — which  is  not 
yet  assured — as  a  capitalist-militarist  republic  she 
can  be  as  aggressively  imperialistic  as  she  was 
under  the  Hohenzollerns.  The  last  years  of  Wil- 
helm  Liebknecht  were  clouded  by  an  intense  fear  of 
precisely  such  a  development.  Germany  began 
to  recover  her  economic  and  political  influence 
over  Russia  before  the  war  ended.  Even  while 
her  great  military  machine  was  collapsing  and 
she  was  facing  the  certainty  of  disastrous  military 
defeat  she  was  building  anew  in  Russia.  From  the 
moment  the  armistice  was  signed,  during  all  the 
months  of  diplomatic  chatter,  huckstering,  and 
growing  disunion  on  the  part  of  the  Allies,  Germany 
was  engaged  in  securing  a  fresh  strangle-hold  upon 
the  life  of  Russia 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  233 

It  requires  no  great  imagination  to  see  that 
with  Germany  in  control  of  the  economic  life  of 
Russia  in  Europe,  and  possibly  even  of  western 
Siberia,  and  Japan  in  control  of  the  rest  of  Siberia, 
the  result  would  be  a  menace  to  every  democrat- 
ically governed  nation  in  the  world.  Across  the 
prostrate  form  of  Russia  the  two  great  militarist 
powers  could  join  hands  and  control  the  resources 
and  the  fate  of  something  like  seven  hundred  mill- 
ion people.  Of  course,  the  combination  of  Ger- 
many and  Japan  with  Russia  governed  by  a  reac- 
tionary monarchy  would  be  still  more  formidable 
and  dangerous;  but  even  if  Russia  does  not  fall 
again  under  the  rule  of  the  reactionary  monarchists 
and  manages  to  establish  and  maintain  a  liberal 
government,  if  her  economic  life  is  to  be  dominated 
by  Germany  in  the  west  and  by  Japan  in  the  east, 
and  especially  if  Japan  is  to  exercise  political  con- 
trol over  the  richest  part  of  Siberia,  the  world 
will  not  be  safe  for  democracy  for  a  long  time  to 
come.  There  will  be  in  effect  two  great  leagues 
of  nations,  the  league  of  democratic  nations  against 
a  stronger  league  of  aggressive  military  nations. 
If  Japan  is  permitted  to  control  Siberia,  or  if 
Russia  is  to  be  held  in  the  relentless  grip  of  a 
German-Japanese  combination,  the  aims  for  the 
attainment  of  which  we  entered  the  Great  War 
will  have  been  defeated. 


In  all  the  history  of  the  World  War  and  the 
tortuous  and  sinister  diplomacy  connected  with  it, 
and   with   the   settlement  of  it,  there  is  no  single 


234    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

chapter  that  is  so  shameful  and  dishonorable  as 
that  which  records  the  behavior  of  Japan  toward 
her  allies  in  connection  with  Siberia.  As  a  story 
of  political  immorality  it  has  hardly  a  parallel. 
Utterly  bad  as  her  actions  in  China  were,  in  Siberia 
she  sank  to  greater  depths  of  infamy. 

We  have  already  noted  the  manner  in  which 
Japan  almost  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  war 
set  about  preparing  the  way  for  the  exploitation 
and  control  of  the  greater  part  of  eastern  Siberia. 
The  great  advantages  gained  by  her  in  the  secret 
agreements  of  1916 — the  concessions  on  the  Man- 
churian  Railway  and  the  shipping  and  fishing 
rights1 — were  undoubtedly  wrested  from  Russia 
by  her  unscrupulous  ally.  Russia  was  dependent 
upon  Japan  to  a  very  large  extent  for  guns,  muni- 
tions, military  equipment,  and  railway  supplies. 
The  Russians  knew  perfectly  well  that  they  were 
really  mortgaging  to  Japan  the  most  valuable  and 
important  part  of  Siberia,  and  that  Japan  would 
assert  real  sovereignty  over  it.  They  were  in  no 
position  to  resist  Japan's  demands,  however,  since 
refusal  would  render  them  helpless  before  the  Ger- 
man onslaught.  Their  only  hope  lay  in  a  success- 
ful termination  of  the  war,  after  which  they  could 
deal  with  Japan. 

Finding  themselves  masters  of  the  situation,  the 
Japanese  swarmed  into  Siberia,  behaving  with  such 
arrogance  as  to  rouse  even  the  tolerant  Russians, 
generally  so  free  from  racial  prejudices,  to  resent- 
ment and  hatred.  Japanese  merchants,  aided  by 
their  government,   poured  into  Siberia  enormous 

1  See  pp.  183-184. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  235 

quantities  of  inferior  and  spurious  goods,  for  which 
chey  charged  exorbitant  prices.  So  bitter  was  the 
feeling  against  the  Japanese  on  account  of  these 
practices  that  the  Japanese  government  became 
alarmed  and,  for  a  little  while,  took  measures  to 
put  a  stop  to  them.  When  the  Revolution  took 
place  in  Russia,  in  March,  1917,  and  it  became 
evident  that  the  great  Slav  power  was  still  further 
weakened,  the  Japanese  government  ceased  to 
interfere  with  its  unscrupulous  traders.  These  be- 
came more  offensively  aggressive  in  Siberia.  Worth- 
less trash  manufactured  in  Japan  for  the  Siberian 
market  was  represented  as  being  standard  mer- 
chandise of  American  and  British  manufacture. 
Perhaps  the  most  unscrupulous  of  all  were  the 
Japanese  drug  dealers,  who  sold  at  enormous 
prices  worthless  and  even  dangerous  imitations. 
A  bitter  substance  of  no  medical  value  at  all  was 
widely  sold  as  quinine;  there  were  many  such 
examples. 

Meantime  the  Japanese  government  saw  that 
the  plight  of  Russia  offered  an  opportunity  not 
merely  to  extend  the  economic  influence  of  Japan 
in  Siberia,  but  also  to  acquire  political  control. 
Her  opportunity  seemed  to  have  come  when  the 
Bolshevist  counter-revolution  occurred  in  Novem- 
ber, 1917.  At  that  time,  it  will  be  remembered, 
the  Bolsheviki  tried  to  seize  north  Manchuria. 
Greatly  to  the  chagrin  of  Japan,  the  foreign  consuls 
called  upon  China  to  furnish  troops  to  drive  out  the 
Bolsheviki  and  the  Chinese  were  successful  in 
doing  so,  deporting  the  Bolsheviki  to  Siberia. 
This  was  a  setback  for  Japan:    that  China's  right 


236    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

to  assume  the  defense  of  northern  Manchuria  was 
recognized  by  the  consular  body  was  bad  enough; 
that  China  should  succeed  was  worse. 

During  the  last  days  of  the  Kerensky  regime 
the  Japanese  instigated  a  very  clever  and  wide- 
spread propaganda  in  the  principal  Allied  nations 
in  favor  of  Japanese  intervention  in  Siberia  for  the 
ostensible  purpose  of  saving  it  from  falling  into 
the  possession  of  Germany.  In  December,  after 
the  Bolshevist  coup  d'etat,  the  Japanese  government 
addressed  a  note  to  the  principal  Allied  nations, 
and  to  the  United  States,  offering  to  send  troops 
into  Siberia  for  this  purpose.  The  proposal  was 
that  enough  Japanese  troops  should  be  sent  into 
Siberia  to  protect  the  Allied  interests  against 
Germany  and  the  Bolsheviki.  Japan  explicitly 
agreed  not  to  attempt  territorial  annexation  or  to 
maintain  a  permanent  occupation  of  Siberia  or 
any  part  of  it.  On  the  other  hand,  she  laid  down 
the  following  conditions:  (a)  the  intervention 
must  be  exclusively  Japanese;  (b)  the  Allied  na- 
tions and  the  United  States  must  recognize  her 
paramount  position  in  China  and  the  existing 
Sino-Japanese  treaties;  (c)  Japan  must  be  given 
exclusive  concessions  for  mining  and  timber  exploi- 
tation and  fishing  in  eastern  Siberia. 

In  return  for  these  things  Japan  was  ready  not 
only  to  act  in  Siberia,  but  also  to  send  troops  to 
Europe  if  desired.  Serious  as  the  situation  was, 
it  was  not  easy  for  France  or  Great  Britain  to 
accept  the  Japanese  proposal.  On  the  whole,  of 
course,  France  was  favorable.  In  the  first  place, 
victory  over  Germany  on  the  western  front  and  the 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  237 

recovery  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  dominated  every 
other  consideration.  She  had  no  interests  at  stake 
in  Siberia  or  Manchuria.  In  the  second  place, 
there  was  some  talk  about  a  repudiation  of  the  war 
debts  by  Russia  after  the  revolutionary  government 
was  formed  and  there  were  many  in  France  who 
believed  that  Japanese  intervention  would  prevent 
this.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  recognized  that 
the  occupation  of  Siberia  by  the  Japanese  would 
be  likely  to  alienate  the  Russians  from  the  Allied 
cause  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  them  active 
allies  of  Germany.  This  would  imperil  the  western 
front,  of  course.  Finally,  there  was  a  good  deal  of 
distrust  of  Japan  and  a  wide-spread  belief  that 
Japan  would  use  the  power  acquired  through 
military  occupation  of  Siberia  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  Russia's  indebtedness  to  her,  quite  regard- 
less of  the  claims  of  France  or  any  other  nation. 
In  the  end,  the  balance  of  French  interest  and 
opinion  inclined  to  acceptance  of  the  Japanese 
proposal. 

Great  Britain  had  a  much  more  difficult  problem 
to  decide.  She  had  important  interests  in  China 
which  would  be  jeopardized  by  any  great  extension 
of  Japan's  power  and  influence  in  the  Far  Fast. 
Here  was  a  very  powerful  reason  for  regarding 
with  disfavor  the  proposal  of  Japan.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  collapse  of  Russia  brought  into  promi- 
nence the.  peril  of  a  German-Turkish  advance  upon 
India.  The  situation  of  India  was  indeed  very 
critical.  One  of  the  reasons  for  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance  was  the  protection  of  India.  Japan  was 
under  obligation  to  send  troops  to  India  if  requested 


238    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

to  do  so.  By  the  end  of  1917  British  statesmen 
realized  that  this  would  be  a  very  dangerous  expedi- 
ent; it  might  well  prove  to  be  more  dangerous  to 
British  rule  in  India  than  the  German-Turkish 
invasion  that  was  feared.  It  was  well  known  that 
the  Japanese  Pan-Asian  propaganda  had  found  a 
fertile  field  in  India;  that  the  Indian  nationalist 
campaign  had  been  aided  by  the  Japanese,  with  the 
connivance  of  the  Japanese  government,  even 
during  the  war.  A  large  army  of  Japanese  in 
India  would  undoubtedly  give  a  great  impetus  to 
the  nationalist  movement  there.  There  was,  more- 
over, a  wide-spread  and  well-grounded  suspicion 
that  Japan  would  very  gladly  make  peace  with 
Germany  and  come  to  an  amicable  understanding 
with  her  concerning  the  exploitation  of  Russia, 
just  as  Russia  and  Japan  had  done  with  regard  to 
China  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  In  Great 
Britain,  as  in  France,  there  was  a  widespread 
feeling  of  uneasiness  and  a  freely  expressed  dis- 
trust of  Japan. 

It  was  a  most  serious  condition  that  confronted 
the  Allied  nations  and  the  anti-Bolshevist  Russians. 
There  were  in  Siberia  at  least  two  hundred  thousand 
German  and  Austrian  prisoners  of  war,  and  there 
was  no  doubt  that  these  would  willingly  agree  to 
fight  with  the  Bolsheviki  against  either  the  Allies 
or  the  anti-Bolshevist  forces  of  Russia  operating 
in  Siberia.  There  were  many  of  these  Teutons 
east  of  Lake  Baikal,  though  the  vast  majority  were 
in  central  and  western  Siberia.  At  Vladivostok 
there  were  immense  military  stores  which  might 
be  sold  to  the  Germans  by  the  Bolsheviki.     At 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  239 

the  same  time,  in  central  Siberia,  in  the  Urals, 
and  in  Turkestan  there  were  enormous  supplies — 
wheat,  butter,  wool,  hides,  cotton,  ores,  platinum, 
and  oil — which  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
keep  from  falling  into  German  hands.1 

On  the  whole,  British  opinion,  like  French  opin- 
ion, accepted  the  view  that  Japanese  intervention 
was  the  lesser  of  two  evils.  In  January,  1918, 
the  two  European  governments  agreed  to  assent 
to  the  Japanese  proposal,  provided  that  the  United 
States  of  America  would  also  assent  to  it.  Great 
Britain  and  France  knew  perfectly  well  that 
America  could  not  be  ignored;  that  her  interest 
in  any  great  extension  of  Japan's  military  power 
and  prestige  was  vital.  It  is  one  of  the  few  bright 
spots  in  our  Far  Eastern  diplomacy  that  the  plan 
for  exclusive  intervention  by  Japan  was  killed  by 
the  refusal  of  our  government  to  assent  to  it.  That 
refusal  was  one  of  the  few  decisive  diplomatic  acts 
of  the  war  of  which  Americans  can  be  whole- 
heartedly proud. 

Even  while  these  negotiations  were  going  on, 
before  the  decision  of  the  United  States  had  been 
made  known,  Japan  made  a  new  move.  The  Rus- 
sian commander  in  the  Far  East,  Gen.  D.  M. 
Horvath,  conceived  the  plan  of  organizing  a  great 
volunteer  Russian  army  to  fight  the  Bolsheviki, 
who  were  steadily  gaining  in  their  efforts  to  con- 
trol Siberia.  He  asked  for  assistance  from  the 
United  States  in  the  first  instance,  and  then  from 
Great  Britain  and  France.  While  he  was  waiting 
for  these  nations  to  reply,  General  Horvath  was 

1  Barrows,  op.  cit.,  p.  929. 


24o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

approached  by  a  representative  of  Japan,  General 
Nakashima,  and  offered  the  entire  support  of 
Japan,  with  all  the  arms,  money,  and  men  that 
might  be  required  to  clear  Siberia  of  the  Bolsheviki. 
The  following  conditions  were  laid  down: 

1.  That  Japan  should  undertake  intervention  in  Siberia 
alone. 

2.  That  she  should  be  given  the  northern  half  of  Saghalien 
Island. 

3.  That  she  should  be  given  preferential  trade  and  com- 
mercial rights  throughout  eastern  Siberia. 

4.  That  she  be  granted  exclusive  concessions  for  the  ex- 
ploitation of  all  mining  areas  and  forests  east  of  Lake  Baikal. 

5.  That  Japanese  subjects  be  granted  full  equality  with 
Russians  in  the  fisheries  of  eastern  Siberia. 

6.  That  Vladivostok  be  transformed  into  a  free  port  and  all 
its  fortifications  dismantled. 

In  the  course  of  these  negotiations  it  developed 
that  Japan  had  no  intention  of  going  beyond  Lake 
Baikal.  This  was  a  reservation  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  the  Russians  and  to  the  Allied  nations 
and  the  United  States.  To  the  former  it  revealed 
the  fact,  which  had  all  along  been  suspected,  that 
Japan  had  no  interest  in  restoring  Russia,  or  even 
Siberia  as  a  whole,  but  that  she  was  interested  only 
in  Siberia  east  of  Lake  Baikal,  which,  for  reasons 
already  set  forth,  she  would  be  easily  able  to  seize 
and  hold  indefinitely.  To  the  latter  it  revealed 
the  fact,  also  previously  suspected,  that  Japan 
was  not  loyal  to  the  Allied  cause;  that  she  had  no 
intention  of  helping  to  save  the  territory  from 
Lake  Baikal  to  the  Urals,  either  from  the  Bolshe- 
viki or  from  the  Germans. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  241 

While  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United 
States  failed  to  come  to  their  assistance  with  the 
desired  support,  the  Russians  steadily  refrained 
from  making  such  a  bargain  with  the  Japanese, 
who  continued  their  overtures.  While  these  dis- 
cussions were  going  on  there  arose  the  little  army 
of  Cossack  guerrillas  under  the  Cossack  Ataman, 
Semenov,  who  has  been  described  as  "the  Villa 
of  Siberia."  His  was  the  only  Russian  fighting 
force  of  any  consequence  in  the  Far  East  at  the 
time,  and  between  Irkutsk  and  Manchuria  station, 
along  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway,  it  waged  savage 
warfare  on  the  Bolsheviki.  Japan  now  made  over- 
tures to  Semenov  similar  to  those  previously  made 
to  Horvath.  She  supplied  him  with  guns,  muni- 
tions, soldiers,  and  military  advisers,  and  money  to 
lavish  upon  his  numerous  mistresses  and  to  buy 
gold-handled  swords  for  himself  and  his  officers.  In 
a  very  little  while  she  had  corrupted  this  Cossack 
officer,  who  had  hitherto  been  loyal  in  a  crude 
way,  and  possessed  real  military  power,  making  a 
pliant  and  willing  tool,  ready  to  do  her  bidding,  as 
his  subsequent  career  has  shown. 

VI 

Fromthe  first  the  government  of  the  United  States 
manifested  a  sincere  and  profound  friendship  for 
revolutionary  Russia.  Mistaken  as  its  policy  has 
often  been,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  America  has  at 
all  times  been  actuated  by  a  genuine  desire  to  help 
Russia.  Of  course,  there  was  in  the  beginning  the 
desire  to  enable  the  great  Slav  power  to  renew  the 
fight  against  Germany  and  so  help  the  Allied  cause, 


242    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

That  was  a  natural  motive  and  a  proper  one;  it 
was  not  the  only  motive,  however.  Even  when  it 
became  apparent  that  Russia  was  out  of  the  war, 
that  her  military  rehabilitation  was  out  of  the 
question,  America  sought  to  help  her.  It  was  in 
a  spirit  of  friendship  that  the  Stevens  Commission 
was  sent  to  Russia  to  give  aid  in  placing  her  rail- 
way system  upon  a  more  efficient  basis.  It  was 
in  the  same  spirit  that  other  projects  for  helping 
Russia  by  supplying  capital  and  expert  assistance  to 
improve  her  economic  life  were  conceived.  The 
spirit  and  the  intention  were  admirable,  however 
much  bungling  there  may  have  been  in  giving  them 
practical  effect.  It  is  well  known  that  Japan 
resented  this  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  and  professed  to  see  in  the  American  efforts 
to  aid  Russia  a  cunning  plot  to  secure  political  and 
economic  control  of  that  country.  At  every  point 
Japanese  agents,  diplomatic  and  military,  hindered 
and  hampered  the  work  of  the  Stevens  Commission. 

In  May,  1918,  Admiral  Kolchak  appeared  on  the 
scene.  He  sought  to  unite  all  the  Russian  anti- 
Bolshevik  groups,  parties,  and  detachments  in  one 
united  force.  This  was  the  only  possible  chance 
for  successful  action  and  was  warmly  approved  by 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  America.  Japan,  on  the 
other  hand,  strenuously  opposed  Kolchak's  efforts, 
thus  confirming  the  Russians  in  their  belief  that 
it  was  the  aim  of  Japan  to  prevent  the  development 
of  a  stable  and  orderly  form  of  self-government 
in  Siberia. 

In  August,  1918,  acting  apparently  under  pressure 
from  Marshal  Foch,  the  United  States  government 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  243 

changed  its  policy.  It  abandoned  the  policy  of 
neutrality  in  the  struggle  between  the  Bolshevist 
and  anti-Bolshevist  forces  and  agreed  to  a  joint 
intervention  in  Siberia  by  Allied  and  American 
forces  under  Japanese  leadership.  The  immediate 
object  of  this  intervention  was  to  clear  and  keep 
open  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  and  to  rescue  the 
Czecho-Slovaks.  The  story  of  these  Czecho-Slovak 
troops  is  well  known.  They  had  deserted  en  masse 
from  the  Austrian  army,  where  they  had  been 
compelled  to  fight  for  their  hereditary  enemy,  in 
order  to  fight  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  who  were 
pledged  to  the  cause  of  an  independent  Czecho- 
slovakia. They  had  fought  for  Russia  and  the 
Allied  cause  with  heroic  courage.  Then,  when  the 
tragic  Peace  of  Brest-Litovsk  was  declared,  they 
wanted  to  join  the  autonomous  army  of  Czecho- 
slovaks in  France  to  fight  against  the  Central 
Empires,  just  as  their  comrades  were  fighting 
against  Austria  in  Italy. 

Fifty  thousand  of  these  brave  patriots  assembled 
in  the  "Ukraine  Republic,"  where  they  were  con- 
centrated, and  voted  to  leave  for  France  via 
Siberia.1  They  had  an  agreement,  signed  by  the 
Bolshevist  government,  guaranteeing  them  unre- 
stricted passage  across  Russia,  and  started  on  their 
way  across  Siberia,  as  happy  and  peaceful  and  law- 
abiding  as  any  great  body  of  men  that  ever  passed 
through  any  country.  The  permission  of  the 
Bolshevist  commander  of  the  south  Russian  forces, 
General  Antonov-Ovsejenko,  to  depart  from  Russia 
via   Vladivostok  had   been   given   and  the   permit 

1  Ackcrinan,  Trailing  the  Bohhiviki,  p.  108. 


244    RUSSIA  AS  AN   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

had  been  approved  by  both  Lenin  and  Trotzky. 
The  Czecho-Slovaks  had  voluntarily  turned  over 
their  surplus  arms  and  military  equipment  and  were 
therefore  only  partially  armed.  General  Antonov- 
Ovsejenko  issued  an  order  to  his  forces  with  the 
following  reference  to  this: 

Our  comrades  of  the  Czecho-SIovak  Army  Corps,  who 
fought  so  bravely  and  gloriously  at  Zhitomir,  Kieff,  Grebyonka, 
and  Bachmac,  defending  the  way  to  Poltava  and  Kharkoff, 
are  now  leaving  Ukraine  territory,  and  are  turning  over  to  us 
a  part  of  their  military  equipment.  The  revolutionary  army 
will  never  forget  the  fraternal  assistance  rendered  by  the 
Czecho-SIovak  Army  Corps  in  the  battle  of  the  working-people 
of  the  Ukraine  against  the  thieving  bands  of  imperialism. 
The  military  equipment  given  up  by  the  Czecho-Slovaks  the 
revolutionary  army  accepts  as  a  fraternal  gift. 

Notwithstanding  all  this,  the  Bolsheviki  placed 
every  conceivable  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the 
Czecho-Slovaks  and  subjected  them  to  constant 
humiliation.  Then  the  Bolsheviki  ordered  their 
complete  disarmament.  In  a  signed  order  Trotzky 
directed  the  local  authorities  to  disarm  and  disband 
the  Czecho-SIovak  Army  Corps,  place  them  in 
prison-camps  and  there  subject  to  hard  labor  all 
who  would  not  enlist  in  the  Red  Army.  Bolshevist 
forces,  largely  composed  of  Germans  and  Magyars, 
made  war  against  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  who,  not- 
withstanding that  they  were  partially  disarmed, 
fought  back  and  succeeded  in  keeping  together. 
After  prolonged  negotiations,  in  which  the  lack  of 
decisive  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  Allies  con- 
cerning Russia  was  made  all  too  evident,  in  May 
the  Czecho-Slovaks  were  informed  that  the  Allies 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  245 

desired  them  to  remain  and  to  form  the  nucleus 
of  an  Allied  army  against  the  Bolsheviki.  This 
information  was  conveyed  in  a  message  from  the 
French  Ambassador,  dated  May  18,  191 8.  It 
was  promised  that  the  Allies  would  intervene  in 
force  at  the  end  of  June. 

The  Czecho-Slovaks  were  glad  to  do  what  they 
believed  to  be  the  will  of  the  Allied  nations  and  the 
United  States  of  America.  The  treachery  of  the 
Bolsheviki  had  enraged  them  and  filled  them  with 
a  desire  for  revenge,  but  there  were  other  and 
deeper  reasons  for  their  glad  acceptance  of  the 
role  assigned  to  them.  They  were  quite  convinced 
that  the  Bolsheviki  were  in  league  with  Germany 
and  Austria;  that  it  was  the  German  Ambassador 
at  Moscow,  Count  Mirbach,  who  had  dictated  the 
treacherous  policy  of  Trotzky.  Finally,  they  be- 
lieved that  by  serving  the  Allied  cause  they  would 
insure  the  establishment  of  their  national  inde- 
pendence. 

Prom  June  to  September  the  Czecho-Slovaks 
fought  all  over  Siberia.  This  little  army  of  fifty 
thousand  men  routed  the  Bolsheviki  from  the  Urals 
to  the  Pacific.  They  kept  up  an  organization  in 
every  city  of  importance  along  the  Trans-Siberian 
Railway.  It  was  due  to  their  courage  and  indomi- 
table energy  that  Siberia  was  saved  from  the  Bol- 
shevist red  terror  and  that  it  was  possible  to  set 
up  at  Ufa  the  All-Russian  government.1 

It  was  mainly  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  the 
Czecho-Slovaks,  who  had  fought  their  way  into  a 

1  I'cih.ips   the    most    completely   docttincnictl    story   ol    this   heroic 
ai  my  is  that  of  Mr.  Ackcrman,  Trailing  the  liohheiiki. 
17 


246    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

critical  situation  in  the  west,  that  joint  interven- 
tion in  Siberia  by  the  Allies  and  America  was  under- 
taken in  August.1  It  was  agreed  that  the  army  of 
intervention  should  be  under  the  supreme  com- 
mand of  the  Japanese,  but  that  the  army  itself 
should  be  composed  of  not  more  than  7,500  men 
from  each  of  the  nations  except,  of  course,  the 
Czecho-Slovaks  already  there.  The  United  States 
sent  its  full  quota.  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Italy  each  sent  less.  Notwithstanding  the  very 
solemn  agreement  that  its  quota  in  the  army  of 
occupation  in  Siberia — like  that  of  the  other 
nations — should  be  limited  to  7,500  men,  it  was 
not  long  before  Japan  had  ten  times  as  many  in 
Siberia — that  is,  more  than  all  the  other  forces  com- 
bined, including  the  Czecho-Slovaks. 

It  was  not  because  of  an  excessively  generous 
loyalty  to  the  common  cause,  or  a  desire  to  serve 
Russia,  that  so  many  Japanese  soldiers  were  sent 
into  Siberia.  The  evidence  is  overwhelming  that 
it  was  deliberately  planned  to  enable  Japan  to 
control  eastern  Siberia.  The  military  situation 
may  have  justified  the  increase  of  forces,  but  the 
conduct  of  the  Japanese  supreme  commander, 
General  Otani,  soon  became  an  international 
scandal.  In  the  first  place,  everything  which 
could  make  the  expedition  offensive  to  the  Russians 
was  done,  as  though  it  were  Japan's  purpose  to 
deliberately  humiliate  and  insult  the  Russian 
population.  The  Japanese  acted  as  conquerors 
rather  than  as  friends  who  had  come  to  render 
friendly   assistance.     The  Japanese  officers  estab- 

1  Barrows,  op.  cit.,  p.  930. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  247 

lished  a  most  oppressive  rule  over  the  civilian 
population.1  The  Russians  resented  this  and  nat- 
urally distrusted  the  Allies,  sometimes  turning 
back  to  Bolshevism  as  a  lesser  evil.  This  was 
precisely  what  Japan  was  aiming  at:  her  policy 
was  to  make  the  Allies  and  America  unpopular  and 
to  bring  about  the  withdrawal  of  the  expedition, 
leaving  her  with  a  free  hand  to  deal  with  the 
situation. 

The  British,  French,  and  American  forces  were 
systematically  kept  from  points  of  strategic  im- 
portance. East  of  Lake  Baikal  every  town  and 
village  of  any  importance  was  placed  under  Japanese 
control.  Every  railroad  bridge  and  every  road  was 
guarded  by  Japanese,  and  every  railroad  station 
from  Vladivostok  to  Chita  flew  the  Japanese  flag 
and  no  other.  Manchuria  was  not  included  in  the 
joint  intervention  agreement  and  Japan  massed 
her  troops  there.  The  following  extract  from  a 
confidential  report  to  one  of  the  Allied  governments 
is  interesting  in  this  connection: 

All  through  south  Manchuria  the  empire  served  notice  on 
the  Chinese,  and  in  north  Manchuria  on  the  Russians,  that 
the  empire  was  on  the  move.  Every  town  was  decorated 
with  flags,  every  house  with  electric  signs  celebrating  the 
advance  of  the  Japanese  Empire  into  her  new  possessions. 
With  the  Japanese  army  came  hundreds  of  merchants,  from 
the  heads  of  commercial  houses  down  to  their  lowest  agents. 
The  Japanese  population  in  Harbin  increased  in  six  weeks 
from  less  than  2,000  to  probably  5,000.  In  Siberia,  because 
of  the  greater  area,  the  increase  was  not  so  noticeable.  Jap- 
anese troops  quartered  in  Harbin  made  house-to-house  can- 
vasses among  the  Russians,  employing  methods  of  a  conqueror 

1  Ackerman,  op.  cit.,  p.  233. 


248    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

to  secure  buildings  for  the  soldiers.  The  Japanese  high  com- 
mand, practically,  though  never  officially,  placed  the  town 
under  Japanese  military  law.  The  Japanese  commercial 
agents  immediately  leased  the  shops  of  Chinese  merchants, 
sometimes  at  the  rate  of  a  score  a  day,  and  brought  in,  in 
car-loads,  Japanese  goods.  Larger  firms  bought  out  at  exor- 
bitant prices  the  Chinese  in  Russian  flour-mills,  the  four  prin- 
cipal electric-power  plants  in  north  Manchuria,  the  Grand 
Hotel,  the  only  hostel ries,  except  one  at  which  foreigners  could 
reside  with  any  degree  of  comfort.  They  also  attempted  to 
secure,  and  may  have  succeeded,  a  concession  to  build  street 
railways;  they  purchased  at  outrageous  figures  several  of  the 
largest  timber  concessions,  belonging  both  to  Russians  and 
to  other  foreigners  along  the  railway  area. 

The  Japanese  General  Staff  had  to  be  informed 
whenever  a  soldier  or  officer  belonging  to  any  of 
the  western  nations  arrived  in  Siberia,  and  no 
American,  British,  French,  Italian,  or  Czecho- 
slovak officer  could  move  a  man  without  informing 
the  Japanese  General  Staff.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  American  and  European  officers  were  never 
informed  of  the  movements  of  Japanese  troops. 
The  Japanese  General  Staff  took  great  care  to  see 
that  if  the  commanders  of  the  non-Japanese  forces 
sent  men  anywhere  for  special  work  a  Japanese 
officer  of  higher  rank  was  there.  Thus,  if  the 
American  commander  sent  a  force  to  a  particular 
place  under  the  command  of  a  major,  the  Japanese 
would  send  a  general  there  to  whom  the  American 
officer  was  subordinate.  Japanese  agents  requisi- 
tioned horses  and  supplies  of  every  description 
until  it  became  almost  impossible  for  the  other 
armies  to  get  anything  at  all.  The  Japanese  con- 
trolled  every   strategic   point   in,   Manchuria   and 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  249 

Siberia.  They  held  every  caravan  route  and 
blockaded  every  port.  Japanese  war-ships  filled 
Vladivostok  harbor,  their  guns  trained  on  the  city 
most  of  the  time.  Japanese  gunboats  and  moni- 
tors were  sent  up  all  the  navigable  rivers  to  the 
interior.  Not  a  caravan  could  move,  not  a  train 
be  run,  not  a  ship  arrive  or  depart  without  passing 
Japanese  inspection  and  securing  Japanese  per- 
mission. 

Not  an  American  officer  who  served  in  the 
Siberian  expedition  will  deny  these  things.  The 
scandal  became  so  bad  that  the  commanders  of  the 
armies  of  the  western  nations  joined  in  a  strong 
formal  protest  to  the  Japanese  General  Staff, 
according  to  a  reliable  report.  It  is  certain  that 
on  November  2,  191 8,  Secretary  Lansing  very 
plainly  told  Viscount  Ishii  that  Japan  had  gone 
too  far  and  that  she  must  withdraw  as  many  troops 
as  would  be  necessary  to  conform  to  the  letter  and 
spirit  of  the  agreement  covering  the  joint  expedi- 
tion. The  situation  was  a  very  critical  one  during 
several  days  following  that  interview.  In  the  end 
General  Otani  received  instructions  to  send  back 
the  greater  part  of  his  troops.  The  first  order  was 
to  return  35,000  and  the  second  to  return  an 
additional  17,000.  Later  General  Inagki,  of  the 
Japanese  General  Staff,  called  upon  the  American 
commander,  Major-General  Graves,  and  expressed 
the  regrets  of  the  Japanese  for  past  practices, 
promising  more  hearty  co-operation  in  the  future. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  in  this  connection  that, 
although  there  had  been  no  revision  of  the  original 
agreement,    on   September    15,    191 9,    Secretary   of 


250    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

War  Baker  told  the  Military  Committee  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  that  there  were  at  that 
time  60,000  Japanese  troops  in  Siberia,  as  against 
8,477  Americans,  1,429  British,  1,400  Italians,  and 
1,076  French.1 

The  situation  again  became  critical  in  January, 
1 9 19.  Notwithstanding  the  agreement  of  Novem- 
ber, when  General  Nakashima,  who  had  been  in 
charge  of  the  Japanese  intelligence  service,  was 
recalled,  the  old  practices  were  renewed.  Semenov 
was  encouraged  and  supported  in  his  opposition  to 
Kolchak  and  the  All-Russian  government.  This 
Cossack  Ataman,  who  had  so  easily  been  corrupted 
by  Nakashima,  openly  boasted  that  he  owed 
allegiance  to  Japan.  He  not  only  refused  to 
recognize  the  authority  of  Kolchak,  but  he  was 
protected  by  the  Japanese.  Time  and  again 
Semenov's  forces  attacked  the  Czecho-Slovak 
troops,  stopping  their  trains  and  looting  them,  and 
killing  some  of  the  soldiers.  The  commander  of  the 
Czecho-Slovaks  vainly  protested  to  the  Japanese 
supreme  command,  and  when  his  forces  undertook 
to  punish  and  disperse  Semenov's  murderous  guer- 
rillas they  were  forcibly  prevented  from  doing 
so  by  the  Japanese,  who  stopped  their  military 
trains.  Japan  was  in  fact  making  war  upon 
the  largest  of  the  Allied  armies  in  Siberia  next  to 
her  own.2 

In  exactly  the  same  way  Japan  corrupted  and 
used  another  Cossack  Ataman,  the  notorious  Kal- 
mikov.     This  bloodthirsty  guerrilla  warrior  and  his 

1  New  York  Times,  September  16,  1919. 

2  See  Ackerman,  op.  cit.,  pp.  244-245;  Barrows,  op.  cit.,  p.  930. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  251 

men  fought  against  the  Bolsheviki,  it  is  true,  but 
they  fought  against  anti-Bolsheviki  also.  They 
robbed  and  terrorized  the  Siberian  villages  in  such 
a  shameful  manner  that  the  people  would  have 
welcomed  the  Bolsheviki  in  preference  to  these 
anti-Bolsheviki.  Like  Semenov,  Kalmikov  refused 
to  acknowledge  the  Omsk  government  and  was 
supported  in  this  by  Japan.  He  it  was  who 
executed  without  trial  the  Swedish  representatives 
of  the  Red  Cross.  He  it  was  who  ordered  Ameri- 
can soldiers  to  be  flogged,  and  who  stole  the  sup- 
plies of  our  American  Red  Cross.1  Says  Lieut. -Col. 
David  P.  Barrows: 

Kalmikov  subjected  Habarovsk  and  a  portion  of  the  Primorsk 
province  to  irresponsible  military  rule,  both  ferocious  and 
repellent.  He  executed  without  trial  a  large  number  of 
reputed  enemies,  including  Swedish  citizens,  representatives 
of  the  Swedish  Red  Cross,  who,  whatever  their  crimes,  were 
denied  trial.  He  firmly  aroused  the  indignant  protest  of  the 
American  commander  by  ruthlessly  shooting  a  number  of 
prisoners  within  sight  of  the  American  quarters.  He  finally 
rose  to  such  a  height  of  insubordination  that  he  defied  the 
Siberian  government  at  Omsk,  the  authority  of  the  Minister 
of  War,  who  had  come  to  Vladivostok  with  the  mission  of  end- 
ing local  military  dissensions,  and  during  all  this  indefensible 
activity  he  had  the  encouragement  and  financial  support  of 
Japan.  At  the  Ussurisk  Cossack  "Krug"  in  the  month  of 
November,  1918,  Kalmikov  unblushingly  announced  that  he 
owed  allegiance  to  no  superior,  and  gratitude  to  no  ally  except 
Japan,  who  he  admitted  had  paid  his  men,  furnished  his  arms 
and  equipment,  and  had  supported  him  in  his  stand.  The 
American  commander,  in  an  incident  which  arose  out  of  the 
mutiny  of  some   five   hundred   of  Kalmikov's   Cossacks,  who 

1  The  San  Francisco  Examiner,  October  10,  IQIQ,  published  an 
account  of  this  by  I  .  J.  hchnouds,  director  <>f  civilian  relief  for  tin' 
eastern  part  of  Siberia. 


252    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

fled  to  American  quarters  for  the  protection  of  their  lives, 
stood  on  impregnable  ground  when  he  refused  to  return  these 
mutineers  to  a  leader  whose  severities  had  disgraced  the  anti- 
Bolshevik  and  Allied  cause.1 


VII 

Infamous  as  the  military  policy  of  the  Japanese 
was  throughout,  their  economic  policy  was  even 
more  discreditable.  No  great  nation  ever  de- 
scended to  lower  depths  of  dishonor  than  did 
Japan  in  Siberia.  Throughout  the  summer  of  1918 
there  were  alarming  rumors  that  Japan  was  secretly 
negotiating  with  Germany,  and  that  an  agreement 
had  been  reached  under  the  terms  of  which  Japan 
was  to  be  given  control  of  Siberia  from  Lake 
Baikal  to  the  Pacific.  This  was  denied  by  the 
Japanese,  of  course,  and  the  denial  may  have  been 
made  in  good  faith.2  It  is  certain  that  in  191 8 
German  diplomacy  was  making  a  strong  effort  to 
conclude  some  such  agreement  with  Japan,  and 
certainly  the  actions  of  the  Japanese  in  Manchuria 
and  Siberia  were  such  as  to  create  a  general  belief 
that  the  German  effort  was  successful.  It  may 
be  that  Tokio  did  not  listen  seriously  to  such  pro- 
posals from  Berlin,  but  it  is  certain  that  if  Germany 
had  won  the  war,  no  power  in  the  world  could  have 
forced  Japan  to  relinquish  eastern  Siberia.  Nearly 
every  foreign  journalist  in  Japan  commented  upon 

1  Barrows,  op.  cil.,  p.  930.     See  also  Ackerman,  op.  cit.,  pp.  239-240. 

-It  is  a  fact,  however,  that  during  the  secret  negotiations  with 
Russia,  in  1916,  Japan  was  suspected,  by  more  than  one  member  of 
the  Russian  Cabinet,  of  having  already  reached  an  understanding 
with  Germany. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  253 

the  fact  that  the  catastrophic  collapse  of  Germany 
stunned  the  leaders  of  the  military  party  in  Japan. 
This  judgment  gives  Japan  the  benefit  of  the 
doubt.  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  the 
volume  of  evidence  against  her  is  very  considerable. 
In  April,  1919,  the  Chinese  delegation  to  the  Peace 
Conference  made  public  an  official  despatch  from 
Peking  referring  to  a  secret  treaty  alleged  to  have 
been  concluded  between  Germany  and  Japan  in 
which  arrangements  for  upholding  the  latter's 
designs  in  China  were  made.  This  was  the  alleged 
secret  German-Japanese  treaty  concerning  which 
Senator  Lodge  made  inquiries  in  the  United  States 
Senate  on  July  8,  1919.  Prior  to  this  action  by 
Senator  Lodge,  the  Russian  Bolshevist  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  Tchicherine,  gave  out  an  inter- 
view positively  asserting  that  such  a  treaty  had 
been  secretly  concluded  between  the  two  powers 
in  question.  Later,  on  June  20,  1919,  the  Soviet 
government  of  Russia  published  an  account  of  this 
alleged  treaty,  but  not  the  text,  stating  positively 
that  it  was  negotiated  at  Stockholm  in  October, 
1918,  by  German  Ambassador  Lucius  and  Mr. 
Oda,  the  plenipotentiary  of  Japan.  According  to 
the  statement,  the  German  Revolution  upset  these 
arrangements.1  In  October,  1919,  //  Tempo,  of 
Rome,  recognized  as  the  mouthpiece  of  Signor 
Nitti,  published  what  purported  to  be  the  full  text 
of  the  German-Japanese  treaty,  stating,  however, 
that  it  was  negotiated  "early  in  1918."2  Accord- 
ing to  the  Italian  journal,  under  the  pretext  of  help- 

1  See  the  Unite!  Press  despatch,  Appendix  I. 
1  See  Nrzv  York  Tribune,  October  27,  1 9 19. 


254    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

ing  Russia,  the  two  contracting  powers  agreed 
upon  a  virtual  division  of  that  country  into  two 
vast  "spheres  of  influence."  Germany  was  to 
have  the  support  of  Japan  in  establishing  her 
paramountcy  over  European  Russia  and  western 
and  central  Siberia,  while  Japan  was  to  be  given 
military  and  naval  support  in  establishing  her 
paramountcy  in  eastern  Siberia  and  in  China. 
Germany  specifically  undertook  to  give  military 
and  naval  assistance,  if  required,  against  England 
and  America,  separately  or  together.  The  usually 
well-informed  French  weekly,  VEurope  Nouvelle, 
commenting  upon  the  disclosures  by  the  Italian 
journal,  confirmed  them,  and  added  on  its  own 
account  that  the  treaty  was  actually  concluded  at 
Stockholm  and  had  the  support  of  the  extreme 
monarchical  element  in  Russia.  The  reader  can 
form  his  own  conclusion. 

The  Japanese  systematically  used  their  military 
position  in  Siberia  to  build  up  Japanese  commerce 
at  the  expense  of  Russia  and  the  Allies  and  America. 
There  is  ample  evidence  of  this,  and  the  Japanese, 
who  are  so  ready  to  defend  themselves,  have  made 
no  serious  attempts  to  deny  it.  The  military 
trains,  supposed  to  be  used  exclusively  for  and  by 
the  joint  expedition,  were  very  largely  used  to 
transport  Japanese  merchandise  into  Siberia.  This 
merchandise  was  literally  smuggled  in  with  the  con- 
nivance of  the  Japanese  authorities.  It  was  a 
common  occurrence  for  train-loads  of  commercial 
wares  from  Japan  to  be  sent  from  Vladivostok, 
marked  as  military  stores,  at  the  time  when  the 
armies  of  the  joint  expeditionary  forces  were  de- 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  255 

prived  of  necessary  supplies  on  account  of  lack  of 
transportation.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barrows  gives 
the  following  account: 

The  peculiar  military  position  occupied  by  the  Japanese 
troops  in  Manchuria,  Mongolia,  and  the  Trans-Baikal  also 
enabled  the  Japanese  to  carry  out  commercial  enterprises 
little  creditable  to  Japanese  policy  or  common  honesty. 
Japanese  merchants,  with  the  connivance  of  military  authori- 
ties, carried  on  large  importations  of  their  wares  over  the  rail- 
roads of  Manchuria  and  Trans-Baikal  in  military  trains. 
These  wares  paid  no  freight,  unless  it  was  to  Japanese  military 
authorities.  The  transportation  system  of  the  Siberian  rail- 
roads had  almost  completely  broken  down.  Russian  merchants 
were  able  to  move  goods  only  by  the  payment  of  extraordinary 
bribes.  Under  these  circumstances  to  employ  rolling-stock, 
commandeered  for  military  use,  for  importing  private  goods 
was  an  act  of  gross  partiality  and  an  abuse  of  Russian  rights. 
These  goods  were  sent  in  sealed  cars  which  Russian  authorities 
were  not  permitted  to  examine;  they  paid  no  duties  to  Chinese 
customs  nor  to  Russian.  The  stores  which  sold  these  articles 
at  such  Russian  cities  as  Tchita  paid  no  licenses  to  the  local 
Russian  administration.  The  extent  of  this  illicit  trade  can 
never  be  determined  but  by  a  revelation  of  the  Japanese 
themselves.  In  December,  1918,  the  writer  was  sent  to 
Tchita  with  the  duty  of  investigating  this  condition,  and  the 
Japanese  commander  at  this  point  admitted  to  the  writer 
that  these  importations  amounted  to  ten  million  yen.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  the  Russian  population  of  Trans-Baikal 
needed  these  goods  and  welcomed  the  opportunity  to  secure 
them.  Their  need  might  have  justified  their  introduction  by 
military  transport,  but  nothing  can  justify  the  secrecy  and 
dissimulation  employed,  the  evasion  of  custom  duties,  and 
the  failure  to  conduct  this  traffic  aboveboard. 

Japan's  methods  in  Siberia  during  this  period 
were  very  similar  to  those  adopted  by  her  in  China. 
There  was  the  same  system  of  organized  smuggling 


256    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

in  the  interests  of  Japanese  traders,  government  and 
traders  co-operating  in  defrauding  a  friendly  but 
weak  nation.  There  was  the  same  unscrupulous 
use  of  the  railway  control  to  give  preference  to 
Japanese  traders.  In  China  it  soon  became  evident 
that  Japanese  control  of  the  railways  meant  that 
there  were  no  freight-cars  available  for  foreign  mer- 
chants, but  always  cars  enough  to  ship  Japanese 
goods  without  delay.  In  Siberia  there  were  not 
cars  enough  available  for  military  purposes,  and 
none  for  the  commercial  needs  of  the  Russians — 
the  great  Siberian  co-operatives,  for  example — but 
there  were  always  cars  enough  for  Japanese  mer- 
chants. The  following  paragraph  from  the  con- 
fidential report  of  one  of  the  Allied  governments, 
previously  referred  to,  is  worthy  of  note  in  this 
connection: 

The  military  arrogance  of  the  Japanese  in  north  Manchuria 
and  Siberia  was  brought  somewhat  to  a  standstill,  however,  by 
the  signing  of  the  armistice.  The  advance  of  their  troops  was 
for  the  moment  halted.  Not  so  their  commercial  advance. 
During  the  period  following  the  armistice  and  until  the  taking 
over  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  and  Trans-Siberian  Railways 
by  the  Inter-allied  Commission,  the  Japanese  government 
freely  employed  its  troops  to  further  shipments  of  Japanese 
goods  in  Siberia,  while  the  shipment  of  goods  of  other  nationali- 
ties was  absolutely  prohibited.  The  Japanese  government 
deliberately  passed  trains  of  commercial  merchandise  through 
Manchuria  and  into  Siberia  under  the  guise  of  military  equip- 
ment for  the  troops,  at  a  time  when  it  was  impossible  for  a 
merchant  of  any  other  nationality  to  secure  even  a  car.  I 
know  of  one  instance  when  a  wreck  of  a  Japanese  military 
train  piled  up  seven  cars  contining  goods  only  for  commercial 
purposes,  and  an  investigation  disclosed  that  twenty-one  cars, 
out  of  a  total  of  twenty-nine,  were  filled  with  similar  wares. 


JAPAN  AND  SIBERIA  257 

The  practices  complained  of  in  this  report  were 
quite  general  and  continued  throughout  1919. 
The  consular  agents  of  the  Allied  governments 
have  reported  numerous  cases  of  the  kind,  though 
for  obvious  reasons  the  reports  have  not  been  pub- 
lished. The  following  is  from  such  a  report,  dated 
June  4,  19 1 9,  the  name  of  the  informant  being 
omitted: 

A  large  department  store  has  been  opened  recently  at 
Verkhne  Udinnk  by  a  certain  Gdali  Matusovich  Itzkovich,  a 

Russian  citizen.     The  latter  has  informed  Mr.  that  he 

has  a  capital  of  #8,000,000.     Stock  to  the  value  of  perhaps 

#50,000  has  been  laid  in,  and  the  merchant  informed  Mr. 

that  it  was  composed  of  Japanese  merchandise  that  had  been 

shipped  in  Japanese  military  and  Red  Cross  trains.     Mr. 

stated  that  he  had  inspected  the  original  packages  and  that 
these  supported  the  above  statement. 

It  was  natural  that  Japanese  trade  with  Siberia 
should  grow  rapidly  during  the  war.  According 
to  the  reports  of  various  foreign  consular  agencies, 
Japanese  syndicates  acquired  many  mines,  flour- 
mills,  sawmills,  brickworks,  and  other  industrial 
establishments  in  the  Maritime  Province  and  in 
Trans-Baikalia,  while  numerous  Japanese  firms 
established  at  Vladivostok  had  their  agents  scour- 
ing the  country  for  scrap-iron,  hides,  wool,  bristles, 
soy  beans,  and  other  Siberian  products.1  On  the 
other  hand,  Japanese  products  were  sold  and  used 
in  Siberia  as  never  before.  In  so  far  as  this  progress 
was  the  result  of  legitimate  business  methods, 
there    could    be    no   objection   to    it.     No   sensible 

1  Sec,  r.c.  Weekly  Bulletin,  Canadian  Department  of  Trade  and 
Commerce,  October  :S',  1918. 


258    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

person  wants  to  see  Japan  denied  a  fair  chance  to 
participate  in  Russia's  trade.  Indeed,  the  develop- 
ment of  legitimate  trade  between  Russia  and  Japan 
would  be  advantageous  to  both  countries  and  con- 
ducive to  peace.  The  methods  described  in  the 
preceding  pages  are  not  the  methods  of  legitimate 
business,  however,  but  commercial  brigandage  of  a 
very  odious  character. 

The  common  people  of  Japan  regard  with  partic- 
ular contempt  the  kaji-dorobo — that  is,  the  thief 
who  takes  advantage  of  a  fire,  while  the  police 
are  busy,  to  ply  his  nefarious  trade  of  robbery. 
The  record  outlined  in  the  foregoing  pages  war- 
rants the  application  of  the  term  kaji-dorobo  to 
Japan.  Korea,  China,  and  Siberia  have  been  the 
victims  of  her  unscrupulous  and  brutal  aggression. 
The  Prussia  of  the  East  is  not  less  to  be  feared 
than  her  western  prototype;  her  passion  for 
aggrandizement  is  no  less  of  a  menace  to  peaceful 
and  freedom-loving  peoples.  A  union  of  the  two 
Prussias  would  be  a  serious  setback  to  civilization. 
The  imperialistic  scheme  of  a  political  and  economic 
union  of  these  two  great  military  powers,  using 
Russia  as  a  bridge  to  link  Berlin  to  Tokio,  is  more 
dangerous  than  the  old  menace  of  an  empire 
stretching  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf, 
just  as  Pan-Asianism  is  more  dangerous  than  Pan- 
Germanism. 


VI 

Russia's  needs  and  resources 


ADDRESSING  the  British-Russian  Club  in 
>  London  on  July  21,  1919,  the  Right  Hon. 
Winston  Churchill  spoke  of  Russia  in  terms  which 
ought  to  be  graven  upon  the  mind  of  every  Ameri- 
can. Declaring  that  if  the  five  great  Allied  and 
Associated  Nations  had  been  able  to  unite  upon 
a  strong  disinterested  policy  from  the  beginning 
Russia's  problem  would  have  been  solved,  the 
British  statesman  said:  "Russia,  my  lords  and 
gentlemen,  is  the  decisive  factor  in  the  history  of 
the  world  at  the  present  time.  .  .  .  Russia,  like 
all  great  nations,  is  indestructible.  Either  she 
must  continue  to  suffer,  and  her  sufferings  will  dis- 
turb and  convulse  the  whole  world,  or  she  must  be 
rescued.  .  .  .  The  League  of  Nations  is  on  trial  in 
regard  to  Russia.  If  the  League  of  Nations  can- 
not save  Russia,  Russia,  in  her  agony,  will  destroy 
the  League  of  Nations.  .  .  .  You  may  abandon 
Russia,  but  Russia  will  not  abandon  you.  .  .  . 
You  cannot  remake  the  world  without  Russia. 
You  cannot  go  on  into  victory  and  prosperity  and 
peace  and  leave  that  vast  portion  of  the  human 
race  suffering  torture  in  the  night  of  barbarism." 


26o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

In  considering  the  Russian  problem  and  its  rela- 
tion to  the  restoration  of  Europe  it  is  necessary 
to  bear  in  mind  that  Russia  is  neither  a  pauper 
nor  a  bankrupt  nation.  Millions  of  her  people 
are  in  a  state  of  semi-starvation;  they  lack  food, 
fuel,  and  clothing.  Babies  and  little  children  are 
dying  of  actual  starvation.  Notwithstanding  these 
things,  Russia  is  a  land  of  plenty.  She  is  not  a 
pauper  begging  alms  or  bread.  Rather,  she  is  the 
victim  of  a  terrible  assault;  she  is  like  a  strong 
man  chained  and  unable  to  reach  and  take  the 
bread  at  his  side  which  was  made  by  his  own  hands. 
Russia  needs  only  to  be  unchained  to  feed  herself; 
nay,  more,  when  she  is  unchained  she  will  provide 
food  for  other  nations.  It  is  true,  of  course,  that  as 
a  temporary  measure  there  must  be  some  relief 
in  famine-stricken  districts.  This  need  will  be 
quickly  met  and  Russia,  liberated  from  the  new 
serfdom  which  came  upon  her  stealthily,  disguised 
as  the  long-awaited  freedom,  will  become  self- 
supporting  and  strong. 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Nations  who  waged 
war  against  the  arrogant  Prussian  and  his  minions 
are  deeply  indebted  to  Russia.  But  for  her 
sacrifices  the  Prussian  jackboot  would  have  tram- 
pled the  freedom  and  self-government  of  those 
nations  beneath  its  heavy  heel.  We  may  forget 
in  the  storm  and  stress  of  these  bitter  and  anxious 
days,  but  the  historian  will  remember  and  record 
that  the  onrush  of  the  great  Russian  armies  saved 
Paris  and  made  possible  the  memorable  and  decisive 
victory  at  the  Marne.  It  is  no  pauper  mendicant  we 
are  asked  to  relieve,  but  a  comrade  in  arms  whose 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     261 

valor  and  might  saved  us  in  a  time  of  peril.  Rus- 
sian casualties  in  the  war — not  including  prisoners 
— amounted  to  over  8,000,000,  and  of  that  number 
more  than  3,000,000  were  killed  or  died  of  their 
wounds.1  Badly  armed  and  equipped,  lacking 
the  economic  strength  of  older  civilizations,  Russia 
saved  the  Allied  cause  again  and  again.  She  held 
a  large  part  of  the  Teutonic  forces  when  the  battle- 
lines  at  the  Marne  were  strained  to  the  uttermost 
and  when  the  thin  line  at  Ypres  had  otherwise  been 
smashed.  She  held  in  combat  a  great  part  of  the 
German  and  Austrian  forces  while  France  held 
Verdun.  But  for  the  Russian  struggle  in  the  east 
the  Prussian  would  have  conquered  in  the  west. 
To  relieve  the  hunger  and  misery  of  those  of  her 
people  who  by  reason  of  the  breakdown  of  her 
transportation  system  are  famine-stricken  is  a 
small  return  for  service  and  sacrifice  so  great. 

The  great  problem  to  be  faced  in  Russia  is  the 
restoration  of  her  economic  life:  industrial  and 
agricultural  production  must  be  regenerated  and 
trade  with  other  nations  resumed.  This  involves — - 
in  addition  to  emergency  relief  measures — -the 
following  program:  (a)  reorganization  of  the  entire 
transportation    system;      (/;)    extensive    industrial 

1  No  absolutely  accurate  figures  are  yet  available.  General  March, 
of  the  United  States  army,  prepared  a  statement  of  the  comparative 
losses  in  the  Allied  armies,  which  gave  1,700,000  as  the  number  of 
Russia's  death-roll.  This  estimate  was  admittedly  based  partially 
on  despatches  and  correspondence  of  the  Associated  Press.  1  he 
estimate  is  certainly  far  too  low.  A  pamphlet  issued  by  the  Committee 
on  Public  Information,  entitled  .-/  Tribute  to  the  Allies,  gave  the  number 
of  Russian  soldiers  killed  and  dead  from  wounds  as  3,000,000.  This 
estimate  corresponds  to  the  estimates  made  by  the  most  competent 
Russian  military  authorities. 

IS 


262    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

development;  (c)  systematic  promotion  of  agri- 
cultural production;  (d)  rehabilitation  of  the 
currency  system;  (e)  expert  technical  assistance 
in  organizing  public  health  services,  transportation, 
agriculture,  and  industry;  (/)  development  of 
foreign  commerce. 

It  is  quite  evident  that  this  program  can  be 
carried  out  only  if  arrangements  be  made  to 
extend  extraordinary  credit  to  Russia.  For  some 
time  Russia's  trade  with  the  outside  world  must 
be  done  largely  on  a  credit  basis.  The  initial 
period  of  her  regeneration  involves  conditions  so 
abnormal  that  ordinary  business  standards  cannot 
be  applied  to  it.  Russia  is  in  the  position  of  an 
embarrassed  but  perfectly  solvent  debtor  whose 
assets  are  sound  and  ample,  but  who  must  be  given 
an  extension  of  credit  or  fall  and  in  falling  drag 
down  the  creditor.  Russia's  resources  are  so 
immense  that  there  can  be  no  question  of  the 
security  of  any  loans  or  credits  which  may  be 
necessary.  It  is  obvious,  however,  that  the  restora- 
tion of  production  and  transportation  must  precede 
exportation  upon  a  scale  large  enough  to  approxi- 
mate her  imports.  For  some  time  to  come,  there- 
fore, she  must  receive  imports  enormously  in  excess 
of  her  exports.  It  is  a  very  simple  problem:  her 
present  stocks  of  exportable  raw  materials,  such 
as  hides,  lumber,  bristles,  and  flax,  while  quite 
large1  judged  by  ordinary  standards,  are  relatively 


1  In  August,  1919,  the  Soviet  government  in  Moscow  instructed  its 
bureau  in  New  York  City  to  offer  upon  the  market  a  great  quantity 
of  raw  materials  ready  for  immediate  shipment  from  Russia.  The 
communication  stated,  "We  have  here,  ready  for  shipment,  432  mill- 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     263 

small  as  compared  with  the  imports  needed.  Given 
the  credit  necessary  to  cover  this  adverse  balance, 
Russia  can  and  will  soon  pay  with  exports  which 
her  creditors  need. 

It  is  very  doubtful  whether  this  problem  of 
furnishing  Russia  with  the  necessary  credit  can 
be  fully  solved  by  the  ordinary  agencies  of  com- 
mercial enterprise.  To  solve  it  will  require,  in  all 
probability,  close  and  scientific  co-operation  of 
governmental  and  commercial  enterprise.  In  other 
words,  all  that  ordinary  capitalist  agencies  can  do 
will  probably  have  to  be  supplemented  by  exten- 
sive state  loans.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  prob- 
lem should  be  considered  as  an  inevitable  element 
of  the  business  of  bringing  the  war  to  a  successful 
termination.  In  this  connection  it  should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  a  very  considerable  part  of  the  credit 
necessary  is  for  machinery  and  goods  to  be  supplied 
to  the  Russian  government  and  to  the  municipali- 
ties. Take,  for  example,  the  reconstruction  of  the 
railways;  the  greater  part  of  these  are  owned  by 
the  Russian  government.  It  would  seem  to  be  a 
very  proper  and  safe  procedure  for  the  United 
States  of  America  to  advance  a  very  considerable 
loan  to  Russia  for  this  purpose,  just  as  we  advanced 
loans  to  various  nations  during  the  war. 

A  very  large  amount  of  machinery  and  goods  is 

ion  pounds  of  flax,  216  million  pounds  of  hemp,  and  a  great  amount 
of  furs,  bristles,  hides,  platinum,  and  unlimited  amounts  of  lumber." 
Instructions  were  given  to  purchase  goods  valued  at  300  millions  of 
dollars.  These  included  railway  material  and  equipment,  agricultural 
implements  and  tractors,  machinery  and  machine  tools,  boots  and 
shoes,  textiles,  paper,  cotton,  and  foodstuffs.  Cf.  Soviet  Russia, 
August  16,  1919. 


264    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

needed  by  the  municipalities  of  Russia  for  street 
railways,  public  lighting,  waterworks,  the  develop- 
ment of  local  transportation  by  land  and  water, 
and  other  vitally  important  public  services.  This 
involves  a  large  amount  of  credit  for  which  bonds 
of  the  municipalities  will  be  given  as  securities. 
It  ought  not  to  be  difficult  to  devise  some  method 
whereby  these  securities  should  be  insured  by  the 
United  States,  so  that  their  purchase  by  numerous 
small  investors  in  this  country  would  be  facilitated. 
Indeed,  governmental  insurance  might  well  be 
extended  much  farther  than  this.  The  British 
government  has  already  provided  means  whereby 
its  merchants  and  manufacturers  in  trading  with 
south  Russia  can  insure  themselves  against  risk 
of  loss  due  to  the  abnormal  political  and  social 
conditions.  The  American  government  ought  to 
adopt  special  measures  to  cover  the  extraordinary 
conditions  of  the  moment  and  to  enable  American 
manufacturers  and  merchants  to  proceed  with 
confidence  to  the  development  of  trade  with 
Russia  to  the  limit  of  our  capacity  and  resources. 
The  present  economic  situation  in  Russia  is  in 
many  respects  analogous  to  that  which  obtained 
in  the  United  States  after  the  Civil  War.  The 
rapid  development  of  the  United  States  was  due 
to  four  principal  factors.  The  first  was  the  youth 
of  the  country;  it  was  energetic  and  eager  for  work. 
The  second  was  the  abundance  and  variety  of  its 
natural  resources.  The  third  was  the  general 
acceptance  of  the  democratic  principle  of  equal 
right  and  opportunity.  The  fourch  was  the  large 
amount  of  foreign  capital  which  flowed  into  the 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     265 

country  after  the  Civil  War,  making  possible  the 
development  of  its  natural  resources. 

Russia,  too,  has  the  energy  and  capacity  of  youth. 
The  giant  whose  name  is  Russia  cannot  be  crushed 
or  permanently  held  down.  No  one  will  dispute 
the  statement  that  the  Russian  people  possess 
great  latent  power.  Proof  of  this  is  found  in  the 
fact  that  under  most  unfortunate  and  incompetent 
government  Russia  has  produced  a  wonderful 
culture.  Russia  possesses,  too,  abundant  and  varied 
natural  resources  of  almost  incalculable  value. 
The  human  and  material  resources  are,  therefore, 
available.  Russia  also  possesses  that  spiritual 
force  which  entered  so  largely  into  the  economic 
development  of  the  United  States  after  the  great 
conflict,  namely,  the  passion  for  democracy.  In 
this  connection,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind 
that,  even  under  the  old  regime,  Russia  was  funda- 
mentally democratic  in  the  sense  that  in  no  country 
in  the  world  was  the  passion  for  democracy  more 
generally  diffused  among  the  population,  and  also 
in  the  sense  that  in  their  relations  with  one  another 
the  every-day  life  of  the  people  was  essentially 
democratic.  Of  course,  the  great  struggle  that  has 
gone  on  since  March,  1917,  has  been  essentially  a 
struggle  to  establish  democracy  in  government. 
This  purpose  once  achieved,  Russia  will  undoubt- 
edly make  rapid  progress  in  reconstructing  her 
economic  life. 

No  more  than  the  United  States  was  able  to  do 
it  will  Russia  be  able  to  do  without  a  very  large 
amount  of  foreign  capital.  As  we  have  already 
seen,  in  the  thirty  or  forty  years  prior  to  the  war, 


266    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

English,  French,  German,  Belgian,  and  Swedish 
capital  was  largely  instrumental  in  building  up 
Russian  industry.  We  cannot  expect  that  a  great 
deal  of  capital  from  any  of  these  countries  will  be 
invested  in  Russian  industries  in  the  immediate 
future.  England,  France,  and  Belgium,  in  partic- 
ular, will  need  nearly  all  their  capital  at  home.  Ger- 
many, indeed,  will  struggle  to  possess  and  control 
Russia's  industries.  The  same  is  true  of  Japan.  In 
order  to  develop  her  industries  and  at  the  same 
time  avoid  falling  under  the  domination  of  either  or 
both  of  the  two  countries  most  dangerous  to  her, 
Russia  must  turn  to  the  United  States,  which, 
during  the  war,  has  developed  from  being  a  debtor 
nation  to  a  creditor  nation.  It  will  be  of  the 
greatest  benefit  to  both  countries  for  American 
capital  to  take  the  same  part  in  Russia's  industrial 
development  as  foreign  capital  once  took  in  the 
industrial  development  of  this  country.  American 
financial  interests  must  prepare  for  financing  Rus- 
sia's industries  and  American  trade  interests  must 
prepare  for  a  very  great  trade  with  Russia. 

II 

In  her  soil,  her  natural  resources,  and  her  man- 
power Russia  is  the  richest  country  in  the  world, 
the  one  which  offers  the  greatest  possibilities  for 
foreign  trade.  England,  France,  Germany,  and 
Japan  are  well  aware  of  these  possibilities.  America 
alone  seems  in  danger  of  not  recognizing  them. 
Before  the  war  America  supplied  only  an  insignif- 
icant part  of  the  $700,000,000  worth  of  Russian 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     267 

imports.  In  191 3  exports  direct  from  the  United 
States  to  Russia  totaled  $25,000,000,  and  in  1914 
$30,000,000.  These  figures,  however,  do  not  rep- 
resent the  real  total  imports  of  American  products 
in  Russia.  A  considerable  amount  of  American 
produce  entered  Russia  through  English  and  Ger- 
man intermediaries.  In  this  way  the  English  and 
German  middlemen  managed  to  secure  a  large 
share  of  the  profits  of  the  scanty  Russian-American 
trade.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of  cotton,  Ameri- 
can statistics  show  the  exportation  of  84,941  bales 
to  Russia,  but  Russian  statistics  for  the  same  year 
show  an  importation  of  568,500  bales  of  American 
cotton.  The  difference  of  483,599  bales  reached 
Russia  through  English  and  German  intermediaries. 
Even  in  such  products  as  agricultural  machinery, 
in  which  the  United  States  pre-eminently  excels, 
we  have  had  only  a  very  small  part  of  Russia's 
trade,  as  the  following  figures  show: 


Year 

1910 
191 1 
1912 

Total  Value  of 

Agricultural  Machinery 

Imported  into  Russia 

#19,5  50,000 
27,000,000 
25,600,000 

Value  of  Agricultural 

Machinery  Imported  into 

Russia  from  U.  S.  A. 

$5,191,904 

7.S67.035 

5,826,000 

During  the  war  American  exports  to  Russia 
naturally  increased  enormously.  In  1917  we  ex- 
ported to  European  Russia  alone  goods  worth 
$397,598,911.  This  included  not  merely  war  ma- 
terials, but  large  quantities  of  agricultural  imple- 
ments, machinery  and  leather,  automobiles,  type- 


268      RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

writers,  cotton,  cordage,  and  locomotives.  Just 
as  we  were  beginning  to  develop  the  possibilities 
of  this  vast  market  the  blockade  intervened.  For 
the  eleven  months  ending  May  31,  1918,  our 
exports  to  European  Russia  had  fallen  to  $1 16,705,- 
345,  and  by  May  1,  1919,  to  #7,000,000.  At  the 
same  time  our  trade  with  Asiatic  Russia  fell  off 
in  about  the  same  way.  The  increase  of  our 
exports  to  European  Russia  from  $25,000,000  in 
191 3  to  nearly  $400,000,000  in  1917  showed  us 
very  clearly  the  very  great  possibilities  of  trade 
with   Russia.1 

New  Russia  must  construct  an  average  of  10,000 
kilometers  of  new  railroad  each  year  for  a  decade 
at  least.  According  to  the  Torgova-Promyshlennaya 
Gatettey  official  organ  of  the  Russian  Ministry  of 
Finance,  this  program  will  require  more  than  twice 
the  amount  of  steel  rails  and  other  metal  products 
which  Russia  was  able  to  produce  in  April,  1916. 
Since  that  time  the  immediate  productive  capacity 
has  greatly  fallen  off.  In  addition  to  this  impera- 
tive need  for  new  construction  practically  the 
entire  trackage  has  to  be  replaced.  Of  all  the 
46,600-odd  miles  of  railway  there  is  hardly  a  mile 
which  does  not  need  overhauling.  The  whole  sys- 
tem has  fallen  into  a  state  of  dilapidation  as  a 
result  of  the  war  and  the  revolutionary  struggle. 
To  replace  the  outworn  rails  of  the  existing  system, 
without  taking  new  construction  into  account  at 
all,  would  require  a  very  considerable  augmentation 
of  the  productive  capacity  of  1916. 

Of  course,  this  points  to  the  necessity  of  such  an 

1  Julius  B.  Fox,  Nezv  York  Commercial,  September,  1919. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND   RESOURCES     269 

augmentation.  There  must  inevitably  be  a  very 
great  immediate  development  of  the  iron  and  steel 
industry  of  Russia.  To  import  all  the  iron  and 
steel  products  required,  without  materially  increas- 
ing her  own  production  of  them,  would  spell  eco- 
nomic ruin  for  Russia.  Any  great  development  of 
her  railway  system,  therefore,  of  necessity  involves 
a  parallel  development  of  her  iron  and  steel  industry. 
Certainly  there  must  for  a  time  be  an  enormous 
importation  of  steel  rails  and  other  products  of 
iron  and  steel  used  in  railroad  construction,  includ- 
ing materials  for  building  bridges.  At  the  same 
time,  to  develop  the  iron  and  steel  industry  it  will 
be  necessary  to  import  an  enormous  amount  of 
machinery  for  blast-furnaces,  rolling-mills,  foun- 
dries, and  so  on. 

This  is  only  part  of  the  minimum  program 
imperatively  necessary  for  Russia's  economic  re- 
habilitation, but  it  involves  an  outlay  which  must 
be  estimated  in  billions  of  dollars.  A  billion  dollars 
for  the  immediate  restoration  of  the  existing  system, 
to  renew  rails,  road-beds,  and  rolling-stock,  is  a  very 
conservative  estimate.  New  construction  neces- 
sary during  the  next  decade  will  require  at  least 
four  billion  dollars  more.  To  equip  the  system 
with  the  necessary  rolling-stock  and  keep  it  in 
repair  will  take  not  less  than  three  and  a  half 
billions  more.  This  means  that  in  the  next  ten 
years  Russia  must  spend  upon  her  railways  alone 
between  eight  and  nine  billions  of  dollars,  fully 
half  of  which  will  have  to  be  expended  within  two 
or  three  years. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  enormous 


270    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

expenditures  will  be  partially  offset  by  the  new 
sources  of  income  which  they  will  open  up.  A  sci- 
entific development  of  her  transportation  system, 
co-ordinating  her  railways  and  waterways,  will 
greatly  add  to  Russia's  income  by  making  accessible 
resources  of  almost  incalculable  richness.  How 
vitally  important  to  her  economic  life  such  a 
development  of  her  transportation  may  be  is 
clearly  indicated  by  the  line  of  railway  constructed 
during  the  war  connecting  the  Murman  coast 
with  Petrograd.  The  efforts  of  Germany  to  deprive 
Russia  of  this  line  show  very  plainly  that  this  is 
thoroughly  appreciated  in  Berlin. 

The  Murman  coast — that  is,  the  northern  coast 
of  the  Kola  Peninsula — though  situated  in  the 
polar  circle,  presents  a  striking  contrast  to  the 
other  ports  of  the  Arctic  shores.  The  Kola  Penin- 
sula is  affected  by  the  Gulf  Stream,  which  passes 
by  the  Murman  coast  on  its  way  from  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  to  the  coast  of  Novaya  Zemlya.  The 
moderating  influence  of  the  Gulf  Stream  can  be 
judged  from  the  fact  that  nearly  all  the  Murman 
bays  and  gulfs  are  ice-free.  The  polar  ice-fields 
are  never  carried  to  the  Murman  and  navigation 
is  kept  open  the  year  around  without  any  difficulty. 
In  summer  the  days  are  absolutely  light  during  the 
whole  twenty-four  hours,  wThile  in  the  coast  country 
in  June  the  sun  never  disappears  beyond  the 
horizon.  During  the  period  of  continuous  polar 
night,  from  the  23d  of  November  to  the  9th  of 
January,  there  is  frequently  such  a  brilliant  aurora 
borealis  that  it  is  possible  to  take  photographs 
by  its  light. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES      271 

The  Murman  coast  has  also  this  advantage  in 
comparison  with  the  ports  of  the  Baltic  that  its 
ports  are  nearer  to  England  and  America  than 
Petrograd,  for  example.  The  route  from  England 
to  the  Murman,  particularly  from  northern  and 
western  British  ports,  is  approximately  the  same 
distance  as  that  to  Libau,  and  consequently  shorter 
than  the  route  to  Petrograd.  The  route  from  New 
York  to  the  Murman  is  shorter  by  a  whole  day  than 
the  one  to  Libau.  Aside  from  economy  in  fuel  as 
a  result  of  the  shortening  of  the  trip  when  going 
by  way  of  the  Murman,  the  very  considerable 
pilot  charges  incurred  for  transit  through  the 
Scandinavian  straits  are  saved.  Thus  the  Murman 
is  valuable  not  only  because  of  its  ice-free  harbors, 
but  also  because  these  make  communication  be- 
tween Russia  and  northwestern  Siberia  on  the 
one  hand,  and  England  and  America  on  the  other, 
much  easier  and  cheaper  than  through  the  Baltic 
seaports. 

To  connect  the  Murman  with  the  main  railway 
system  had  been  contemplated  during  many  years. 
The  scheme  was  not  carried  out,  principally  because 
most  of  the  money  available  for  railway  con- 
struction was  spent  in  the  Far  East.  When  the 
war  broke  out,  and  especially  after  Turkey  had 
joined  the  German  coalition,  Russia  found  herself 
completely  shut  off  from  all  her  European  harbors, 
and  the  government  then  decided  to  start  the  con- 
struction of  a  railway  to  connect  the  Russian  rail- 
way system  with  Murman.  There  was  a  private 
railway  line  from  Zvanka  to  Petrozavodsk.  The 
latter  city  was  therefore  chosen  as  a  starting-point 


272    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

for  the  new  railway,  which  ran  through  the  Bay  of 
Soroka-Kem-Kandalaksha-Murman,  ending  at  Ro- 
manov on  the  Murman,  a  new  settlement.  From 
Petrograd  to  Zvanka  is  144  versts,  and  from  there 
to  Petrozavodsk  is  266  versts.  Thence  to  the 
Murman  coast  port,  Romanov,  by  way  of  Soroka 
and  Kandalaksha  is  978  versts,  the  length  of  the 
new  line.  The  distance  between  Petrograd  and 
Romanov  is,  therefore,  1,397  versts.1  The  territory 
through  which  the  railroad  passes  is  for  the  most 
part  desolate  and  sparsely  populated.  It  covers 
an  area  of  about  220,243  square  versts  and  has  a 
population  of  about  179,000. 

The  Murman  line  was  built  very  quickly,  es- 
pecially when  we  take  into  account  the  nature  of 
the  difficulties  which  had  to  be  overcome.  Under 
date  of  October  30,  191 5,  the  correspondent  of  The 
London  Times  wrote  the  following  account  of  this 
enterprise: 

Endless  difficulties  were  encountered.  .  .  .  So,  a  short  time 
after  they  had  begun  to  lay  the  rails,  the  workmen  were  forced 
to  abandon  all  work,  as  they  were  practically  eaten  alive  by 
mosquitoes  and  gnats  which  appeared  like  dense  clouds  and 
gave  no  rest  day  or  night.  In  another  sector  they  struck 
solid  bottom  only  at  the  end  of  June.  Up  to  that  time  there 
stood  water.  In  a  sector  200  versts  long,  half  of  the  road-bed 
rests  in  a  swamp,  from  time  to  time  water  appears,  and  then 
the  road  is  again  shifted.  No  less  great  are  the  difficulties 
caused  by  granite  rocks  and  mountains  of  stone,  with  deeply 
rooted  gigantic  fir-trees.  Conquering  all  these  difficulties, 
up  to  their  knees  in  water  or  in  deep  sand,  through  mire  and 
swamp,  rocks  and  trees,  Russian  engineers  and  laborers  are 
simultaneously,  from  both  ends,  constructing  a  railway  which 
will  at  last  give  Russia  a  free  outlet  to  a  free  sea. 

1 A  vcrst  is  0.663  mile. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     273 

Notwithstanding  all  these  extraordinary  handi- 
caps, the  line  from  Petrozavodsk  to  the  shore  of 
the  Arctic  Ocean,  987  versts  long,  was  completed 
on  November  3,  1916,  having  taken  less  than  eigh- 
teen months.  The  cost  of  construction  amounted 
to  about  180  million  rubles.  Nearly  all  the  work 
was  done  directly  by  the  Russian  government. 
The  last  northern  sector,  120  versts  long,  was 
turned  over  to  a  group  of  English  contractors,  with 
Lord  French  at  the  head.  This  undertaking 
proved  a  failure  and  the  greater  part  of  che  work 
on  this  sector  also  had  to  be  completed  by  the 
Russian  government. 

The  construction  of  the  railway  from  Petrograd 
to  the  Murman  coast  makes  possible  the  coloniza- 
tion and  exploitation  of  a  rich  territory.  Says 
The  Russian  Economist: 

The  colonization  of  this  rich  territory  may  bring  forth  its 
great  natural  wealth.  Economists  who  are  acquainted  with 
the  Murman  point  out,  among  other  things,  its  tremendous 
grass  meadows,  covering  a  colossal  area.  These  could  serve 
as  pastures  for  millions  of  cattle.  According  to  the  calcu- 
lations of  Christianovitch,  this  wealth  of  grass,  used  for  feeding 
cows,  could  annually  produce  butter  worth  one  billion  rubles 
in  gold. 

However,  the  greatest  natural  wealth  of  the  country  lies, 
aside  from  its  immense  deposits  of  mineral  ores,  in  its  water. 
The  streams  and  lakes  abound  in  all  kinds  of  fish.  There  is 
a  wealth  of  shell-fish,  and  the  railroad  opens  up  great  possi- 
bilities for  the  development  of  this  branch  of  fishery. 

Among  the  natural  resources  of  the  territory  may  also  be 
mentioned  its  abundance  of  waterfalls.  Those  on  the  Paz 
River  could  furnish  a  tremendous  amount  of  power. 

The  chief  occupation  <>f  the  inhabitants  is  fishing,  but  the 
entire  local  yield  represents  only  an  insignificant  part  of  the 


274    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

wealth  that  could  be  derived  from  proper  development  of  the 
fishing  industry. 

All  this  wealth  lies  dormant,  and  is  only  waiting  for  men 
of  enterprise  and  for  the  application  of  human  labor.1 

Having  deprived  Russia  of  the  ports  of  the  Black 
Sea  and  the  Baltic,  so  vitally  important  to  her 
economic  life,  Germany  sought  also  to  deprive 
her  of  this  port  on  the  Murman  coast.  After  the 
shameful  Peace  of  Brest-Litovsk  Germany  con- 
tinued to  maintain  very  close  relations  with  the 
Lenin-Trotzky  regime.  It  is  the  almost  universal 
testimony  of  competent  observers,  Russian  and 
foreign,  that  the  German  Ambassador  at  Moscow, 
Count  Mirbach,  exercised  very  great  influence  upon 
Russian  policy,  both  domestic  and  foreign.  It  was 
Mirbach  who  was  primarily  responsible  for  the 
systematic  dismemberment  of  Russia  and  the 
sacrifice  of  her  ports  and  outlets  to  the  sea.  This 
was  the  traditional  German  policy,  of  course. 
Taking  advantage  of  Russia's  weakness,  instigated 
by  Germany  and  supported  by  German  bayonets, 
Finland  laid  claim  to  the  western  strip  of  the  Mur- 
man coast  with  its  outlet  to  the  sea. 

In  May,  1918,  the  Bolshevist  Commissary  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  Tchicherine,  addressed  a  note  to 
the  German  Ambassador,  Count  Mirbach,  saying 
that  his  government  agreed  "to  accept  the  plan 
proposed  by  Germany  to  regulate  the  relations 
with  the  Finnish  government."  Russia  agreed, 
he  said,  to  cede  the  western  strip  of  the  Murman 
coast  in  return  for  Fort  Ino  and  Raivola.  Fortu- 
nately for  Russia,  the  British  prevented  the  carrying 

1  The  Russian  Economist,  July  7,  1919. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES      275 

out  of  this  plan,  which  would  have  robbed  Russia 
of  one  of  its  most  important  assets.  In  June,  191 8, 
an  English  force  landed  at  Port  Romanov  and 
concluded  an  agreement  with  the  local  Bolshevist 
Soviet,  which  was  in  revolt  against  the  policy  of 
the  Bolshevist  government  in  so  far  as  it  related  to 
Finland's  demands.  The  struggle  for  the  Murman 
coast  is  not  yet  ended,  but  the  plan  of  the  Germans 
and  their  Russian  Bolshevist  tools  has  been  frus- 
trated. It  is  quite  clear  that  the  Germans  have 
understood  fully  the  close  dependence  of  Russia's 
future  economic  independence  and  prosperity  upon 
the  development  of  her  transportation  system. 
That  is  the  key  to  the  whole  problem. 

From  this  point  of  view  the  waterways  are  almost 
as  important  as  the  railways.  One  of  the  many 
serious  crimes  of  the  old  regime  was  its  failure  to 
develop  these  waterways  properly.  It  was  indeed 
a  stupid  blunder,  so  much  worse  than  a  crime 
in  government.  Russia  is  probably  more  richly- 
endowed  with  inland  waterways  than  any  other 
great  nation.  Peter  the  Great  perceived  this  fact 
and  its  importance,  but  most  of  his  successors 
were  less  wise.  The  great  systems  of  inland  water- 
ways of  Russia,  as  she  was  constituted  prior  to  the 
Revolution  of  1917,  aggregate  more  than  200,000 
miles.  Careful  development  of  these  upon  scientific 
lines  would  not  only  vastly  increase  the  transporta- 
tion facilities  of  the  country,  but  also  furnish  an 
immense  amount  of  water-power  for  industrial 
purposes. 

Until  a  few  years  before  the  World  War  broke- 
out,  during  at  least  fifty  years  the  Russian  govern- 


276    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

ment  neglected  this  most  important  asset.  Little 
was  done  to  develop  inland  navigation;  indeed, 
existing  canals  were  shamefully  neglected.  We 
have  here  an  illuminating  example  of  the  unlooked- 
for  ways  in  which  government  ownership  of  rail- 
ways may,  unless  great  care  is  exercised  to  prevent 
it,  obstruct  progress.  The  neglect  of  Russia's 
waterways  resulted  directly  from  the  ownership 
of  her  railways  by  the  state.  The  Russian  govern- 
ment was  actually  afraid  that  the  extensive  use 
of  the  rivers  and  canals  would  injure  the  railways 
and  reduce  their  profits.  This  was  a  very  short- 
sighted and  mistaken  view,  of  course,  but  it  was 
characteristically  bureaucratic.  In  point  of  fact, 
every  inland  waterway  inevitably  becomes  a  feeder 
to  the  railroads.  In  the  interest  of  the  railway 
system  as  they  conceived  it,  the  bureaucrats  of  the 
old  regime  dealt  with  the  waterways  of  Russia  in 
the  most  niggardly  fashion.  The  annual  expendi- 
ture upon  the  waterways  of  the  Russian  Empire 
averaged,  in  the  period  1907  to  1917,  ^4,000,000. 
For  the  maintenance  of  the  enormously  valuable 
and  important  inland  waterways  of'  Siberia  the 
annual  expenditure  in  the  same  period  averaged 
about  $25o,ooo.1 

The  war  brought  home  to  Russia  the  great  im- 
portance of  these  inland  waterways  and  the  neces- 
sity of  developing  them.  In  1917  the  Ministry 
of  Ways  and  Communications  presented  a  plan 
for  dealing  with  this  problem.  It  was  proposed  to 
reconstruct  and  repair  existing  waterways  and 
canals  and  to  construct  a  number  of  new  systems 

1  Goldstein,  op.  cit.,  pp.  39-40. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     277 

by  deepening  rivers  and  connecting  them  by  means 
of  canals.  It  was  proposed  to  more  than  double 
the  inland  navigation  facilities.  In  the  first  six 
years,  1918-23  inclusive,  it  was  proposed  to  spend 
on  this  work  about  a  billion  dollars,  and  a  like 
sum  in  the  next  six-year  period.  To  carry  out  this 
program  now  would  require  at  least  twice  this 
expenditure:  Russian  economists  of  to-day  regard 
#4,000,000,000  to  be  spent  on  inland  waterways 
during  the  next  decade  as  the  irreducible  minimum. 
For  carrying  out  such  a  scheme  as  that  proposed 
Russia  would  require  a  very  considerable  amount 
of  machinery. 

Such  a  comprehensive  development  of  inland 
navigation  would  very  profoundly  affect  the  eco- 
nomic life  of  Russia.  By  means  of  canals  it  would 
connect  into  an  organic  whole  the  most  important 
water  systems;  it  would  provide  cheap  transporta- 
tion for  heavy  and  bulky  goods  from  the  interior 
to  the  seaports;  it  would  promote  colonization 
and  the  exploitation  of  districts  rich  in  natural 
resources  now  neglected  by  reason  of  their  isolation; 
it  would  make  possible  the  use  of  the  rivers  and 
waterfalls  for  the  development  of  electric  power 
for  industrial  purposes.1 

in 

Nothing  like  a  scientific  survey  of  Russia's 
industrial  needs  has  yet  been  made,  so  far  as  the 
present  writer  is  informed.  Numerous  Russian 
writers   have   discussed   the   subject,    and   the   con- 

1  Sec  Appendix  F. 


278    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

tributions  of  some  of  them  are  of  very  great  value; 
none  has  succeeded  thus  far  in  making  a  com- 
prehensive scientific  survey  of  the  problem.  Per- 
haps this  cannot  be  done;  the  statistical  data 
available  are  rather  limited,  to  begin  with;  further- 
more, when  we  come  to  deal  with  general  industrial 
development,  the  element  of  speculation  is  too 
large  to  permit  anything  like  an  exact  budget. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  estimates  yet  made 
appeared  in  a  statement  made  in  August,  1919,  by  a 
prominent  Bolshevist  official,  Milyutin,  vice-presi- 
dent of  the  Supreme  Council  of  National  Economy. 
This  statement,  a  translation  of  which  was  pub- 
lished by  a  French  Socialist  organ,  VHumanite, 
was  a  comment  upon  an  official  message  of  the 
Soviet  government  concerning  Russia's  needs  and 
available  resources,  an  argument  for  the  removal 
of  the  blockade  of  Russia  by  the  Allied  governments. 
According  to  Milyutin,  the  most  important  needs 
of  Russia,  even  more  important  than  railway  equip- 
ment, are  industrial  machinery  and  agricultural 
implements  and  machinery.  "Although  the  in- 
dustry of  Soviet  Russia  is  attempting  to  increase 
its  production  of  agricultural  implements  and 
machines,  80  per  cent,  of  the  number  required 
may  still  be  filled  by  importations  from  abroad," 
he  wrote.  Evidently,  therefore,  this  Bolshevist 
official  sees  no  hope  that  Russia  unaided  can  pro- 
duce more  than  20  per  cent,  of  the  agricultural 
machinery  and  implements  required.  Milyutin's 
statement  goes  on  to  say,  "The  government  is  at 
present  concentrating  in  its  hands  three  thousand 
factories  selected  from  among  those  which  are  most 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES      279 

important,  representing,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
production,  90  per  cent,  of  the  industry."  This 
refers,  of  course,  to  the  nationalization  of  the  in- 
dustries by  the  Soviet  government,  and  lends 
especial  significance  to  the  following  admission: 
"These  enterprises  are  in  a  sad  state,  as,  for 
instance,  those  of  the  electrotechnical  branches, 
the  mines,  and  a  number  of  textile  combines,  each 
including  from  five  to  ten  concerns.  The  national 
industry  has  in  its  possession  a  sufficient  quantity 
of  raw  material,  except  in  the  matter  of  cotton. 
As  far  as  the  machinery  is  concerned,  as  well  as 
replacing  detached  parts  and  accessory  materials, 
its  needs,  according  to  the  plan  drawn  up  by  the 
Supreme  Council  of  National  Economy,  would 
amount  to  25  milliards  of  rubles.  The  Russians  also 
feel  a  lack  of  medicaments  and  of  chemical  products 
of  other  kinds,  as  well  as  of  automobile  motors." 

The  estimate  that  machinery  and  implements 
to  the  value  of  25,000,000,000  rubles,  or  twelve 
and  a  half  billions  of  dollars,  are  necessary  to  meet 
Russia's  needs  must  be  considered  in  the  light 
of  the  aim  of  the  Soviet  government.  That  aim  is 
to  provide  for  the  wants  of  the  Russian  people 
themselves,  not  to  develop  Russia  capitalistically. 
The  latter  would  require  a  much  more  extensive 
industrial  development.  Unfortunately,  no  details 
have  been  published  of  the  plan  of  the  Supreme 
Council  of  National  Economy  referred  to  by 
Milyutin,  so  it  is  impossible  to  judge  the  value  of 
the  estimate  that  he  makes.  It  is  significant, 
however,  that  this  responsible  Bolshevist  authority 
should  estimate  that  twelve  and  a  half  billions  of 


28o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

dollars  is  needed  to  provide  the  machinery  for 
industrial  and  agricultural  development,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  enormous  sum  required  for  transporta- 
tion and  for  other  purposes.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  Russia  is  the  world's  greatest  open 
market  for  machinery  and  manufactured  goods. 

The  electrotechnical  industry  of  Russia  is  in  its 
infancy  as  yet.  For  the  purposes  of  this  discussion 
this  industry  may  be  regarded  as  being  divided 
into  two  branches,  namely,  the  production  of 
electrical  energy  and  the  production  of  electrical 
machinery,  apparatus,  and  accessories.  According 
to  a  report  made  by  Prof.  A.  A.  Voronoff,  of  the 
Central  War  Committee  in  Petrograd,  in  January, 
1917,  there  were  in  Russia  in  191 3  about  three 
hundred  central  stations  for  the  distribution  of 
electrical  power  and  over  nine  thousand  special 
stations — that  is,  stations  serving  a  single  indus- 
trial establishment  or  municipality.  The  total 
production  was  about  1,900,000,00x3  kilowatt  hours, 
400,000,000  being  consumed  for  lighting  purposes 
and  1,500,000,000  for  motor  power.  It  is  certain 
that  the  use  of  electric  motor  power  for  industrial 
purposes  was  very  greatly  increased  during  the 
first  three  years  of  the  war,  but,  unfortunately,  there 
are  no  available  statistics  on  the  subject.  Pro- 
fessor Voronoff  is  one  of  the  foremost  authorities 
on  the  subject  in  Russia,  and  his  statement  that 
a  very  large  development  of  the  electrotechnical 
industry  of  Russia  is  inevitable  can  be  accepted 
as  authoritative  and  reliable. 

Before  the  war  this  important  Russian  industry 
was  very  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans, 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES      281 

The  production  and  distribution  of  electric  power 
was  mainly  carried  on  by  German  capitalists. 
Naturally  the  domination  of  the  power  stations  by 
German  capital  resulted  in  the  trade  in  electric 
machinery  and  accessories  being  nearly  a  German 
monopoly.  The  four  principal  manufacturers  of 
electrical  machinery  in  Russia  were  Siemens-Schu- 
kert,  General  Electric  Company,  Siemens  &  Halske, 
and  Duflon,  Konstantinovich  &  Co.  1  hese  com- 
panies made  practically  all  the  generators  and 
transformers  produced  in  Russia,  the  first  two 
companies  named  producing  two-thirds  of  the 
whole.  Of  the  four  companies  named  three  were 
simply  Russian  branches  of  German  concerns,  the 
last  named,  the  Duflon-Konstantinovich  firm,  being 
French. 

These  factories  were  quite  unable  to  meet  the 
demand  for  generators,  transformers,  and  other 
electrical  machinery  even  before  the  war.  It  was 
necessary,  therefore,  for  Russia  to  import  motors 
and  transformers  of  small  capacity  as  well  as 
electrical  materials  in  bulk.  Most  of  this  trade 
went  to  Germany,  of  course.  Thus  in  1912  Russia 
imported  288,500  poods  of  electro  generators, 
motors,  and  transformers.  Of  this  total,  250,000 
poods  were  supplied  by  Germany.  This  does  not 
tell  the  whole  story,  however,  for  practically  all 
the  parts  used  in  the  Russian  factories,  such  as 
insoles,  convertible  plates,  dynamos,  and  so  on,  were 
also  supplied  by  Germany.  Practically  all  the 
measuring  instruments  and  meters  used  in  the 
electrotechnical  industry  of  Russia  were  of  German 
manufacture.     None  was  made  in   Russia,  and  of 


282    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

the  importation  of  such  articles  in  1913,  valued  at 
1,452,000  rubles,  those  supplied  by  Germany 
amounted  to  1,422,000  rubles. 

According  to  the  report  of  Professor  Voronoff, 
from  which  these  figures  are  taken,  of  all  the 
materials,  accessories,  and  fittings  used  for  electric 
installation,  such  as  sockets,  wire-work,  switches, 
and  so  forth,  imported  by  Russia  in  191 3 — valued 
at  6,602,000  rubles — Germany  supplied  93.5  per 
cent.  Very  few  incandescent  lamps  were  produced 
in  Russia,  almost  all  those  used  being  imported. 
In  191 3  the  value  of  such  lamps  imported  was 
4,916,000  rubles,  of  which  German  and  Austrian 
manufacturers  supplied  all  except  about  60,000 
rubles'  worth.  Subsequently  factories  were  estab- 
lished in  Russia  for  the  production  of  these  lamps, 
so  that  there  was  less  dependence  upon  importa- 
tion. The  factories  were  started  by  Germans, 
however,  and  for  all  the  filaments  used  the  industry 
remained  dependent  upon  Germany.  These  figures 
show  very  clearly  that  Professor  VoronofF  was 
justified  when  he  described  the  electrotechnical 
industry  of  Russia  as  being  in  a  state  of  vassalage 
to  Germany. 

A  correspondent  of  a  well-known  Dutch  news- 
paper, the  Algemeen  Handelsblad,  writing  in  the 
summer  of  1919,1  called  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  complete  dependence  of  Russia  upon  Germany 
for  a  number  of  vitally  important  industrial  prod- 

1 A  summary  of  the  article,  forwarded  by  Trade  Commissioner 
Arthur  H.  Redfield,  The  Hague,  Holland,  was  published  in  Commerce 
Reports,  by  the  United  States  Department  of  Commerce,  September 

IS»  1919- 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES      283 

ucts  stimulated  industrial  development  in  the 
early  part  of  the  war.  If  France  or  England  had 
held  Germany's  position  in  Russian  industry  and 
commerce  there  would  not  have  been  the  same 
incentive  to  become  self-sufficient  and  independent. 
The  Revolution  not  only  prevented  the  continua- 
tion of  this  development;  it  destroyed  much  of  the 
gain  made  under  the  stimulus  of  war's  demands. 
We  are  told  by  this  Dutch  observer: 

With  strong  support  on  the  part  of  the  government  a  great 
number  of  new  industrial  enterprises  arose.  A  venture  was 
even  made  to  manufacture  electric  incandescent  bulbs.  The 
capacity  of  the  new  factories  was  by  far  insufficient  to  satisfy 
all  the  requirements  of  Russia,  but  the  foundation  was  laid 
for  many  new  branches  of  industry.  Unsettled  conditions, 
however,  have  crippled  all  industry  since  that  time.  With  the 
rejuvenation  of  Russia  the  national  industry  must  be  revived 
anew. 

It  is  a  noteworthy  fact  that  in  Russia  the  very  branches  of 
industry  which  should  be  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the 
country  are  entirely  neglected.  Russia  possesses  no  large 
factories  for  making  agricultural  machines  and  implements. 
It  must  even  be  confessed  that  no  scythes  are  made  in  Russia. 
The  ordinary  plow  with  one  share  is  made  in  two  factories — 
one  in  Riga  and  one  in  Kharkov.  The  attempt  that  was  made 
by  the  locomotive  works  at  Kharkov  to  manufacture  other 
agricultural  implements  has  proved  a  total  failure,  in  spite 
of  the  large  sums  of  money  that  were  spent.  Year  after  year 
this  branch  of  the  industry  was  worked  with  considerable  loss, 
which  exercised  a  very  detrimental  influence  upon  the  dividends 
of  an  otherwise  profitable  factory. 

For  several  years  there  has  been  a  scarcity  of  agricultural 
machinery,  and  even  of  the  simplest  agricultural  implements, 
in  Russia.  Austria  and  (Jennany  formerly  supplied  each  year 
a  large  number  of  scythes.  Knglish  implements  were  also 
bought,  but  in  spite  of  their  better  quality  they  were  less  in 


284    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

demand,  because  they  could  not  compete  with  the  Austrian 
and  the  German  articles  either  in  price  or  in  terms  of  payment. 
Then  came  the  great  war,  which  affected  the  import  trade 
with  the  adjacent  countries.  This  had  an  immediate  influence 
on  the  price  of  agricultural  tools,  which  rose  rapidly.  Whole- 
salers had  no  stocks,  and  there  was  no  domestic  production. 
Every  one  thought  only  of  war  material  and  war  orders;  no 
one  thought  of  the  production  of  agricultural  implements. 
Even  the  locomotive  works  at  Kharkov  turned  its  plant  for 
making  agricultural  tools,  now  working  at  a  loss,  into  a  prof- 
itable munition-factory.  During  the  Revolution  much  of  the 
equipment  of  the  large  estates  was  destroyed,  so  Russia  now 
faces  a  total  lack  of  farm  implements.  How  great  this  lack 
is  at  present  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  in  the  summer  of 
1918  150  rubles  apiece  was  paid  for  ordinary  scythes,  and  even 
broken  or  blunted  scythes  were  sold  for  75  to  90  rubles  apiece. 


IV 

Colossal  as  some  of  the  economic  demands  of 
Russia  herein  indicated  are,  they  indicate  only 
partially  the  scope  and  character  of  the  program 
essential  to  anything  like  a  reconstruction  of  her 
economic  life.  There  are  many  other  needs  to  be 
met,  some  of  them  not  even  indicated  in  this 
summary.  There  is  a  crying  need  of  clothing  and 
shoes,  for  example.  Cotton  is  also  needed  in  large 
quantities.  Not  only  have  the  large  imports  of 
cotton  from  America  been  cut  off  for  a  long  time, 
but  the  great  cotton-fields  of  Turkestan  have  been 
practically  ruined.  For  these  things  Russia  turns 
to  America,  the  only  country  able  to  supply  them. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  of  very  great  importance 
to  Russia  that  this  trade  be  direct,  and  not  depend- 
ent  upon   intermediaries.     In   the   past   Germany 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     285 

acted  the  part  of  middleman  and  parasitically 
exploited  Russia's  trade  with  America  and  other 
nations.  The  consular  reports  of  England  and  the 
United  States  bear  eloquent  testimony  to  this. 
The  following  extracts  are  from  American  consular 
reports  of  late  1914  and  the  early  part  of  191 5: 

A  notable  example  of  large  profits  made  in  the  intermediary 
trade  is  that  of  Markt  &  Co.,  of  Berlin,  and  Anton  Ohlert. 
The  first-named  firm  does  a  business  of  about  ten  million 
rubles  a  year  in  Russia,  principally  in  American  automobiles 
and  all  sorts  of  American  notions  and  fancy-goods,  buying 
in  America  for  cash  and  selling  in  Russia  on  long  credits. 
The  firm  of  Ohlert  does  about  half  the  business  on  the  same 
lines.  As  an  illustration  of  the  large  profits  made,  it  may  be 
mentioned  that  an  American  razor  strop  with  *'  Price  50 
cents"  stamped  on  it  sells  in  a  well-known  shop  in  the  Newski 
at  two  and  a  half  rubles,  or  a  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents. 
When  it  was  pointed  out  that  that  was  two  and  a  half  times 
as  much  as  the  stamped  price,  the  reason  given  was  that  the 
goods  came  via  Germany,  that  the  Russian  firm  paid  con- 
siderably more  than  fifty  cents  originally,  and  had  to  pay  the 
freight  and  duty  besides.  This  strop  is  supplied  by  Markt  & 
Co.  to  Russian  dealers. 


All  American  cotton  is  imported  into  Russia  by  way  of 
Bremen,  in  spite  of  a  direct  line  of  steamers  which  before  the 
war  sailed  from  Libau  to  New  York.  Bremen  maintained  a 
direct  line  of  steamers  to  Galveston,  Texas,  and  to  New 
Orleans,  and  the  Bremen  importers  sold  cotton  to  Russia  at  a 
profit  of  from  a  quarter  to  a  half-cent  a  pound,  besides  making 
an  additional  profit  on  the  freight,  insurance,  and  reloading. 
The  same  applies  to  cottonseed  oil. 


American  machine  tools,  it  seems,  were  practically  a  monop- 
oly in  the  hands  of  the  German  firm  of  Schuchardt  &:  Schutte, 


286    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

whose  turnover  in  Russia  amounted  to  six  or  seven  million 
rubles  a  year.  This  firm  paid  for  the  American  machine  tools 
in  New  York,  carried  a  stock  in  Petrograd  and  Moscow,  and 
sold  them  here  at  enormous  prices.  For  instance,  an  ordinary 
gear-headed  lathe  which  sells  in  America  for  $600,  or  1,200 
rubles,  appears  on  the  price-list  of  Schuchardt  &  Schutte  at 
2,700  rubles.  Allowing  50  per  cent,  for  freight  and  duty, 
which  is  very  high,  Schuchardt  &  Schutte  made  a  profit  of  900 
rubles,  or  $450,  on  a  $600  machine.  Needless  to  say,  German 
machine-tool  works  could  easily  compete.  The  same  applies 
to  lathe  and  wood-working  machinery. 


The  Vera  Company,  of  Berlin,  imports  American  boots  and 
shoes  from  Rice  &  Hutchins,  Lynn,  Massachusetts,  and  sells 
in  Russia  over  one  million  rubles'  worth  a  year,  at  a  profit 
of  over  10  per  cent,  net,  and  not  a  single  American  manufact- 
urer so  far  as  known  has  ever  made  the  attempt  to  sell  goods 
direct  to  Russia  in  spite  of  the  big  field. 


At  a  meeting  of  the  Russian-American  Chamber  of  Commerce 
which  took  place  on  April  23,  1915,  one  of  the  members  read  a 
report  on  the  conditions  of  the  leather  industry.  It  appears 
that  in  this  respect,  as  in  others,  Russia  has  been  dependent  on 
Germany,  which  obtained  its  supplies  of  cheap  raw  materials 
from  Russia,  and  on  the  other  hand  sold  to  Russia  dressed 
leather  and  expensive  tanning  extracts.  He  said  it  is  important 
to  note  that  the  tanning  extracts  were  supplied  to  Germany 
by  America,  the  former  country  making  a  profit  of  100  per  cent, 
and  more  on  the  reselling  of  the  same. 

The  principal  articles  of  export  from  Russia  are  hides, 
Russian  linens,  flax,  wax,  linseed,  hemp,  soy  beans,  sunflower 
seeds,  buckwheat,  and  rags,  all  of  which  articles  go  to  America 
via  Germany.  German  exporters  have  their  men  on  the  spot 
who  buy  up  these  articles  at  the  most  favorable  times,  fre- 
quently hold  them  in  warehouses  until  the  time  is  most  pro- 
pitious in  America,  and  then  export  them  to  that  country.  In 
consequence  American  manufacturers  who  are  in  need  of  these 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     287 

raw  materials  pay  considerably  higher  prices  for  them  than 
they  would  pay  if  they  bought  direct.  Even  in  the  extreme 
East  the  export  trade  is  in  the  hands  of  Germans.  The  firm 
of  Kunst  &  Albers  in  Vladivostok  ship  hides,  furs,  and  soy 
beans  to  Hamburg,  and  thence  tranship  them  to  America, 
and  are  said  to  have  made  millions  in  this  trade  in  the  past 
few  years. 

It  is  of  the  highest  importance  that  Russian- 
American  trade  be  emancipated  from  this  parasiti- 
cal domination  and  exploitation.  This  is  not  an 
exhortation  to  make  economic  war  upon  Germany. 
No  obstacle  should  be  placed  in  the  way  of  Germany 
to  prevent  the  development  of  legitimate  trade 
between  her  and  Russia.  To  trade  freely,  upon 
equal  terms  with  all  nations,  is  her  right,  and  the 
proper  exercise  of  that  right  will  be  beneficial  to 
Russia  and  to  the  world  at  large.  In  the  past, 
however,  Germany's  commerce  with  Russia  has 
been  a  form  of  warfare  directed  against  Russia 
and  every  other  great  commercial  nation.  Res- 
toration of  the  old  economic  relations  would  in- 
evitably perpetuate,  in  an  intensified  form,  Russian 
fear  and  hatred  of  Germany.  Soon  or  late  the 
war  of  Slav  and  Teuton  would  break  out  afresh. 
No  greater  service  can  be  rendered  to  Russia  in 
the  critical  days  ahead  than  to  make  her  trade 
with  America  as  extensive  as  possible,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  wholly  free  from  German  exploitation 
or  domination. 

To  do  this  American  manufacturers  and  traders 
must  adopt  new  methods.  They  must  take  the 
trouble  to  understand  Russia  and  the  Russian 
people.     Although  the  economic  predominance  of 


288    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Germany  in  Russian  commerce  was  largely  due  to 
such  unfair  advantages  gained  by  political  pressure 
as  the  Russian-German  Commercial  Treaty,  and  to 
unscrupulous  methods,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
much  of  it  was  the  legitimate  result  of  superior 
business  methods.  No  one  can  read  the  British 
and  American  consular  reports  for  the  ten  years 
preceding  the  war  without  realizing  this  fact. 
Because  England  was  Germany's  chief  competitor 
in  the  Russian  market,  it  is  worth  while  comparing 
the  commercial  methods  of  the  two  countries. 

It  is  the  universal  testimony  of  competent  ob- 
servers that  goods  of  English  manufacture  were 
almost  invariably  better  than  similar  goods  of 
German  manufacture.  They  were  not  able  to 
meet  the  competition  of  the  German-made  goods, 
however,  for  the  easily  understood  reason  that  the 
latter  were  cheaper  and  generally  made  according 
to  Russian  designs.  The  British  took  no  account 
of  the  low  purchasing  power  of  the  Russian  people; 
they  made  goods  of  standard  quality.  The  Ger- 
mans, on  the  other  hand,  sacrificed  quality  to 
cheapness.  They  did  not  at  all  mind  the  taunt 
that  German  goods  were  "cheap  and  nasty."  The 
British  made  goods  for  Russia  exactly  like  those 
intended  for  the  home  market.  The  Germans  took 
pains  to  please  Russian  tastes.  When  a  British 
manufacturer  or  merchant  sought  to  do  business 
with  a  Russian  concern,  no  attempt  was  made  to 
use  the  Russian  language,  except  in  very  rare 
instances.  Letters  were  written  in  English,  thus 
placing  upon  the  recipient  the  necessity  of  transla- 
tion.    Prices    were    generally    quoted    in    English 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES      289 

money,  not  Russian.  Catalogues  were  sent  to 
Russia  printed  in  English  and  quoting  prices  based 
on  English  measures  in  English  money.  Salesmen 
were  rarely  sent  and  few  of  those  sent  could  speak 
Russian.  The  Germans,  on  the  other  hand,  made 
it  as  easy  for  a  Russian  to  trade  with  them  as  with 
Russians.  Their  letters  to  Russian  clients  were 
written  in  Russian;  their  catalogues  were  printed 
in  Russian,  and  prices  were  quoted  in  Russian 
money  and  based  upon  the  Russian  system  of 
measuring.  Thus,  instead  of  quoting  copper  wire 
at  so  many  pounds,  shillings,  and  pence  per  English 
"hundredweight"  of  112  pounds,  the  Germans 
quoted  it  so  many  rubles  and  copecks  per  pood. 
The  Germans  sent  numerous  salesmen  into  Russia, 
all  of  them  able  to  speak  Russian  with  fluency 
and  ease. 

Of  course,  it  will  be  said  that  this  superiority  of 
method  was  the  natural  result  of  the  geographical 
situation;  that  Germany,  as  a  near  neighbor, 
was  in  a  position  to  do  these  things  better  than  any 
other  country  could  hope  to  do  them.  Those  who 
are  inclined  to  be  satisfied  with  this  explanation 
should  bear  in  mind  that  in  South  America  Germany 
has  shown  the  same  superiority  over  the  United 
States.  Change  the  words  "Russia"  and  "Rus- 
sian" in  the  foregoing  paragraph  to  "South 
America"  and  "South  American,"  and  the  words 
"England"  and  "British"  to  "United  States"  and 
"American,"  and  the  result  is  a  true  picture  of  the 
different  methods  employed  by  Germany  and 
America  in  the  Latin  countries  of  South  America. 

In   dealing   with    Russia.    British   and  American 


290    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

firms  rarely  were  willing  to  give  the  credit  which  is 
a  Russian  trade  custom.  They  insisted  on  cash 
on  delivery  f.o.b.  This  meant  that  the  Russian 
buyer  must  pay  for  the  goods  six  weeks,  or  even 
two  or  three  months,  before  receiving  them.  Ger- 
man firms  were  always  ready  to  give  the  credit 
asked  for;  the  whole  banking  and  commercial 
system  of  the  country  was  organized  to  that  end. 
Every  large  Russian  city  had  its  German  com- 
mercial agency  through  which  any  German  manu- 
facturer or  merchant  could  secure  information 
as  to  the  credit  of  a  prospective  Russian  customer; 
through  the  same  agencies  credit  transactions 
could  be  arranged.  Upon  this  point  an  American 
consular  report,  dated  December  28,  1914,  makes 
interesting  reading.  It  says:  "American  firms 
could  obtain  information  as  to  credits  only  at  great 
expense  and  with  great  delay,  and  the  information 
going  through  the  German  agency  was  not  always 
given  with  a  view  to  safeguarding  American  in- 
terests. In  consequence  American  manufacturers 
insisted,  when  dealing  with  Russian  buyers,  on 
cash  with  order.  The  Russian  merchant,  however, 
will  agree  to  such  terms  only  when  he  cannot  get 
the  goods  from  any  other  source." 

It  is  quite  evident  from  the  foregoing  that  it  is 
not  simply  a  question  of  supplying  Russia  with  a 
vast  amount  of  capital  and  goods.  Quite  as 
necessary  as  these  is  the  adoption  of  a  new  attitude 
in  our  commercial  relations  with  her.  It  is  ex- 
tremely important  that  American  manufacturers, 
merchants,  and  financiers  learn  to  understand 
Russian   psychology   and   business   methods.     We 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     291 

must  in  this  copy  Germany's  example.  It  is  to 
our  interest  to  co-operate  with  Russia  in  the  recon- 
struction of  her  economic  system,  just  as  it  is  to 
the  interest  of  Russia.  Fortunately,  this  mutual 
interest  of  the  two  nations  coincides  with  the 
general  interest  of  mankind. 


In  addition  to  capital,  credit,  machinery,  and 
goods,  Russia  needs  the  services  of  tens  of  thousands 
of  experts.  To  rehabilitate  her  currency  system 
she  will  require  the  assistance  of  many  financial 
experts.  The  restoration  and  development  of  her 
transportation  facilities  will  call  for  the  assistance 
of  numerous  engineers  and  transportation  experts. 
In  order  to  develop  the  production  and  distribution 
of  electrical  energy  for  industrial  purposes,  she 
must  secure  from  abroad  the  services  of  thousands 
of  technical  advisers,  supervisors,  and  managers. 
Other  experts  will  be  needed  for  the  development 
of  her  mines  and  forests,  the  improvement  of  her 
agriculture  and  stock-raising,  and  for  planning 
and  carrying  out  the  numerous  municipal  enter- 
prises essential  to  her  life  and  progress.  In  short, 
Russia  needs  technical  experts  of  every  kind. 
Probably  no  country  in  the  world  will  offer  so  many 
opportunities  for  useful  and  lucrative  employment 
to  trained  and  competent  men. 

Nor  must  we  overlook  the  tragic  fact  that  the 
ravages  of  disease  and  hunger  during  the  long 
years  of  war  and  revolution  have  left  Russia  with 
an  enormous  problem  of  reclaiming  and  regenerating 


292    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

her  human  resources.  For  this  she  needs  immense 
quantities  of  medicines  and  drugs  and  a  small  army 
of  doctors.  In  September,  1919,  the  Russian 
Political  Conference  at  Paris  addressed  the  Red 
Cross  societies  of  Europe  and  America  on  behalf 
of  the  unfortunate  victims  of  starvation  and 
disease  in  Russia.  The  appeal,  which  was  signed 
by  Prince  Lvov  and  Messrs.  Serghei  Sazonov,  N. 
Tchaykovsky,  and  B.  Maklakov,  said: 

Ruined  by  the  war  and  anarchy,  Russia  is  dying  a  slow 
death.  Unemployment,  famine,  typhus  epidemics,  and  other 
contagious  diseases  carrying  in  their  wake  frightful  mortality, 
and  the  pitiless  massacre  of  the  peaceful  inhabitants,  such  are 
the  terrible  scourges  which  are  literally  wiping  out  the  popula- 
tion of  Russia. 

According  to  the  communication  of  Lord  Kilmarnock,  which 
was  published  in  the  English  White  Book  of  January  21,  1919, 
"nearly  the  whole  population  of  Moscow  was  suffering  from 
starvation."  M.  Alston  communicated  to  Secretary  of  State 
Halfour  on  January  2d:  *' Three-fourths  of  the  population  of 
Moscow  is  slowly  dying.  Typhus  and  tuberculosis  are  spread- 
ing faster  and  faster,  and  the  masses  of  the  people  are  in  no 
position  whatever  to  obtain  necessary  medicaments  even  at 
high  prices." 

According  to  another  report  emanating  from  Petrograd: 
"The  famine  in  this  city  is  making  great  strides.  All  products 
and  foodstuffs  are  disappearing  with  remarkable  rapidity, 
and  the  epidemics  of  typhus,  smallpox,  and  glanders  are  raging 
cruelly." 

In  the  same  White  Book  of  the  British  government  there  ap- 
pears the  following  picture  of  the  situation  in  Moscow  during 
the  month  of  February:  "What  is  worst  of  all  is  the  fact 
that  the  disease  of  glanders  is  beginning  to  spread  among  the 
population.  The  danger  of  the  spread  of  this  terrible  malady 
has  become  so  great  that  the  Bolshevist  authorities  have  com- 
menced to  exterminate  the  unfortunates  stricken  with  this 
disease  by  shooting  them,  purely  and  simply.     And  under  such 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES      293 

terrible  circumstances  there  is  hardly  any  medical  aid  to  be 
gotten,  the  supply  of  medicaments  is  very  insufficient,  and 
often  there  is  a  complete  lack  of  medicines." 

According  to  the  report  of  Doctor  Dolgopolov,  a  member 
of  the  Kuban  government,  in  the  Kuban  territory  alone,  in 
four  and  a  half  months  (from  January  to  June  of  the  current 
year)  almost  54,000  persons  have  died  from  abdominal  typhus. 
Moreover,  the  scarcity  of  medical  means  was  so  great  that 
most  serious  surgical  operations  were  performed  without 
chloroform  or  other  anesthetics,  and  the  sick  among  the  more 
cultured  classes  were  dying  in  numbers  on  account  of  lack  of 
bandages,  of  which  there  were  none  to  be  had.1 

An  appeal  by  the  Russian  Red  Cross  to  the  Red 
Cross  societies  of  Europe  and  America,  signed  by 
Count  Paul  N.  lgnatiev  and  others,  issued  at  the 
same  time  as  the  foregoing,  said:  "Civil  war  is  in 
full  swing  in  our  country.  The  wounded  are 
counted  by  tens  of  thousands.  The  fields  and 
villages  are  devastated  and  contagious  diseases 
are  raging  with  a  violence  that  recalls  the  dark 
epoch  of  the  Middle  Ages.  These  diseases,  if 
unchecked,  may  in  the  near  future  cross  the 
borders  of  eastern  Europe."  2  Russian  Bolshevist 
organs  published  during  the  summer  of  1919 
numerous  articles  describing  the  epidemics  of  typhus 
and  smallpox,  bor  example,  the  Ekonomichcskaya 
Zhizn  stated  that  in  the  hospitals  in  Moscow  the 
average  death-rate  among  teamen  in  the  maternity 
wards  had  risen  to  So  per  cent.  "Owing  to  under- 
feeding, they  cannot  stand  the  pains  of  labor. 
The  death-rate  among  new-born  infants  is  00  per 
rent."     Some  idea  of  the  epidemics  may  be  gathered 

1  Published  September  (•>,  1919.  in  La  Cause  Commune,  the  Frcneli- 
Rnssian  weekly  edited  by  Vladimir  Buurt/ev. 
:  La  Cause  Commune,  Paris,  September  6,  1 9 1 9 . 


294    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

trom  the  following  paragraphs  from  a  distressing 
account  published  in  the  Bolshevist  journal  just 
auoted: 

All  kinds  of  epidemics  are  raging,  and  spotted  typhus  carries 
away  most  victims.  On  April  ist  the  Moscow  hospital  con- 
tained 8,486  spotted-typhus  patients,  and  cases  are  on  the 
increase.  In  January  there  were  6,820  cases,  in  February 
9,829,  and  in  March  12,985.  From  October  1st  to  April  1st 
5^2  per  cent,  of  the  medical  staff  attending  typhus  cases  died. 

Besides  spotted  typhus  there  is  a  great  deal  of  smallpox  all 
over  Russia.  Owing  to  the  use  of  horseflesh,  there  have  been 
cases  of  glanders  among  people,  which  are  generally  fatal. 
There  are  already  signs  of  cholera.  The  percentage  of  nervous 
cases  is  far  greater  than  during  the  war.  Hospitals  for  nervous 
diseases  have  long  been  overcrowded,  and  at  present  the 
Soviet  authorities  are  trying  to  find  new  premises  where 
lunatics  could  be  isolated. 

A  memorandum  published  in  a  British  parlia- 
mentary report  in  1919  says:  "Underfeeding  is 
having  its  effect,  and  the  epidemics  of  typhus, 
smallpox,  and  influenza  are  spreading  rapidly.  In  the 
Obukhov  hospital  during  December  (1918)  the  mor- 
tality amounted  to  14,000.  During  that  month  the 
population  of  Petrograd  fell  by  105,000.  Next  to 
disease  and  famine,  the  absence  of  fuel  is  the  worst 
scourge.  All  this  presses  terribly  upon  the  pris- 
oners, who  are  now  thrust  eight  into  a  cell  intended 
for  one  person,  and  fed  upon  putrid  herring  and  soup 
made  from  potato  peel.  Typhoid,  smallpox,  and 
influenza  cases  are  left  in  the  same  cell  with  unin- 
fected persons,  and  in  the  quarantine  cells  eight  to 
ten  patients  lie  together."  * 

1  A  Collection  of  Reports  on  Bolshevism  in  Russia;  abridged  edition 
of  Parliamentary  Paper,  Russia  No.  1.     Document  No.  59,  p.  82. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES      295 

On  January  2,  1919,  Mr.  Alston  telegraphed  to 
Mr.  Balfour  from  Vladivostok  concerning  conditions 
in  Moscow  and  Petrograd.  Of  the  former  city  he 
reported,  "Every  day  typhoid  and  tuberculosis 
are  increasing,  and  ordinary  populations  are  quite 
unable  to  procure  medical  supplies  even  at  the  most 
outrageous  prices."  Of  conditions  in  Petrograd 
the  despatch  said:  "Owing  to  there  being  less 
food  even  than  in  Moscow,  the  death-roll  from 
disease  is  much  higher.  This  is  also  due  to  the 
fact  that,  without  being  buried,  corpses  of  horses, 
dogs,  and  human  beings  lie  about  in  the  streets. 
Cholera  took  a  heavy  toll  in  the  summer,  as  all  the 
canals  were  polluted  with  decomposed  bodies  of 
men  and  animals."  x 

These  are  only  a  few  typical  reports  by  witnesses 
of  the  highest  competency,  chosen  from  among 
hundreds.  They  make  quite  plain  why  Russia 
must  call  upon  the  outside  world  for  extensive, 
well-organized  medical  and  sanitary  aid.  There 
are  not  doctors  enough  in  Russia  to  do  the  medical 
work  required;  there  are  very  few  sanitary  experts 
in  proportion  to  the  vast  work  to  be  done.  Mill- 
ions of  Russian  children  will  need  special  care  and 
treatment  to  overcome  the  baleful  effects  of  the 
malnutrition  of  which  they  are  the  victims;  millions 
of  men  and  women  must  be  restored  to  health 
before  Russia  can  recover. 

There  is  another  grave  problem  to  be  faced, 
namely,  the  frightful  prevalence  of  venereal  diseases. 
This  problem  has  assumed  alarming  proportions 
during  the  past  five  years.     Notwithstanding  the 

1  A  Collection  oj  Reports  on  Bolshevism,  Document  No.  16,  p.  30. 


296    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

terrible  experiences  of  1904-05,  in  the  war  with 
Japan,  and  the  great  increase  of  venereal  diseases 
and  sexual  vice  which  followed  that  war,1  the  year 
1914  found  the  Russian  military  authorities  wholly 
unprepared  to  cope  with  the  peril  by  any  well- 
conceived  prophylactic  measures.  An  army  vaster 
than  any  ever  before  mobilized  was  left  unpro- 
tected. Practically  no  attention  was  paid  to  this 
important  subject;  men  suffering  from  venereal 
diseases  were  not  segregated,  but  admitted  into 
the  barracks  and  camps,  spreading  infection  far 
and  wide.  Little  attempt  was  made  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  war  to  restrict  the  number  of  prosti- 
tutes in  military  centers  or  to  regulate  their  activi- 
ties. As  a  result  of  this  neglect  venereal  diseases 
spread  to  a  most  alarming  extent.  In  some  regi- 
ments more  than  90  per  cent,  of  the  men  were 
infected,  many  of  them  by  accidental  contact. 
In  many  villages  and  towns  venereal  diseases  have 
spread  to  more  than  95  per  cent,  of  the  population. 
They  have  become  endemic  and  no  longer  depend 
upon  sex  vice.2  As  far  back  as  1899  it  was  pointed 
out  that  80  per  cent,  of  the  syphilis  among  the 
rural  population  of  Russia  was  due  to  accidental 
contact  and  not  to  personal  vice.3  To  combat 
this  black  plague  successfully  Russia  must  be  given 

1  See,  e.g.,  the  article  by  Professor  Asnurof,  "La  Crise  Sexuelle  en 
Russie,"  published  in  Archives  d'  Anthropologie  Criminelle,  April,  1911. 

2  "In  some  villages  the  syphilization  of  the  entire  population  has 
been  accomplished,  and  the  disease  is  equally  distributed  among  men, 
women,  and  children,  most  of  the  infections  being  extra-genital." — 
Syphilis  and  Public  Health,  by  Lieut. -Col.  Edward  B.  Vedder,  A.M., 
M.D.,  p.  31. 

2Confaence  Internationale,  Bruxelles,  1899;   Enquetes  I,  p.  264. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     297 

a  great  deal  of  help  both  in  the  form  of  drugs 
and  medical  service. 

These  are  suggestions  merely;  no  attempt  is 
made  to  give  anything  like  a  comprehensive  survey 
of  the  extent  of  Russia's  need  of  expert  service. 
1  hese  suggestions,  however,  will  suffice  to  make 
it  quite  plain  that  the  reconstruction  of  Russia 
will  call  for  the  services  of  many  thousands  of 
highly  trained  specialists.  Whether  this  demand 
is  supplied  by  Germany  and  Japan,  or  by  America 
and  other  western  nations,  is  a  question  of  the 
highest  importance.  It  can  hardly  be  doubted 
that  both  Germany  and  Japan  will  be  eager  to 
supply  Russia  with  all  the  experts  she  needs  for 
her  industries  and  her  social  services.  Both  nations 
will  be  equally  ready  to  grasp  such  a  splendid 
opportunity  to  influence  the  public  opinion  and 
the  political  life  of  Russia  during  the  next  few 
years.  It  is  not  difficult  to  comprehend  this; 
tens  of  thousands  of  educated  men,  widely  dis- 
tributed, all  holding  important  positions,  would 
necessarily  be  a  propagandist  force  of  the  highest 
value,  influencing  Russian  opinion  in  favor  of  the 
nation  or  nations  to  which  they  belonged. 

Just  such  penetration  played  an  important  part 
in  Germany's  domination  of  Russia  before  the 
World  War.  It  is  fairly  generally  known  that  in 
July,  1914,  Germans  were  in  charge  of  the  principal 
factories  in  Russia,  the  very  factories  upon  which 
Russia  was  dependent  for  guns  and  munitions. 
Many  of  these  factories  were  crippled  simply  by  the 
withdrawal  of  the  German  managers,  foremen,  and 
technical  experts.     Consciously  and  otherwise,  these 


298    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Germans  had  for  years  been  creating  pro-German 
sentiment  in  Russia.1  If  it  becomes  necessary 
for  Russia  to  rely  upon  German  experts  in  the 
future  as  in  the  past,  she  will  be  subject  to  a  much 
more  extensive — and,  therefore,  more  dangerous— 
pro-German  propaganda.  If  she  is  forced  to  rely 
upon  Japan,  naturally  the  influence  of  the  Japanese 
will  be  correspondingly  increased.  In  other  words, 
if  either  or  both  of  these  two  nations  should  supply 
the  technical  experts  and  specialists  needed  by 
Russia,  their  influence  would  of  necessity,  and  in 
the  main,  tend  to  link  the  life  of  Russia  to  reaction- 
ary militarism  and  all  that  the  term  implies.  It 
is  of  the  highest  importance  that  this  be  prevented, 
if  possible,  and  that  Russia  be  linked  to  the  more 
democratic  western  nations,  and  to  the  United 
States  in  particular.  This  is  equally  desirable 
for  Russia  and  for  America.  Political  consequences 
of  very  great  and  vital  importance  are  involved. 


VI 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  only  Russia's  most 
pressing  needs,  with  only  passing  reference  to  her 
resources.  We  must  now  turn  to  a  consideration 
of  these,  for  it  is  as  a  customer  we  must  regard 

l"  In  visiting  the  business  houses  or  industrial  establishments  in 
Russia,  whom  do  we  find  as  managers,  foremen,  or  superintendents? 
Almost  invariably  Germans.  One  hardly  finds  an  English  or  a  French 
boss  dyer,  fitter,  or  manager  of  a  wholesale  or  retail  establishment. 
Practically  all  buyers  in  the  large  business  houses  are  Germans  or 
Russians,  but  not  French  or  English."  Articles  on  "The  Prospects 
for  German  Exports  to  Russia,"  reprinted  from  the  Neue  Ziirchcr 
'/.citur.g,  Daily  Consular  and  Trade  Reports,  United  States  Bureau  of 
Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  October  15,  1915. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     299 

Russia,  not  as  a  beggar.  Her  wants  are  too  great 
and  too  numerous  to  be  supplied  by  philanthropy, 
even  if  this  were  desired;  they  can  only  be  supplied 
as  a  matter  of  business,  based  on  mutual  reciprocal 
interest.  It  is  therefore  eminently  proper  and 
right  that  we  should  inquire  into  her  resources  as 
closely  as  we  have  inquired  into  her  needs.  What 
has  Russia  to  offer  in  exchange  for  what  she  desires 
to  receive  from  us?  What  guaranty  have  we  that 
she  can  pay  the  immense  bill,  if  we  become  her 
creditor? 

In  reply  to  these  and  similar  questions  it  ought 
to  be  sufficient  to  direct  attention  to  a  few  funda- 
mental facts  concerning  Russia.  Here  is  a  people 
numbering  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  mill- 
ions; a  people  sprung  from  one  of  the  great  racial 
stocks  of  the  earth,  inhabiting  a  vast  country 
rich  in  agricultural  and  mineral  resources,  and  hav- 
ing attained  a  high  degree  of  civilization;  every 
economic  laze  warrants  the  extension  of  credit  to  such 
a  people,  to  the  full  extent  required  for  the  profitable 
development  and  exploitation  of  their  resources  and 
compatible  with  the  stability  of  the  creditor  nation. 

We  may  with  advantage  restate  this  in  a  some- 
what more  elaborate  form  as  follows:  In  Russia 
we  have  a  great  nation  of  more  than  one  hundred 
and  fifty  millions  of  people,1  predominantly  of  the 
Slavonic  race,  one  of  the  principal  racial  stocks 
of  the  world.  In  the  recent  past  this  nation  has 
contributed  very  largely  to  the  prosperity  and 
progress  of  the  world.  Its  exports  of  food  have 
helped  to  feed  other  nations;  its  scientists  have 
1  Finland  and  Poland  are  omitted  here. 


300    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

made  numerous  and  important  contributions  to  the 
enlargement  of  man's  kingdom  in  the  universe; 
its  literature  ranks  with  the  greatest;  its  statesmen 
have,  upon  the  whole,  in  recent  times,  upheld 
international  order;  in  the  greatest  of  all  the  wars 
of  history  its  armies  have  fought  valorously  beside 
those  of  the  most  enlightened  and  democratic 
nations,  making  enormous  sacrifices.  Russia  is  a 
great  civilized  nation.  Within  her  boundaries  she 
possesses  resources  of  unrivaled  abundance,  variety, 
and  richness.  Her  people  are  honest,  peaceful, 
and  industrious  normally.  Her  fertile  lands  are 
easily  capable  of  producing  food  grains  enough 
to  feed  several  times  her  present  population; 
cattle  enough  can  be  nurtured  on  her  hills  and 
plains  to  supply  all  the  beef  needed  by  the  people 
of  Europe  in  addition  to  her  own;  her  coastal 
waters  abound  in  fish;  her  forests  are  the  most 
abundant  in  the  world;  she  has  all  the  basic 
minerals  and  metals  in  abundance,  including  coal, 
iron,  copper,  gold,  silver,  lead,  zinc,  tin,  platinum, 
and  petroleum.  Given  such  a  people,  and  such 
assets,  there  can  be  no  greater  security  for  creditors 
anywhere  in  the  world. 

Perhaps  the  most  prevalent  fear  concerning  the 
future  of  Russia  arises  from  a  doubt  of  the  capacity 
of  her  people  for  organization.  In  all  the  volumi- 
nous mass  of  discussion  of  Russian  affairs  during  the 
past  three  years,  the  dominant  note  can  be  sum- 
marized in  the  single  sentence,  "The  Russian 
people  lack  the  capacity  for  effective  organization." 
This  is  found  equally  in  the  criticisms  of  Scandina- 
vian,   French,    British,    and    American    observers. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     301 

For  a  judgment  so  well-nigh  universal,  there  must 
obviously  be  some  basis  of  fact.  Yet,  if  there  is 
one  thing  which  impresses  the  careful  and  close 
student  of  Russian  affairs  more  than  any  other, 
it  is  that  the  Russian  people  have  again  and  again 
shown  a  wonderful  aptitude  for  organization 
amounting  almost  to  genius. 

How,  then,  shall  we  account  for  the  common 
impression  to  che  contrary?  In  the  judgment  of 
the  present  writer,  this  may  be  attributed  to 
two  principal  facts:  In  the  first  place,  foreign 
observers  have  been  impressed  by  the  numerous 
lamentable  and  almost  grotesque  failures  of  the 
economic  and  military  organization  under  the  old 
regime.  The  terrible  incompetency  displayed  in 
the  Russo-Japanese  War  created  a  sort  of  myth 
that  Russians  were  incapable  of  effective  organiza- 
tion. This  myth  was  greatly  strengthened  by  the 
bureaucratic  stupidity  and  mismanagement  which 
characterized  the  policy  of  the  Russian  government 
from  Jul\',  1914,  to  the  Revolution  in  March,  1917. 
Wherever  one  looks  at  the  record  during  those 
fateful  years  the  incompetence  of  the  bureaucracy 
becomes  at  once  apparent.  The  enormous  over- 
mobilization,  the  failure  to  organize  the  transpor- 
tation system,  the  neglect  of  those  prophylactic 
measures  which  experience  had  shown  to  be  vitally 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  health  of  the 
army — these  are  only  typical  examples  of  the 
universal  failure  and  incompetence. 

In  the  second  place,  most  of  the  observers  who 
have  commented  upon  the  Russians'  apparent 
lack    of   orjranizinu    ability    have    overlooked    one 


302    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

important  fact,  namely,  that  they  have  been 
observing  Russia  in  an  abnormal  state  of  chaos. 
When  a  great  nation  is  passing  through  a  revolu- 
tion constructive  processes  are  rarely  apparent. 
When  we  read  the  contemporary  comment  upon 
the  French  Revolution,  for  example,  we  cannot 
fail  to  recognize  its  similarity  to  much  of  the  recent 
comment  upon  Russia.  Numerous  foreign  ob- 
servers and  critics  wrote  disparagingly  of  the 
French  as  a  nation  of  talkers,  incapable  of  doing 
anything  else,  just  as  superficial  journalists  of 
to-day  are  writing  about  Russia.1  When  we  turn 
to  the  contemporary  records  of  the  formative 
period  in  the  history  of  this  Republic  we  can  find 
a  great  deal  to  remind  us  of  the  chaotic  conditions 
in  Russia.  There  was  the  same  indulgence  in 
endless  discussion,  the  same  lack  of  organization. 
These  things  are  inevitable.  Manifestly,  however, 
it  is  not  wise  to  judge  the  fundamental  character 
and  capacities  of  a  people  by  the  incidents  of  such 
periods  of  revolution. 

The  extraordinary  aptitude  for  organization  pos- 
sessed by  the  Russian  people,  already  referred  to, 
is  admirably  exemplified  in  the  zemstvos  and  the 
co-operative  associations.  The  zemstvos  are  rural 
provincial  organizations  which  were  called  into 
being  by  Alexander  II  at  the  time  of  the  liberation 
of  the  serfs  in  1864.  They  were  originally  intended 
to  be  representative  legislative  bodies  having  juris- 

1  A  notable  example  of  this  journalistic  superficiality  is  trie  article 
by  William  Dudley  Pelley,  "Siberia  Back  of  the  Whiskers,"  published 
in  Sunset,  November,  1919.  Mr.  Pelley's  article  is  described  as  "a 
close  study  of  the  Siberian  peasant."  It  is  such  a  "study"  as  might 
be  made  from  melodramatic  moving-picture  scenarios. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     303 

diction  over  such  matters  as  taxation  and  educa- 
tion. They  were  not  popularly  elected  upon  a 
basis  of  universal  suffrage,  but  were  dominated 
by  the  large  landowners  and  the  clergy.  The 
governing  council  of  each  zemstvo  was  elected  by 
an  assembly  composed  of  the  large  landowners, 
landowning  clergy,  and  representatives  of  the 
peasant  communal  organizations.  After  the  assas- 
sination of  Alexander  II,  in  the  period  of  reaction 
following  that  event,  the  powers  of  the  zemstvos 
were  very  greatly  restricted.  They  were  deprived 
of  their  legislative  functions,  no  decision  of  a 
zemstvo  being  valid  unless  approved  by  the 
provincial  governor,  who  was  a  police  official. 

Notwithstanding  the  restrictions  thus  imposed 
upon  them,  the  zemstvos  developed  into  local 
government  bodies  of  great  importance  and  con- 
siderable efficiency: 

Elected  mainly  by  the  landlords  and  the  peasants,  they 
were  a  vital  part  of  the  life  of  the  nation.  Possessing  no 
political  powers  or  functions,  having  nothing  to  do  with  legis- 
lation, they  were  important  agencies  of  local  government. 
The  representatives  of  each  county  constituted  a  county 
zemstvo  and  the  representatives  elected  by  all  the  county 
zemstvos  in  a  province  constituted  a  province  zemstvo.  Both 
types  concerned  themselves  with  much  the  same  range  of 
activities.  They  built  roads  and  telegraph  stations;  they 
maintained  model  farms  and  agricultural  experiment  stations 
similar  to  those  maintained  by  our  state  governments.  '1  hey 
maintained  schools,  bookstores,  and  libraries,  co-operative 
stores,  hospitals,  and  banks.  They  provided  the  peasants 
with  cheap  credit,  good  seeds,  fertilizers,  agricultural  imple- 
ments, and  so  forth.  In  many  cases  they  provided  for  fret; 
medical  aid  to  the  peasants,  in  some  instances  they  published 
newspapers  and  magazines. 


3o4    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  zemstvos  were  the  onlyreprc- 
sentative  public  bodies  elected  by  any  large  part  of  the  people. 
While  the  suffrage  was  quite  undemocratic,  being  so  arranged 
that  the  landlords  were  assured  a  majority  over  the  peasants 
at  all  times,  nevertheless  they  did  perform  a  great  democratic 
service.  But  for  them,  life  would  have  been  well-nigh  impos- 
sible for  the  peasant.  In  addition  to  the  services  already 
enumerated,  these  civic  bodies  were  the  relief  agencies  of  the 
empire,  and  when  crop  failures  brought  famine  to  the  peasants 
it  was  always  the  zemstvos  which  undertook  the  work  of 
relief.1 

But  for  these  zemstvos  it  is  unlikely  that  Russia 
could  have  carried  on  the  war  for  more  than  six 
months.  It  was  their  energy  and  enterprise  which 
made  it  possible  for  Russia  to  render  the  services  to 
the  Allied  cause  during  the  first  two  years  which 
ultimately  assured  the  triumph  over  the  Central 
Empires.  In  August,  1914,  representatives  of 
almost  every  zemstvo  in  Russia  met  in  Moscow 
and  formed  a  national  organization  called  the  All- 
Russian  Zemstvo  Union.  The  original  intention 
seems  to  have  been  to  create  an  organization  for 
the  single  purpose  of  caring  for  sick  and  wounded 
soldiers,  as  an  auxiliary  to  the  Army  Medical 
Service  and  the  Russian  Red  Cross  Society.  It 
very  soon  appeared,  however,  that  the  military 
authorities  and  the  government  had  seriously 
underestimated  the  amount  of  hospital  accommo- 
dations that  would  be  required,  and  the  Union  of 
Zemstvos  was  called  upon  to  furnish  a  very  large 
proportion  of  the  additional  hospital  accommoda- 
tion required.  In  a  surprisingly  short  time  it 
had  more  than  three  thousand  hospitals  in  opera- 

1  Bolshevism,  by  John  Spargo  (1919),  p.  16. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     305 

tion.  These  hospitals  were  universally  superior 
to  those  provided  by  the  government  in  con- 
struction, equipment,  administration,  and  service. 
When  the  problem  of  transporting  the  wounded 
soldiers  proved  too  difficult  for  the  military  au- 
thorities, the  Union  of  Zemstvos  addressed  itself 
to  the  solution  of  the  problem.  It  devised  a  better 
type  of  hospital  train  and  effected  a  revolution  in 
the  method  of  transporting  wounded  men. 

A  very  large  part  of  such  work  as  that  which 
was  done  for  our  armies  by  organizations  like  the 
Young  Men's  Christian  Association,  Young 
Women's  Christian  Association,  Knights  of  Colum- 
bus, Salvation  Army,  and  others,  was  done  for  the 
Russian  army  by  the  Union  of  Zemstvos.  Rest 
stations,  canteens,  bath-houses,  and  laundries  were 
established  back  of  the  lines.  When  the  prevalence 
of  vent-real  and  other  infectious  diseases  manifested 
itself  as  a  serious  danger  it  was  the  Union  of 
Zemstvos  which  again  came  to  the  front  and  did 
what  it  could  to  meet  the  problem  in  a  practical 
way.  Its  sanitar>  organization  provided  for  vac- 
cination, bacteriological  examination,  segregation, 
and  treatment.  When  the  evacuation  of  inhabited 
districts  was  necessary  it  was  the  Union  of  Zemstvos 
again  which  undertook  the  necessary  organization, 
feeding  the  refugees,  caring  for  the  children,  the 
sick  and  infirm. 

Just  as  in  the  war  with  Japan  ten  years  earlier, 
the  bureaucracy  failed  to  provide  adequate  and 
satisfactory  footgear  for  the  army.  Of  course,  the 
government  had  never  previously  contemplated 
the  mobilization  of  so  many  millions  of  men.     No 


306    RUSSIA  AS  AN   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

government  in  the  world,  it  is  safe  to  say,  had  ever 
seriously  contemplated  the  possibility  of  such  an 
enormous  mobilization.  It  was  not  surprising, 
therefore,  that  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  the 
need  for  boots  and  shoes  presented  a  very  great 
and  grave  problem.  In  an  incredibly  short  time 
and  with  remarkable  efficiency  the  Union  of 
Zemstvos  organized  the  boot-  and  shoe-making 
industry  throughout  Russia.  The  country  was 
systematically  scoured  for  hides,  existing  tanneries, 
utilized  to  their  full  capacity  and  new  tanneries 
established.  Notwithstanding  these  efforts,  the 
demand  for  boots  and  shoes  for  the  army  still  far 
exceeded  the  supply  and  it  was  necessary  to  go  to 
foreign  markets.  Millions  of  pairs  of  boots  and 
shoes  were  purchased  abroad  by  agents  of  the 
zemstvos.1 


Even  if  the  Russian  people,  as  distinguished  from 
the  government  of  Russia,  had  done  nothing  else 
in  the  way  of  organization,  the  record  of  the  zemstvos 
would,  of  itself,  be  sufficient  to  disprove  the  theory, 
held  by  so  many  people,  that  the  Russians  are 
peculiarly  incapable  of  creating  and  maintaining 
efficient  organizations.  When  we  take  into  account 
the  enormous  difficulties  by  which  they  have  been 
confronted — the  lack  of  transportation  facilities, 
the  immense  area  of  the  country,  the  opposition 
of  the  bureaucracy,  the  illiteracy  of  a  large  part  of 
the  population — we  cannot  fail  to  admire  their 
achievements.  It  is  very  doubtful  whether  any 
other  nation,  including  our  own,  can  point  to  any- 

1  An  interesting  account  of  the  work  of  the  zemstvos  is  given  by 
Isaac  Don  Levine  in  his  book.  The  Russian  Revolution  (1917). 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     307 

thing  like  such  an  extensive  voluntary  organization 
successfully  continued  over  a  long  period  of  time. 

Writers  upon  sociological  questions  have  fre- 
quently called  attention  to  the  growth  of  co-opera- 
tives in  England,  Belgium,  Denmark,  and  other 
European  countries  as  an  evidence  of  the  special 
organizing  capacity  of  the  people  of  these  countries. 
Certainly  the  development  of  a  strong  co-operative 
movement  requires  organizing  ability  of  a  very 
high  order.  It  is  much  more  difficult  to  organize 
and  successfully  conduct  a  business  on  co-operative 
lines  than  to  organize  and  conduct  a  similar  business 
on  ordinary  business  principles.  It  can  fairly  be 
claimed,  therefore,  that  the  presence  in  a  country 
of  a  successful  and  flourishing  co-operative  move- 
ment is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  organizing 
ability  of  its  people. 

Let  us  apply  this  test  to  Russia.  Long  before 
the  Russo-Japanese  War  many  co-operatives  existed 
in  Russia.  They  did  not  differ  materially  from  the 
co-operatives  of  England,  Belgium,  Denmark,  or 
Germany,  except  in  that  they  relied  to  a  greater 
extent  than  these  upon  the  assistance  of  the  middle- 
class  Intellectuals.  This  peculiarity  was  due,  of 
course,  to  the  very  large  amount  of  illiteracy  among 
the  masses.  As  the  condition  of  the  masses  in 
this  particular  improved,  so  the  co-operatives  be- 
came less  dependent  upon  the  guidance  and  sup- 
port of  professional  men.  From  1900  onward  the 
illiteracy  of  the  masses  steadily  declined.  Educa- 
tion was  making  itself  felt.  After  the  revolution- 
ary movement  of  1905  the  number  of  co-operative- 
organizations  in  Russia  increased  at  an  astonishing 


3o8    RUSSIA  AS   AN   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

rate.  In  1905  there  were  less  than  6,000  co-opera- 
tive societies,  including  credit  and  loan  associa- 
tions; in  1914  there  were  over  30,000.  The  growth 
of  the  movement  from  1905  to  1916  is  illustrated 
by  the  following  table: 


Organization 

1905 

1914 

12,751 

10,080 
5,000 

3,000 
11 

30,842 

1915 

1916 

Jan.  i, 
IQ17 

Credit  and  loan  associations.  .  .  . 

1,434 

1,000 

1,275 

2,000 

14.350 

10,900 

5,000 

3,300 
28 

33,578 

15.450 

iS.203 
5.SOO 

3.600 
62 

39.8i5 

16,057 

20,000 
6,000 

Agricultural  societies 

Artels  of  kustar  and  butter-mak- 
ing artels 

4,000 
92 

Union  of  credit  societies 

Total 

5.7" 

46,149 

When  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  Russian 
co-operative  movement  was  celebrated  in  1916, 
the  number  of  the  co-operative  societies  was  a  little 
less  than  36,000  and  the  total  membership  was 
estimated  at  about  12,000,000.  S.  N.  Prokopo- 
vich,  a  well-known  Russian  economist,  who  became 
Secretary  of  Supplies  in  the  Provisional  government, 
estimated  that  the  co-operatives  represented,  at 
that  time,  60,000,000  people.  Prokopovich,  who 
is  one  of  the  best  authorities  on  the  Russian  co- 
operative movement,  based  this  conclusion  upon 
the  well-known  fact  that  the  strength  of  the  co- 
operative government  is  principally  among  the 
peasantry  and  that  almost  every  member  of  the 
co-operative  society  is  the  head  of  a  family. 

The  co-operatives  control  more  than  50,000 
factories,  mills,  workshops,  stores,  and  warehouses. 
The    Ail-Russian    Central    Union    of    Consumers' 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     309 

Societies,  one  of  the  five  central  organizations  of 
co-operatives,  operates  flour  and  paper  mills, 
refrigerator  plants,  factories  for  the  manufacture 
of  shoes,  soap,  candy,  matches,  tobacco,  and 
chemicals.  Its  capital  is  100,000,000  rubles.  The 
Union  of  Siberian  Creamery  Associations  has  more 
than  3,000  factories,  plants,  and  distributing  cen- 
ters. It  operates  factories  for  making  oil,  rope, 
and  soap  and  for  rebuilding  agricultural  machinery. 
It  maintains  cold-storage  warehouses  and  grain- 
elevators.  The  All-Russian  Co-operative  Union 
of  Flax-growers,  which  was  organized  in  191 5,  had 
nearly  2,000,000  members  at  the  end  of  1918.  The 
total  trade  of  the  co-operatives  of  Russia  in  1918 
exceeded  8,000,000,000  of  rubles.1 

The  co-operatives  alone  have  kept  Russia  alive 
during  the  Bolshevist  regime.  They  have  main- 
tained the  necessary  economic  foundations  for 
Russia's  future  development.  At  first,  the  Soviet 
government  and  the  co-operatives  came  into  sharp 
conflict  over  the  operation  of  the  cotton-mills  in 
Moscow.  The  Bolshevist  commissaries  wanted  to 
dictate  to  the  co-operatives  how  the  factories  should 
be  operated,  but  very  soon  discovered  that  the 
co-operatives  were  not  to  be  trifled  with.  Lenin 
recognized  that  these  organizations  alone  were 
maintaining  life  in  Russia,  and,  as  he  himself 
has  frankly  admitted,  found  it  necessary  to  com- 
promise with  the  co-operatives,  which  he  describes 
as  "mass  organizations  inherited  from  capitalism." 
The  Bolsheviki  have  not  dared  to  attempt  to  apply 

1  See  Development  of  Russian  and  Siberian  Co-operatives,  Appendix  (j. 

2  Lenin,  The  Soviets  at  Work. 
21 


3io    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

their  principle  of  the  conhscation  of  property  to  the 
co-operatives.  Through  all  the  rack  and  ruin, 
therefore,  the  co-operatives  of  Russia  have  main- 
tained their  existence  and  grown.  Surely  no  fur- 
ther demonstration  of  the  organizing  ability  of  the 
Russian  people  is  necessary. 


VII 

The  energy  and  resourcefulness  of  the  Russian 
people,  as  shown  by  the  zemstvos  and  the  co- 
operatives, can  be  relied  upon  to  develop  the 
incalculably  great  resources  of  the  country,  once 
stable  and  orderly  government  is  established. 
More  than  a  third  of  all  the  forest  lands  of  the 
world  lie  within  the  boundaries  of  the  former  Rus- 
sian Empire.  Of  its  immense  area  of  8,660,000 
square  miles,  39  per  cent,  is  composed  of  forests. 
The  forest  lands  belonging  to  the  Russian  govern- 
ment, the  greater  part  of  which  have  not  been 
properly  surveyed,  amount  to  almost  a  billion  acres. 
The  total  area  of  the  forests  of  Russia  is  about 
3,150,000,000  acres.  In  European  Russia  alone 
there  are  about  400,000,000  acres  of  forest.  Ac- 
cording to  a  report  issued  by  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture  in  1914,  the  surveyed  forests  of  Siberia 
alone  amounted  to  more  than  731,000,000  acres.1 
The  total  forest  areas  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada  combined  amount  to  only  about  one-third 
the  acreage  of  Russia's  forests.  More  than  half 
of  the  forests  of  Asia  are  in  Siberia. 


1  Quoted   by   Goldstein,   Russia — Her  Economic  Past  and  Future, 
pp.  65-66. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     311 

It  is  quite  true,  of  course,  that,  as  pointed  out 
in  the  report  of  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Agriculture 
already  referred  to,  in  these  vast  forests  there  is 
a  good  deal  of  timber  that  is  commercially  valuable 
only  for  making  pulp,  matches,  and  the  like.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  are  immense  tracts  of  primeval 
forests  containing  centuries-old  timber  of  the  high- 
est quality  for  building  and  furniture-making. 
There  are  hundreds  of  millions  of  acres  of  cedar, 
pine,  fir,  birch,  oak,  spruce,  elm,  ash,  maple,  and 
other  valuable  woods.  In  his  book,  Our  Wealth, 
published  in  1910,  Bogdanov  called  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  world  was  facing  a  timber  famine 
and  that  the  colossal  forests  of  Russia  must  be  the 
principal  source  of  supply  for  the  world.  More 
recently  foreign  observers  have  given  serious  at- 
tention to  this  subject,  recognizing  that  in  her 
forests  Russia  has  the  means  of  supplying  the 
world's  demand  for  timber  and,  at  the  same  time, 
of  paying  off  her  indebtedness.  Thus  Professor 
Brennan,  of  the  University  of  Glasgow,  believes 
that  "it  would  be  possible  for  Russia,  in  no  distant 
future,  to  pay  off  the  whole  of  the  interest  on  her 
war  debts  merely  by  the  exploitation  of  her  forests 
alone."  l 

In  view  of  the  growing  scarcity  of  lumber  in  this 
country  the  desire  of  Russia  to  exchange  timber 
for  such  goods  as  we  can  supply  in  abundance 
is  of  vital  importance  to  us.  We  are  at  the  present 
time  finding  it  difficult  to  get  a  sufficient  supply 
of  print  paper.  As  these  pages  are  being  written, 
the    newspapers    are    discussing    the    shortage    of 

1  Sidelights  on  Rujia,  by  Hugh  Bnnnan,  pp.  33-34. 


312    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

paper  and  the  need  of  placing  restrictions  upon  the 
size  of  the  daily  newspapers  in  order  to  avert  a 
paper  famine.  At  the  same  time  the  cost  of 
lumber  for  building  has  increased  so  greatly  as  to 
become  a  very  serious  factor  in  the  housing  problem, 
while  our  railways  are  finding  it  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult to  obtain  a  sufficient  supply  of  ties  at  anything 
short  of  prohibitive  prices.  There  is  open  to  us 
in  Russia  a  supply  of  timber  sufficiently  large  to 
meet  our  requirements  for  a  period  long  enough 
to  grow  new  forests,  if  we  only  have  the  enterprise 
to  avail  ourselves  of  it. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  at  all  that  by  the  develop- 
ment of  her  timber  trade  Russia  can  pay  for  a  very 
considerable  part  of  the  goods  she  needs  to  import. 
This  will  go  far  toward  producing  a  favorable 
trade  balance  and  so  tend  to  the  stabilization  of 
the  markets  of  the  world.  Moreover,  by  a  wise 
policy  of  granting  forest  concessions  Russia  can 
secure  a  large  part  of  the  credit  she  needs.  This  is 
recognized  by  practically  every  Russian  economist 
and  statesman.  One  of  the  first  things  done  by 
Konovalov,  Minister  of  Trade  and  Industry  in  the 
Provisional  government,  was  to  appoint  a  special 
committee  of  experts  to  study  the  natural  resources 
of  northern  Russia,  and,  above  all,  the  development 
of  the  export  trade  in  timber. 

The  Svensk  Handelstidning,  of  Stockholm,  pub- 
lished on  April  3,  1919,  an  account  of  a  concession 
granted  by  the  Soviet  government  of  Russia  to  a 
Norwegian-American  syndicate  to  exploit  the  enor- 
mous resources  of  northern  Russia,  including  its 
timber-lands.     The  Swedish  paper  republished  the 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     313 

following  account  of  the  concession  from  the  official 
organ  of  the  Soviet  government,  Severnaya  Kom- 
muna: 

The  concession  first  comprises  the  establishment  and  opera- 
tion of  a  railway  line  of  normal  gage  for  general  traffic  from 
Ob  in  Siberia  to  the  west,  in  the  direction  of  the  town  of  Kotlas 
on  the  Duna  River,  and  from  there  two  main  tracks  to  Zvanka, 
where  the  Murman  Railway  joins  the  Petrograd-Vyatka- 
Siberia  Railway,  or  past  Zvanka  directly  to  Petrograd.  Be- 
sides, there  are  also  proposed  spur  tracks  to  the  town  of  Ustyug- 
Veliki  and  the  Nadyesdinski  mills.  The  railway  concession 
represents  lines  aggregating  about  3,000  versts,  approximately 
2,000  miles.  .  .  . 

The  concession  also  comprises  the  right  to  use  8,000,000 
dessiatines  (about  22,000.000  acres)  of  forest.  Of  these 
8,000,000  dessiatines  of  forest,  2,000,000  dessiatines  (5,500,000 
acres)  will  be  for  the  company's  own  needs  for  the  term  of 
eighty  years.  The  net  profit  from  these  2,000,000  dessiatines 
and  the  sawmills  and  factories  that  the  company  may  establish 
is  included  in  the  surplus  of  the  railway.  Of  the  remaining 
6,000,000  dessiatines  the  company  has  a  right  to  fell  the  whole 
district,  estimating  that  the  forests  are  renewed  every  one 
hundred  and  fifty  years.  1  he  concessions  for  these  6,000,000 
dessiatines  is  given  for  forty-eight  years.  According  to  the 
statutes,  the  company  may  hold  its  timber-lands  over  the 
whole  of  Russia.  As  to  the  6,000,000  dessiatines,  the  com- 
pany may  demand  that  the  districts  be  transferred  in  con- 
nected forests  of  up  to  500,000  dessiatines  (1,350,000  acres) 
for  the  establishment  of  special  enterprises,  according  to  the 
directions  of  the  company. 

The  company  will  have  the  right  to  use  the  soil  that  is  laid 
out  for  the  railway  which  is  nor  cultivated  or  common  land 
and  is  not  taken  up  by  other  railway  lines. 

The  company  has  the  right  to  use  all  live  lodes  found  on 
examination  of  the  lines.  The  company  pays  to  the  state 
one-half  copeck  per  pood  (36.1128  pounds)  for  ore  dug  out, 
v  ithout  regard  to  the  kind  of  ore.  The  company  also  lias  a 
right  to  establish  and  run  shipyards  and  ports,  to  open  steam- 


314    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

ship  lines,  to  get,  without  charge,  districts  for  the  establishment 
of  towns  and  villages.  All  such  undertakings  are  looked  upon 
as  parts  of  the  railway  project.  Further,  it  may  use  water- 
power  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  railway  line. 

The  railway  is  permitted  to  start  banking  enterprises  of  its 
own  at  all  railway  stations  and  in  neighboring  towns.  It  is  to 
be  observed,  however,  that  these  banking  enterprises  must 
not  take  cash  loans  on  interest. 

The  company  must  pay  to  the  Soviet  government  a  charge 
of  5  per  cent,  of  the  quotation  on  the  London  market  for  tim- 
ber cut,  while  the  charge  for  fuel  and  building  material  for 
local  use  is  according  to  local  prices.  Instead  of  paying  income 
and  industrial  taxe^,  the  company  pays  25  per  cent,  of  its 
net  profit,  but  no  minimum  sum  is  fixed.  When  necessary, 
the  company  must  procure  tonnage  of  10,000  to  20,000  tons. 

The  concession  is  granted  to  the  Russian,  Borissof,  and  the 
Norwegian,  Ganewitsch  (Hannevig),  who  has  American 
capital  behind  him.  If  the  Hannevig  group  does  not  assume 
the  undertaking,  the  concession  will  be  offered  on  the  inter- 
national financial  market.1 


To  grant  such  concessions  in  return  for  machinery 
and  manufactured  goods  has  been  recognized 
even  by  the  Bolsheviki,  as  a  necessary  and  legiti- 
mate policy  to  be  pursued  in  the  reconstruction  of 
Russia.  Thus  Arthur  Ransome,  the  English  writer 
whose  pro-Bolshevist  writings  have  been  exten- 
sively circulated  in  this  country  and  in  England, 
says  of  Krasin,  the  Soviet  Commissar  for  Trade 
and  Industry  and  president  of  the  Committee  for 
Supplying  the  Needs  of  the  Army :  "  He  recognized 
that  foreign  trade  on  any  large  scale  was  impossible 
until  their  transport  had  been  improved.  Russia 
proposed  to  do  her  paying  in  raw  material,  in  flaxy 

1  Commerce  Reports,  United  States  Department  of  Commerce, 
July  9,  1919. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     315 

timber,  etc.,  in  materials  of  which  she  had  great 
quantities,  although  she  could  not  bring  them  to  the 
ports  until  her  transport  should  be  restored.  It 
would,  therefore,  be  in  the  foreigner's  own  interest 
to  help  them  in  this  matter."  x  Even  more 
explicit  is  this  account  of  a  conversation  with 
Pavlovitch,  president  of  the  Committee  of  State 
Construction: 

"We  want  from  abroad  all  that  we  cannot  make  ourselves. 
We  want  a  hundred  thousand  versts  of  rails.  Now  we  have  to 
take  up  rails  in  one  place  to  lay  them  in  another.  We  want 
new  railways  built.  We  want  dredgers  for  our  canals  and 
river  works.     We  want  excavators." 

"And  how  do  you  expect  people  to  sell  you  these  things 
when  your  foreign  credit  is  not  worth  a  farthing?" 

"We  shall  pay  in  concessions,  giving  foreigners  ike  right  to 
take  raw  materials.  Timber,  actual  timber,  is  as  good  as  credit. 
We  have  huge  areas  of  forest  in  the  north,  and  every  country  in 
Europe  needs  timber.  Let  that  be  our  currency  for  foreign  pur- 
chases. We  are  prepared  to  say,  '  You  build  this,  or  give  us 
that,  and  we  will  give  you  the  right  to  take  so  much  timber 
for  yourselves.'  And  so  on.  And  concessions  of  other  kinds 
also.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  negotiations  are  now  proceeding 
with  a  foreign  firm  for  the  building  of  a  railway  from  the  Obi 
to  Kotlas."  2 

The  testimony  of  Mr.  Ransome  is  corroborated 
by  Mr.  William  C.  Bullitt,  in  a  report  made  by 
him  to  President  Wilson  and  the  other  American 
plenipotentiaries  in  Paris.  The  text  of  the  report, 
made  public  by  him,  contains  the  following  illumi- 
nating paragraph: 

The  Soviet  government  recognizes  \ery  clearly  the  unde- 
sirability  of  granting  concessions  to  foreigners,  and  is  ready  to 

1  Ransome,  Russia  in  1919,  p.  154. 

2  Ransome,  up.  cit.,  p.  105. 


316    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

do  so  only  because  of  necessity.  The  members  of  the  govern- 
ment realize  that  the  lifting  of  the  blockade  will  be  illusory 
unless  the  Soviet  government  is  able  to  establish  credits  in 
foreign  countries,  particularly  the  United  States  and  England, 
so  that  goods  may  be  bought  in  those  countries.  For  Russia 
to-day  is  in  a  position  to  export  only  a  little  gold,  a  little 
platinum,  a  little  hemp,  flax,  and  wood.  These  exports  will 
be  utterly  inadequate  to  pay  for  the  vast  quantity  of  imports 
which  Russia  needs.  Russia  must,  therefore,  obtain  credit 
at  any  price.  The  members  of  the  Soviet  government  realize 
fully  that  as  a  preliminary  step  to  the  obtaining  of  credit  the 
payment  of  foreign  debts  must  be  resumed,  and,  therefore, 
are  ready  to  pay  such  debts.  But  even  though  these  debts 
are  paid,  the  members  of  the  Soviet  government  believe  that 
they  will  not  be  able  to  borrow  money  in  foreign  countries 
on  any  mere  promise  to  pay.  They  believe,  therefore,  that 
they  will  have  to  grant  concessions  in  Russia  to  foreigners  in 
order  to  obtain  immediate  credit.  They  desire  to  avoid  this 
expedient  if  in  any  way  it  shall  be  possible,  but  if  absolutely 
necessary  they  may  be  ready  to  adopt  it  in  order  to  begin  the 
restoration  of  the  normal  life  of  the  country.1 

Finally,  there  is  the  note  addressed  by  Tchi- 
cherine,  the  Soviet  Commissioner  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  the  Entente  Allies  on  February  4,  1919. 
The  note  set  forth  the  willingness  of  the  Soviet 
government  to  recognize  all  the  national  debts, 
interest  on  which  it  is  proposed  to  guarantee  in 
raw  materials,  "in  view  of  Russia's  difficult  finan- 
cial position  and  her  unsatisfactory  credit."  The 
note  continued :  "  In  view  of  the  interest  continually 
expressed  by  foreign  capital  in  the  question  of  the 
exploitation  for  its  advantage  of  the  natural  resources 
of  Russia,  the  Soviet  government  is  ready  to  give  to 

1  The  Bullitt  Mission  to  Russia.  Testimony  before  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations,  United  States  Senate,  of  William  C.  Bullitt, 
New  York,  19 19,  p.  64. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     317 

subjects  of  the  Powers  of  the  Entente  mineral,  timber, 
and  other  concessions,  to  be  defined  in  detail,  on 
condition  that  the  economic  and  social  structure  of 
Soviet  Russia  shall  not  be  touched  by  the  internal 
arrangements  of  these  concessions."  l 

There  is  an  element  of  irony  in  these  naive  pro- 
posals: the  success  of  this  anti-capitalistic  Soviet 
Utopia  is  to  be  assured  by — capitalism  and  capi- 
talist enterprise!  In  order  to  establish  communism 
capitalism  has  to  be  invoked  and  the  country's 
greatest  sources  of  natural  wealth  must  be  leased 
for  exploitation  by  foreign  capitalists.  To  permit 
them  to  be  exploited  by  Russian  capital  would  be 
wrong,  but  it  is  all  right  to  let  them  be  exploited 
by  foreign  capital.  What  a  grotesquery  this  is — 
a  communist  Utopia  parasitically  dependent  upon 
the  capitalist  enterprise  of  other  nations!  The 
plan  of  the  Soviet  government  amounts  to  nothing 
less  than  that.  It  is  a  confession  that  in  the  present 
stage  of  her  economic  development  it  is  impossible 
for  Russia  to  realize  the  anti-capitalistic,  com- 
munistic ideals  which  alone  can  justify  the  Bol- 
shevist experiment.  There  could  be  no  more 
complete  confession  of  the  bankruptcy  of  Bol- 
shevism. 

Russia's  exports  of  timber  have  grown  steadily 
year  by  year.  In  the  decade  1904-13  they  rose 
in  value  from  73,200,000  rubles  to  164,900,000 
rubles — an  increase  of  about  125  per  cent.  Next 
to  wheat  it  was  the  most  important  item  in  her 
export  trade.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  during 
the     nineteenth     century     Russia's     total     exports 

1  Idem,  p.  46.     Italics  arc  mine. — J.  S. 


3i8    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

multiplied  twenty-one  times,  and  her  grain  exports 
forty-four  times,  her  timber  exports  multiplied 
one  hundred  and  twenty-six  times.1  It  is  inter- 
esting also  to  observe  that  while  the  timber  trade 
of  the  United  States  has  shown  a  large  excess  of 
imports  over  exports,  the  Russian  trade  has  shown 
a  steadily  increasing  excess  of  exports  over  imports. 
In  the  ten-year  period  1904-13  America's  excess  of 
timber  imports  over  exports  totaled  $361,000,000; 
Russia's  balance  of  exports  over  imports  totaled 
$576,900,000.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  for 
many  years  to  come  Russia  will  be  the  principal 
timber-exporting  country  of  the  world. 


VIII 

The  vast  mineral  resources  of  Russia  have  as  yet 
only  been  scratched  on  the  surface,  as  it  were. 
Take,  for  example,  coal.  The  total  annual  pro- 
duction of  coal  for  the  years  1912-13  averaged 
34,000,000  metric  tons.  This  represents  a  per- 
capita  production  of  0.2  metric  ton  only.  How 
low  this  is  can  be  seen  from  the  following  com- 
parative figures: 

PER-CAPITA    PRODUCTION   OF   COAL    IN   VARIOUS    COUNTRIES 

Country  Metric  Tons 

Austria-Hungary 1 .0 

France I  .o 

Belgium 3.0 

Germany 3.8 

United  States 5.1 

United  Kingdom 6.0 

1  Sack,  America's  Possible  Share  in  the  Economic  Future  of  Russia, 
p.  10. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     319 

The  per-capita  production  of  coal  in  Austria- 
Hungary  was  five  times  greater  than  that  of  Russia, 
while  that  of  the  United  States  was  twenty-seven 
times  greater.1  Of  the  total  production  of  34,000,- 
000  metric  tons,  about  23,000,000,  or  70  per  cent., 
were  mined  in  the  Donetz  Basin  and  the  neighbor- 
ing territory  along  the  Sea  of  Azov.  The  coal 
area  here  comprises  something  like  5,000  square 
miles.  Shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  World 
War  a  geological  survey  was  made  of  the  coal-beds 
of  this  district  and  the  unmined  coal  was  estimated 
at  over  sixty  billion  tons.  This  coal  is  of  excellent 
quality. 

Although  the  coal  mined  in  Siberia  annually 
averages  only  about  100,000,000  poods,2  of  which 
seven-tenths  is  consumed  on  the  railways,  coal 
is  found  in  great  abundance  all  through  Siberia 
from  the  Urals  to  the  Pacific.  The  greater  part 
of  the  present  output  is  mined  from  the  Anzhersk 
mines,  near  Tomsk,  and  the  Tcheremkhovsk  mines, 
northwest  of  Irkutsk.  In  both  these  districts  the 
coal  is  of  very  high  quality.  Geological  surveys 
have  shown  that  the  coal  deposits  of  the  Kuznetsk 
region  are  far  richer  than  those  of  the  Donetz 
region  upon  which  Russia  has  heretofore  mainly 
depended.  The  following  account  of  the  coal 
resources  of  Siberia  is  based  upon  Golovachev's 
Economic  Geography  of  Siberia,  published  in  1914:3 

1  These  comparisons  are  taken  from  Goldstein,  op.  at.,  p.  43. 

2  Approximately   1,800,000  short  tons— a  pood  finals  ;/>.  1    pounds. 

3  The  translation  was  made  and  published  hy  the  Russian  Division 
of  the  United  States  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce, 
April,  IQIQ,  recent  figures  being  inserted  and  other  changes  made  to 
bnn  ■  the  text  up  to  date. 


520    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

Coal  also  is  found  in  great  abundance  and  coal  strata  have 
been  definitely  ascertained  in  all  parts  of  Siberia.  In  the 
Semipalatinsk  Province,  near  Pavlodar,  95  versts  (63  miles) 
from  the  river  Irtysh,  are  the  Ekibas-Tuzski  coal-mines, 
containing  up  to  6,500,000,000  poods  (117,000,000  short  tons) 
of  coal.  Although  this  coal  is  characterized  by  fineness  and 
dust,  nevertheless,  owing  to  the  exhaustion  of  the  forests  in 
this  part  of  western  Siberia,  there  is  a  very  good  market  for 
it  for  the  steamers  on  the  Irtysh  and  the  divisions  of  the  rail- 
road lying  near  by.  At  the  present  time,  however,  these  mines 
are  scarcely  working.  They  are  connected  with  the  Irtysh 
by  a  narrow-gage  railroad.  Furthermore,  in  the  Kirghiz 
steppe  there  are  known  deposits  of  coal;  for  instance,  the 
Karagandinsk,  between  Akmolinsk  and  Karkaralinsk;  Kuut- 
chekinsk,  not  far  from  the  former;  Dzhamantuzsk,  140  versts 
(93  miles)  to  the  south;  Pavlodar,  55  versts  (36  miles)  from 
the  Irtysh;  Zaisansk,  and  others.  The  coal  of  the  Kirghiz 
steppe  is  not  of  high  quality.  It  is  hard  and  does  not  coke 
and  the  strata  are  crooked. 

In  the  Tomsk  Government  the  Kuznetsk  basin  is  noted 
for  the  abundance  of  its  coal.  There  is  found  the  so-called 
Kuznetsk  coal  valley,  which  is  about  400  versts  (265  miles) 
wide  and  contains  not  less  than  40,000  square  versts  (17,600 
square  miles).  All  over  this  area,  along  the  banks  of  the 
Tom  and  other  less  important  rivers  that  flow  through  it, 
there  are  clearly  visible  outcroppings  of  coal,  beginning  with 
the  deposits  nearest  to  the  line  of  the  Siberian  Railway  along 
the  river  Balakhonka,  40  versts  (18  miles)  from  the  line. 
Whole  successions  of  strata  extend  almost  uninterruptedly  for 
380  versts  (252  miles)  to  the  south,  where  they  terminate 
in  the  rich  deposits  along  the  rivers  Tchumysh,  Kondoma, 
and  Tesha.  Here  are  found  the  Koltchugin,  Anzhersk, 
Sudzhensk,  and  Lebedyansk  mines — the  last  three  near 
Tomsk,  on  the  line  of  the  railway.  The  Anzhersk  mines  are 
now  the  most  important  producers  of  coal,  having  produced 
20,000,000  poods  (360,000  short  tons)  in  191 2.  The  coal 
obtained  in  the  Sudzhensk  and  Anzhersk  mines  is  consumed 
chiefly  on  the  western  division  of  the  Siberian  Trunk  Line, 
but  it  is  not  sufficient  to  cover  the  entire  needs  of  this  division; 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     321 

hence  it  will  be  necessary  to  work  the  Koltchugin  mines  more 
actively  and  to  connect  them  with  the  Trans-Siberian  Rail- 
way. In  this  region  the  coal  strata  reach  the  thickness  of 
2  sazhens  (14  feet)  and  are  almost  horizontal.  The  extent  of 
the  strata  has  been  followed  for  20  versts  (13  miles)  and  the 
total  quantity  of  coal  determined  by  investigations  as  amount- 
ing to  several  billions  of  poods;  and  this  only  a  small  part  of 
the  Kuznetsk  Valley,  which  holds  in  its  bosom  almost  inex- 
haustible supplies  of  mineral  fuel. 

Thanks  to  its  quality  and  the  nearness  of  the  mines  to  the 
Trans-Siberian  Railway,  the  Koltchugin  coal  will  undoubtedly 
find  a  market  very  rapidly  on  this  railway,  especially  in  the 
eastern  part,  and,  it  goes  without  saying,  on  the  Altai  Rail- 
road.1 The  Koltchugin  coal  is  distinguished  by  its  high  qual- 
ity; it  is  semi-volatile,  yields  very  little  ash,  and  develops 
8,000  heat  units.  One  of  its  strata  yields  up  to  60  per  cent, 
of  metallurgical  coke.  The  Anzhersk  and  Sudzhensk  coals 
are  not  so  good  as  this.  The  cost2  of  the  Koltchugin  coal  at 
the  mine  is  not  in  excess  of  4.64  copecks  per  pood  (#1.32  per 
short  ton),  and  with  delivery  as  far  west  as  Kurgan  a  pood 
costs  10.33  copecks  ($2.90  per  ton),  so  that  for  the  western 
division  of  the  Siberian  Trunk  Line  it  will  be  more  advantage- 
ous not  only  than  the  Ural  coal,  but  also  than  the  Sudzhensk 
and  Anzhersk.  In  the  Kuznetsk  basin  are  also  notable  the 
Batcharsk  and  Koltansk  coal-mines. 

In  the  Yenisei  Government  coal  has  been  found  in  many 
places — in  the  north  along  the  river  Kureika,  the  right  affluent 
of  the  Yenisei  in  the  Turukhansk  region;  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Abakan  in  the  Minusinsk  Uyezd  (Mt.  Izykh);  near 
Minusinsk  (Black  Hills  mines  of  the  Balandins);  along  the 
Tchulym;  and  half-way  down  the  Angara.  The  Izykh  coal 
is  the  best  of  the  east  Siberian  coals.  The  average  thickness 
of  the  strata  is  3  to  4  arshins  (7  to  9^  feet)  and  the  yield  in 
coke  is  60  per  cent.  Mt.  Izykh  is  situated  about  35  versts 
(23  miles)  from  the  mouth  of  the  Abakan,  in  the  populated 
region  of  the   Uyezd  and   its  deposits  are  very  convenient  for 

'The  Altai  Railroad  commenced  ro  operate  in  1916. 
2  Before    rhe    war.     Conversions    have    been    madr    at    the    normal 
exchange  rate  for  rhe  ruble  (51.5  cents). 


322    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

mining  and  exporting.  The  road  which  is  projected  from 
Atchinsk  to  Minusinsk1  will  of  course  avail  itself  preferably 
of  the  local  coal. 

In  the  Irkutsk  Government,  120  versts  (80  miles)  to  the 
northwest  of  Irkutsk,  extends  the  Tcheremkhovsk  coal  basin, 
about  40  to  50  versts  (27  to  33  miles)  long  and  containing  up 
to  12,000,000  metric  tons.  The  Tcheremkhovsk  coal  develops 
about  7,000  heat  units  and  yields  up  to  50  per  cent.  coke. 
This  coal  serves  as  fuel  for  the  adjoining  divisions  of  the 
Siberian  and  Trans-Baikal  railways,  and  also  for  the  steamers 
of  Lake  Baikal  and  for  several  private  factories  in  Irkutsk. 

In  the  Trans-Baikal,  although  coal  is  found  in  many  places, 
it  is  generally  (with  very  few  exceptions)  brown  coal  and 
lignite  and  must  be  used  soon  after  mining,  since  it  rapidly 
disintegrates.  The  Amur  Province  is  poor  in  coal  (although 
some  is  found  on  the  Bureya  and  near  the  stanitsa — Cossack 
village — of  Innokentevskaya,  about  half-way  down  the  river 
Amur,  and  in  other  localities);  nevertheless  this  coal  is  of 
good  quality  and  very  satisfactory  as  fuel.  In  the  Maritime 
Province  the  following  deposits  are  known:  The  Sutchansk 
deposit  on  the  river  Sutchan,  40  versts  from  the  Gulf  of  Na- 
khadka,  containing  a  fair  amount  of  coal  and  having  a  produc- 
tion of  about  12,000,000  poods  (217,000  short  tons).  A  branch 
line  has  been  constructed  connecting  this  mine  with  the  Ussuri 
Railway.  Another  is  near  the  natural  boundary  of  the  Bara- 
bash,  a  third  on  the  Gulf  of  Amur,  a  fourth  near  Khabarovsk, 
and  a  fifth  near  Nikolaevsk,  a  sixth  at  Lake  Zhanka,  and  still 
others  in  other  localities.  In  the  Yakutsk  Province  coal  has 
been  found  along  the  Lena  and  Aldan  rivers;  in  Kamchatka, 
on  the  shores  of  the  Penzhinsk  and  the  Gizhiginsk  bays;  in 
Saghalien  along  the  entire  western  coast,  the  best  coal  being 
that  of  the  Duisk  mines. 

Coal  is  also  found  in  great  abundance  in  Russian 
Saghalien,  much  of  it  being  of  very  excellent 
quality.  So  far  as  surveyed  by  the  Russian  Geo- 
logical   Commission,    the    coal    area    of   northern 

1  This  railroad  has  since  been  completed. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     323 

Saghalien  exceeds  that  of  the  Donetz  region, 
extending  over  6,000  square  miles.  The  Russian 
engineer,  P.  I.  Polevoy,  who  made  the  survey, 
believes  that  the  volume  of  unmined  coal  in  Rus- 
sian Saghalien  far  exceeds  that  of  the  Donetz  Basin 
and  its  surroundings.1 

It  must  always  be  borne  in  mind,  in  considering 
the  mineral  resources  of  Russia,  that  there  has  been 
no  really  comprehensive  survey  of  them  as  yet. 
The  surveys  made  in  recent  years  have  been  much 
more  scientific  than  those  made  earlier,  but  they 
still  leave  much  to  be  desired.  The  chief  difficulty, 
however,  lies  in  the  fact  that,  owing  to  the  vastness 
of  the  territory  to  be  covered,  so  little  has  actually 
been  surveyed.  Great  as  the  mineral  resources 
already  surveyed  undoubtedly  are,  they  represent 
only  a  part — perhaps  even  a  relatively  small  part — 
of  the  total.  It  is  well  known,  for  example,  that 
there  are  many  large  deposits  of  iron  ore  which  are 
as  yet  undeveloped.  The  average  annual  pro- 
duction of  iron  ore  in  the  years  191 2  and  191 3  was 
8,900,000  metric  tons,  of  which  71  per  cent. — 
6,300,000  metric  tons — came  from  the  Donetz 
Basin  and  vicinity.  Practically  all  of  the  remainder, 
29  per  cent.,  came  from  the  Ural  region.  Owing 
to  the  fact  that  until  recently  this  region  has 
lacked  suitable  coal,  its  iron  industry  has  developed 
very  slowly.  It  is  known,  however,  that  its  iron- 
ore  deposits  greatly  exceed  those  of  the  Donetz 
region  in  magnitude  and  quality.  Ore  of  very 
high  quality  is  found  in  enormous  quantity  in  the 

1  Vide  the  confidential  report  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Office  referred 
to  in  th'  preceding  chapter. 


324    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

district  of  Zlatonst.  It  is  estimated  that  Mt. 
Magnitnaya,  in  the  Government  of  Orenburg, 
has  more  than  a  hundred  million  tons  of  mag- 
netic iron  ore,  and  Mt.  Blagodat  fully  as  much. 
In  the  vicinity  of  Nijni-Tagil  and  of  Bogoslov 
are  immense  deposits  of  iron  ore  of  a  very  high 
grade.  Most  of  these  rich  deposits  of  ore  are 
quite  accessible,  and,  now  that  an  abundant  supply 
of  coke-producing  coal  can  be  had  from  the 
Kuznetsk  mines  the  rapid  development  of  iron 
mining  in  the  Ural  region  may  be  confidently 
predicted. 

There  has  been  very  little  iron  mining  in  Siberia 
as  yet,  owing  principally  to  lack  of  capital,  the 
absence  of  a  strong  local  demand,  and  the  poor 
transportation  facilities.  The  iron-ore  deposits 
already  surveyed  are  numerous  and  extensive, 
a  great  deal  of  the  ore  being  of  a  very  high  grade. 
Perhaps  the  best  known  of  these  are  the  big  deposits 
of  magnetic  ore  near  Kuznetsk,  which  are  quite 
close  to  splendid  coal-supplies,  the  Koltchugin 
mines  in  the  Altai  and  the  magnetic-ore  deposits 
near  the  Gulf  of  St.  Olga,  on  the  Maritime  coast, 
for  working  which  coal  could  be  economically 
brought  from  Saghalien,  where  the  production  cost 
is  very  low.  The  following  summary  by  Golova- 
chev  gives  a  fairly  good  idea  of  the  iron-ore  deposits 
of  Siberia  thus  far  surveyed:  ] 

The  presence  of  iron  ores  has  been  noted  in  numerous  regions 
of  Siberia.  In  the  Tobolsk  Government,  near  Tyumen,  there 
is  a  spathic  iron  ore  containing  30  per  cent,  of  iron.  In  the 
Semipalatinsk  Province,  in  the  Karkaralinsk  Uyezd,  there  are 

1  See  foot-note  on  p.  319. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     325 

known  to  be  enormous  outcroppings  of  these  ores  in  the  form 
of  two  mountains,  Togai  and  Ken-Tibe,  containing  up  to  70 
per  cent,  of  pure  iron.  In  general  in  the  Kirghiz  steppe  more 
than  twenty  deposits  of  iron  ore  are  known,  in  some  cases 
near  to  layers  of  coal.  In  the  Tomsk  Government,  in  the 
Kuznetsk  Uyezd,  on  the  river  Telbesa,  which  is  a  right  tributary 
of  the  Kondoma,  an  affluent  of  the  Tom,  not  far  from  Kuznetsk, 
very  rich  deposits  of  magnetic  and  red-iron  ore  have  long  been 
discovered  containing  more  than  65  per  cent,  of  pure  iron. 
In  these  deposits  there  are  up  to  100,000,000  poods  (1,800,000 
short  tons)  of  ore,  along  with  an  outcrop  of  good  coal  at  Koltan, 
20  to  30  versts  (13  to  20  miles)  away. 

In  the  Yenisei  Government  iron  is  found  in  the  Yeniseisk 
and  especially  in  the  Minusinsk  Uyezds,  in  the  upper  course 
of  the  river  Abakan.  The  iron  content  in  the  Abakan  deposits 
runs  as  high  as  70  per  cent.  Furthermore,  in  the  Minusinsk 
Uyezd  there  is  iron  in  the  Irbensk  crown  lands,  along  the  right 
affluents  of  the  Tuba,  along  the  Kizir,  Irba,  etc.  The  iron  is  a 
magnetite  with  an  iron  content  of  64  to  67  per  cent.  It  is 
very  difficult  of  access.  The  presence  of  iron  ore  has  been 
noted  also  in  other  parts  of  the  Minusinsk  Uyezd. 

Numerous  deposits  of  iron  are  also  found  in  the  Irkutsk 
Government,  in  the  Nizhneudinsk  Uyezd.  There  are  the 
Nikolaevsk  works  near  the  Angara,  where  the  ore  runs  49  to 
65  per  cent,  iron,  along  the  affluents  of  the  Ilim,  on  the  south- 
eastern shore  of  Baikal,  and  in  other  places. 

The  Trans-Baikal  also  is  rich  in  iron.  The  Petrovsk  works 
should  be  noted  in  the  Verkhneudinsk  Uyezd.  The  Amur 
Province  is  not  rich  in  iron.  The  strata  of  brown-iron  ore, 
found  in  the  region  round  about  Nikolaevsk,  containing  43 
per  cent,  of  iron,  and  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Amur,  160 
versts  (106  miles)  from  Sofisk,  are  considered  the  most  promis- 
ing. On  the  other  hand,  the  Maritime  Province  contains  a 
region  very  rich  in  iron,  between  the  Gulfs  of  St.  Olga  and  St. 
Vladimir.  Here  is  found  a  magnetic-iron  ore,  with  56  to  61 
per  cent.  iron.  The  Byelogorsk  deposit,  12  versts  (8  miles) 
from  the  Gulf  of  St.  Olga,  should  be  especially  mentioned. 
Coal  for  smelting  this  iron  could  easily  be  obtained  from 
Saghalien.     There  is  also  iron  in  Kamchatka. 


326    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

The  average  annual  production  of  copper  in 
Russia  for  the  years  1902-03  was,  in  round  figures, 
9,000  tons.  A  decade  later,  1912-13,  it  was  almost 
four  times  as  much — 34,000  tons.  About  one-half 
of  this  came  from  the  Ural  region.  There  is  an 
abundance  of  copper  in  the  Akmolinsk  and  Semi- 
palatinsk  provinces,  though  the  ores  are  not  of  a 
high  grade,  not  running  above  10  per  cent.  The 
fact  that  the  ore  deposits  are  close  to  good  coal- 
fields, the  increasing  railroad  facilities,  and  the 
nearness  to  the  industrial  centers  of  European 
Russia  are  all  factors  which  make  possible  the 
profitable  working  of  these  copper  deposits.  The 
Altai  region,  in  the  Tomsk  Government,  has  been 
noted  for  its  rich  copper  deposits  since  the  early 
part  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Numerous  other 
deposits  of  copper  have  been  surveyed  in  Siberia, 
notably  near  Minusinsk,  in  the  southeastern  part 
of  the  Yenisei  Government;  along  the  river  Uda, 
in  the  Irkutsk  Government;  in  the  Trans-Baikal, 
along  the  river  Khilk,  and  in  Kamchatka.  Not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  up  to  the  present  time  its 
copper  output  has  been  insignificant,  its  deposits 
of  that  metal  are  enormous.  An  American  mining 
engineer,  writing  to  The  Vladivostok  Echo,  calls 
Siberia  "unquestionably  the  world's  greatest  store- 
house of  copper  as  well  as  of  gold."  * 

The  annual  production  of  gold  from  1910  to  191 3 
amounted  to  about  one-fifteenth  of  the  total  gold 
production  of  the  world  and  was  valued  at  $30,000,- 
000.     Of  the  3,635  poods  which  was  the  average 

1  Quoted  in  Weehly  Bulletin,  Canadian  Department  of  Trade  and 
Commerce,  Ottawa,  September  15,  1919 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     327 

production  for  the  years  1912  and  1913,  Siberia 
supplied  about  3,000  poods,  or  approximately  80 
per  cent.  The  following  table,  based  on  the  data 
of  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Finance,  shows  the 
amount  of  pure  gold  delivered  at  the  state  and 
private  laboratories  from  1908  to  191 5: 


Eastern   Siberia 

Western  Siberia 

Total 

Years 

Poods 

Troy 
Pounds 

Poods 

Troy 
Pounds 

Poods 

Troy 
Pounds 

1908 

1,890 
2,220 
2,487 
2,539 
2,534 
2,687 

3,132 
2,512 

82,946 

97,429 
109,147 
111,429 

111,210 
117,924 

137,454 
HO.244 

269 
291 
310 

430 
365 
372 
387 
248 

11,806 
12,771 
13,605 
18,871 
16,019 
16,326 
16.984 
10,884 

2,159 
2,511 

2,797 
2,969 
2,899 
3,o59 
3,519 
2,760 

94,752 
110,200 
122,752 
130,300 
127,229 
134,250 
154,438 

1909 

1910 

191 1 

1912 

1913 

1914 

1QI5 

Russia  produces  more  than  94  per  cent,  of  all  the 
platinum  of  the  world.  The  average  annual  pro- 
duction of  this  important  precious  metal  in  the 
three-year  period  191 2-14  was  280,400  troy  ounces, 
as  compared  with  14,800  troy  ounces  produced  in 
British  Columbia.  In  percentages  of  the  total 
production  the  figures  are:  Russia,  94. 1  percent.; 
British  Columbia,  5.3  per  cent.;  and  all  other 
countries,  0.6  per  cent.1  While  the  production  of 
platinum  fell  off  during  the  war,  and  there  was  some 
talk  of  the  platinum  fields  becoming  exhausted, 
the  decline  in  the  output  was  due  to  other  causes. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  due  largely  to  lack  of 
machinery.     A    number    of    important    discoveries 

1  Goldstein,  op.  ci!.,  p.  59. 


328    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

of  platinum  have  been  made  during  the  past  five 
years.  Russia  is  also  the  largest  producer  of  man- 
ganese ore  in  the  world.  In  the  three  years  191 1— 13 
Russia  exported  924,000  metric  tons  of  manganese, 
which  was  more  than  the  combined  total  exports 
of  British  India  and  Brazil,  the  two  next  most 
important  manganese-producing  countries.  Other 
minerals  are  found  in  abundance  in  various  parts  of 
Russia,  including  silver,  lead,  zinc,  tin,  nickel, 
mercury,  antimony,  and  sulphur. 

The  decline  in  the  production  of  oil  has  led  many 
persons  to  believe  that  this  important  Russian 
industry  is  destined  to  dwindle  to  insignificant 
proportions  in  the  near  future.  This  pessimistic 
view  is  not  at  all  justified  by  the  facts  at  present 
available.  It  is  true  that  whereas  the  annual  pro- 
duction of  oil  in  1902-03  was  10,800,000  tons  as 
against  9,200,000  in  the  years  1912-13,  this  was 
only  in  part  due  to  the  exhaustion  of  certain  wells. 
It  was  due  still  more  to  the  regulations  restricting 
the  output  adopted  by  the  Czar's  government. 
Approximately  85  per  cent,  of  the  oil  production 
of  Russia  up  to  the  year  1914  came  from  the  four 
great  oil-fields  of  the  Baku  district.  It  has  been 
alleged  by  Milyutin  and  other  Bolshevik  officials 
that  these  oil-fields  have  been  "ruined  by  the 
English."  There  is  probably  not  very  much  truth 
in  this  charge,  but  even  if  it  were  wholly  true  the 
oil  industry  of  Russia  would  very  soon  recover 
and  make  great  progress.  Judging  by  the  declin- 
ing output,  the  Baku  oil-fields  were  rapidly  becom- 
ing exhausted  before  the  war  began  in  1914.  Other 
fields  were  being  developed,  however,  notably  at 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     329 

Binagadi,  Sourakhani,  Grozni,  Siratoi,  and  Emba, 
all  of  them  with  a  rapidly  increasing  output.  New 
and  extensive  oil-fields  have  been  opened  up  near 
the  coast  of  the  Caspian  Sea  along  the  Trans- 
Caspian  Railway,  in  Trans-Baikal,  and  elsewhere. 
The  immense  oil  deposits  of  northern  Saghalien 
have  not  yet  been  developed.  The  latter  field 
alone  covers  some  1,500  square  miles  and  is  capable 
of  an  output  exceeding  that  of  the  Baku  district.1 
Neither  Japan  nor  China  is  well  supplied  with  oil  2 
and  both  countries  afford  a  ready  market  for  the 
Saghalien  oil  industry  whenever  it  shall  be  de- 
veloped. 

IX 

No  attempt  has  been  made  in  these  pages  to 
give  anything  like  a  comprehensive  summary  of 
Russia's  economic  resources.  No  account  has 
been  taken  of  her  great  export  trade  in  furs  and 
hides,  her  enormous  output  of  flax  and  wool,  or  her 
production  of  raw  silk  and  cotton.  In  connection 
with  her  need  of  credit,  upon  a  scale  of  unprec- 
edented vastness,  attention  has  been  given  to 
certain  of  her  resources  by  which  the  credit  she 
needs  can  be  secured.     Only  the  most  casual  men- 

1  "  Our  half  of  the  Saghalien  abounds  in  oil.  Natural  oil  leakages, 
in  the  form  of  pools  and  lakes,  arc  found  along  the?  eastern  coast  of  the 
island  on  a  stretch  of  280  versts,  beginning  from  the  extreme  northern 
end.  The  oil  area  of  our  Saghalien  is  estimated  at  3,000  square  versts. 
The  Saghalien  oil  is  not  inferior  to  Baku  oil,  as  its  kerosene  yield 
exceeds  40  per  cent.  Owing  to  the  nature  of  the  local  oil-wcllings, 
the  production  of  oil  on  the  Saghalien  should  be  considerably  cheaper 
than  in  the  Caucasus."  From  a  confidential  report  to  the  Russian 
Foreign  Office,  previously  quoted. 

2  Japan  imports  about  60  per  cent,  of  the  oil  she  consumes. 


330    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

tion  has  been  made  of  the  almost  unlimited  possi- 
bilities of  her  agriculture  and  her  fisheries,  for 
example.  We  have  considered  some  of  Russia's 
great  natural  resources  in  connection  with  her 
desire  for  credit,  partly  because  those  resources 
include  some  of  the  things  we  most  need  and  must 
buy,  and  partly  because  they  afford  the  best  pos- 
sible security  for  credit,  from  the  points  of  view 
of  both  debtor  and  creditor. 

Five  years  of  war  and  revolution  have  almost 
ruined  the  productive  machinery  of  Russia.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  revolution  in  the  consciousness 
of  the  people  has  developed  new  ideals  and  new 
standards  of  living.  The  great  mass  of  the  Russian 
people  will  never  again  be  content  to  live  as  they 
lived  in  pre-war  days.  The  war  itself  was  a  revo- 
lution from  this  point  of  view.  As  one  very  com- 
petent and  wise  observer  reminds  us:  "Some 
millions  of  men,  who  at  home  had  been  accustomed 
to  eat  meat  only  half  a  dozen  times  a  year,  were 
now  receiving  a  liberal  ration  of  it  every  day  at 
the  front  and  in  the  barracks.  During  the  session 
of  191 5  the  Minister  of  Agriculture  startled  the 
Duma  with  figures  providing  that  if  the  consump- 
tion of  meat  continued  at  the  then  prevailing  rate, 
and  nothing  were  done  to  stimulate  production, 
within  three  or  four  years  not  a  single  head  of 
cattle  would  be  left  in  the  country."  x  The  pri- 
vation and  misery  endured  under  the  Bolsheviki 
have  not  obliterated  the  lesson  thus  learned.  On 
the  contrary,  throughout  the  whole  period  of  hunger 
and   suffering  the   masses   have   been   promised   a 

1  Wilcox,  Russia's  Ruin,  p.  21. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     331 

future  brighter  and  richer  than  anything  they  have 
ever  known.  Russia  becomes,  in  consequence  of 
these  things,  the  world's  greatest  potential  market 
for  machinery  and  manufactured  goods  and  one  of 
its  most  important  fields  for  investment. 

This  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  United 
States.  Before  the  World  War  we  were  a  debtor 
nation,  our  indebtedness  abroad  amounting  to  not 
less  than  five  billion  dollars.  At  the  present  time 
we  are  a  creditor  nation,  foreign  governments  and 
peoples  owing  us  not  less  than  ten  billion  dollars.1 
In  the  year  ending  June  30,  1914,  our  exports 
amounted  to  #2,379,000,000  and  our  trade  balance 
was  about  #500,000,000.  In  the  year  ending 
June  30,  191 9,  we  exported  goods  to  the  value  of 
well  over  #7,000,000,000  as  against  imports  valued 
at  a  trifle  over  #3,000,000,000.  The  trade  balance 
in  our  favor  was,  therefore,  well  over  #4,000,000,000, 
or  eight  times  that  of  the  year  1913-14.  It  will  be 
a  long  time  before  the  full  significance  of  the 
revolutionary  changes  indicated  by  these  figures 
is  recognized,  even  by  our  financiers.  One  fact  is, 
however,  quite  apparent,  namely,  the  fact  of 
American  leadership  in  international  commerce 
and  finance.  That  leadership  brings  with  it  a  very 
great  responsibility.  Our  obligation  to  aid  in 
rebuilding  the  world  is  as  great  as  was  our  obliga- 
tion to  aid  in  carrying  the  war  to  a  victorious  end. 
The  leadership  of  the  world's  commerce  and 
finance  which  events  have  thrust  upon  us,  and  the 
great    responsibilities   attendant   thereon,   calls   for 

1  Address  by  Thomas  T.  T-nmonr,  of  J.  I'.  Morgan  &  Co.,  before  the 
Bond  ('!.:!>  of  New  York  City,  September  z(>,  1919. 


332    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

constructive  imagination,  wisaom,  and  courage. 
This  is  no  time  to  harken  to  the  puling  plea  that  "we 
have  done  enough  for  other  nations";  that  "all 
our  attention  is  needed  for  our  own  affairs. "  To 
see  the  great  nations  of  the  world — including  Ger- 
many— recover  from  the  ruinous  effects  of  the  war 
is  very  decidedly  our  concern  as  much  as  it  is  the 
concern  of  the  most  stricken  and  distressed  of 
them  all.  There  can  be  no  security  for  us,  no 
assurance  of  our  continued  prosperity,  until  some- 
thing like  economic  order  is  restored  in  Europe. 
And  there  can  be  no  such  restoration  until  Russia's 
great  fundamental  wants  are  supplied.  Russia's 
problem  is  our  problem  in  a  very  real  and  vital 
sense.  Just  as  there  are  forms  of  internationalism 
which  are  dangerous  because  they  strike  at  the 
foundations  of  national  order,  so  there  are  forms 
of  nationalism  which  are  dangerous  because  they 
strike  at  the  foundations  of  international  order. 
The  doctrine  that  we  should  ignore  the  claims  and 
needs  of  other  nations,  upon  the  selfish  pretext  that 
we  need  to  isolate  ourselves  and  care  only  for  our 
own  well-being,  is  as  reprehensible  and  as  danger- 
ous as  its  opposite,  the  doctrine  that  we  should 
recognize  no  special  obligation  to  serve  our  own 
land,  that  a  nebulous  internationalism  supersedes 
all  national  obligations. 

We  owe  friendliness  and  helpfulness  to  the  great 
Russian  nation.  But  if  we  put  aside  every  moral 
obligation  and  view  the  matter  in  the  light  of  our 
own  material  interest,  we  shall  see  clearly  enough, 
if  our  selfishness  is  enlightened  and  not  ignorant, 
that  by  helping  Russia  we  shall  promote  our  own 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES 


OJJ 


best  interest.  It  may  in  truth  be  said  that  the 
American  who  aids  in  Russia's  restoration,  be  he 
financier  or  statesman,  merchant  or  mechanic, 
by  so  much  serves  America.  This  is  not  senti- 
mental rhetoric,  but  the  hardest  of  hard  facts. 

During  the  war  our  productive  powers  were 
greatly  expanded,  just  as  were  those  of  other 
warring  nations.  We  need,  and  must  have,  a 
market  for  our  goods.  Unless  that  market  is 
obtained,  we  must  fall  back,  our  standards  of 
living  be  lowered.  The  question  therefore  arises, 
Where  shall  we  find  the  market  we  need  for  our 
manufactures?  Certainly  not  in  the  industrial 
countries  of  Europe.  These  countries  will  for 
some  time  to  come  be  largely  dependent  upon  us  for 
food,  but  they  do  not  want  our  manufactured  goods 
and  will  not  take  them.  England,  France,  Bel- 
gium, Italy,  our  European  allies  in  the  war,  and 
German}-,  our  most  powerful  enemy,  must  minimize 
their  imports  of  manufactured  goods  and  increase 
their  exports  of  such  goods  as  much  and  as  rapidly 
as  they  can.  We  may  indeed  find  a  very  con- 
siderable market  for  our  products  in  South  America. 
In  that  market  we  shall  indeed  encounter  very 
keen  competition  from  Germany  and  other  Euro- 
pean countries,  but  that  need  not  alarm  us.  It  is 
pertinent  to  remark,  however,  that  all  the  countries 
of  Latin  America  combined  have  less  than  half  the 
population  of  Russia.1  Even  if  we  could  secure  a 
monopoly  of  their  import  trade — which  is  quite 
out  of  the  question— its  total  volume  would  be  far 

1  The  population  of  I.arin  America  is  less  than  82,000,000. — Latin- 
Americar.   Year-Hook,  1919,  p.  2. 


334    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

less  than  the  share  of  Russia's  trade  that  is  await- 
ing us.  The  total  imports  of  Argentina,  Chile, 
Cuba,  Brazil,  and  Mexico  combined  barely  exceeded 
a  billion  dollars  in  1917.1 

Russia's  needs  are  so  enormous  that  no  one  nation 
can  supply  them  all.  America  has  no  interest  in 
securing  a  monopoly  of  Russia's  foreign  trade. 
It  is  not  to  the  interest  of  Russia  or  of  the  world 
generally  that  such  a  monopoly  be  held  by  any 
nation.  For  example,  Belgium  is  an  exporting 
nation  and  her  economic  recovery  depends,  in  a 
very  large  measure,  upon  her  success  in  securing 
a  substantial  share  of  Russia's  foreign  trade.  Dur- 
ing the  war  Belgium  lost  some  of  her  most  important 
foreign  markets.  It  is  quite  possible  that  a  large 
increase  in  her  trade  with  Russia  will  play  a  big 
part  in  the  rehabilitation  of  her  industry  and  trade. 
There  is  room  in  that  vast  market  for  the  trade  of 
every  exporting  nation,  including,  of  course,  Ger- 
many and  Japan.  We  have  not  the  slightest  in- 
terest in  excluding  the  legitimate  trade  of  these  or 
any  other  nations  from  Russia.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  to  our  interest  to  prevent  the  domination  of 
Russia's  economic  life,  and  the  political  control 
which  must  inevitably  follow  such  domination,  by 
Germany  or  Japan  or  by  both  combined.  Herein 
our  interest  coincides  with  the  highest  and  best 
interests  of  Russia  and  of  the  entire  civilized 
world.     Nothing    but    evil    can    result    from    such 

1  For  Chile,  the  figures  for  1916,  and  for  Mexico  1913,  were  the 
latest  available  according  to  the  Latin-American  Year-Book,  1919. 
The  imports  were,  in  round  figures:  Argentina,  $380,000,000;  Chile 
(1916),  $83,000,000;  Cuba,  $271,000,000;  Brazil,  $216,000,000; 
Mexico  (1913),  $93,000,000. 


RUSSIA'S  NEEDS  AND  RESOURCES     335 

domination  of  the  economic  life  of  Russia  as  that 
which  Germany  exercised  prior  to  1914,  and  which 
she  will  restore  unless  that  is  made  impossible  by 
the  action  of  other  nations  led  by  the  United 
States  of  America.  We  cannot  escape  the  responsi- 
bility of  that  leadership. 

The  economic  reconstruction  of  Russia  is  a 
gigantic  task,  only  the  barest  outline  of  which  has 
been  sketched  in  these  pages.  Its  successful  ful- 
filment will  require  the  joint  energy  and  enterprise 
of  the  great  civilized  nations.  For  reasons  which 
have  been  sufficiently  indicated,  it  is  desirable  that 
the  western  nations  undertake  the  greater  part 
of  this  work,  so  that  the  future  life  of  Russia  may 
be  linked  to  the  civilization  of  the  Occident  rather 
than  to  that  of  the  Orient.  This  is  the  hope  and 
aim  of  the  noblest  and  best  of  Russia's  sons  and 
daughters.  Not  the  least  of  the  crimes  of  the 
Bolsheviki  is  the  reckless  and  desperate  manner  in 
which  they  have  sought  to  link  the  life  of  Russia  to 
Asiatic  civilization  and  to  spread  revolt  in  China 
and  Central  Asia.  Their  success  would  of  necessity 
mean  the  uprising  of  the  East  against  the  West. 
Just  as  they  have  practically  destroyed  the  gains 
made  by  centuries  of  industrial  progress,  and 
forced  Russia  back  to  the  primitive  civilization  of 
the  hand-loom,  the  loutchina,1  and  the  limited 
culture  inseparable  from  these,  so  they  would  arouse 
the  hordes  of  Asia  against  the  Western  World  as 
Huns,  Avars,  Tatars,  and  other  Asiatic  barbarians 
rose  against  it  long  centuries  ago. 

1  1  hat  is,  illumination  by  burning  wood — similar  to  lighted  pine- 
knots. 


336    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

To  save  Russia,  and  with  it  the  whole  of  western 
civilization,  is  the  task  which  the  great  Occidental 
nations  are  called  upon  to  undertake.  It  is  for 
the  United  States  of  America,  incalculably  rich  in 
human  genius  and  energy  and  in  material  power, 
to  lead  in  this  work. 


POSTSCRIPTUM 

SINCE  the  foregoing  pages  were  written,  and 
during  the  progress  of  the  mechanical  work  inci- 
dental to  publication,  there  have  been  some  notable 
developments  of  the  Russian  problem  which  merit 
attention  and  comment.  While  these  do  not 
materially  affect  the  conclusions  reached  and  elabo- 
rated in  this  volume,  they  are  facts  of  very  great 
importance  and  must  be  seriously  regarded. 

Of  course,  the  outstanding  fact  is  the  sensational 
defeat  of  the  organized  anti-Bolshevist  forces  of 
Russia  by  the  armies  of  the  Bolsheviki.  The 
virtual  collapse  of  the  forces  of  Kolchak,  Denikine, 
and  Yudenich,  and  the  very  great  extension  of  the 
area  of  Bolshevist  control,  are  the  results  of  blunder- 
ing by  the  Allies  and  America  in  the  main.  More- 
over, they  are  results  which  were  clearly  foreseen  by 
many  students  of  Russian  affairs,  and  might  have 
been  guarded  against.  They  are  the  bitter  fruits 
of  indecision,  timidity,  bungling,  and,  perhaps, 
petty  jealousies.  The  adoption  of  a  unified  and 
concerted  plan  by  the  Allies  and  America  a  year 
ago  would  have  obviated  these  disasters — for 
disasters  they  are. 

At  that  time  the  anti-Bolshevist  forces,  which 
were  heroically  striving  to  overthrow  the  tyranny 
of  Bolshevism  and  restore  the  Russian  nation,  had 


338    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

splendid  chances  of  success.  They  needed  only 
to  be  plentifully  supplied  with  the  materials 
requisite  for  offensive  warfare.  It  was  not  neces- 
sary for  the  Allies  or  America  to  send  troops  to 
Russia  or  to  interfere  in  any  other  way  with  the 
internal  affairs  of  that  country.  There  was  a 
sufficient  Russian  anti-Bolshevist  force  if  it  could 
be  properly  equipped  and  supplied.  The  leaders 
of  that  force,  including  representatives  of  all 
parties  except  the  Bolsheviki,  begged  time  and 
again  for  just  that  material  support.  The  failure 
of  the  leaders  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  nations 
to  respond  to  those  appeals  is  to  be  counted  among 
the  greatest  blunders  of  history,  as  it  is  one  of  the 
most  incomprehensible.  Apart  from  every  other 
consideration,  even  if  they  had  neither  gratitude 
to  Russia  nor  interest  in  her  well-being,  a  prudent 
and  enlightened  self-interest  might  well  have 
induced  them  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  the 
Russians  who  were  fighting  Bolshevism,  since 
every  blow  struck  by  them  was  equally  a  blow  in 
defense  of  every  civilized  nation. 

No  believer  in  democracy  can  survey  calmly 
the  events  of  the  Russian  conflict  during  the  past 
year  with  any  degree  of  satisfaction,  or  without 
realizing  the  evil  results  of  the  blundering  of  the 
statesmen  and  diplomats  of  the  United  States, 
England,  France,  and  Japan.  The  All-Russian 
government  under  the  direction  of  Admiral  Kolchak 
should  have  been  supported  to  the  limit,  so  long  as 
it  remained  faithful  to  its  trust  and  made  war 
against  the  Bolsheviki.  Instead  of  that,  it  was 
bedeviled  and   hampered   by  Japan  and  its  needs 


POSTSCRIPTUM  339 

neglected  and  ignored  by  the  other  nations.  Rec- 
ognition and  material  support  should  have  been 
given  to  Kolchak;  every  possible  effort  should 
have  been  made  to  strengthen  his  position  with  the 
democratic  anti-Bolshevist  forces  and  to  lessen  his 
dependence  upon  the  reactionary  monarchist  and 
pro-Japanese  elements.  Unsupported  by  America 
and  the  Allies,  harassed  by  one  of  the  latter,  Japan, 
Admiral  Kolchak  became  more  and  more  entangled 
with,  and  dependent  upon,  the  reactionary  elements 
and  estranged  from  the  democratic  elements. 
And  herein  lies  the  great  tragedy:  only  the  demo- 
cratic forces  in  Russia  can  be  relied  on  to  defeat 
Bolshevism.  Kolchak's  army  has  crumbled  and 
is  scattered;  the  high  hopes  centered  upon  it 
equally  have  crumbled  and  are  scattered.  There 
were  too  many  reactionary  influences  and  intrigues. 
The  army  crumbled  and  scattered — it  was  not 
shattered  by  attack — because  of  these.  Had  the 
Allies  and  America  given  hearty  and  generous 
support  to  the  Omsk  government,  the  democratic 
elements  in  the  anti-Bolshevist  movement  would 
have  been  greatly  strengthened  and,  in  all  proba- 
bility, the  overthrow  of  the  Bolsheviki  assured. 
The  withholding  of  that  support  from  the  Omsk 
government  strengthened  the  Bolsheviki  and  also 
the  reactionary  element  in  the  anti-Bolshevist 
fight,  which  doomed  it  to  failure.  Those  who 
urged  that  the  United  States  should  support 
Admiral  Kolchak — the  present  writer  is  one  of 
these — knew  well  enough  the  role  of  the  undemo- 
cratic reactionary  elements  among  his  forces;  they 
believed  that  these  could  be  overcome  onlv  as  a 


340    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

result  of  a  generous  support  of  Kolchak  by  the 
United  States  and  the  Allied  nations. 

Much  the  same  might  be  said  of  General  Denikine 
and  his  volunteer  army.  Because  he  lacked  arms 
and  military  supplies,  Denikine  was  never  able 
to  arm  more  than  one-sixth  of  his  men,  and  those 
very  inadequately.  Yet  he  swept  to  within  about 
a  hundred  and  twenty-five  miles  of  Moscow!  The 
failure  to  furnish  him  with  the  material  support 
needed  was  more  than  a  tragic  blunder:  it  was 
one  of  those  blunders  which  are  also  crimes.  The 
policy  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  nations  toward 
Russia,  in  these  important  particulars,  might 
almost  have  been  inspired  by  Lenin  himself.  It 
needed  only  the  Prinkipo  folly  to  complete  the 
betrayal  of  the  Russian  anti-Bolshevist  struggle. 

Bolshevism  is  victorious  in  Russia  just  now,  but 
it  is  no  longer  Bolshevism.  By  this  I  mean  that 
the  Bolshevist  government  is  no  longer  occupied 
with  the  communistic  Utopian  ideal  which  gave  it 
birth.  Bolshevism  is  no  longer  an  effort  to  build 
a  social  paradise,  but  a  military  system.  It  is 
militarism  gone  mad.  Victorious  over  the  anti- 
Bolshevist  movements  led  by  Kolchak,  Denikine, 
and  Yudenich,  its  leaders  find  themselves  with  a 
large,  disciplined,  and  fairly  equipped  army.  That 
army,  we  must  bear  in  mind,  can  easily  become  the 
instrument  of  a  new  sort  of  imperialism.  It  may 
strike  at  central  Europe,  through  Poland,  or  at 
Persia  and  India. 

The  spread  of  Bolshevism  in  Siberia,  and  the 
determined  efforts  of  the  Bolsheviki  to  reach  out 
to  central  Asia,  have  had  the  effect,  apparently,  of 


POSTSCRIPTUM  341 

profoundly  altering  the  policy  of  Japan.  The 
imperialists  of  Japan  were  never  guilty  of  co-operat- 
ing with  the  Bolsheviki  in  the  manner  that  the 
German  imperialists  did.  But  they  pursued  a 
policy  which  strengthened  the  Bolsheviki,  never- 
theless. The  whole  joint  expedition  in  Siberia 
resolved  itself  into  a  movement  to  hamper  and 
harass  the  efforts  of  the  Russians  to  create  a  strong, 
stable  government  and  successfully  to  combat  the 
Bolsheviki.  For  that  the  Japanese  must  be  held 
responsible,  though  it  must  be  said  that  the  whole 
plan  of  intervention  was  a  mistake. 

The  Japanese  imperialists  saw  in  the  turmoil 
and  unrest  in  Siberia  a  great  opportunity  for 
Japanese  aggrandizement.  They  were  willing  to 
drive  the  Bolsheviki  westward  beyond  Lake  Baikal, 
but  only  if  permitted  to  acquire  economic  domina- 
tion and  control  of  the  territory  thus  freed  and  to 
succeed  to  the  Russian  "rights"  in  China.  When 
these  conditions  were  rejected  by  the  Russians 
and  vetoed  by  the  other  nations  concerned,  Japan 
assiduously  strove  to  keep  Siberia  in  turmoil  and  to 
prevent  the  successful  establishment  of  a  strong 
and  stable  government.  She  hoped  again  to 
"fish  in  troubled  waters,"  and  to  take  advantage 
of  the  weakness  of  Russia. 

Recently,  since  October,  1919,  the  policy  of 
Japan  in  Siberia  has  been  very  materially  and 
beneficially  modified.  Her  statesmen  seem  to 
have  awakened  to  a  realization  of  the  fact  that, 
in  the  long  run,  it  will  prove  a  profitable  policy 
to  secure  the  friendship  and  good-will  of  the  new 
Russia,    and    to   share   with   other   nations   in   the 


342    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

immense  volume  of  trade  essential  to  Russia's 
reconstruction.  It  may  be  that  the  change  in 
policy  is  not  due  to  any  such  high  reasoning,  how- 
ever, but  to  a  belated  recognition  of  the  important 
fact  that  Bolshevism  is  far  more  likely  to  spread 
over  Asia  than  over  Europe  or  America.  Bol- 
shevism is,  in  fact,  far  more  congenial  to  the  Orient 
than  to  the  Occident.  The  traditions  and  political 
experience  of  Oriental  nations  make  it  relatively 
easy  for  conspiratory  movements  and  dictatorships 
to  gain  headway.  It  is  much  harder  in  countries 
which  have  enjoyed  constitutional,  representative 
governments.  Realizing  this,  and  blocked  on  the 
west  by  the  failure  of  Bolshevism  in  Germany  and 
in  Hungary,  the  leaders  of  the  Russian  Bolsheviki 
have  turned  their  attention  to  the  spread  of  their 
propaganda  among  the  Asiatic  peoples. 

They  are  reaching  into  China,  Turkey,  into 
Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  India.  They  are  making 
connection  with,  and  exploiting,  Pan-Islamism. 
All  the  Moslem  hatred  of  Christianity  and  resent- 
ment against  the  treatment  of  Turkey  in  the  peace 
settlement,  all  the  fanatical  nationalism  of  Persia 
and  India  they  welcome  as  so  much  grist  to  their 
mill.  According  to  semi-official  accounts  in  The 
London  Times,  the  leaders  of  the  recent  serious  riots 
at  Amritsar  were  in  touch  with  the  Russian  Bol- 
sheviki. There  is  not,  indeed  there  cannot  well  be, 
any  pretense  that  these  Asiatic  nations  have  reached 
anything  approaching  the  economic  development 
which  Lenin  has  many  times  declared  to  be  essential 
to  a  collectivist  state  of  any  kind,  whether  Soviet  or 
parliamentary  in  form.     The  Bolshevist  leaders  can 


POSTSCRIPTUM  343 

hardly  pretend  or  hope  to  find  in  Mohammedanism 
any  kinship  with  Marxism.  What  they  can  hope  to 
find  in  common  with  and  useful  to  their  purpose  in 
Persia,  Turkey,  Afghanistan,  and  India  is  a  fear 
and  hatred  of  democracy  and  of  western  civilization. 
The  Bolshevist  leader,  Karl  Radek,  said  in  a  recent 
interview:  "If  we  cannot  have  peace  we  will  fight 
to  a  finish.  If  the  war  keeps  on  we  will  set  the  Near 
and  Far  East  on  fire.  We  will  stir  up  such  trouble 
in  Turkey,  Afghanistan,  Turkestan,  Kurdistan,  Per- 
sia, and  India  that  England  will  not  have  another 
quiet  moment."  ] 

Perhaps  it  is  because  Japan  is  genuinely  alarmed 
by  this  development  of  Bolshevism  that  her  policy 
in  Siberia  has  changed.  To  fight  the  Bolsheviki 
becomes  for  her  a  matter  of  self-protection.  That 
she  would  prefer  to  do  this  in  Siberia  rather  than 
in  China,  for  instance,  is  probable.  Certainly, 
Japan  cannot  afford  to  permit  the  virus  of  Bol- 
shevism to  spread  throughout  Asia.  In  this  her 
interest  becomes  coincidental  with  that  of  the 
western  nations.  Dangerous  as  Pan-Asianism  un- 
der the  hegemony  of  Japan  would  be  to  western 
civilization,  a  Pan-Asian  Bolshevism  would  be 
infinitely  more  dangerous.  In  preventing  that 
Japan  will  render  a  great  service  to  the  Occidental 
nations  as  well  as  to  the  Orient. 

Serious  students  of  Russian  affairs  have  feared 
that,  as  a  consequence  of  the  disastrous  defeats 
of  the  Russian  anti-Bolshevist  forces,  the  Allied 
and  Associated  nations  would  be  induced  to 
recognize   the   Soviet   government   which    rules   in 

1  Nezu  York  Glob?,  December  29,  19 19. 


344    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

central  Russia  with  such  tyranny.  It  is  to  be 
hoped  that  the  honor  of  America  will  not  be  sullied 
by  any  such  action.  The  crimes  of  the  Bolsheviki 
against  civilization,  against  all  that  civilized 
nations  hold  sacred  and  dear,  have  been  too  mon- 
strous and  too  systematically  contrived  and  pur- 
sued to  warrant  our  having  any  relations  with  them. 
Recently  Lenin  and  other  responsible  leaders  of  the 
Bolsheviki  have  adopted  the  tone  and  manner  of 
moderation  and  sweetly  reasonable  opportunism 
toward  our  own  and  other  governments.  We 
shall  do  well  to  remember  in  connection  with  every 
plausible  address  from  that  quarter  that  it  is  a 
fundamental  principle  of  the  perverted  philosophy 
upon  which  Bolshevism  rests  that  truth  and  honor 
are  "bourgeois  conceptions,"  and  that  treachery  and 
deceit  are  legitimate  weapons.  It  is  of  the  essence  of 
the  faith  of  the  whole  movement  that  to  make  agree- 
ments without  the  least  intention  of  keeping  them 
is  a  valuable  proletarian  method  of  class  warfare. 
I  have  indicated  among  the  possibilities  such  a 
reform  of  Bolshevism  as  would  make  possible  the 
recognition  of  the  Bolsheviki  by  other  nations  and 
a  resumption  of  trade  relations.1  Notwithstanding 
the  moderation  of  tone  adopted  by  Lenin,  Tchich- 
erine,  and  other  leaders,  there  is  nothing  in  the  recent 
developments  of  Bolshevism  to  warrant  the  belief 
that  such  a  condition  has  been  reached.  True, 
Bolshevism  has  ceased  to  be  Bolshevism,  as  I  have 
already  pointed  out,  but  instead  of  reforming  and 
becoming  less  dangerous  to  civilization,  it  has  de- 
veloped new  terrors.     Every  believer  in  democracy 

iSee  p.  33. 


POSTSCRIPTUM  345 

must  oppose  any  recognition  of  the  Bolsheviki  as 
the  de  facto  government  of  Russia. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  long  as  there  are  any  con- 
siderable constructive  forces  in  Russia  united 
against  the  Bolsheviki  and  pledged  to  the  condi- 
tions set  forth  by  the  Council  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers,  on  May  26,  1919,  they  should 
be  given  recognition  and  whatever  aid  and  support, 
other  than  armed  assistance,  may  be  needed.  If 
necessary,  Congress  should  act  and  authorize  the 
use  of  government  credit  for  the  purpose  of  aiding 
these  forces,  reconstructing  the  economic  life  of  the 
areas  freed  from  Bolshevist  control  and  relieving 
the  distress  and  suffering  due  to  famine  and  disease. 
There  should  be  no  repetition  of  the  tragic  dealing 
with  Kolchak,  the  failure  to  give  the  support 
definitely  promised  to  him.  If,  as  is  quite  likely, 
the  anti-Bolshevist  forces  are  so  utterly  eliminated 
that  there  remains,  on  Russian  soil,  nothing  of  the 
All-Russian-Government  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  resumption  of  trade  with  Russia  can  be  long 
delayed.  Through  the  co-operatives  this  may  be 
done  without  a  pro-forma  recognition  of  the  Soviet 
government.  This  was  proposed  to  our  State 
Department  several  months  ago  by  Mr.  Berkenheim, 
on  behalf  of  the  Russian  co-operatives.  In  actual 
fact,  however,  the  co-operatives  will  be  the  agents 
of,  and  subject  to  control  by,  the  Soviet  govern- 
ment. 

There  is  one  great  danger  in  the  situation  against 
which  I  would  earnestly  and  solemnly  warn  my 
fellow-countrymen — namely,  the  danger  of  a  war 
against  Bolshevism  which  becomes  a  war  against 


346    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Russia  and  which  will  unite  all  the  Russian  nation 
under  the  banners  of  the  Bolsheviki.  A  drive 
toward  central  Europe  by  the  large  disciplined 
Bolshevist  army  would  be  fraught  with  very  serious 
consequences,  not  the  least  important  of  these 
being  the  restoration  of  German  militarism.  Ger- 
many must  fight  and  defeat  the  forces  of  Bolshevist 
Russia  or  she  must  seek  alliance  with  her.  Either 
event  would  be  a  peril  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 
Recognizing  this,  European  statesmen  and  publicists 
have  placed  their  reliance  upon  a  barrier  of  buffer 
states  to  keep  Bolshevism  from  spreading  west- 
ward. Of  these  buffer  states  Poland  is  most 
important,  Rumania  being  next  in  order.  The 
Baltic  states — Esthonia,  Lithuania,  and  Letvia — ■ 
are  less  important,  though  far  from  insignificant 
It  is  proposed  to  guarantee  the  independence  of  the 
Baltic  states,  to  support  Rumania's  claim  to  Bess- 
arabia, and  to  strengthen  Poland — upon  whom  the 
burden  of  fighting  the  Bolsheviki  will  principally 
fall — by  permitting  her  to  annex  a  great  stretch 
of  Russian  territory,  and  by  giving  her  economic 
and  military  support.  In  other  words,  the  pro- 
gram of  the  Polish  imperialists  is  to  be  complied 
with. 

With  such  a  policy  the  United  States  should  have 
nothing  whatever  to  do,  either  directly  or  indirectly. 
Any  attempt  to  dismember  Russia  in  such  a  manner, 
for  the  protection  of  western  Europe,  would  unite 
all  factions  in  Russia  against  it.  There  will  cease 
to  be  a  majority  in  Russia  struggling  to  overthrow 
the  Bolshevist  minority.  For  the  unity  of  Russia, 
for  the  maintenance  of  her  outlet  to  the  sea,  so 


POSTSCRIPTUM  347 

vital  to  her  economic  life,  Russia  will  fight  so  that 
it  will  be  said  of  her  that 

Then  none  was  for  a  party, 
But  all  were  for  the  state. 

There  will  be  no  anti-Bolshevism  in  Russia  if 
anti-Bolshevism  outside  of  Russia  assumes  the 
form  suggested.  Moreover,  such  a  policy  will  make 
inevitable  a  renewal  of  war,  with  probable  conse- 
quences too  terrible  to  contemplate.  Ready  as 
we  may  be,  and  ought  to  be,  to  help  the  Russian 
people  in  their  fight  against  Bolshevism,  we  must 
not  fight  against  Russia  in  the  hope  that  thereby 
we  can  crush  Bolshevism.  The  United  States 
government  ought  to  make  it  quite  clear  to  the 
world  that  this  nation  will  not  support,  or  coun- 
tenance, any  policy  based  upon  the  dismemberment 
and  Balkanization  of  Russia. 

Finally,  for  reasons  which  have  been  set  forth 
in  the  body  of  the  book,  with  much  detail  of 
argument  and  illustration,  there  should  be  a  very 
clear  recognition,  alike  by  the  government  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  of  the  great  and  far- 
reaching  importance  of  securing  for  this  country 
a  very  large  share  in  the  immense  volume  of  trade 
which  Russia's  recovery  and  economic  recon- 
struction must  inevitably  produce.  As  I  have 
attempted  to  emphasize  in  the  text,  we  need  not, 
and  must  not,  seek  to  dominate  the  economic  life 
of  Russia;  we  need  not,  and  must  not,  attempt 
to  secure  a  monopoly  of  her  foreign  trade;  we 
can  have  no  interest  in  trying  to  exclude  either 
German)    or    Japan  —or    any    other    nation -from 


348    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

enjoying  full  and  free  trade  intercourse  with  Russia. 
Our  interest — which  is  identical  with  the  interest  of 
Russia  herself  and  of  civilization  generally — is  to 
see  Russia  healed  of  her  wounds,  made  strong  and 
set  free — a  strong  and  free  nation  in  a  free  world. 

J.  S. 
Old  Bennington,  Vermont, 
January  3,  iQ2a 


APPENDIX  A 

AUTONOMY    FOR    DIFFERENT    NATIONALITIES    IN 
RUSSIA 

Interview  with  M.  Sazonovy  published  in  the  French 
Press,  July,  igig 

I  have  often  been  approached  lately  with  the 
request  that  more  detailed  explanation  be  presented 
of  the  meaning  of  the  term  "autonomous  arrange- 
ment" which,  according  to  the  pledge  given  by 
Admiral  Kolchak  in  his  reply  to  the  Allied  and 
associated  powers,  is  to  govern  in  the  future  the 
life  of  different  nationalities  within  reconstituted 
Russia. 

The  laws  regulating  the  status  of  nationalities, 
being  of  fundamental  character,  are  to  be  embodied 
within  the  future  "Constitution  of  Russia."  To 
establish  the  Constitution  will  be  the  duty  and  the 
privilege  of  the  Constituent  Assembly,  the  Supreme 
Legislative  elected  by  all  the  people.  Therefore 
no  regulations  or  decisions  can  be  considered  as 
final  before  ratified  and  approved  by  that  body. 

Still,  certain  basic  conceptions  regarding  the 
question  of  autonomy  are  so  clear  and  have  at  all 
times  been  so  unanimously  accepted  by  liberal 
constructive  opinion  in  Russia  that  I  feel  no  hesita- 
tion in  outlining,  in  a  general  way,  what,  with  all 


350    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

certainty,  will  be  the  main  features  of  autonomous 
privileges  enjoyed  by  the  nationalities  within 
Russia. 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  first  of  all,  that  autonomous 
arrangement  for  nationalities  naturally  complies 
with  the  general  system  of  decentralization  to  be 
applied  in  the  reconstruction  of  Russia.  In  fact, 
one  of  the  most  harmful  defects  of  the  old  system 
was  its  over-centralization,  the  endeavor  to  direct 
details  of  life  in  the  remotest  corner  of  the  huge 
empire  from  a  far-away  bureaucratic  center.  In 
new  Russia,  on  the  contrary,  local  government  is 
to  be  a  fundamental  basis  of  life.  Experience  is 
teaching  that  local  government  is  the  real  founda- 
tion of  efficient  public  structure.  It  is  Admiral 
Kolchak's  purpose  to  leave  all  local  matters  to 
the  inhabitants  themselves  and  to  conserve  for 
the  state  as  a  whole  only  functions  of  a  general 
character  to  be  embodied  in  the  Constitution. 
Because  of  difference  in  customs,  culture,  and 
traditions,  one  must  foresee  for  different  parts  of 
Russia  varied  forms  of  self-government,  ranging 
from  complete  home  rule  down  to  elementary 
forms  of  communal  administration,  where,  as  with 
certain  mountain  tribes  or  nomads  of  Asia,  the 
extremely  low  state  of  culture  does  not  at  the 
moment  permit  application  of  complete  self- 
government  and  a  certain  period  of  education  is 
necessary.  In  such  cases  the  practice  will  be 
similar  to  that  followed  by  the  United  States  in 
its  so-called  "territories." 

In  the  particular  case  of  nationalities  it  is  the 
aim  and  purpose  of  new  Russia  to  give  the  different 


APPENDICES  351 

peoples  all  the  possibilities  to  construct  their  life 
according  to  their  own  customs  and  traditions  and 
to  cultivate  their  language  and  religion. 

Self-government  and  nationalities  must  not 
prejudice,  however,  the  unity  and  sovereignty  of 
the  state  as  a  whole.  Decentralization  and  the 
broadest  local  government  are  to  be  established 
within  a  unified  state. 

The  essence  of  autonomous  arrangement  is 
provincial  self-government  having  a  local  legislative 
assembly,  popularly  elected,  as  its  basis.  Prov- 
inces will  be  determined  on  ethnographic  lines. 
Their  legislatures  will  control  all  features  of  local 
public  life,  including  provincial  judiciary,  revenues, 
and  expenditures. 

Delimitation  of  authority  between  central  and 
local  authorities  can  be  best  of  all  determined  by 
enumerating  the  functions  which  would  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  state  as  a  whole,  and  outside  of  which 
the  entire  field  of  internal  life  and  local  adminis- 
tration would  be  left  to  the  disposal  of  the  nationali- 
ties themselves. 

As  such  functions,  belonging  to  the  competency 
of  the  central  government,  one  may  enumerate: 

Foreign  relations,  army  and  navy,  unified  mone- 
tary system,  state  finance,  post  and  telegraph, 
main  ways  of  communication,  civil  and  criminal 
code,  high  courts  of  justice. 

An  important  feature  is  to  be  the  protection  of 
rights  of  minorities. 

This,  in  reality,  is  but  a  consequence  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  unity  and  equality  of  citizenship  forbidding 
any   discrimination    whatever   in    any   part   of  the 


352    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

country  against  any  citizen  irrespective  of  his 
religion  or  locality  of  birth,  and  allowing  every 
citizen  equal  political  and  civil  rights  all  throughout 
the  territory  of  Russia. 

Before  terminating  I  would  like  to  add  a  few 
words  in  order  to  emphasize  the  sincerity  and 
straightforwardness  with  which  new  Russia  is 
approaching  the  question  of  giving  the  nationalities 
all  the  possibility  for  developing  their  culture  and 
prosperity  on  a  just  and  inviolable  basis  of  con- 
stitutional privileges. 

We  are  aware  of  the  spirit  of  alienation  and  dis- 
trust which  is  animating  at  this  moment  many 
representatives  of  nationalities.  We  deplore  the 
injustice  and  prejudice  of  this  animosity,  although 
we  understand  that  it  is  but  a  reverberation  of 
certain  conditions  of  the  past.  We  are  facing  the 
situation  with  patience  and  conciliation  and  are 
certain  that  reason  and  temperance  will  ultimately 
prevail.  The  future  belongs  to  huge  political 
bodies  and  not  to  small  and  parceled  formations. 

The  nationalities,  once  the  basis  of  their  autono- 
mous life  is  firmly  settled  in  justice  and  law,  will 
understand  that  the  real  safeguard  of  their  culture 
and  national  self-dependence  lies  in  unity  with  the 
Russian  people,  peaceful  and  non-aggressive  in  its 
aims  and  purposes. 

The  nationalities,  now  animated  with  centrifugal 
tendencies,  will  certainly  appreciate  the  benefits 
of  being  a  part  of  a  big  state  with  all  its  promises 
of  guardianship  and  the  possibilities  of  development. 


APPENDIX  B 

RUSSIAN    ECONOMIC    CONCESSIONS    GRANTED    BY 
THE    BOI.SHEVIKI 

On  July  9,  1919,  the  Daily  Consular  and  Trade 
Reports,  issued  by  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  and 
Domestic  Commerce  of  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce, contained  the  following  statement  from  the 
Svensk  Handelstidning  of  April  3,  1919,  transmitted 
by  Trade  Commissioner  Norman  L.  Anderson, 
stationed  at  Stockholm: 

The  Soviet  government  in  Russia  is  said  to  have  lately  given 
concessions  to  a  Norwegian-American  syndicate  to  exploit 
the  enormous  resources  of  northern  Russia.  The  following  is 
a  report  of  the  concession,  taken  from  the  official  organ,  Sever- 
naya  Kommuna,  in  Petrograd: 

"The  concession  first  comprises  the  establishment  and  opera- 
tion of  a  railway  line  of  normal  gage  for  general  traffic  from 
Ob  in  Siberia  to  the  west,  in  the  direction  of  the  town  of  Kotlas 
on  the  Dvina  River,  and  from  there  two  main  tracks  to  Zvanka, 
where  the  Murman  Railway  joins  the  Petrograd-Vyatka- 
Siberia  Railway,  or  past  Zvanka  directly  to  Petrograd.  Be- 
sides, there  are  also  proposed  spur  tracks  to  the  town  of  Ustyug- 
Veliki  and  the  Nadyezhdinski  mills.  The  railway  concession 
represents  lines  aggregating  about  3,000  versts  (approximately 
2,000  miles). 

L'SE    OF    EXTENSIVE    FOREST-LANDS 

"The  concession  also  comprises  the  right  to  use  8,000,000 
dessiatines    (about    :2,000,00c    acres)    of    forest.     Of    these 


354    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

8,000,000  dessiatines  of  forest,  2,ooo,ooo  dessiatines  (5,500,000 
acres)  will  be  for  the  company's  own  needs  for  a  term  of  eighty 
years.  The  net  profit  from  these  2,000,000  dessiatines  and 
the  sawmills  and  factories  that  the  company  may  establish 
is  included  in  the  surplus  of  the  railway.  Of  the  remaining 
6,000,000  dessiatines  the  company  has  a  right  to  fell  the  whole 
district,  estimating  that  the  foiests  are  renewed  every  one 
hundred  and  fifty  years.  The  concession  for  these  6,000,000 
dessiatines  is  given  for  forty-eight  years.  According  to  the 
statutes,  the  company  may  hold  its  timber-lands  over  the 
whole  of  Russia.  As  to  the  6,000,000  dessiatines,  the  com- 
pany may  demand  that  the  districts  be  transferred  in  con- 
nected forests  of  500,000  dessiatines  (1,350,000  acres)  for  the 
establishment  of  special  enterprises,  according  to  the  directions 
of  the  company. 

FARMING,   MINING,   AND   OTHER  RIGHTS — TAXES — 

CONCESSIONARIES 

"The  company  will  have  a  right  to  use  the  soil  that  is  laid 
out  for  the  railway  which  is  not  cultivated  or  common  land 
and  is  not  taken  up  by  other  railway  lines. 

"The  company  has  a  right  to  use  all  live  lodes  found  on 
examination  of  the  lines.  The  company  pays  to  the  state  one- 
half  copeck  per  pood  (36.1128  pounds)  for  ore  dug  out,  without 
regard  to  the  kind  of  ore.  The  company  also  has  a  right  to 
establish  and  run  shipyards  and  ports,  to  open  steamship  lines, 
to  get,  without  charge,  districts  for  the  establishment  of  towns 
and  villages.  All  such  undertakings  are  looked  upon  as  parts 
of  the  railway  project.  Further,  it  may  use  water-power  in 
the  neighborhood  of  the  railway  line. 

"The  railway  is  permitted  to  start  banking  enterprises  of 
its  own  at  all  railway  stations  and  in  neighboring  towns.  It 
is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  these  banking  enterprises 
must  not  take  cash  loans  on  interest. 

"The  company  must  pay  to  the  Soviet  government  a  charge 
of  5  per  cent,  of  the  quotation  on  the  London  market  for  timber 
cut,  while  the  charge  for  fuel  and  building  material  for  local 
use  is  according   to  local   prices.     Instead  of  paying  income 


APPENDICES  355 

and  industrial  taxes,  the  company  pays  25  per  cent,  of  its 
net  profit,  but  no  minimum  sum  is  fixed.  When  necessary, 
the  company  must  procure  tonnage  of  10,000  to  20,000  tons. 
"The  concession  is  granted  to  the  Russian,  Borissof,  and 
the  Norwegian,  Ganewitsch  (Hannevig),  who  has  American 
capital  behind  him.  If  the  Hannevig  group  does  not  assume 
the  undertaking,  the  concession  will  be  offered  on  the  inter- 
national financial  market." 


APPENDIX  C 


Table  I 

GROWTH   OF   PRINCIPAL  CITIES 

{According  to  V.  1.  Pokrovski,  in  "  Russia  at  the  End  of  the  Nineteenth 
Century,"  -published  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance) 


Citi 


St.  Petersburg.  .  .  . 

Moscow 

Warsaw 

Odessa 

Lodz 

Riga 

Kiev 

Charkov 

Tiflis 

Vilna 

Tashkent 

Saratov 

Kazan 

Ekaterinosiav 

Rostov-on-Don . .  . 

Astrakhan 

Baku 

Tula 

Kishenev 

Libau 

Ekaterinodar 

Tzaritzyn 

lvanovo-Vosnescnk 

Sebastopol 

Vladikavkaz 


Number  of  Inhabitants 

Increase 
of  the 

1867 

1897 

Population 

Per  Cent. 

539,471 

1,267,023 

136.7 

35I>6o9 

1,035,664 

1948 

180,657 

638,208 

253 -o 

118,970 

405,041 

240.0 

32,437 

315,299 

872.0 

77,468 

282,943 

264.6 

68,429 

247,432 

261 .7 

52,016 

174,846 

236.0 

60,776 

160,645 

163.3 

69,467 

159,568 

129.7 

80,000 

156,414 

95  5 

84,391 

137,109 

62.5 

63,084 

I3l,5o8 

106.9 

19,908 

121,216 

508.0 

29,261 

119,889 

310.0 

42,832 

113,001 

163.8 

13,992 

"2,253 

702.0 

53,739 

111,048 

106.6 

94,124 

108,796 

15.6 

10,227 

64,505 

540.0 

9,504 

65,697 

591.0 

8,456 

55,967 

562.0 

i,3SO 

53,949 

3,896.2 

8,218 

50,710 

5i7-o 

3,358 

43,843 

1,205.6 

APPENDICES 
Table  II 

DEVELOPMENT   OF  INDUSTRIES   IN  RUSSIA,    1887-97 
(According  to  official  data) 


357 


Industries 

Value  of  the  Product  (in  Thousands  of  Rubles) 

1887 
463,044 
375,286 
79,495 

25,688 
21,030 
21,509 
28,965 

156,012 

112,618 

50,852 

1890 

1893 

1896 

1897 

Textiles 

Foodstuffs 

Animal  products 
Wooden     prod- 
ucts  

Paper 

519,365 

39L947 

74,391 

33,377 
23,804 
29,750 
32,543 

202,894 

127,920 

66,672 

621,929 

399,700 

78,422 

38,876 
27,529 

39.56o 
34-472 

249,168 
171,140 

74,201 

837.598 
627,815 
"7,473 

91,258 

45,386 

57,139 
70,046 

559,170 

283,973 
121,106 

946,296 
648,116 
132,058 

102,897 
45,490 

59.555 
82,590 

393.749 
310,626 

117,767 

Chemicals 

Ceramics 

Mining     and 

smelting.  .  .  . 

Metal   products 

Other  industries 

Total 

1,334,499 

1,502,663 

1,734,997 

2,590,964 

2,839,144 

Table  III 

DEVELOPMENT   OF   INDUSTRIES   IN  RUSSIA,    1887-97 

(According  to  official  data) 


Itvlu  'tries 

Number 

of 
Factories 
in   1H07 

4,1-19 
16.512 

4,238 

2,357 
53-' 
760 

3.U3 

3.412 
2,412 

OiS 
39.029 

Number  of  Workmen  Employed 

1KK7 
399,178 
205,. '23 

38,876 
30.703 

19,491 
21,134 
67,346 

390,915 
103,300 

41.882 

I  Kyi) 

1S03 

1 896 

1897 

Textiles ........ 

Foodstuffs 

Animal  prod- 

433.320 
203,000 

39.6S4 

36.101 
27.38» 
27,791 
72.361 

426.635 
109,982 

48,467 

497.O10 
210. 834 

44,228 

39.913 
33.803 
28,382 

75.474 

461.45." 
132.008 

S2.867 

545920 
239,899 

63.484 

75.411 
35.328 
36,402 
90.551 

489.038 

182,514 

59,928 

642,520 
25S.J57 

64.418 

Wooden     prod- 
uct ; 

86,27? 

I'ap.-r   

Chemicals 

Mini  n  g  a  n  <! 
smelting 

Mrtal  products. 

Or hor  indus- 
tries   

35,32o 
143.291 

544.333 
214,311 

66,240 

Total 

1. 318. 048 

1.424.730 

1,582.004 

1,818,475 

2,008,26a 

-'1 


APPENDIX  D 

japan's  territorial  aims 

Despatches  from  M.  Krupensky,  Russian  Am- 
bassador at  Tokio. 

February  8,  1917: 

I  never  omit  an  opportunity  for  representing  to  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  the  desirability,  in  the  interests  of  Japan 
herself,  of  China's  intervention  in  the  war,  and  only  last 
week  I  had  a  conversation  with  him  on  the  subject.  To-day 
I  again  pointed  out  to  him  that  the  present  moment  was  par- 
ticularly favorable,  in  view  of  the  position  taken  up  by  the 
United  States,  and  the  proposal  made  by  them  to  the  neutral 
Powers  to  follow  their  example,  and  more  particularly,  in  view 
of  the  recent  speeches  of  the  American  Minister  at  Peking. 
Viscount  Motono  replied  that  he  would  be  the  first  to  welcome 
a  rupture  between  China  and  Germany,  and  would  not  hesitate 
to  take  steps  in  this  direction  at  Peking  if  he  were  sure  that 
the  Chinese  government  would  go  in  that  direction.  So  far, 
however,  he  had  no  such  assurance,  and  he  feared  lest  unsuc- 
cessful representations  at  Peking  might  do  harm  to  the  Allies. 
He  promised  me  to  sound  the  attitude  of  Peking  without  delay, 
and,  in  case  of  some  hope  of  success,  to  propose  to  the  Cabinet 
to  take  a  decision  in  the  desired  direction. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Minister  pointed  out  the  necessity 
for  him,  in  view  of  the  attitude  of  Japanese  public  opinion 
on  the  subject,  as  well  as  with  a  view  to  safeguard  Japan's  position 
at  the  future  Peace  Conference,  if  China  should  be  admitted  to  it, 
of  securing  the  support  of  the  Allied  Powers  to  the  desires  of  Japan 
in  respect  of  Shantung  and  the  Pacific  islands.     These  desires 


APPENDICES  359 

are  for  the  succession  to  all  the  rights  and  privileges  hitherto 
possessed  by  Germany  in  the  Shantung  province  and  for  the 
acquisition  of  the  islands  to  the  north  of  the  equator  which 
are  now  occupied  by  the  Japanese. 

Motono  plainly  told  me  that  the  Japanese  government 
would  like  to  receive  at  once  the  promise  of  the  Imperial 
government  to  support  the  above  desires  of  Japan.  In  order 
to  give  a  push  to  the  highly  important  question  of  a  break 
between  China  and  Germany,  /  regard  it  as  very  desirable  that 
the  Japanese  should  be  given  the  promise  they  ask,  this  the  more 
so  as,  so  far  as  can  be  seen  here,  the  relations  between  Great  Britain 
and  Japan  have  of  late  been  such  as  to  justify  a  surmise  that  the 
Japanese  aspirations  would  not  meet  with  any  objections  on  the 
part  of  the  London  Cabinet. 

March  i,  1917: 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  asked  me  to-day  whether 
I  had  received  a  reply  from  the  Imperial  government  relating 
to  Japan's  desires  on  the  question  of  Shantung  and  the  Pacific 
islands,  and  told  me  that  the  Japanese  government  would 
very  much  like  to  have  at  the  earliest  moment  a  promise  from 
us  on  the  subject. 


APPENDIX  E 

Part  I 

japan's  demands  on  china 

The  original  Twenty-one  Demands,  as  presented 
January  18,  1915. 


The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese 
government,  being  desirous  of  maintaining  the  gen- 
eral peace  in  eastern  Asia  and  further  strengthening 
the  friendly  relations  and  good  neighborhood  exist- 
ing between  the  two  nations,  agree  to  the  following 
articles: 

Article  I.  The  Chinese  government  engages  to 
give  full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the 
Japanese  government  may  hereafter  agree  with  the 
German  government  relating  to  the  disposition 
of  all  rights,  interests,  and  concessions  which  Ger- 
many, by  virtue  of  treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses 
in  relation  to  the  province  of  Shantung. 

Article  II.  The  Chinese  government  engages 
that  within  the  province  of  Shantung,  and  along 
its  coast,  no  territory  or  island  will  be  ceded  or 
leased  to  a  third  power  under  any  pretext. 

Article  III.  The  Chinese  government  consents 
to  Japan's  building  a  railway  from  Chefoo  or 
Lungkou  to  join  the  Kiaochau-Tsinanfu  Railway. 


APPENDICES  361 

Article  IV.  The  Chinese  government  engages, 
in  the  interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of 
foreigners,  to  open  by  herself  as  soon  as  possible 
certain  important  cities  and  towns  in  the  province 
of  Shantung  as  commercial  ports.  What  places 
shall  be  opened  are  to  be  jointly  decided  upon  in  a 
separate  agreement. 

11 

The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese  gov- 
ernment, since  the  Chinese  government  has  always 
acknowledged  the  special  position  enjoyed  by  Japan 
in  south  Manchuria  and  eastern  inner  Mongolia, 
agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  I.  The  two  contracting  parties  mutually 
agree  that  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny  and  the  term  of  lease  of  the  South  Man- 
churian  Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway 
shall  be  extended  to  the  period  of  ninety-nine  years. 

Article  II.  Japanese  subjects  in  south  Man- 
churia and  eastern  inner  Mongolia  shall  have  the 
right  to  lease  or  own  land  required  either  for  erecting 
suitable  buildings  for  trade  and  manufacture  or 
for  farming. 

Article  III.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to 
reside  and  travel  in  south  Manchuria  and  eastern 
inner  Mongolia  and  to  engage  in  business  and  in 
manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Article  IV.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  to 
grant  to  Japanese  subjects  the  right  of  opening 
the  mines  in  south  Manchuria  and  eastern  Mon- 
golia. As  regards  what  mines  are  to  be  opened, 
the\"  shall  be  decided  upon  jointly. 


362    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Article  V.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  that 
in  respect  of  the  (two)  cases  mentioned  herein 
below  the  Japanese  government's  consent  shall 
be  first  obtained  before  action  is  taken: 

(a)  Whenever  permission  is  granted  to  the  sub- 
ject of  a  third  power  to  build  a  railway  or  to  make 
a  loan  with  a  third  power  for  the  purpose  of  building 
a  railway  in  south  Manchuria  and  eastern  inner 
Mongolia. 

(b)  Whenever  a  loan  is  to  be  made  with  a  third 
power  pledging  the  local  taxes  of  south  Manchuria 
and  eastern  inner  Mongolia  as  security. 

Article  VI.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  that 
if  the  Chinese  government  employs  political,  finan- 
cial, or  military  advisers  or  instructors  in  south 
Manchuria  or  eastern  Mongolia,  the  Japanese 
government  shall  first  be  consulted. 

Article  VII.  The  Chinese  government  agrees 
that  the  control  and  management  of  the  Kirin- 
Changchun  Railway  shall  be  handed  over  to  the 
Japanese  government  for  a  term  of  ninety-nine 
years  dating  from  the  signing  of  this  agreement. 

in 

The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese  gov- 
ernment, seeing  that  Japanese  financiers  and  the 
Hanyehping  Company  have  close  relations  with 
each  other  at  present,  and  desiring  that  the  com- 
mon interests  of  the  two  nations  shall  be  advanced, 
agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  I.  The  two  contracting  parties  mutually 
agree  that  when  the  opportune  moment   arrives 


APPENDICES  363 

the  Hanyehping  Company  shall  be  made  a  joint 
concern  of  the  two  nations,  and  they  further  agree 
that,  without  the  previous  consent  of  Japan,  China 
shall  not  by  her  own  act  dispose  of  the  rights  and 
property  of  whatsoever  nature  of  the  said  company 
nor  cause  the  said  company  to  dispose  freely  of  the 
same. 

Article  II.  The  Chinese  government  agrees 
that  all  mines  in  the  neighborhood  of  those  owned 
by  the  Hanyehping  Company  shall  not  be  per- 
mitted, without  the  consent  of  the  said  company, 
to  be  worked  by  other  persons  outside  of  the  said 
company;  and  further  agrees  that  if  it  is  desired 
to  carry  out  any  undertaking  which,  it  is  appre- 
hended, may  directly  or  indirectly  affect  the  in- 
terests of  the  said  company,  the  consent  of  the 
said  company  shall  first  be  obtained. 


IV 

The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese 
government,  with  the  object  of  effectively  pre- 
serving the  territorial  integrity  of  China,  agree  to 
the  following  special  article: 

The  Chinese  government  engages  not  to  cede 
or  lease  to  a  third  power  any  harbor  or  bay  or 
island  along  the  coast  of  China. 


Article  I.  The  Chinese  central  government 
shall  employ  influential  Japanese  as  advisers  in 
political,  financial,  and  military  affairs. 


}64    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Article  II.  Japanese  hospitals,  churches,  and 
schools  in  the  interior  of  China  shall  be  granted 
the  right  of  owning  land. 

Article  III.  Inasmuch  as  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment and  the  Chinese  government  have  had  many 
cases  of  dispute  between  Japanese  and  Chinese 
police  which  caused  no  little  misunderstanding, 
it  is  for  this  reason  necessary  that  the  police  de- 
partments of  important  places  vin  China)  shall  be 
jointly  administered  by  Japanese  and  Chinese, 
or  that  the  police  departments  of  these  places 
shall  employ  numerous  Japanese,  so  that  they  may 
at  the  same  time  help  to  plan  for  the  improvement 
of  the  Chinese  police  service. 

Article  IV.  China  shall  purchase  from  Japan  a 
fixed  amount  of  munitions  ot  war  (say  50  per  cent, 
or  more  of  what  is  needed  by  the  Chinese  govern- 
ment), or  that  there  shall  be  established  in  China 
a  Sino-Japanese  jointly  worked  arsenal.  Japanese 
technical  experts  are  to  be  employed  and  Japanese 
material  to  be  purchased. 

Article  V.  China  agrees  to  grant  to  Japan  the 

right  of  constructing  a  railway  connecting  Wuchang 

•    Jriang  and  Xanchang,  another  line  between 

Xanchang  and   Hangchow,   and   another  between 

Xanchang  and  Chaochou. 

Article  VI.  If  China  needs  foreign  capital  to 
work  mines,  build  railways,  and  construct  harbor- 
works  'including  dockyards'  in  the  province  of 
Fukien.  Japan  shall  be  rirst  consulted. 

Article  MI.  China  agrees  that  Japanese  sub- 
-•  -  lall  have  the  right  of  missionary  propaganda 
in  China 


Part  II 

THE     DEMANDS     IN     REVISED     FORM     AS     PRESENTED 
APRIL   26,    IQI 5 

Group  I 

The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese 
government,  being  desirous  of  maintaining  the 
general  peace  in  eastern  Asia  and  further  strength- 
ening the  friendly  relations  and  good  neighborhood 
existing  between  the  two  nations,  agree  to  the  fol- 
lowing articles: 

Article  I.  The  Chinese  government  engages  to 
give  full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the 
Japanese  government  may  hereafter  agree  with  the 
German  government,  relating  to  the  disposition 
of  all  rights,  interests,  and  concessions  which 
Germany,  by  virtue  of  treaties  or  otherwise,  pos- 
sesses in  relation  to  the  province  of  Shantung. 

Article  II.  (Changed  into  an  exchange  of  notes.) 
The  Chinese  government  declares  that  within  the 
province  of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast  no  terri- 
tory or  island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  power 
under  any  pretext. 

Article  III.  The  Chinese  government  consents 
that  as  regards  the  railway  to  be  built  by  China 
herself  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkou,  to  connect  with 
the    Kiaochau-Tsinanfu    Railway,    if   Germany    is 


366    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

willing  to  abandon  the  privilege  of  financing  the 
Chefoo-Weihsien  line,  China  will  approach  Japanese 
capitalists  to  negotiate  for  a  loan. 

Article  IV.  The  Chinese  government  engages 
in  the  interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of 
foreigners  to  open  by  China  herself  as  soon  as 
possible  certain  suitable  places  in  the  province  of 
Shantung  as  commercial  ports. 

(Supplementary  exchange  of  notes.) 
The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be 
chosen,  and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by 
the  Chinese  government,  but  the  Japanese  Minister 
must  be  consulted  before  making  a  decision. 

Group  II 

The  Japanese  government  and  the  Chinese 
government,  with  a  view  to  developing  their 
economic  relations  in  south  Manchuria  and  eastern 
inner  Mongolia,  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  I.  The  two  contracting  powers  mutually 
agree  that  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny  and  the  term  of  the  South  Manchurian 
Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway  shall 
be  extended  to  ninety-nine  years. 

(Supplementary  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  shall 
expire  in  the  eighty-sixth  year  of  the  Republic,  or 
1997.  The  date  for  restoring  the  South  Man- 
churian Railway  to  China  shall  fall  due  in  the 
ninety-first  year  of  the  Republic,  or  2002. 

Article  XII  in  the  original  South  Manchurian 
Railway  Agreement,  that  it  may  be  redeemed  by 


APPENDICES  367 

China  thirty-six  years  after  the  traffic  is  opened, 
is  hereby  canceled.  1  he  term  of  the  Antung- 
Mukden  Railway  shall  expire  in  the  ninety-sixth 
year  of  the  Republic,  or  2007. 

Article  II.  Japanese  subjects  in  south  Man- 
churia may  lease  or  purchase  the  necessary  land 
for  erecting  suitable  buildings  for  trade  and  manu- 
facture or  for  prosecuting  agricultural  enterprises. 

Article  III.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to 
reside  and  travel  in  south  Manchuria  and  to  engage 
in  business  and  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatso- 
ever. 

Article  Ilia.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to 
in  the  preceding  two  articles,  besides  being  required 
to  register  with  the  local  authorities  passports, 
which  they  must  procure  under  the  existing  regula- 
tions, shall  also  submit  to  police  laws  and  ordi- 
nances and  tax  regulations  which  are  approved  by 
the  Japanese  consul.  Civil  and  criminal  cases  in 
which  the  defendants  are  Japanese  shall  be  tried 
and  adjudicated  by  the  Japanese  consul;  those  in 
which  the  defendants  are  Chinese  shall  be  tried 
and  adjudicated  by  Chinese  authorities.  In  either 
case  an  officer  can  be  deputed  to  the  court  to 
attend  the  proceedings.  But  mixed  civil  cases 
between  Chinese  and  Japanese  relating  to  land 
shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  delegates  of  both 
nations  conjointly,  in  accordance  with  Chinese 
law  and  local  usage.  When  the  judicial  system  in 
the  said  region  is  completely  reformed,  all  civil 
and  criminal  cases  concerning  Japanese  subjects 
shall  be  tried  entirely  by  Chinese  law-courts. 

Article  IV.   (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 


368    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

The  Chinese  government  agrees  that  Japanese 
subjects  shall  be  permitted  forthwith  to  investi- 
gate, select,  and  then  prospect  for  and  open  mines  at 
the  following  places  in  south  Manchuria,  apart 
from  those  mining  areas  in  which  mines  are  being 
prospected  for  or  worked;  until  the  mining  ordi- 
nance is  definitely  settled,  methods  at  present  in 
force  shall  be  followed: 

Province  of  Feng-tien 


Locality 

District 

Mineral 

Niu  Hsin  T'ai 

Pen-hsi 

Coal 

Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou 

Pen-hsi 

<( 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Hai-lung 

a 

T'ieh  Ch'ang 

T'ung-hua 

a 

Nuan  Ti  T'ang 

Chin 

it 

An  Shan  Chan  region 

From  Liao- 

yang  to 

Pen-hsi 

Iron 

Province  of  Kir  in  (Southern  Portion) 

Locality 

District 

Mineral 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Ho-lung 

Coal  and  Iron 

Kang  Yao 

Chi-lin 

(Kirin) 

Coal 

Chia  Pi'i  Kou 

Hua-tien 

Gold 

Article  V.  (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The    Chinese   government    declares   that   China 

will  hereafter  provide  funds  for  building  railways 

in  south  Manchuria;    if  foreign  capital  is  required 

the  Chinese  government  agrees  to  negotiate  for  a 

loan  with  Japanese  capitalists  first. 

Article  \a.    (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  government  agrees  that  hereafter, 


APPENDICES  369 

when  a  foreign  loan  is  to  be  made  on  the  security 
of  the  taxes  of  south  Manchuria  (not  including 
customs  and  salt  revenue  on  the  security  of  which 
loans  have  already  been  made  by  the  Central 
government),  it  will  negotiate  for  the  loan  with 
Japanese  capitalists  first. 

Article  VI.  (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 
The  Chinese  government  declares  that  hereafter 
if  foreign  advisers  or  instructors  on  political, 
financial,  military,  or  police  matters  are  to  be 
employed  in  south  Manchuria,  Japanese  will  be 
employed  first. 

Article  VII.  The  Chinese  government  agrees 
speedily  to  make  a  fundamental  revision  of  the 
Kirin-Changchun  Railway  Loan  Agreement,  taking 
as  a  standard  the  provisions  in  railway  loan  agree- 
ments made  heretofore  between  China  and  foreign 
financiers.  If,  in  future,  more  advantageous  terms 
than  those  in  existing  railway  loan  agreements 
are  granted  to  foreign  financiers,  in  connection 
with  railway  loans,  the  above  agreement  shall 
again  be  revised  in  accordance  with  Japan's  wishes. 

Chinese  Counter-Proposal  to  Article  VII 

All  existing  treaties  between  China  and  Japan 
relating  to  Manchuria  shall,  except  where  other- 
wise provided  for  by  this  convention,  remain  in 
force. 

Matters  Relating  to  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 

1.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  that  here- 
after when   a   foreign   loan   is  to  be  made  on  the 


370    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

security  of  the  taxes  of  eastern  inner  Mongolia, 
China  must  negotiate  with  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment first. 

2.  The  Chinese  government  agrees  that  China 
will  herself  provide  funds  for  building  the  railways 
in  eastern  inner  Mongolia;  if  foreign  capital  is 
required,  she  must  negotiate  with  the  Japanese 
government  first. 

3.  The  Chinese  government  agrees,  in  the  in- 
terest of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
to  open  by  China  herself,  as  soon  as  possible,  cer- 
tain places  suitable  in  eastern  inner  Mongolia 
as  commercial  ports.  The  places  which  ought  to  be 
opened  are  to  be  chosen,  and  the  regulations  are 
to  be  drafted,  by  the  Chinese  government,  but  the 
Japanese  Minister  must  be  consulted  before  making 
a  decision. 

4.  In  the  event  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  desiring 
jointly  to  undertake  agricultural  enterprises  and 
industries  incidental  thereto,  the  Chinese  govern- 
ment shall  give  its  permission. 

Group  III 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping 
Company  being  very  intimate,  if  the  interested 
party  of  the  said  company  comes  to  an  agreement 
with  the  Japanese  capitalists  for  co-operation,  the 
Chinese  government  shall  forthwith  give  its  con- 
sent thereto.  The  Chinese  government  further 
agrees  that,  without  the  consent  of  the  Japanese 
capitalists,  China  will  not  convert  the  company 
into  a  state  enterprise,  nor  confiscate  it,  nor  cause 


APPENDICES  371 

it  to  borrow  and   use  foreign  capital  other  than 
Japanese. 

Article  IV 

China  to  give  a  pronouncement  by  herself  in 
accordance  with  the  following  principle: 

No  bay,  harbor,  or  island  along  the  coast  of 
China  may  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any  power. 

Notes  to  Be  Exchanged 


As  regards  the  right  of  financing  a  railway  from 
Wuchang  to  connect  with  the  Kiukiang-Nanchang 
line,  the  Nanchang-Hangchow  Railway,  and  the 
Nanchang-Chaochow  Railway,  if  it  is  clearly 
ascertained  that  other  powers  have  no  objection, 
China  shall  grant  the  said  right  to  Japan. 


As  regards  the  right  of  financing  a  railway  from 
Wuchang  to  connect  with  the  Kiukiang-Nanchang 
Railway,  a  railway  from  Nanchang  to  Hangchow, 
and  another  from  Nanchang  to  Chaochow,  the 
Chinese  government  shall  not  grant  the  said  right 
to  any  foreign  power  before  Japan  comes  to  an 
understanding  with  the  other  power  which  is  here- 
tofore interested  therein. 

The  Chinese  government  agrees  that  no  nation 
whatever  is  to  be  permitted  to  construct,  on  the 


372    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

coast  of  Fukien  Province,  a  dockyard,  a  coaling- 
station  for  military  use,  or  a  naval  base;  nor  to  be 
authorized  to  set  up  any  other  military  establish- 
ment. The  Chinese  government  further  agrees 
not  to  use  foreign  capital  for  setting  up  the  above- 
mentioned  construction  or  establishment. 

Mr.  Lu,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  stated 
as  follows: 

i.  The  Chinese  government  shall,  whenever  in 
future  it  considers  this  step  necessary,  engage 
numerous  Japanese  advisers. 

2.  Whenever  in  future  Japanese  subjects  desire 
to  lease  or  purchase  land  in  the  interior  of  China 
for  establishing  schools  or  hospitals  the  Chinese 
government  shall  forthwith  give  its  consent  thereto. 

3.  When  a  suitable  opportunity  arises  in  future 
the  Chinese  government  will  send  military  officers 
to  Japan  to  negotiate  with  Japanese  military 
authorities  the  matter  of  purchasing  arms  or  that 
of  establishing  a  joint  arsenal. 

Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japanese  Minister,  stated  as 
follows : 

As  relates  to  the  question  of  the  right  of  mis- 
sionary propaganda,  the  same  shall  be  taken  up 
again  for  negotiation  in  future. 


APPENDIX  F 

RUSSIAN     WATER-POWER     PROJECT     ON     RIVER     VYG 

(By  De  Witt  C.  Poole,  Jr.,  counselor  of  the  em- 
bassy, Archangel,  May  5,  IQ19) 

A  Russian  engineer  has  applied  to  the  Provisional 
government  of  north  Russia  under  date  of  April 
1  st,  requesting  that  he  be  given  a  guaranty  on 
behalf  of  his  principals  to  the  effect  that  the  govern- 
ment will  grant  a  concession  for  the  exploitation 
of  two  waterfalls  on  the  river  Vyg. 

Substance  of  Request  for  Concession 

In  his  request  the  engineer  recites  the  following: 

In  the  spring  of  191 5  the  founders  of  the  company  called 
White  Coal  of  the  North  were  granted  permission  by  the 
Russian  government  to  survey  the  Vyg  River.  During  1915, 
1 9 1 6,  and  1917  there  was  worked  out  a  project  for  the  utiliza- 
tion of  water-power  amounting  to  80,000  horse-power.  The 
engineer  states  that  if  the  guaranty  is  given,  he  will  proceed 
to  Paris,  where  the  chief  financial  leaders  mentioned  above 
are  now  located,  in  order  to  arrange  for  the  financing  of  the 
enterprise.  He  also  promises  to  start  actual  construction 
operations  as  soon  as  the  river  and  the  surrounding  territory 
are  freed  from  the  Bolsheviks.  (The  river  Vyg  flows  from 
Lake  Vyg,  which  is  just  north  of  Lake  Onega,  due  north  to  the 
White  Sea,  which  it  enters  at  the  town  of  Soroka  on  the  Mur- 
man  Railroad.)     Two  Russian  banks  agreed  in  1917  to  finance 


374    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

this  project,  and  so  informed  the  Kerensky  government. 
The  concessionnaires  will  agree  that  the  company  will  never 
be  sold  to  any  foreign  company  in  which  there  are  not  at 
least  50  per  cent,  of  Russian  capitalists. 

The  purposes  of  the  company  are  (1)  the  extraction  of 
nitrogen  from  the  air  by  use  of  electric  power;  (2)  electro- 
smelting  of  bog-iron  ore;  (3)  the  manufacture  of  wood  pulp 
from  timber;  and  (4)  the  electrification  of  that  portion  of  the 
Murman  Railroad  to  which  power  can  be  transmitted. 


History  of  Power  Project 

At  a  special  sitting  of  the  Provisional  government 
held  on  May  5,  1917,  in  Petrograd,  reported  in  the 
special  journal  No.  6A  of  same  date,  a  law  was 
established  providing  that  the  exploitation  of 
water-power  in  Russia  by  private  persons  should 
be  done  only  on  the  basis  of  concessions.  The 
granting  of  such  concessions  and  the  supervision 
thereof  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  water-power 
committee,  which  was  thereby  founded. 

Various  ministerial  institutions,  such  as  the 
Board  of  Internal  Waterways  (Ministry  of  Ways  of 
Communication),  the  Board  of  Ship-building  (Min- 
istry of  Marine),  the  Ministry  of  War,  and  the 
Ministry  of  Trade  and  Industry,  approved  of  the 
company's  project  in  principle.  It  was  first  de- 
cided, however,  that  the  White  Coal  Company 
should  exploit  only  one  of  the  two  falls  on  the  river 
and  that  its  work  should  be  confined  to  the  pro- 
duction of  nitrogen.  The  company  persuaded  the 
authorities  finally  not  to  separate  the  exploitation 
of  the  falls,  and  it  was  also  allowed  to  base  its  plans 
on  the  four  modes  of  utilization  of  electric  energy 


APPENDICES  375 

already  mentioned.  The  White  Coal  of  the  North 
Company  is  the  only  company  that  has  ever  sur- 
veyed this  river. 

As  stated,  the  river  rises  in  the  Vyg  Lake  and 
flows  parallel  to  the  Murman  Railroad  to  Soroka. 
One  of  the  falls  is  situated  near  the  point  where 
the  river  leaves  the  lake,  and  the  other  is  near  the 
mouth  of  the  river  at  Soroka. 

The  plan  of  the  company  is  to  make  first  use  of 
the  Shavanski  Falls,  9  versts  (6  miles)  from  the 
lake,  building  there  a  hydraulic-power  station  of 
60,000  horse-power,  which  it  is  proposed  to  use  in 
the  annual  production  of  about  10,000,000  poods 
(161,000  long  tons)  of  steel  and  pig-iron.  The 
second  effort  of  the  company  will  be  to  utilize  the 
Matkozhenski  Falls,  25  versts  (i6}4  miles)  south 
of  the  town  of  Soroka.  The  hydraulic-power 
station  here  is  to  be  for  60,000  horse-power,  to  be 
used  in  the  production  of  nitrogen  from  the  air. 
It  is  estimated  that  800,000  poods  (13,000  tons)  of 
nitric  acid  and  2,000,000  poods  (32,000  tons)  of 
fertilizer  can  be  produced  annually.  At  war-time 
prices  it  has  been  estimated  that  these  two  enter- 
prises, complete,  with  all  appliances,  will  cost 
27,000,000  rubles.  The  company  claims  to  have 
spent  120,000  rubles  on  surveys,  drawings,  etc. 
(The  official  exchange  rate  for  the  new  currency  of 
north  Russia  is  40  rubles  to  the  pound  sterling, 
or  about  12  cents.  At  this  rate,  the  foregoing 
amounts  would  be  $3,240,000  and  $14,400,  re- 
spectively; but  the  surveys  were  probably  made 
when  the  ruble  was  worth  much  more  than  12 
cents.) 


376    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

Terms  of  the  Agreement 

(i)  The  entrepreneur  agrees  to:  (a)  build  hydro- 
electric-power plants  at  the  Shavanski  and  Boitski 
(Matkozhenski)  Falls;  (b)  with  the  energy  so 
obtained  to  produce  the  merchandise  later  de- 
manded of  him  and  under  the  conditions  set  forth 
below. 

(2)  The  entrepreneur  can  use  for  his  own  benefit 
the  surplus  electrical  energy  remaining  after  satis- 
faction of  the  demands  mentioned  above  in  point 
(b)  of  paragraph  1  and  below  in  paragraph  10. 
This  energy  can  be  either  used  on  the  spot  or  trans- 
mitted to  a  distance. 

(3)  The  power  station  will  be  built  according  to 
plans  approved  by  the  Ministry  of  Ways  of  Com- 
munication. If  the  plans  submitted  do  not  make 
provision  for  the  demands  of  navigation  or  log- 
floating  or  fisheries  on  the  river  they  must  be 
changed.  Certain  technical  limits  as  to  water- 
levels  in  the  lake  and  river  must  be  observed. 

(4)  The  entrepreneur  will  keep  the  plants  in  per- 
fect technical  order  as  required  by  the  terms  of  the 
concession  or  by  subsequent  special  rules. 

(5)  The  entrepreneur  will  have  full  control  of 
the  water-levels  within  the  limits  set  forth  in 
paragraph  3  under  regulations  issued  by  the 
Ministry  of  Ways  of  Communication. 

(6)  The  entrepreneur  will  build  and  put  into 
operation  within  three  years  (a)  dams,  sluices,  etc.; 
(b)  hydroelectric  stations;  (c)  acid  and  fertilizer 
factories;  (d)  workmen's  quarters;  (e)  full-gage 
branch  railroad  to  one  of  the  nearest  stations  on  the 


APPENDICES  377 

Murman  Railroad;  (J)  a  highway  to  the  same  point; 
(g)  other  construction  work  necessary  for  the  prop- 
er functioning  of  the  enterprise. 

(7)  During  a  period  of  ten  years  from  the  open- 
ing of  operations  the  entrepreneur  agrees  to  sell 
to  the  Ministry  of  War  (a)  400,000  poods  (6,500 
long  tons)  of  nitric  acid  of  not  less  than  90  per  cent. 

strength,  at  a  price  of  not  more  than rubles; 

(b)  not  less  than  10  per  cent,  of  the  entire  amount 
of  fertilizer  produced,  at  a  price,  f.o.b.  factory, 
which  shall  be  not  less  than  15  per  cent,  cheaper 
than  the  prevailing  market  price.  If  a  higher 
productivity  is  demanded  of  the  factory  a  year's 
notice  must  be  given.  After  ten  years  the  amounts 
and  prices  of  the  factory's  contract  deliveries  to 
the  government  will  be  set  for  three-year  periods, 
and  in  delivering  these  prices  a  normal  profit  of 
8  per  cent,  on  the  invested  capital  must  be  reckoned. 

(8)  The  portion  of  the  products  mentioned  in 
paragraph  6  which  are  not  contracted  for  by  the 
government  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  entre- 
preneur for  sale  at  prices  fixed  by  him. 

(9)  The  water-power  stations  must  utilize  the 
full  power  of  the  falls.  Inside  of  three  years  from 
the  conclusion  of  the  contract  the  works  must 
produce  50  per  cent,  more  of  the  products  mentioned 
in  paragraph  7  than  is  there  demanded.  After 
years  the  production  must  attain  the  max- 
imum of  which  the  horse-power  generated  at  the 
falls  is  capable. 

(10)  During  the  first  ten  years  the  government 
can  demand  that  it  be  allowed  to  utilize  all  the 
electrical  energy  which  is  not  used  in  the  factories 


37S    RUSSIA  AS   AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

themselves,  but  this  must  not  exceed  10,000  horse- 
power nor  must  the  price  thereon  be  more  than 

rubles.     The  remaining  energy  is  for  the 

use  of  the  entrepreneur,  as  in  paragraph  2. 

(11)  If  electrical  energy  is  sold  to  third  parties 
by  the  entrepreneur,  the  prices  therefor  must 
agree  with  the  published  tariffs,   but   are  not  to 

be  more  than  rubles  per  kilowatt  hour,  all 

prices  depending  upon  the  use  to  which  the  energy 
is  put,  whether  for  lighting,  traction,  or  industrial 
purposes,  and  in  all  cases  the  government  is  to 
have  the  precedence  as  a  purchaser  over  private 
parties. 

(12)  The  entrepreneur  will  be  given  the  right  of 
eminent  domain  to  take  and  use  private  lands 
for  the  construction  of  (a)  dams,  sluices,  and  locks 
for  boats;  (b)  water-power  plants;  (c)  factories,  as 
mentioned  in  paragraph  6;  (d)  workmen's  villages; 
(e)  transmission  lines;  (/)  roads  and  railroads. 
The  company's  right  of  eminent  domain  also  applies 
to  all  land  that  is  liable  to  be  flooded  up  to  the 
high-water  line  resulting  from  the  highest  water- 
level  permissible  according  to  paragraph  3.  All 
government  lands  necessary  will  be  given  free  of 
charge  for  the  above  purposes,  but  the  ownership 
so  vested  in  the  entrepreneur  will  not  include  the 
ownership  of  various  materials  either  below  or  on 
the  surface  of  the  land,  except  building  material, 
unless  especially  agreed  to.  The  entrepreneur  is 
to  deposit  — rubles  as  a  fund  to  insure  pay- 
ments to  private  owners  of  land  taken  under  the 
right  of  eminent  domain. 

(13)  The   railroads   mentioned   in   paragraphs  6 


APPENDICES  379 

and   12  are  to  be  built  under  the  prevailing  laws 
governing  privately  owned  branch  lines. 

(14)  At  the  end  of  three  years  from  the  opening 
of  the  factory  there  must  be  in  each  class  and  grade 
of  the  company's  employees  at  least  50  per  cent, 
of  Russian  citizens;  at  the  end  of  the  eighth  year, 
75  per  cent.;  and  at  the  end  of  the  tenth  year,  95 
per  cent. 

(15)  The  surveys  and  construction  work  men- 
tioned in  paragraph  6  are  to  be  supervised  by  a 
special  board  of  inspection  acting  under  instructions 
from  the  Ministry  of  Ways  of  Communication. 
Its  expenses  will  be  paid  by  the  entrepreneur. 

(16)  The  industrial  work  carried  on  in  the  fac- 
tories will  be  controlled  by  the  usual  factory  laws. 

(17)  Before  the  signing  of  the  contract  the  entre- 
preneur must  submit  complete  and  detailed  com- 
mercial and  technical  calculations  regarding  the 
costs  of  the  products  he  is  to  sell.  These  cal- 
culations are  to  be  based  on  a  concession  to  last 
thirty  years,  with  a  second  set  based  on  a  fifty-year 
tenure.  The  quantities  of  products  to  be  pro- 
duced, as  mentioned  in  these  calculations,  are 
binding  on  the  company.  When  the  period  of  the 
concession  runs  out  at  the  end  of  either  thirty  or 
fifty  years  the  entire  plants  for  utilizing  the  water- 
power  of  the  falls  and  for  the  transmission  of  this 
power  revert  free  of  charge  to  the  government  and 
must  be  delivered  to  it  in  good  working  order. 

(18)  At  the  end  of years  after  the  opening 

of  the  enterprise  the  government  can  purchase  it  in 
its  entirety.  The  basis  of  the  purchase  price  is  to 
be  as  follows:      The  average  net  profit  of  the  last 


38o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

five  years  is  to  be  taken  as  the  normal  profit.  This 
will  be  capitalized  at  not  less  than  5  per  cent,  for 
each  of  the  years  the  contract  has  yet  to  run. 

(19)  If  the  net  profit  for  any  financial  year  is 
more  than  8  per  cent,  on  the  invested  capital  the 
surplus  profit  is  to  be  divided  equally  between 
the  entrepreneur  and  the  government. 

(20)  The  entrepreneur  must  publish  his  accounts. 

(21)  The  detailed  decisions  of  the  entrepreneur 
in  building  and  managing  the  plant,  the  method  by 
which  disputed  points  not  mentioned  herein  and 
not  elsewhere  covered  are  to  be  decided,  are  to  be 
fixed  in  the  terms  of  a  detailed  contract,  which 
will  be  signed  by  the  entrepreneur  and  the  Minister 
of  Ways  of  Communication  as  soon  as  the  present 
fundamental  agreement  goes  into  effect. 

— Commerce  Reports,  United  States  Department  of 
Commerce,  July  1,  1919. 


APPENDIX  G 

DEVELOPMENT   OF    RUSSIAN   AND    SIBERIAN 
CO-OPERATIVES 


{From  " Svensk  Export,"  Stockholm,  February, 
I  gig;  transmitted  by  Commercial  Attache  Erzvin  W. 
Thompson,  Copenhagen,  Denmark) 

Russian  co-operative  activity  extends  back  over 
a  period  of  fifty  years.  But  its  flourishing  develop- 
ment began  about  1905  when  co-operative  societies 
began  to  appear  in  the  towns  everywhere,  and 
their  activities  broke  up  the  monopolistic  control 
that  the  merchants  had  enjoyed  in  selling  their 
goods  at  as  much  as  40  per  cent,  profit.  These 
small  local  societies  proved  the  strongest  support 
of  the  co-operative  movement. 

At  the  same  time  this  movement  was  beginning 
to  develop  in  Siberia.  The  Siberian  peasant  is 
generally  pretty  well  off  and  possesses  considerably 
more  farm-land  than  his  Russian  brother,  and  this 
has  mac'e  it  possible  for  him  to  take  an  interest  in 
cattle-raiding.  The  average  farmstead  in  Siberia 
has  from  four  to  fifty  cows,  a  number  which  the 
Russian  peasant  formerly  could  not  even  dream  of 
having.  The  great  Siberian  railroad  made  it  pos- 
sible to  secure  good   returns  for  farm  products  in 


382    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

distant  markets.  Dairies  sprang  up  everywhere, 
and  with  the  aid  of  specially  constructed  refrigera- 
tor-cars great  quantities  of  butter  were  successfully 
disposed  of  in  foreign  countries,  principally  England. 

After  the  first  few  years  of  expansion,  competition 
made  itself  a  factor,  and  strife  began  between  the 
individual  producers.  Finally  there  was  formed 
a  special  dairy  union  for  the  sale  of  these  products. 
In  1908  a  dozen  of  these  unions  joined  into  a  league 
to  further  strengthen  their  position,  and  by  1916 
not  less  than  1,000  dairies  belonged  to  the  league, 
which  is  called  the  Union  of  Siberian  Creamery  As- 
sociations, one  of  the  strongest  organizations  of  this 
kind.  There  were  many  co-operative  societies  in 
various    lines,    but    without    any    interconnection. 

The  war  so  disrupted  private  trade  in  Siberia 
that  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  in  March, 
1917,  hardly  any  private  trade  associations  still 
existed.  Here  it  was  that  co-operation  succeeded, 
by  the  exchange  of  goods,  in  restoring  order  and 
system  in  trade.  In  this  work  an  important  part 
was  played  by  the  central  co-operative  society, 
Zakoopsbit,  which  was  organized  on  the  1st  of 
May,  1916,  and  covers  most  of  the  phases  of 
economic  life.  The  8,362  societies  had  nearly 
2,000,000  individual  members  perhaps  serving  seven 
or  eight  million  people.  Non-members  have  the 
privilege  of  making  purchases  in  the  co-operative 
stores,  thereby  deriving  the  benefit  of  lower  prices. 

In  its  work  for  the  country's  economic  life  the 
Zakoopsbit  has  also  done  much  to  develop  Siberia's 
natural  resources.  For  example,  rights  in  a  num- 
ber of  salt-water  lakes  have  been  secured,  and  it  is 


APPENDICES  383 

planned  to  erect  a  large  soda  manufactory  with  an 
annual  production  of  8,000  tons.  A  large  number 
of  other  manufactories  have  also  been  erected  or 
are  in  process  of  erection. 

Co-operative  societies  have  become  an  important 
feature  of  Siberian  agricultural  life;  almost  all 
purchases  of  supplies  and  sales  of  products  are  now 
managed  by  one  or  the  other  of  the  co-operative 
groups.  In  central  and  western  Siberia,  from 
Irkutsk  to  the  Urals,  there  are  seven  to  eight 
thousand  of  these  societies,  divided  into  the  fol- 
lowing groups:  Peasant  banks,  2,500;  butter 
artels  or  dairy  associations,  2,500;  general  mer- 
chandise artels,  2,500.  The  organizations  are  also 
carrying  on  a  vigorous  educational  campaign. 


11 

(Consul  D.  B.  MacGozvany  Vladivostok,  Siberia, 
January  25,  igig) 

Though  they  continue  to  grow,  the  Siberian 
co-operative  associations  are  suffering  from  lack 
of  operating  funds,  owing  to  severance  of  communi- 
cations with  the  Moscow  Narodny  Bank  and  to 
other  causes.  The  management  of  some  of  the 
associations  is  not  experienced  in  international 
commerce,  and  some  of  their  efforts  in  this  field 
have  not  progressed  as  favorably  as  was  hoped; 
changes  of  officers  are  frequent,  owing  to  annual 
elections,  and  political  conditions  have  reacted 
rather  unfavorably  on  the  co-operatives. 

According  to  the  president  of  the  Russo-Ameri- 


384    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

can  Committee  for  the  Far  East,  all  the  fundamental 
branches  of  co-operation  are  represented  in  Siberia, 
viz.,  consumers'  co-operation,  agricultural  co-opera- 
tion, credit  co-operation,  and  others.  The  con- 
sumers' co-operation  in  Siberia  is  united  in  the 
Union  of  Siberian  Co-operative  Unions  (Zakoopsbit) 
and  the  Union  of  Siberian  Creamery  Associations, 
and  active  steps  are  now  being  taken  to  unite 
these  two  associations.1 

According  to  a  statement  issued  by  the  American 
committee  of  the  Russian  co-operative  unions, 
the  aims  pursued  by  the  organizations  can  be 
divided  into  three  classes:  (i)  The  purchase  of 
goods  direct  without  the  intervention  of  middlemen 
(consumers'  societies);  (2)  making  provision  for 
the  sale  of  the  product  of  labor  without  resource 
to  middlemen  (artels  and  agricultural  associations); 
(3)  the  supply  of  small  credit  at  cheap  rates  to  the 
working  population  (credit  co-operative  societies). 

The  growth  of  the  movement  from  1905  to  1916 
is  illustrated  by  the  following  table: 


Organizations 

1905 

1914 

1915 

1916 

Jan.  1, 
1917 

Credit  and  loan  associations 

Consumers'  societies 

1.434 
1,000 

1,275 

2,000 

2 

12,751 

10,080 
5,000 

3,000 
11 

14,350 

10,900 

5,000 

3.300 
28 

15,450 

15,203 

5.500 

3,600 
62 

16,057 

20,000 

Agricultural  societies 

6,000 

Artels  of  kustar  and  butter-mak- 
ing artels 

4,000 

Union  of  credit  societies 

92 

Total 

5,7" 

30,842 

33,578 

3Q,8i5 

46,149 

1  According  to  more  recent  information  received  by  the  Bureau  of 
Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  this  amalgamation  has  been  effected. 


APPENDICES  385 

The  principal  offices  of  the  Siberian  Creamery 
Association  are  at  Kurgan,  with  thirty  additional 
offices  in  Siberia  and  agencies  in  London  and  New 
York.  The  region  of  activity  of  the  organization 
comprises  Orenburg  Province  and  Turgai  Ter- 
ritory in  European  Russia,  and  Tobolsk,  Akmolinsk, 
Altai,  and  Semipalatinsk  provinces  in  western 
Siberia.  An  American  agency  has  recently  been 
opened.  The  union  possesses  4,100  creameries, 
producing  60  per  cent,  of  all  the  butter  made  in 
Siberia,  worth  approximately  400,000,000  rubles, 
cheese  factories,  rope  and  soap  factories,  a  shop 
for  the  repair  of  agricultural  machinery,  and  many 
stores  and  consumers'  societies;  in  addition,  it 
publishes  two  magazines  and  several  co-operative 
newspapers,  and  has  courses  of  instruction  in 
butter-making,  bookkeeping,  and  store-work.  The 
union  aims  at  a  joint  disposal  of  agricultural  produce 
on  foreign  markets  and  an  exchange  of  merchandise 
with  exporting  countries. 

The  capital  of  the  association  has  increased  as 
follows:  In  1908  it  was  21,064  rubles;  in  1916, 
469,800  rubles;  in  1917,  3,000,000  rubles;  in  1918, 
3,500,000  rubles.  The  turnover  in  1908  amounted 
to  2,380,000  rubles;  in  1916,  to  73,498,000  rubles; 
in  1917,  to  160,367,000  rubles;  and  in  1918,  to 
200,000,000  rubles.  This  organization  is  one  of 
the  strongest  and  best  organized  in  Siberia. 

Zakoopsbit  has  its  head  office  at  Novonikolaievsk, 
with  branches  at  Vladivostok,  Nikolaievsk,  Samar- 
kand, Blagovestchensk,  Irkutsk,  Omsk,  Harbin, 
Ekaterinburg,  and  Petrograd,  with  foreign  agencies 
*t  New  York,  London,  Kobe,  and  Shanghai.     The 


386    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

union  acts  as  manufacturer,  importer,  and  exporter, 
dealing  in  wholesale,  retail,  and  commission  busi- 
ness. The  total  capital  amounts  to  26,568,800 
rubles,  and  in  191 8  total  sales  of  the  union  were 
valued  at  154,214,200  rubles.  In  1917  the  turn- 
over amounted  to  43,000,000  rubles,  but  these 
figures  do  not  include  the  operations  carried  on  by 
the  various  unions  that  make  up  the  co-operative 
associations,  which  amounts  to  500,000,000  rubles. 
In  1918  the  union  bought  for  export  1,000  tons  of 
flax,  10,000  tons  of  wool,  800  tons  of  hair  and 
bristle  goods,  and  2,000,000  pelts. 

The  Central  Union  of  Russian  Co-operative 
Societies,  known  as  Centrosoyuz,  has  a  large  num- 
ber of  co-operative  unions  in  Russia  and  Siberia,  and 
its  principal  operations  are  in  western  Siberia,  the 
Ural  Mountains,  the  Volga  Valley,  and  central 
Russia.  It  claims  to  represent  a  population  of 
75,000,000  in  European  Russia  alone;  at  present 
it  supplies  about  25,000,000  persons.  The  activities 
of  the  Centrosoyuz  include  branches  of  most  of  the 
industrial  enterprises  in  Siberia  and  Russia. 

The  total  capital  is  about  850,000,000  rubles  and 
the  annual  turnover  in  191 8  amounted  to  1,000,000,- 
000  rubles.  The  output  of  industrial  enterprises 
last  year  was  worth  81,840,000  rubles.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  political  troubles  in  Russia  the  union 
transferred  to  London  the  sum  of  £1,500,000. 
Recently  it  has  bought  a  large  packing-house 
established  at  Kurgan,  with  a  daily  capacity  of 
300  head  of  cattle  and  600  head  of  hogs;  the  annual 
turnover  of  this  plant  is  about  72,000,000  rubles. 
The  association  is  planning  to  erect  a  combined 


APPENDICES  3S7 

tannery,  machine-made-shoe  factory,  and  a  tanning- 
extract  plant;  later  it  expects  to  organize  a  mutual 
insurance  society. 

The  United  Credit  Unions  of  Siberia,  called  Sin- 
credsoyuz,  has  its  main  office  at  Omsk  and  branches 
in  other  cities  of  Siberia.  The  union  embraces 
32  constituent  associations  and  represents  3,500 
township  mutual-credit  unions;  it  operates  twenty- 
eight  flour-mills  and  many  other  industrial  estab- 
lishments and  acts  as  importer  and  exporter  of 
Siberian  products.  The  paid-in  capital  is  about 
10,000,000  rubles.  The  banks  have  opened  credits 
to  the  amount  of  35,000,000  rubles,  but  these  are 
not  available,  owing  to  the  lack  of  currency.  The 
association  has  a  large  quantity  of  raw  materials 
in  Vladivostok  which  it  is  unwilling  to  sell  at  pre- 
vailing prices,  but  which  it  desires  to  mortgage  in 
order  to  procure  funds  for  the  purchase  of  com- 
modities abroad. 

According  to  a  report  dated  January  4,  1919, 
there  are  139  member  unions  in  the  Maritime  Prov- 
ince Co-operative  Association,  with  a  total  mem- 
bership of  27,164,  mainly  peasants,  a  share  capital 
of  759,147  rubles,  and  dues  paid  to  the  amount  of 
28,495  rubles.  This  association  operates  not  only 
in  the  Maritime  Province  and  the  island  of  Sagha- 
lien,  but  also  in  the  Amur  Territory. 

Banking  co-operation  is  represented  by  the  Union 
of  Siberian  Hanking  Unions,  states  an  official  of  the 
Russo-American  Committee  for  the  Far  East.  The 
association  aims  to  help  grain  producers,  to  secure 
the  best  agricultural  implements  for  them,  and  to 
assist  the  peasant  in  acquiring  technical  knowledge 


388    RUSSIA  AS  AN   AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

pertaining  to  agricultural  production.  It  con 
prises  about  4,000  land  and  savings  associ; 
tions,  united  according  to  region  into  28  bankir 
unions.  The  board  of  the  unions  is  located  ; 
Novonikolaievsk.  Although  the  capital  is  not  large- 
only  1,000,000  rubles — the  activities  are  increasin; 
The  association  is  greatly  interested  in  the  esta! 
lishment  of  sound  economic  relations  with  foreig 
countries,  since  it  is  not  only  an  important  buye 
but  a  large  seller  of  goods. 

The  Moscow  Union  of  Consumers'  Societies 
the  central  ail-Russian  organization  of  consumer 
The  principal  object  of  the  union  is  the  purchase  < 
goods  of  first  necessity,  although  it  has  its  ow 
factories  for  tobacco,  candy,  matches,  and  soa; 
The  head  office  is  in  Moscow,  with  agencies  di 
tributed  in  various  towns  of  Russia  and  Siber 
and  in  London.  Last  year  the  share  capit 
amounted  to  1,800,000  rubles.  A  remarkable  ii 
crease  is  to  be  noted  in  the  turnover  of  the  unioi 
in  191 1  it  was  estimated  at  3,500,000  ruble 
and  in  1917  at  86,500,000  rubles.  At  the  end  < 
1917  the  Moscow  union  was  reorganized  into 
Central  All-Russian  Union  of  Consumers'  Societie 
which  embraces  more  than  250  unions  and  aboi 
25,000  individual  societies.  This  Central  Unic 
is  the  largest  body  of  organized  consumers  in  tl 
world,  it  is  said. 

The  Russian  Union  of  Zemstvos,  or  the  Soyi 
of  Zemstvos  and  Towns  and  the  Zemsky  Soyu 
were  established  during  the  war,  when,  besidi 
doing  Red  Cross  work,  they  established  organiz; 
tions  for  purchasing  materials  and  supplies  for  tl 


APPENDICES  389 

army.  The  aims  of  the  new  societies  are  to  develop 
and  finance  Russian  enterprises,  to  establish  a 
trade  apparatus  to  supply  the  demands  of  the  Rus- 
sian market  by  importing  and  distributing  agri- 
cultural implements,  clothing,  etc.,  and  to  export 
Russian  raw  goods. 

The  central  administration  is  in  Moscow  and 
branches  are  being  opened  in  Petrograd,  Tumen, 
Omsk,  Novonikolaiev,  Tomsk,  Turkestan,  Tash- 
kent, and  in  the  Caucasus.  Transport  offices  are 
located  at  Archangel  and  Vladivostok,  and  special 
representatives  of  the  organizations  are  in  the 
United  States,  authorized  to  establish  trade  rela- 
tions and  make  contracts. 

The  All-Russian  Co-operative  Union  of  Flax- 
Growers  was  founded  in  191 5.  It  comprises  46 
unions,  142  individual  societies  in  flax-producing 
provinces,  and  has  a  total  membership  of  1,500,000 
individual  members  (peasant  households).  It  prac- 
tically controls  the  production  and  distribution  of 
the  product  within  Russia,  as  well  as  its  exportation 
to  other  countries.  In  191 7  the  union  collected 
40,000  tons  of  flax  and  bought  3,000  tons  of  flaxseed 
for  distribution  among  their  members;  the  total 
turnover  amounted  to  160,000,000  rubles.  Last 
year  about  18,000  tons  of  flax  were  sold  in  foreign 
countries,  the  proceeds  to  be  used  to  buy  machinery 
in  England  and  America.  The  organization  has  an 
American  representative. 

The  Co-operative  Society  of  Railroad  Workers 
is  a  co-operative  purchasing  organization  made  up 
of  1,500,000  railroad  workers,  and  manages  co- 
operative stores  on  all  the  Russian  railway  systems. 

■jo 


390    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

It  supplies  its  members  with  general  merchandise, 
including  boots,  shoes,  clothing,  etc.  At  present 
representatives  of  this  society  are  in  the  United 
States  arranging  for  purchases  of  supplies. 


in 

(Consul-General  Ernest  L.  Harris ;  Irkutsk,  March 
22,  igig) 

Owing  to  unsettled  conditions,  which  prevented 
regular  enterprises  from  keeping  up  their  standard 
of  business,  the  co-operatives  have  entered  and 
practically  monopolized  fields  into  which  they  would 
not  have  gone  in  normal  times.  To-day  the  greater 
part  of  the  co-operatives  find  themselves  with  con- 
siderable property  and  large  organizations,  but 
with  little  ready  money  with  which  to  carry  on 
operating  expenses.  In  manufacturing  they  have 
had  some  success  by  grouping  farmers  and  workmen 
in  shops  in  different  villages,  furnishing  the  tools 
and  materials,  and  taking  the  entire  output,  thus 
using  the  spare  time  of  the  farmers  and  showing 
them  that  money  can  be  earned  from  other  sources 
than  land. 

The  co-operative  movement  has  grown  enor- 
mously in  Siberia  during  the  war,  and  the  conditions 
produced  during  that  period  have  greatly  favored 
the  societies.  The  result  has  been  considerable 
overgrowth  and  inflation,  which  will  be  corrected 
in  the  near  future  when  keen  competition  between 
co-operatives  and  merchants  begins.  As  goods- 
distributing  organizations  there  is  nothing  to  equal 


APPENDICES  391 

co-operatives,   owing  to   the  many  thousands  of 
branches  they  possess  throughout  Siberia. 

In  Tomsk  the  societies  are  doing  most  of  the  busi- 
ness with  villages.  Distribution  is  carried  out  by 
societies  that  are  organized  in  each  village  to  work 
in  conjunction  with  the  central  organ.  The  large 
organizations  are  gradually  buying  and  establishing 
small  factories  also. 

The  co-operative  movement  in  the  Irkutsk 
district  is  steadily  increasing.  There  are  no  landed  » 
proprietors  here,  and  small  landholders  favor  the 
associations  as  the  best  purchaser  of  all  kinds  of 
goods  for  peasants.  Co-operatives  are  gradually 
taking  over  all  internal  Russian  trade  in  this  section. 

The  co-operative  movement  is  a  genuine  Russian 
movement,  purely  economic,  and  a  powerful  factor 
in  Russian  life.  The  organizations  are  democratic, 
handle  their  business  well,  although  lacking  edu- 
cated people  to  fill  the  various  positions  effectively. 
Furthermore,  the  unions  possess  the  necessary 
machinery  for  collecting  and  handling  agricultural 
produce  and  raw  goods  as  well  as  for  supplying  the 
general  requirements  for  their  members. 
— Commerce  Reports,  United  States  Dept.  of  Com- 
merce, May  24,  1 919. 


APPENDIX  H 

CORRESPONDENCE   BETWEEN  THE  ALLIED  AND  ASSO- 
CIATED  POWERS   AND   ADMIRAL   KOLCHAK 

I 

{Despatch  to  Admiral  Kolchak,  dated  May  26,  igig) 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  feel  that  the 
time  has  come  when  it  is  necessary  for  them  once 
more  to  make  clear  the  policy  they  propose  to 
pursue  in  regard  to  Russia. 

It  has  always  been  a  cardinal  axiom  of  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  to  avoid  interference  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  Russia.  Their  original  inter- 
vention was  made  for  the  sole  purpose  of  assisting 
those  elements  in  Russia  which  wanted  to  continue 
the  struggle  against  German  autocracy  and  to  free 
their  country  from  German  rule,  and  in  order  to 
rescue  the  Czecho-Slovaks  from  the  danger  of 
annihilation  at  the  hands  of  the  Bolshevik  forces. 

The  Overtures  to  Moscow 

Since  the  signature  of  the  armistice  on  November 
11,  1918,  they  have  kept  forces  in  various  parts  of 
Russia.  Munitions  and  supplies  have  been  sent 
to  assist  those  associated  with  them  at  a  very  con- 


APPENDICES  393 

siderable  cost.  No  sooner,  however,  did  the  Peace 
Conference  assemble  than  they  endeavored  to 
bring  peace  and  order  to  Russia  by  inviting  repre- 
sentatives of  all  the  warring  governments  within 
Russia  to  meet  them,  in  the  hope  that  they  might 
be  able  to  arrange  a  permanent  solution  of  Russian 
problems. 

This  proposal,  and  a  later  offer  to  relieve  the 
distress  among  the  suffering  millions  of  Russia, 
broke  down  through  the  refusal  of  the  Soviet 
government  to  accept  the  fundamental  conditions 
of  suspending  hostilities  while  negotiations  or  the 
work  of  relief  was  proceeding. 

Some  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments 
are  now  being  pressed  to  withdraw  their  troops 
and  to  incur  no  further  expense  in  Russia,  on  the 
ground  that  continued  intervention  shows  no 
prospect  of  producing  an  early  settlement.  They 
are  prepared,  however,  to  continue  their  assistance 
on  the  lines  laid  down  below,  provided  they  are 
satisfied  that  it  will  really  help  the  Russian  people 
to  liberty,  self-government,  and  peace. 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  now 
wish  to  declare  formally  that  the  object  of  their 
policy  is  to  restore  peace  within  Russia  by  enabling 
the  Russian  people  to  resume  control  of  their  own 
affairs  through  the  instrumentality  of  a  freely 
elected  Constituent  Assembly,  and  to  restore  peace 
along  its  frontiers  by  arranging  for  the  settlement 
of  disputes  in  regard  to  the  boundaries  of  the 
Russian  state  and  its  relations  with  its  neighbors 
through  the  peaceful  arbitration  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 


394    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 

The  Conditions  of  Recognition 

They  are  convinced  by  their  experiences  of  the 
last  twelve  months  that  it  is  not  possible  to  attain 
these  ends  by  dealings  with  the  Soviet  government 
of  Moscow.  They  are  therefore  disposed  to  assist 
the  government  of  Admiral  Kolchak  and  his  asso- 
ciates with  munitions,  supplies,  and  food  to  establish 
themselves  as  the  government  of  All-Russia,  pro- 
vided they  receive  from  them  definite  guaranties 
that  their  policy  has  the  same  objects  in  view  as 
that  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers.  With 
this  object  they  would  ask  Admiral  Kolchak  and  his 
associates  whether  they  would  agree  to  the  following 
as  the  conditions  upon  which  they  accept  continued 
assistance  from  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers: 

1.  That  as  soon  as  they  reach  Moscow  they  will 
summon  a  Constituent  Assembly,  elected  by  a  free, 
secret,  and  democratic  franchise  as  the  supreme 
legislature  for  Russia,  to  which  the  government  of 
Russia  must  be  responsible,  or,  if  at  that  time  order 
is  not  sufficiently  restored,  they  will  summon  the 
Constituent  Assembly  elected  in  1917  to  sit  until 
such  time  as  new  elections  are  possible. 

2.  That  throughout  the  areas  which  they  at 
present  control  they  will  permit  free  elections  in 
the  normal  course  for  all  local  and  legally  con- 
stituted assemblies,  such  as  municipalities,  zemst- 
vos,  etc. 

3.  That  they  will  countenance  no  attempt  to 
revive  the  special  privileges  of  any  class  or  order 
in  Russia.  The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  have 
noted    with    satisfaction   the   solemn    declarations 


APPENDICES  395 

made  by  Admiral  Kolchak  and  his  associates  that 
they  have  no  intention  of  restoring  the  former 
land  system.  They  feel  that  the  principles  to  be 
followed  in  the  solution  of  this  and  other  internal 
questions  must  be  left  to  the  free  decision  of  the 
Russian  Constituent  Assembly;  but  they  wish  to 
be  assured  that  those  whom  they  are  prepared  to 
assist  stand  for  civil  and  religious  liberty  of  all 
Russian  citizens,  and  will  make  no  attempt  to 
reintroduce  the  regime  which  the  Revolution  has 
destroyed. 

4.  That  the  independence  of  Finland  and  Poland 
be  recognized,  and,  in  the  event  of  the  frontiers 
and  other  relations  between  Russia  and  these 
countries  not  being  settled  by  agreement,  they  will 
be  referred  to  the  arbitration  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

5.  That  if  a  solution  of  the  relations  between 
Esthonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  and  the  Caucasian 
and  Trans-Caspian  territories  and  Russia  is  not 
speedily  reached  by  agreement,  the  settlement  will 
be  made  in  consultation  and  co-operation  with  the 
League  of  Nations,  and  that  until  such  settlement 
is  made  the  government  of  Russia  agrees  to  recog- 
nize these  territories  as  autonomous,  and  to  confirm 
the  relations  which  may  exist  between  their  de  facto 
governments  and  the  Allied  and  Associated  Govern- 
ments. 

6.  That  the  right  of  the  Peace  Conference  to 
determine  the  future  of  the  Rumanian  part  of 
Bessarabia  be  recognized. 

7.  That  as  soon  as  a  government  for  Russia  has 
Iren    constituted    on    a    democratic    basis    Russia 


396    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

should  join  the  League  of  Nations  and  co-operate 
with  the  other  members  in  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ments and  military  organization  throughout  the 
world. 

Finally,  that  they  abide  by  the  declaration  made 
by  Admiral  Kolchak's  government  on  November 
27,  191 8,  in  regard  to  Russia's  national  debts. 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  will  be  glad 
to  learn  as  soon  as  possible  whether  the  government 
of  Admiral  Kolchak  and  his  associates  are  prepared 
to  accept  these  conditions,  and  also  whether,  in 
the  event  of  acceptance,  they  will  undertake  to 
form  a  single  government,  and  as  soon  as  the  mili- 
tary situation  makes  it  possible. 

[Signed]  G.  Clemenceau, 
D.  Ll.  George, 
V.  E.  Orlando, 
Woodrow  Wilson, 
Makino. 

11 
reply  of  admiral  kolchak  to  the  powers 

Dated  Omsk,  June  4,  iqiq 

(Original  in  French) 

The  government  over  which  I  preside  has  been 
happy  to  learn  that  the  policy  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers  in  regard  to  Russia  is  in  perfect 
accord  with  the  task  which  the  Russian  government 
itself  has  undertaken,  that  government  being 
anxious  above  all  things  to  re-establish  peace  in  the 


APPENDICES  397 

country  and  to  assure  to  the  Russian  people  the 
right  to  decide  their  own  destiny  in  freedom  by 
means  of  a  Constituent  Assembly.  I  appreciate 
highly  the  interest  shown  by  the  Powers  as  regards 
the  national  movement,  and  consider  their  wish  to 
make  certain  of  the  political  conviction  with  which 
we  are  inspired  as  legitimate.  I  am  therefore  ready 
to  confirm  once  more  my  previous  declaration, 
which  I  have  always  regarded  as  irrevocable. 

The  Constituent  Assembly 

(i)  On  November  18,  191 8,  I  assumed  power, 
and  I  shall  not  retain  that  power  one  day  longer 
than  is  required  by  the  interests  of  the  country. 
My  first  thought  at  the  moment  when  the  Bolshe- 
viks are  definitely  crushed  will  be  to  fix  the  date 
for  the  elections  of  the  Constituent  Assembly.  A 
commission  is  now  at  work  on  direct  preparation 
for  them  on  the  basis  of  universal  suffrage.  Con- 
sidering myself  as  responsible  before  that  Con- 
stituent Assembly,  I  shall  hand  over  to  it  all  my 
powers  in  order  that  it  may  freely  determine  the 
system  of  government.  I  have,  moreover,  taken 
the  oath  to  do  this  before  the  supreme  Russian 
tribunal,  the  guardian  of  legality.  All  my  efforts 
are  aimed  at  concluding  the  civil  war  as  soon  as 
possible  by  crushing  Bolshevism  in  order  to  put 
the  Russian  people  effectively  in  a  position  to 
express  its  free-will.  Any  prolongation  of  this 
struggle  would  only  postpone  the  moment. 

The  government,  however,  does  not  consider 
itself  authorized    to   substitute   for   the   inalienable 


398    RUSSIA  AS   AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

right  of  free  and  legal  elections  the  mere  re-establish- 
ment of  the  Assembly  of  1917,  which  was  elected 
under  a  regime  of  Bolshevist  violence,  and  the 
majority  of  whose  members  are  now  in  the  Sovietist 
ranks.  It  is  to  the  legally  elected  Constituent 
Assembly  alone,  which  my  government  will  do  its 
utmost  to  convoke  promptly,  that  there  will  belong 
the  sovereign  rights  of  deciding  the  problem  of  the 
Russian  state  both  in  the  internal  and  external 
affairs  of  the  country. 

(2)  We  gladly  consent  to  discuss  at  once  with 
the  powers  all  international  questions,  and  in  doing 
so  shall  aim  at  the  free  and  peaceful  developments 
of  peoples,  the  limitation  of  armaments,  and  the 
measures  calculated  to  prevent  new  wars,  of  which 
the  League  of  Nations  is  the  highest  expression. 
The  Russian  government  thinks,  however,  that  it 
should  recall  the  fact  that  the  final  sanction  of  the 
decisions  which  may  be  taken  in  the  name  of  Russia 
will  belong  to  the  Constituent  Assembly.  Russia 
cannot  now,  and  cannot  in  the  future,  ever  be  any- 
thing but  a  democratic  state,  where  all  questions 
involving  modifications  of  the  territorial  frontiers 
and  of  external  relations  must  be  ratified  by  a 
representative  body  which  is  the  natural  expression 
of  the  people's  sovereignty. 

(3)  Considering  the  creation  of  a  unified  Polish 
state  to  be  one  of  the  chief  of  the  normal  and  just 
consequences  of  the  World  War,  the  government 
thinks  itself  justified  in  confirming  the  independence 
of  Poland  proclaimed  by  the  Provisional  govern- 
ment of  1917,  all  the  pledges  and  degrees  of  which 
we  have  accepted.     The  final  solution  of  the   ques- 


APPENDICES  399 

tion  of  delimiting  the  frontiers  between  Russia  and 
Poland  must,  however,  in  conformity  with  the 
principles  set  forth  above,  be  postponed  till  the 
meeting  with  the  Constituent  Assembly.  We  are 
disposed  at  once  to  recognize  the  de  facto  govern- 
ment of  Finland,  but  the  final  solution  of  the  Fin- 
nish question  must  belong  to  the  Constituent 
Assembly. 

(4)  We  are  fully  disposed  at  once  to  prepare 
for  the  solution  of  the  questions  concerning  the 
fate  of  the  national  groups  in  Esthonia,  Latvia, 
Lithuania,  and  of  the  Caucasian  and  Trans-Caspian 
countries,  and  we  have  every  reason  to  believe 
that  a  prompt  settlement  will  be  made,  seeing  that 
the  government  is  assuring,  as  from  the  present 
time,  the  autonomy  of  the  various  nationalities. 
It  goes  without  saying  that  the  limits  and  condi- 
tions of  these  autonomous  institutions  will  be  set- 
tled separately  as  regards  each  of  the  nationalities 
concerned.  And  even  in  case  difficulties  should 
arise  in  regard  to  the  solution  of  these  various 
questions  the  government  is  ready  to  have  recourse 
to  the  collaboration  and  good  offices  of  the  League 
of  Nations  with  a  view  to  arriving  at  a  satisfactory 
settlement. 

(5)  The  above  principle,  implying  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  agreements  by  the  Constituent  Assembly, 
should  obviously  be  applied  to  the  question  of 
Bessarabia. 

(6)  The  Russian  government  once  more  repeats 
its  declaration  of  November  27,  1918,  by  which  it 
accepted  the  burden  of  the  national  debt  of  Russia. 

(7)  As  regards  the  question  of  internal  politics, 


4oo    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

which  can  only  interest  the  powers  in  so  far  as  they 
reflect  the  political  tendencies  of  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment, I  make  point  of  repeating  that  there  can- 
not be  a  return  to  the  regime  which  existed  in 
Russia  before  February,  1917.  The  provisional 
solution  which  my  government  has  adopted  in 
regard  to  the  agrarian  question  aims  at  satisfying 
the  interest  of  the  great  mass  of  the  population, 
and  is  inspired  by  the  conviction  that  Russia  can 
only  be  flourishing  and  strong  when  the  millions 
of  Russian  peasants  receive  all  guaranties  for  the 
possession  of  the  land.  Similarly  as  regards  the 
regime  to  be  applied  to  the  liberated  territories, 
the  government,  far  from  placing  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  the  free  election  of  local  assemblies,  mu- 
nicipalities, and  zemstvos,  regards  the  activities  of 
these  bodies  and  also  the  development  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  self-government  as  the  necessary  conditions 
for  the  reconstruction  of  the  country,  and  is  already 
actually  giving  them  its  support  and  help  by  all 
the  means  at  its  disposal. 

(8)  Having  set  ourselves  the  task  of  re-establish- 
ing order  and  justice  and  of  insuring  individual 
security  to  the  persecuted  population  which  is  tired 
of  trials  and  exactions,  the  government  affirms 
the  equality  before  the  law  of  all  classes  and  all 
citizens  without  any  special  privileges.  All  shall 
(enjoy?)  without  distinction  of  origin  or  of  religion 
the  protection  of  the  state  and  of  the  law.  The 
government  whose  head  I  am  is  concentrating  all 
the  forces  and  all  the  resources  at  its  disposal  in 
order  to  accomplish  the  task  which  it  has  set  itself 
at  this  decisive  hour.     I  speak  in  the  name  of  all 


APPENDICES  401 

national  Russia.  I  am  confident  that,  Bolshevism 
once  crushed,  satisfactory  solutions  will  be  found 
for  all  questions  which  equally  concern  all  these 
populations  whose  existence  is  bound  up  with  that 
of  Russia. 

[Signed]         Kolchak. 

hi 
Dated  Paris,  June  12,  IQIQ 

The  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  wish  to 
acknowledge  receipt  of  Admiral  Kolchak's  reply 
to  their  note  of  May  26th.  They  welcome  the 
tone  of  that  reply,  which  seems  to  them  to  be  in 
substantial  agreement  with  the  propositions  which 
they  had  made  and  to  contain  satisfactory  assur- 
ances for  the  freedom,  self-government,  and  peace 
of  the  Russian  people  and  their  neighbors.  They 
are,  therefore,  willing  to  extend  to  Admiral  Kolchak 
and  his  associates  the  support  set  forth  in  their 
original  letter. 

[Signed]         I).  Lloyd  George, 
Woodrow    Wilson, 
G.  Clemenceau, 
V.  E.  Orlando, 
N.  Makino. 


APPENDIX  I 

Soviet   Government   of    Russia    on   Alleged 
Secret  German-Japanese  Treaty 

japan  and  foe  in  secret  pact — soviet  govern- 
ment makes   public  treaty  between 
nippon  empire  and  germany 

(By  United  Press) 

Budapest,  June  20. 

The  Soviet  government  to-day  made  public  in  a 
wireless  despatch  from  Moscow  the  following  ver- 
sion of  an  alleged  secret  treaty  negotiated  between 
Japan  and  Germany: 

"First.  Both  parties  undertake  to  lend  a  helping 
hand  to  the  third  treaty  party  (Russia)  as  soon  as 
compatible  with  the  world's  political  situation, 
for  the  restoration  of  her  internal  order,  interna- 
tional prestige,  and  power. 

"Second.  Japan  undertakes  the  granting  to 
Germany  of  advantages  resulting  from  the  most- 
favored-nation  reciprocity  clauses  of  the  existing 
Russo-Japanese    treaty. 

"Third.  Japan  undertakes  to  permit  Germany 
to  participate  in  accordance  with  concessions  em- 
bodied in  this  special  treaty,  in  Japan's  preferential 


APPENDICES  403 

treaty  rights  in  China,  the  parties  undertaking  to 
exclude  foreign  powers  (United  States  and  Great 
Britain)   from  securing  further  concessions  there. 

"Fourth.  Japan  undertakes  the  safeguarding 
indirectly  of  Germany's  interests  in  the  forthcoming 
Peace  Conference,  striving  for  minimum  territorial 
and  material  disadvantages  to  Germany." 

The  despatch  declared  that  the  alleged  treaty 
was  negotiated  by  Oda,  Japanese  plenipotentiary, 
who  arrived  in  Stockholm  on  October  18,  191 8,  to 
begin  secret  conferences  with  German  Ambassador 
Lucius.  The  Bolsheviki  claim  that  Oda  trans- 
mitted to  Tokio  secret  German  overtures  for  a 
separate  peace. 

Oda  and  Lucius,  agreeing  upon  the  principles  of  a 
treaty,  later  went  to  Berlin  to  complete  the  draft, 
the  Bolsheviki  charge.  The  German  government 
approved  the  document,  it  was  said,  but  the  Revolu- 
tion rendered  it  impossible  of  execution 

The  alleged  existence  of  such  a  treaty  was  first 
definitely  asserted  by  Foreign  Minister  Tchitcherine 
in  a  recent  interview  with  the  United  Press.  The 
Bolsheviki's  bitter  opposition  to  the  alleged  treaty 
and  their  desire  to  make  it  public  results,  Tchit- 
cherine explained,  from  the  fact  that  it  could  only 
become  operative  through  their  overthrow  and  the 
restoration  of  the  Russian  Empire. 


INDEX 

.  as  liberal  democrat,  79;    essen- 
tially tyrannical,  79;    views  on 

Abakan:     coal    along    river,    521;  serfdom,  80;    conceives  reforms 

iron  along  the,  325.  as   autocrat,   So;    regards  him- 

Ackerman,     Carl,     245  «,     245  ;;,  self  as  agent  of  Providence,  80; 

247  *;,  250  n,  2^2  n.  meets   Napoleon   at   Tilsit,   80; 

A    collection    of   reports   on    Bol-  brutality  of,  80;    becomes  most 

shevism,  29;  n.  powerful    European    sovereign, 

Act  of  Emancipation,  203.  80;   launches  Holy  Alliance,  80; 

Act  of  Liberation,  84,  97.  evangelical  religious  views,  80; 

Aden,  195.  plan   for   European   Confedera- 

Adscriptio   Glebce,   abolished,   87.  rion  submitted  to  Pitt,  80;  Con- 
Afghanistan,     Bolshevist     propa-  federation  of  European  powers 
ganda  in,  342,  343.  described    by,    81;     anticipates 

Agricultural  experts  needed,  291.  League  of  Nations,  81;    Rous- 

Agricultural    societies    in    Russia,  s<  au's  influence  upon,  81;  joins 

19.  Metternich  in  suppressing  revo- 

Agriculture  in  Russia:  extent  of,  lutionary  movements  abroad, 
14;  products  of  important  to  81;  adopts  brutally  reactionary 
world,  14;  increase  of  needed,  policy  at  home,  81;  permits 
13;  backwardness  of,  16;  primi-  serfdom  to  continue,  81;  con- 
tive  implements  used  in.  id,  17;  tempt  for  by  Russian  people, 
modern  machinery  used  in,  17;  82;  joins  pursuit  of  Napoleon's 
improvement  of,  17;  Russian  army,  82;  succeeded  by  Nicho- 
government  and,  i*.  zemstvos  las  I,  83;  exiles  Poles,  201. 
and,  !•'-■',  19;  co-operative  socie-  Alexander  II:  abolishes  serfdom 
ties  and,  19;  agricultural  suae-  by  Act  of  Liberation,  84;  i fi- 
nes and,  19;  future  of,  20;  im-  Huenced  byjTchernyshevsky,  84; 
poriance  oi  to  Europe  and  belief  that  emancipation  would 
America,  20;  war  and,  19,  21;  bring  prosperity,  84;  liberalism 
cost  ot  modernizing,  31;  ma-  ot  early  years  of  reign,  85; 
chinery  needed  for,  31.  adopts  policy  of  repression,  85; 

Aigun,   Treaty  of,  113.  assassination     of,     98;       exiles 

Akmolinsk,  coal  mar,  320;  copper  Poles,  201. 

1:1    326.  Alexander    I  If,    development    of 

Alaska,  nearness  to  Siberian  coast,  czarism  under,  100. 

2  5 1-  Alexinsky,    (ircgor:     on     Krasin, 

,\ldan,  coal  found  :i1oiil',  sZi.  42  n;  49  v.\  quoted,  61-62;  71  7;; 

Ah  \ander  I.    western  idealism   m  97",  129?;;    132;    it}«. 

Russia  under,  79,    began  reign  Jlgemcen  Uandclsllad,  282. 
21 


4o6    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

All-Russian     Central     Union     of 

Consumers'  Societies,  308. 
All-Russian    Co-operative    Union 

of  Flax-growers,  309. 
All-Russian  Government,  245, 250, 

33^  33>  345- 
All-Russian  Zemstvo  Union,  304. 
Aloysius,  Marcus,  61. 
Alsace  (and  Lorraine),  237. 
Alston,  Mr.,  292,  295. 
Altai:    Railroad,  321;    mines  in, 

324;   copper  in,  326. 
America:      Russia's     problem     a 

challenge  to,  29;  closely  related 

to  European  culture,  51;    fails 

to    give    Russia   support,    241; 

friendship  for  Russia,  241-242; 

supports  Admiral  Kolchak,  242; 

changes  policy,  243;    and  joint 

intervention    in    Siberia,    243; 

Japan  intrigues  to  secure  with- 
drawal of,   247;    blundering  in 

dealing  with   Bolshevism,   337, 

338. 
American:  capital  in  western  Man- 
churia, 214;  trade  in  Manchuria 

destroyed,  215;   consular  report 

on  Russian  credits,  290;   troops 

in  Siberia,  246-247,  250. 
American    Railroad    Commission, 

25,  242. 
America  s  Opportunities  for  Trade 

and  Investment  in  Russia,  137  n. 
America's   Possible   Share    in   the 

Economic     Future     of    Russia, 

129  n,  318  n. 
Amritsar,  Bolshevist  riots  in,  342. 
Amur    Province:     and    Japanese 

rule,  197;  coal  in,  322;  iron  ore 

deposits  in,  325. 
Amur,  River,  115,  223. 
Amursk,  fisheries  of,  223,  229. 
Anadyr,  Gulf  of,  1. 
Anert,  E.  E.,  on  Japanese  activity 

in  Russian  Far  East,  228. 
Anesthetics,  lack  of,  293. 
Angara:   coal  near,  321;   iron  ore 

deposits,  325. 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance:  as  rea- 
son for  Japan's  war  on  Germany, 


159-162;  made  and  extended, 
160;   terms  of,  161. 

Anglo-Russian  commerce,  base 
for  at  Archangel,  64. 

Anglo-Saxon  influence  on  Japan, 
144. 

Annam,  117. 

Anne  of  Courland:  her  relations 
with  Biihren,  73-75;  her  char- 
acter, 76;  preyed  on  by  adven- 
turers, 76. 

Antimony,  328. 

Antonio,  Petro,  61. 

Antonov-Ovsejenko,  General,  243. 

Anzhersk  mines,  319,  320. 

Appeal  to  the  Slavs,  An,  91. 

Archangel:  first  English  traders 
arrive  at,  64;  trade  route  to 
Moscow,  67,  69. 

Archives  d' Anthropologie  Crimi- 
nelle,  296. 

Arctic  Ocean,  67. 

Argentina:  average  wheat  yield, 
16;  wheat  exports  to  Great 
Britain,  18;  cattle  per  head  of 
population  in,  21;  proposed 
purchase  of  cruisers  from,  127; 
imports  of,  334. 

Armenia,  danger  to,  2. 

Asia:  our  neighbor,  10;  Japanese 
hegemony  of,  33;  power  of 
Japan-China-Siberia  union  in, 
26;  aggressions  upon  Russia, 
47;  barbarians  of  invade  Russia, 
47;  conquerors  from  tax  Russia, 
47;  invaders  from  deprive  Rus- 
sia of  communication  with  By- 
zantium, 48;  Russia's  potential 
advantage  in  markets  of,  58; 
development  of  Russian  trade 
with,  68;  French  interests  in, 
117;  hegemony  of,  150,  154; 
Bolshevism  likely  to  spread 
over,  342. 

Asia,  191  n,  215  n. 

"Asia  for  the  Asiatics,"  196. 

Asia  Minor,  Russia  excluded  from 
by  Bagdad  railway,  124. 

"Asiatic  Prussia,"  the,  36,  142. 

Asunrov,  Professor,  296  n. 


INDEX 


407 


Associated  Press,  161  n,  261  n. 

Atchinsk,  322.1 

Aurora  borealis,  270. 

Australia:  average  wheat  yield, 
16;  cattle  per  head  of  popula- 
tion, 21;  exports  of  wheat  from, 
to  Great  Britain,  18;  and  Jap- 
anese immigration,  149. 

Austria:  average  wheat  yield,  16; 
Emperor  of,  joins  Alexander  I 
in  pursuit  of  Napoleon's  army, 
82. 

Austria-Hungary:  Russia's  trade 
with,  138;  China  declares  war 
on,  159;  coal  production  of,  318, 

319; 

Austnans,  in  Siberia,  205. 
Autonomy:      of    nationalities,    4; 

and     self-government     in     new 

Russia,  7. 
Avachin  Bay,  224. 
Avars,  335. 

Avvakum,  protopope,  201. 
Awakening    uf   .Is. a,    The,    134  n, 

196  n. 
Azov,  Sea  of,  1 23,  133. 

B 

Bachmac,  244. 

Bagdad  Railway,  124. 

Baker,  U.  S.  Secretary  of  War,  250. 

Baku:  growth  of  population  of, 
100;   oil  rields  of,  328. 

Bakunin:  joined  by  Herzen,  85; 
regards  mir  as  foundation  for 
Socialist  society,  90;  friendship 
with  Hur/.en,  90;  "George 
Sand"  and,  90;  accused  by 
Marx  of  espionage,  90;  his 
doctrine  of  Panslavisme,  91; 
controversy  with  Marx,  91; 
idealization  of  Russian  peasant 
by,  92:  influence  on  People's 
Will  Party,  93;  similarity  of 
Marxian  letter  to  views  of,  94; 
his  An  Appeal  to  the  Slavs,  91; 
idealizes  mir  and  muzhik,  95; 
and  abolition  of  state,  96. 

"  Bakuninists,"  96. 

Balakhonka,  River,  320. 


Balandins,  coal  mines  of,  321. 

Balfour,  Rt.  Hon.  A.  J.:  on  "Bal- 
kanization," 2;   292,  295. 

Balkans,  control  of,  98. 

Baltic  coast:  Russia  and,  5; 
failure  of  Ivan  the  Terrible  to 
reach,  66;  Russian  foothold  on, 
70;  Russia  deprived  of  ports  of, 
274. 

Baltic  fleet,  destruction  of,  122. 

Baltic  routes,  used  by  Germans 
and  Swedes,  67. 

Baltic  Sea,  1,  123,  133. 

Baltic  States,  independence  of, 
,346. 

bank  of  1  okio,  seeks  monopoly 
right  in  Pri-Amursk,  223. 

Barabash,  coal  at,  322. 

Barley,  production  of,  in  Russia, 
14. 

Barnaul:  growth  of,  207;  growth 
of  municipal  expenditure  in,  208. 

Barrows,  Lieut. -Col.  David  P., 
215  n,  239  n,  246  n,  250  ;;, 
252  ?;;  quoted,  251,  255. 

Batchatsk,  coal  mines,  321. 

Belgium:  average  wheat  yield,  15; 
capital  in  Russia,  134;  Russia's 
trade  with,  138;  colonial  ter- 
ritory of,  149;  outlet  for  sur- 
plus of  population  of,  149; 
density  of  population,  149; 
needs  most  of  her  capital,  266; 
co-operatives  of,  307;  coal  pro- 
duction of,  318;  must  limit 
imports,  333;  importance  to, 
of  Russian  trade,  334. 

Bering  Strait,  226,  231. 

Berkenheim,  Mr.,  345. 

Berlin,  252. 

Berlin-to-Bagdad  scheme,  37. 

Bctlin-to-Tokio:  a  possible  com- 
bination of  military  and  eco- 
nomic power,  37;  meaning  of 
such  a  combination  to  United 
States,  37;  such  consolidation 
would  force  militarism  on  all 
nations,  37;  involves  struggle 
between    Orient    and    Occident, 

37;  -5«- 


4o8    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


Bernhardt  General  F.  von,  quoted, 

I25- 
Bessarabia,   Rumania's  claim   to, 

.346- 

Bieberstein,  Colonel  R.  von, 
quoted,  123,  124. 

Biisk,  growth  of  municipal  ex- 
penditure in,  208. 

Binagadi,  oil  at,  329. 

Birth-rate  in  Siberia,  204. 

Bismarck,  quoted,  125. 

Black  Sea:  blockade  of,  115; 
Russia  deprived  of  ports  of,  274; 


1,  123,  133. 
Blagodat,  Mt., 


magnetic  iron  in, 


324- 


Blagovyestchensk:  growth  of,  207; 

growth  of  municipal  expenditure 

in,  208. 
Blanqui,  A.,  followers  of,  in  Russia, 

95»  97- 

Blanquism,  and  Bolshevism,  97. 

Blockade  of  Russia,  268,  278; 
lifting  of  useless,  without  credits, 
316. 

Bogdanov,  224  n,  311. 

Bogoslov,  iron  ore  near,  324. 

Bolsheviki:  encourage  separatism, 
6;  seize  power,  8;  and  railway 
system,  25;  and  American 
Railroad  Commission,  25;  rapid 
deterioration  of  railways  under, 
25-26;  prospects  of  being  over- 
thrown from  within,  30;  their 
overthrow  essential  to  union  of 
Siberia  with  Russia,  32;  possi- 
bility of  retaining  control  west 
of  Urals,  33;  progressive  aban- 
donment of  worst  features  of 
Bolshevism,  33;  possible  recog- 
nition by  other  powers,  33; 
Tchaykovsky  points  to  changes 
of,  33;  intimate  relations  of, 
with  Germany,  33;  willing  to 
trade  "concessions,"  33;  charged 
with  selling  out  to  foreign  capi- 
talist-imperialists, 34;  in  power 
will  be  subservient  to  Germany, 
34;  and  Japanese  imperialism, 
215;  struggle  against  in  Siberia, 


231;  and  Japanese  imperialists, 
235>  34i>  trY  to  seize  northern 
Manchuria,  235;  driven  out  of 
Manchuria  by  Chinese,  235; 
coup  d'etat  of,  236;  protection  of 
Allied  interests  against,  236; 
Teuton  prisoners  willing  to  join 
against  Allies,  238;  and  Allied 
stores  at  Vladivostok,  238; 
Japan  and,  240;  Semenov  wars 
against,  241;  Admiral  Kolchak 
and,  242;  treachery  of,  to 
Czecho-Slovaks,  244;  Germans 
among,  244;  Magyars  among, 
244;  routed  by  Czecho-Slovaks, 
244,  245;  suspected  of  league 
with  Germany,  245;  Allied 
army  against,  245;  tools  of 
Germans,  275;  shoot  victims  of 
glanders,  292;  co-operatives 
and,  309-310;  and  economic 
concessions,  314-317;  irony  of 
proposals  of,  317;  aim  to  stir 
Orient,  335;  victories  over  op- 
ponents, 337;  propaganda 
among  Asiatic  peoples  by,  340, 
342;  and  Pan-Islamism,  342; 
connected  with  riots  in  India, 
342;  why  Japan  must  fight 
against,  343;  adoption  of  moder- 
ate tone  by,  344;  must  not  be 
recognized,  344-345;  danger  of 
uniting   Russian   nation   under, 

Bolshevism:  ruinous  effects  of,  31; 
described  by  Tchaykovsky,  43; 
German  specialists  and  man- 
agers under,  43;  way  for,  paved 
by  Nihilism,  88;  depends  on 
revolution  in  western  nations, 
95;  elements  of,  Marxism  in,  97; 
mainly  a  revival  of  Blanquism, 
97;  bankruptcy  of,  317;  anti- 
Bolshevist  war  against,  337,  338; 
only  democracy  can  defeat,  339; 
becomes  a  military  system,  340; 
spread  of,  in  Siberia,  340;  dan- 
ger of  spread  of,  in  Asia,  342; 
adapted  to  Oriental  mind,  342; 
failure  of,  in  Germany  and  Hua» 


INDEX 


409 


gary,  342;  Japan  alarmed  by 
development  of,  343;  dancer  of 
Pan-Asian,  343;  perverted  phi- 
losophy of,  344;  has  developed 
new  terrors,  344;  danger  of 
external    warfare    against,    545- 

357-  . 
Bolshevism,  58  n,  304  n. 
Bolshevism  and  the  United  Stales, 

12  n. 
Bolshevist  Government:  publishes 

diplomatic  correspondence,  169; 

44-  175- 

Bond  Club,  of  New  York,  331  n. 

Borissof,  314. 

Bosphorus,  the,  123. 

Bourgeoisie:  rise  of,  in  western 
nations,  79;  weakness  of,  in 
Russia,  79;  growing  power  of, 
in  France,  89. 

Bourtzev,  V'.,  293  n. 

Boycott  of  Japanese  goods  by 
Chinese,  217. 

Brazil:  manganese  produced  in. 
328;   imports  of,  334. 

Bremen:  American  cotton  passed 
through,  285;  line  of  steamers 
to  Galveston  and  New  Orleans, 
285. 

Brennan,  Professor  H.,  3 it. 

Brest-Litovsk,  Peace  of,  243,  274. 

British:  captain  visits  Ivan  the 
Ierrible,  22;  diplomacy  respon- 
sible for  French  loan,  54;  ship 
enters  Northern  Dvina,  63-64; 
subjects  in  Russia,  56;  capital 
invested  in  Russia,  133,  134; 
troops  in  Siberia,  230. 

British  Columbia,  platinum  pro- 
duced in,  327. 

British  House  of  Commons,  speech 
in,  43. 

British  India:  average  wheat 
yield,  16;  manganese  produced 
in,  ^ :  - . 

Krvan.W.  J.,  16S. 

Biihren,  lover  of  Anne  ol  Coin- 
land,  74, 75. 

Bulgaria,  average  wheat  yield,  K. 

Bulgauans:     at  ratted    to    Russia 


by  Catherine  II,  74;    industries 
owned  by,  78. 

Bullitt    Mission    to    Russia,    The, 

Bullitt,  William  C,  quoted,  315- 
316. 

Billow,  Prince  von,  and  Bismarck, 
125. 

Bunge,  M.,  100. 

Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic 
Commerce  (U.  S.),  319  n. 

Bureya,  coal  at,  322. 

Burlingame,  Anson,  177. 

Byelogorsk,  iron  deposit  of,  325. 

Byzantine  Orthodox  Church:  in- 
troduced into  Russia,  47;  be- 
comesOrthodox  Russian  Church, 
48;  its  heritage  of  Greek  culture 
corrupted,  48;  Hellenism  and, 
48;  semi-Oriental  character  of, 
48;  its  influence  not  merely 
spiritual,  48-49;  paves  way  for 
imperialism  of  czars,  49;  and 
Constantinople,  49;  supports 
struggle  against  Mohammedan 
lurk,  49. 

Byzantinism:  and  contact  of  Rus- 
sia with  western  civilization,  49; 
revolt  of  Intellectuals  against,  50. 

Byzantium,  severance  of  communi- 
cation between  Russia  and,  by 
barbarians,  49. 

C 

Cambric!,'/  Modern  History,  122  v. 

Canada:  wheat  yield  per  acre 
compared  with  Russia,  16;  as 
Russia's  competitor  in  British 
wheat  market,  18;  cattle  per 
head  of,  population  in,  21; 
railways  of,  112;  and  Japanese 
immigration,  149;  forest  area 
of,  310. 

Canton,  1 19. 

Capacity  of  Russians  for  organi/a- 
t if >n,  \  io. 

Cape  Prince  of  Wales,  231. 

Capital,  amount  of  Russian,  1 1  ">. 

Capitalist  prosperity,  vital  to  all 
classes,  39. 


4io    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 


Caroline  Islands,  163. 

Cartels,  227. 

Caspian  Sea,  107. 

Casualties  to  Russian  army,  261. 

Catherine  II:  admiration  for 
French  literature,  5 1 ;  patronizes 
Voltaire  and  Encyclopedists,  51; 
reaction  against  French  Revolu- 
tion, 51;  and  Diderot,  51;  sup- 
ports Byzantine  religion,  51; 
becomes  fanatical  oppressor,  51; 
opposition  to  Occidentalism,  5 1 ; 
accession  of,  73 ;  continues  work 
of  Peter  the  Great,  74;  liberal 
invitation  to  foreigners,  74; 
English  attracted  to  Russia  by, 
74;  Germans  attracted  to  Russia 
by,  74;  French  attracted  to 
Russia  by,  74;  Swedes  attracted 
to  Russia  by,  74;  Italians  at- 
tracted to  Russia  by,  74;  Bul- 
garians attracted  to  Russia  by, 
74;  condition  of  Russian  indus- 
try under,  75;  power  of  nobility 
under,  76;  manufacturing  class 
opposed  under,  75-76;  lacked 
vision,  76;  turned  to  Germany 
for  support,  76;  Prussianism  of, 
77;  genius  for  statecraft,  77; 
hostility  to  French  Revolution, 
77;  introduced  liberal  legisla- 
tive reforms,  77;  adopts  reac- 
tionary policy,  77;  comparison 
with  Peter  the  Great,  77;  pins 
faith  to  immigration,  jy;  her 
ukase  attracts  German  agri- 
culturists, 77;  foreign  ownership 
of  industry  under,  78;  serious 
consequences  of  her  policy, 
78-79;  efforts  to  prevent  Rus- 
sia's "contamination,"  79;  sends 
Polish  insurrectionists  to  Si- 
beria, 201;  introduces  German 
colonists,  205. 

Caucasus:  population  of,  1;  Rus- 
sian culture  and,  2;  machinery 
received  from  Vladivostok,  24; 
oil  industry  in,  106;  German- 
Russians  in,  205. 

Central  Asia:,   population   of,   1; 


as   Russia's   sphere,    124;    Bol- 
sheviki  aim  to  spread  revolt  in, 

^335- 

Central  Europe,  nations  of  least 
liberal,  52. 

Central  Russia,  German  exploita- 
tion of,  43. 

Central  Siberia:  boundaries  of, 
210;  population  of,  210;  prov- 
inces of,  210;  characteristics 
of,  210;  economic  retardation 
of,  210;  trade  with,  through 
Moscow,  211;  Allied  military 
stores  in,  239. 

Chancellor,  Richard,  visits  Ivan 
the  Terrible,  64. 

Charles  V,  disperses  German  im- 
migrants, 63. 

Chauvinists,  indifferent  to  Russia, 
8. 

Cheradame,  Andre,  124  n. 

Children,  Russian,  suffering  from 
malnutrition,  295. 

Chile,  imports  of,  334. 

China:  dominated  by  Japan,  32; 
resources  controlled  by  Japan, 
36,  40;  British  squadron  seeks 
to  reach,  by  Northeast  Passage, 
63-64;  war  with  Japan,  114, 
142,  151,  154;  peace  treaty  with 
Japan,  114;  recognizes  Korean 
independence,  114,  152;  cedes 
Liaotung  Peninsula  and  Port 
Arthur,  114;  surrenders  Talien- 
wan,  Formosa,  and  Pescadores, 
114;  indemnity  paid  to  Japan, 
114,  119;  gives  Wei-hai-wei  as 
pledge,  114;  intimate  relations 
with  Russia,  115;  loan  to,  by 
Russia,  119;  economic  and  polit- 
ical subjection  of,  139;  allied 
war  upon,  146;  Regent  Nobu- 
naga  and,  150  n;  as  protector 
of  Korea,  151;  joins  Russia  in 
supporting  Korea,  151;  Japan 
begins  war  on,  151;  case  of, 
similar  to  Russia,  154;  Japan 
seeks  economic  control  of,  154; 
officials  of,  corrupted  by  Japan, 
iqq;     Japan    promotes    revolts 


INDEX 


411 


in,  156,  157;  resources  of,  mort- 
gaged to  Japan,  156;  enters 
World  War,  159;  Japan  pledged 
to  uphold  integrity  of,  161; 
Japan  demands  surrender  of 
Kiaochau  to,  162;  German- 
leased  territory  in,  163,  184; 
Japan  fears  increase  of  British 
power  in,  164;  increased  Japa- 
nese control  of,  165;  restoration 
of  Kiaochau  promised,  165,  170; 
tries  to  avoid  being  drawn  into 
World  War,  165;  fears  Japan, 
163;  proposes  neutralization  of 
leased  territory,  165;  proposes 
to  join  Entente,  166;  Japan 
opposes  proposals  of,  165,  166; 
Japan's  fear  of  crearion  of  army 
by,  167:  confidence  of,  in 
United  States,  168;  pro-Ger- 
man agitation  in,  168;  anti- 
Entente  agitation  in,  168;  Japan 
bargains  for  recognition  of  para- 
mountcy  in,  168;  Russo-Japa- 
nese- diplomatic  conversation 
concerning,  169;  development 
of  relations  with  Japan,  57; 
Japan  denies  wanting  territory 
of,  170;  Twenty-one  Demands, 
the,  upon,  170-172;  Japan  de- 
nies obligation  to  return  Kiao- 
chau to,  170;  increase  of  Japa- 
nese power  over,  173;  special 
interests  of  Japan  in,  recognized 
by  L'nited  States,  171;  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement  and,  174-176; 
"open  door"  policy  in,  174,  176, 
21S;  Burlingame,  first  American 
Minister  to,  177;  Russia  nomi- 
!  ally  recogni/.es  sovereignty  of, 
177;  forced  to  give  Russia  ex- 
.  c  control  m  Mongolia,  177; 
"open  door"  policy  in,  flouted 
by  Russia  and  Japan,  177; 
agreement  by  Japan  and  Russia 
to  dominate,  17S';  American 
friendship  for,  174,  183;  stra- 
t  :'!c  military  power  of  Japan 
nvii,  [".-;  left  defenseless  oil 
Yelio,\  Sea,  I'-;:  sovereignty  of, 


violated  by  Japan,  186;  illicit 
trade  in  morphia  in,  187;  Japa- 
nese conditions  for  return  of 
Kiaochau  to,  18S;  Japanese 
monopoly  of  railways  of,  188, 
189;  monopolization  01  mining 
of,  by  Japanese,  189-191;  Ger- 
man trade  methods  in,  191; 
Japanese  smuggling  in,  192; 
maritime  customs  of,  192;  rob- 
bery of  revenue  of,  by  Japan, 
192;  becomes  a  Japanese  colony, 
195;  impairment  of  sovereignty 
of,  193;  domination  of,  and 
Pan-Asianism,  195;  close  rela- 
tion to  Russia,  197;  economic 
control  of,  by  Japan,  213-214, 
216;  sovereignty  of,  weakened 
by  Japan,  213,  216;  neutraliza- 
tion of  railroads  of,  proposed, 
214;  raw  materials  of,  possessed 
by  Japan,  216;  supplies  cheap 
labor  to  Japan,  216;  enables 
Japan  to  develop  industry,  216; 
low  purchasing  power  of,  217; 
boycott  of  Japanese  goods  in, 
217;  Russian  "rights"  in, 
sought  by  Japan,  218-220; 
democratic  Russian  government 
and,  220;  Japanese  conduct  in, 
234;  Bolsheviki  and,  235;  drives 
Bolsheviki  from  Manchuria, 
235;  foreign  consuls  recognize 
right  of,  in  Manchuria,  236; 
Japan  asserts  paramountcy  in, 
236;  not  well  supplied  with  oil, 
329;  Bolsheviki  aim  to  spread 
revolt  in,  333;  Japan's  interest 
in  Russian  rights  in,  341;  Bol- 
shevist propaganda  in,  342, 343. 

China  unci  the  World  War,   171  v.. 

Chinese:  in  Siberia,  199;  publish 
information  of  secret  German- 
Japanese  treaty,  253. 

Chino-Japanese  War,  114. 

Chol<  ra,  294-295. 

Christian  Science  Monitor,  The, 
189  >\  194  n. 

Christianity,  introduced  into  Rus- 
sia, 47. 


4i2    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


Christianovitch,  273. 

Chungking,  open  to  trade,  114. 

Churchill,  Rt.  Hon.  Winston, 
M.  P.,  quoted,  259. 

Circle  of  Tchaykovsky,  97. 

Civil  War,  American,  264. 

Coal:  of  Donetz  Basin,  24;  pro- 
duction of,  107,  127;   216;  318- 

323- 

Commerce,  growth  of  Russian, 
128. 

Commerce  Reports,  U.  S.  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce,  22  n,  282  n, 

Commercial  agencies,  263,  290. 

Commercial  houses,  in  Russia,  128. 

Committee  on  Public  Information 
of  United  States,  261  n. 

Communist  Manifesto,  90,  95. 

Condition  of  our  Fisheries  in  the 
Far  East,  The,  224  n. 

Conference  Internationale,  Brux- 
elles,  1899;    Enquetes,  296  ft. 

Constituent  Assembly,  32. 

Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far 
East,  1 74  n. 

Co-operative  movement,  in  Si- 
beria, 202. 

Co-operatives:  Siberian,  256; 
growth  of,  in  Russia,  307-310; 
as  possible  agencies  for  resump- 
tion of  trade  with  Russia,  345; 
subject  to  control  by  Soviet 
government,  345. 

Copper:  production  of,  128,  326; 
in  Siberia,  213;  in  China,  216. 

Corn,  production  of,  in  Russia,  14. 

Cossacks:  in  Siberia,  200,  203; 
guerillas,  241. 

Cotton:  of  Turkestan,  24;  in- 
dustry, growth  of,  108;  needed 
by  Russia,  284. 

Credit  customs,  of  Russia,  290. 

Crimean  War,  84,  115. 

Cuba,  imports  of,  334. 

Czar  Nicholas  II:  married  to  Ger- 
man princess,  55;  seven-eighths 
German,  55;  incompetence  of 
government  of,  126. 

Czarism,  overthrow  of,  52. 


Czecho-Slovaks:  Allied  and  Ameri- 
can intervention  to  rescue,  243, 
245-246;  deserted  from  Aus- 
trian army,  243 ;  fight  on  side  of 
Allies,  243;  Peace  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  and,  243;  desire  to 
fight  in  France,  243;  assembly 
of,  in  Ukraine,  243;  make  agree- 
ment with  Bolshevist  Govern- 
ment, 243;  start  across  Siberia, 
243;  give  arms  and  military 
equipment  to  Bolsheviki,  244; 
praised  by  Bolshevik  com- 
mander, 24.4;  betrayed,  by  Bol- 
sheviki, 244;  disarmament  and 
disbandment  of,  244;  Bolshe- 
viki, aided  by  Germans  and 
Magyars,  fight  against,  244; 
successful  resistance  to  Bolshe- 
viki, 244-245;  requested  by 
Allies  to  fight  Bolsheviki,  245; 
enraged  by  treachery  of  Bol- 
sheviki, 245;  convinced  Bol- 
sheviki in  league  .with  Germany 
and  Austria,  245;  extensive 
fighting  in  Siberia  by,  245;  save 
Siberia  from  Bolsheviki,  245; 
make  All-Russian  Government 
possible,  245;  share  in  Allied 
forces  in  Siberia,  246;  attacked 
by  Semenov's  Cossacks,  250. 

D 

Daily  Consular  and  Trade  Re- 
ports, U.  S.,  298  n. 

Dalny:  France  and  Russia  oppose 
Japanese  possession  of,  116; 
Russia's  interest  in,  116;  ac- 
quired by  Russia,  119;  185,  214. 

Danes,  early  trade  with  Russia,  67. 

Dardanelles,  the,  123,  133. 

Darwinism,  a  precursor  of  Nihil- 
ism, 88. 

Davis,  F.  Hadland,  11471,  119  n, 
148  ft. 

Decembrists:  armed  revolt  of,  83; 
history  of,  83;  martyrdom  of, 
83;  literary  leaders  among,  83; 
Herzen  exiled  for  singing  praise 
of,   84-85;    crushing  of  prelude 


INDEX 


4i3 


to  reign  of  tyranny,  £3;  sent 
to  Siberia,  201. 

Decembrist  uprising,  98. 

Democracy  and  the  Eastern  Ques- 
tion, 148  n,  156  n. 

Denikine:  collapse  of  forces  of, 
337;  lack  of  arms  and  supplies, 
340;  armies  of,  approach  Mos- 
cow, 340;  failure  of  Allies  to 
support,  340;  victory  of  Bol- 
sheviki  over,  340. 

Denmark:  average  wheat  yield, 
15;  Russia's  trade  with,  138; 
co-operatives  of,  307. 

Deutsch,  L.,  98. 

Deutsche  Bank,  43. 

Development  of  Japan,  The,  155"  n. 

Development  o]  Russian  and  Si- 
berian Co-operatives,  309  n. 

Doctors  needed,  292,  295. 

Dolgopolov,  Doctor,  293. 

Donetz  Basin,  coal  and  coke  of, 
24,319,323. 

Dowager  empress  of  Russia,   127. 

Drugs,  fake,  sold  by  Japanese,  235. 

Diiflon,  Konstantinovich  &  Co., 
281. 

Duisk  coal  mines,  322. 

Duma,  330. 

Duncker,  93. 

Dutch:  competition  of  the,  with 
English,  67;  become  supreme 
traders  in  Russian  marker,  6<>; 
maintain  representatives  in 
.Moscow ,  69. 

Dzhamantuzsk,  coal  deposit,  320. 

I! 

Kast  Cape,  73. 

Eastern  Siberia:  boundaries  of, 
211;  population  of,  211;  prov- 
inces of,  211;  characteristics 
of,  211;  distinct  horn  res!  of 
country,  211;  importance  of,  in 
Russia's  foreign  policy,  211; 
tiade  through  \ ladivostok,  211; 
close  relations  with  Japan,  211; 
economic  development  retarded 
throu  'li  political  policy,  211; 
its    immense    iich<  s,    211,    21;; 


Japan's  desire  to  dominate  and 
control,  212;  material  reasons 
for  Japan's  interest  in,  212-213; 
annexation  of  possible,  212; 
imperialist  policy  of  Japan  and, 
212;  control  of,  related  to 
domination  of  China,  213; 
mineral  springs  in,  acquired  by 
Japanese,  223;  electric  power 
plant,  acquired  by  Japanese, 
223;  flour  mills,  acquired  by 
Japanese,  223;  mud  baths, 
acquired  by  Japanese,  223; 
Japanese  colonization  in,  222; 
hotels  in,  acquired  by  Japanese, 
223;  Japanese  use  special  cur- 
rency in,  223;  mining  rights  in, 
acquired  by  Japanese,  223. 

Economic  Geography  of  Siberia, 
206  n:  319. 

Economic  imperialism,  11. 

Economic  warfare,  140. 

Edmonds,  T.  J.,  251. 

Egypt,  difficulties  of  England  in, 
121. 

Ekaterinoslav,  growth  of  popula- 
tion of,  106. 

Ekibas-Tuzski  coal  mines,  320. 

Ekonomicheskaya  Zhin,  the, 
quoted,  293-294. 

Electrotcchnical  industry  in  Rus- 
sia, 280-2S2. 

Eliseyev,  Dr.  S.  G.,  on  secret 
Russo-Japanese  agreements,  183. 

Elizabeth,  impress:  her  hatred  of 
Germans,  74;  lessened  German 
influence,  74;  compelled  to  name 
German  heir-apparent,  74;  her 
hatred  of  Frederick  the  Grear, 

74- 

F.mba,  oil  at,  529. 

Embourgeoisement,  fear  of,  89. 

Emperor  ot  Germany,  envoy  sent 
to,  by  Ivan  the  Terrible,  63. 

Emperor  of  Japan,  1 16. 

/>:•■,■  lopcdia  Britannica,  1  S3  n. 

Engels,  1' .,  93  ;   quoted,  95. 

England:  Germany's  neatest  com- 
petitor, q.(;  not  favored  by 
reactionary  elements  111  Russia, 


4i4    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


55;  German  export  bounties 
and,  56;  German  alcohol  and, 
56;  serious  consequences  of 
German  competition  to,  57; 
success  of  foreign  trade  policy 
of,  58;  aids  industrial  develop- 
ment of  foreign  countries,  59; 
statesmen  of,  do  not  hinder 
German  maritime  development, 
59;  policy  of  natural  develop- 
ment of  capitalism,  59;  admira- 
tion of  Ivan  the  Terrible  for,  64; 
first  Russian  trade  agreement 
with,  64;  first  traders  from, 
arrive  at  Archangel,  64;  early 
traders  from,  gain  over  Ger- 
mans, 65;  traders  of,  aided  by 
Ivan  the  Terrible,  65 ;  free  from 
fear  of  "Muscovite  barbarians," 
65;  profitable  trade  of,  with 
Russia  under  Queen  Elizabeth, 
65;  Queen  Elizabeth  of,  sends 
skilled  workers  to  Russia,  66; 
manufacturers  from,  granted 
patent  by  Ivan  the  Terrible,  66; 
pioneers  from,  penetrate  Ural 
Mountains,  66;  her  traders  sur- 
passed by  Dutch,  67,  69;  de- 
mand for  right  to  use  Volga 
refused,  68;  imports  from  Rus- 
sia, 137,  138;  exports  to  Russia, 
l37>  138;  outlet  for  surplus 
population  of,  149;  naval  bases 
of,  221-222;  needs  most  of  her 
capital,  266;  aware  of  Russia's 
resources,  266;  co-operatives 
of,  307;  must  limit  imports,  333; 
blundering  in  dealing  with  Bol- 
shevism, 337-338;  Bolshevist 
oriental  policy,  and,  343. 
English:  capitalists  favor  con- 
stitutional democracy,  53;  trad- 
ers, early,  61 ;  attracted  to 
Russia  by  Catherine  II,  74; 
industries  owned  by,  78;  in- 
vestments in  Russia,  135;  manu- 
factured goods  superior  to  Ger- 
man-made goods,  288;  and 
American  trading  methods  in- 
ferior to  German,  288-290. 


Esthonia:  independence  of,  2, 5, 6; 
acquired  by  Russia,  66;  as 
barrier  to  Bolshevism,  346. 

Europe:  our  neighbor,  10;  ideali- 
zation of,  in  Russia,  50. 

Europeanization:  passion  for,  50; 
Zapadniki  and,  50,  51;  Peter  I 
and,  51;  Catherine  II  and,  51; 
Russian  Intellectuals  and,  51; 
reactionary  elements  opposed 
to,  52. 

European  nations,  must  limit 
imports,  333.  _ 

European  Russia:  population  of, 
1;  unity  of,  7;  dismemberment 
of,  31;  Germany  seeks  to  ex- 
ploit, 36;  danger  of  German 
domination  of,  44. 

Expansion  of  Races,  The,  149  n. 

Experts:  need  of,  291-297;  can  be 
supplied  by  Germany,  297. 

Export  bounties,  German,  56,  103, 
140. 

Exports  from  Russia,  129-132. 


Famines  of  1891-92,  101. 

Far  Eastern  Review,  The,  21611. 

Fatherland's  Records,  93. 

Feudalism,  Russian,  72-73. 

Financial  experts  needed,  291. 

Finland:  population  of,  1;  inde- 
pendence of,  6,  7,  31;  with- 
drawal of,  from  Russia,  32; 
part  of,  acquired  by  Russia,  66; 
lays  claim  to  Murman  coast, 
274;  Bolsheviki  agree  to  cede 
Murman  coast  to,  274. 

Fiorventi  (Aristotele),  teaches 
Muscovites,  61. 

Fishing  industry:  fisheries  of 
Amursk  and  Kamchatka,  223; 
abundance  of  Russian  fisheries, 
223;  and  Japanese  poachers, 
224;  fish  imports  into  Russia, 
224;  Russian-Japanese  fishing 
treaty,  224;  Japanese  secure 
equal  rights  in  Russian  waters, 
224;  restricted  waters  and,  224; 
Japanese  drive  Russians  from, 


INDEX 


4i5 


224;  number  of  Japanese  ves- 
sels in,  compared  with  Russian, 
224;  sales  of  fishing  rights,  224; 
Russia  gives  Japan  new  rights, 
225;  restrictions  on  Japanese 
removed,  225;  Russian  popula- 
tion incensed  against  Japanese 
fish  imports,  226;  preponder- 
ance of  Japanese  in  Russian 
fishing  waters,  226;  Russkaya 
Folia  on,  226;  ruinous  effects 
of  Japanese  competition,  226; 
sales  of  fishing  rights  in  con- 
ventional waters,  226;  depre- 
ciated value  of  fishing  rights, 
226;  U.  S.  Consul  MacGowan 
on,  226;  Japanese  organization 
of,  227;  Maritime  Commercial 
Fisheries  of  Tokio  and,  227; 
Japanese  demands  in  Siberia, 
240;  of  Murman  coast  territory, 

,  273-274. 

Foch,  Marshal,  242. 

Foreign  capital,  in  Russia,  133-155, 
265. 

Foreign    markets,   importance   of, 

,    34; 

Foreign  trade,  growth  of  Russian, 

120. 

Forests:  of  Siberia,  210-211;  ex- 
perts needed  to  develop,  291; 
abundance  of,  300;  total  area 
of  all  Russian,  310;  government 
owned,  310;  area  of,  surveyed 
in  Siberia,  310;  Canadian,  310; 
Fnited  States,  310;  quality  of 
limber  in.  311;  economic  im- 
portance of,  3  1 1-3  1 2;  Hogdanov 
on,  311;  Professor  Brennan  on, 
311;  concessions  in,  as  a  basis 
of  credit,  312;  Provisional  ( lov- 
ernment  and,  312;  concessions 
of,  by  Bolsheviki,  312-313; 
Krasin  on,  314-315;  Pavlovitch 
on,  315;  Ichichenne  on,  316- 
;i7. 

i:     cede  (1    to    Japan,    114; 
1I1  nsit  v  o|  population  in,  147. 

1       •    I,,,;,  274. 

theories   of    popularized 


by  Tchernyshevsky,  85;  great 
influence  of,  on  Russian  So- 
cialism, 85. 

Fox,  Julius  B.,  268  n. 

France:  average  wheat  yield,  15; 
not  favored  by  reactionary 
elements  in  Russia,  55;  and 
German  export  bounties,  56; 
German  coal  sold  in,  56;  seri- 
ousness of  German  competition 
in,  57;  demands  right  to  use 
Volga  as  highway  to  Persia,  68; 
Russian  merchants  sell  Asiatic 
goods  to,  68;  officers  of  Alex- 
ander I  in,  82;  Russian  officers 
imbibe  revolutionary  ideals  in, 
82;  interests  of,  in  Asia,  117; 
relations  of,  with  Fngland 
strained,  117;  supports  Russia 
against  Japan,  117;  joins  Russia 
in  opposing  Japanese  acquisi- 
tion in  Manchuria,  118;  com- 
mon action  of  Russia,  Germany, 
and,  118;  Russia  defeated, 
unable  to  help,  125;  and 
Moroccan  question,  125;  Rus- 
sian trade  with,  135,  136,  138; 
exports  to  Russia,  136,  138; 
imports  from  Russia,  136,  138; 
influence  of,  on  Japan,  14.1; 
density  of  population,  149; 
favorable  to  Japanese  interven- 
tion, 236;  importance  of  victory 
over  Germany  to,  236;  an  1 
recovery  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 
237;  distrust  of  Japan  in,  237; 
recognizes  importance  of  Amer- 
ica, 239;  fails  to  give  Russia 
support,  241;  supports  Admiral 
Kolchak,  242;  share  of,  in  joint 
expedition  in  Siberia,  246;  needs 
most  of  her  capital,  266;  awaie 
of  Russia's  resources,  266;  coal 
production  of,  318;  must  limit 
imports,  333;  blundering  of,  in 
dealing  with  Bolshevism,  ^7- 
338. 

1  1.11H0-P1  iissian  War,  influence  011 
Japan,  145. 

1  rederick  the  Great,  of  Prussia,  74. 


4i6    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


Frederick  William  II,  of  Germany, 
asked  to  suppress  French  Revo- 
lution, 77. 

Free  towns  of  Hanseatic  League, 
60. 

French:  loan  to  Russia,  53; 
capitalists  favor  constitutional 
democracy,  53;  early  trade  with 
Russia,  67;  attracted  to  Russia 
by  Catherine  II,  74;  industries 
owned  by,  78;  Socialists  and 
Russian  mir,  89;  investments 
in  Russian  loans,  117;  capital, 
preponderance  of,  in  Russia, 
133;  capital  invested  in  Russia, 
133-136;   troops  in  Siberia,  250. 

French,  Lord,  273. 

French  Revolution:  influence  of, 
on  Russia,  51-52;  Catherine  II 
opposed  to,  51;  spirit  of  per- 
meates United  States,  52;  Cath- 
erine II  asks  Frederick  Will- 
iam II  to  suppress, 77;  generates 
current  in  Russia,  79;  302. 

G 

Galveston,  Texas,  285. 

General  Electric  Company,  281. 

Geological  Commission  of  Russia, 
229.  m 

Geological  Institution  of  Japan, 
229. 

Georgia,  independence  of,  2. 

German:  firm,  ofFered  domination 
of  northern  Russia,  42;  syndi- 
cate, negotiates  with  Russia, 
43;  subjects  in  Russia,  56; 
syndicate  of  alcohol  distillers, 
56;  traders  in  Russia  centuries 
before  British  arrive,  65;  and 
Austrian  colonists  in  Siberia, 
205;  colonies  in  Siberia,  205; 
Revolution,  253;  intermediaries' 
profits  on  American  goods,  284- 
287;  imperialists  and  Boishe- 
viki,  341. 

German-Russians  in   Russia,  205. 

Germans:  prevented  from  entering 
Russia  in  sixteenth  century, 
63;  maintain  representatives  in 


Moscow  (1680),  69;  attracted 
to  Russia  by  Catherine  II,  74; 
industries  owned  by,  78;  seize 
economic  advantages  in  Siberia, 
205;  in  Siberia,  205;  in  Bol- 
shevist army,  244. 

German-Turkish  advance  upon 
India,  237. 

Germany:  war  with,  11;  eco- 
nomic recovery  of,  desirable,  11; 
average  wheat  yield,  15;  favored 
by  Bolsheviki,  33;  economic 
mastery  of  Bolshevist  Russia, 
34;  menace  to  Siberia,  34; 
"peaceful  penetration"  of  Si- 
beria by,  35;  Junkers  still  strong 
in,  36;  possible  alliance  with 
Japan,  36;  separate  peace  with, 
threatened  by  Japan,  36;  and 
Russia's  needs,  40;  possible 
economic  co-operation  of,  with 
Japan,  40,  41;  pre-war  eco- 
nomic domination  of  Russia,  41 ; 
methods  of,  copied  by  Japan, 
41;  delegates  of,  sign  Peace 
Treaty,  41;  aims  to  regain 
mastery  of  Russia,  41,  64;  and 
Great  North  Way,  42;  mer- 
chants of,  in  Soviet  Russia,  43; 
imports  raw  materials  from 
Soviet  Russia,  43,  44;  relations 
of,  with  Bolshevist  government, 
44;  checked  by  French  loan,  53; 
gain  of,  over  competitors  in 
Russian  market,  54;  Professor 
Goldstein  on,  54;  commercial 
treaty  with  Russia,  54-55;  most 
aggressive  of  western  nations, 
55;  advantage  of  geographical 
propinquity  to  Russia,  55;  fa- 
vored by  reactionary  elements 
in  Russia,  5  5 ;  power  over  Russia 
a  feature  of  foreign  policy  of,  55; 
economic  conquest  of  Russia 
made  easy,  55;  economic  policy 
toward  Russia  a  form  of  war- 
fare, 56;  system  of  export 
bounties  of,  56,  104,  140;  pre- 
vents normal  development  of 
Russian     industry,     56;      sells 


INDEX 


4i7 


goods  in  Russia  below  produc- 
tion cost,  56;  characteristics  of 
trade  with  Russia,  57;  her  fear 
of  Russia  as  competitor,  58; 
trade  of,  with  United  States, 
59;  progress  of  mercantile 
marine  of,  59;  policy  of  artifi- 
cial, 59;  Russian  nationalism 
and  economic  control  by,  60;  im- 
portation of  workmen  from,  pre- 
vented in  sixteenth  century,  63; 
beginning  of  rivalry  with  Eng- 
land for  Russian  trade,  64;  Ivan 
the  Terrible  sends  envoy  to 
emperor  of,  63;  early  trade  with 
Russia,  65;  Russian  merchants 
sell  Asiatic  goods  to,  68;  revo- 
lutionary movement  is  sup- 
pressed, 81;  officers  of  Alex- 
ander I  in,  82;  economic  union 
with  Russia,  98;  prices  in,  com- 
pared with  Russia,  102;  oppo- 
sition of,  to  Witte,  103;  growth 
of  trade  of,  in  Russia,  105;  aims 
to  prevent  growth  of  Russian 
navy,  117;  opposes  Russian 
protectorate  over  Korea,  117; 
warns  Japan  of  Franco-Russian 
intentions,  118;  protests  against 
treaty  of  Shimonoseki,  118; 
forces  China  to  cede  Kiaochau, 
119;  instigates  Russian  de- 
mands on  China,  119;  motives 
of,  in  encouraging  Russia,  120; 
as  master  of  Turkey,  123;  keeps 
Russia  from  Mediterranean, 
123;  elated  by  victory  of  Japan, 
124;  served  by  Russian  bureau- 
cracy, 123;  dominates  principal 
trade  routes,  133;  capital  of, 
invested  in  Russia,  134-136; 
comparison  of  her  Russian  trade 
with  that  of  Fiance,  133-136; 
imports  from  Russia,  136,  138; 
exports  to  Russia,  156-138; 
gam  over  England  in  Russian 
trade,  137;  approaches  mas- 
tery of  Russian  commerce,  r 3 7- 
1  ;8;  her  srt  ancle-hold  on  Rus- 
na,    139;    superior   trade   meth- 


ods, 139;  dishonorable  trade 
methods,  140;  foreign  policy 
and  industrialism,  141;  influence 
of,  on  Japan,  145;  feudalism  of, 
like  Japan's,  146;  idealized  by 
Japan,  147-148;  density  of 
population  of,  149;  outlet  for 
surplus  population,  149;  colonial 
territory  of,  149;  declares  war  on 
Russia  and  France,  159;  Great 
Britain  declares  war  on,  159; 
pro-Japanese  demonstration  in, 
159;  China  declares  war  on, 
159;  Japan  declares  war  on,  159; 
Japanese  ultimatum  to,  160;  mo- 
tives for  Japanese  war  on,  161; 
Japan  settles  score  with,  163; 
permanent  reform  of  uncertain, 
232;  possible  return  to  mon- 
archism,  232;  as  aggressive 
capitalist-militarist  republic, 
232;  struggles  to  regain  mastery 
of  Russia,  232;  possible  eco- 
nomic alliance  with  Japan,  233; 
onslaught  of,  on  Russia,  234; 
and  Siberia,  236;  France  and 
victory  over,  236;  fear  of  mak- 
ing Russians  allies  of,  237;  fear 
of  separate  peace  between  Japan 
and,  23S;  secret  negotiations 
with  Japan  for  separate  peace, 
252-253;  collapse  of  stuns  mili- 
tary party  in  Japan,  253;  revo- 
lution in,  253;  alleged  secret 
treaty  with  Japan,  253;  terms 
of  alleged  treaty  with  Japan, 
254;  aims  at  control  of  Russian 
industry,  266;  aware  of  Russia's 
resources,  266;  seeks  to  deprive 
Russia  of  Murman  coast  port, 
274;  co-operatives  of,  507;  coal 
production  of,  318;  must  limit 
impotts,  333;  as  competitor  in 
South  America,  333;  failure  of 
Bolshevism  in,  342;  possibili- 
ties nf  restoring  militarism  in, 
346;  right  of,  to  free  trade  with 
Russia,  347. 

Gi/.higinsk  nay,  coal  near,  322. 

Glanders,  epidemic  of,  292,  294, 


4i8    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


Gogol,  83. 

Gold:  mines  along  Zeia  River,  73; 
mines  at  Blagovestchensk,  73; 
production  of,  in  Russia,  326; 
value  of,  Russian  output,  326; 
production  of,  in  Siberia,  327; 
annual  production  tables,  327. 

Goldstein,  Prof.  Joseph  M.,  14  n, 
17  n,  21  n,  54,  112  n,  113  n, 
128  n,  137  n,  224  n,  276  n,  310*2, 
319  n,  327  n. 

Golovachev,  M.,  256  n,  319,  324. 

Gothland,  merchants  of,  60. 

Graft,  in  Russian  army,  126,  127. 

Graves,  Major-General,  U.  S.  A., 
249. 

Great  Britain:  average  wheat 
yield,  15;  wheat  imports,  18; 
friendly  to  Japan,  117;  relations 
of,  with  French  and  Russia 
strained,  117;  refuses  to  join  in 
coercion  of  Japan,  118;  takes 
over  Wei-hai-vvei,  120;  difficul- 
ties throughout  empire,  121; 
density  of  population  in,  149; 
recognizes  Japan's  special  in- 
terest in  Korea,  152;  declares 
war  on  Germany,  159;  treaty 
with  Japan,  163;  important 
interests  of,  in  China,  237;  in- 
terests of,  jeopardized  by  exten- 
sion of  Japanese  power,  237; 
importance  of  protection  of 
India  to,  237;  and  German- 
Turkish  advance  upon  India, 
237;  danger  of  Japanese  in- 
fluence in  India  to,  238;  dis- 
trust of  Japan  in,  238;  recog- 
nizes importance  of  United 
States,  239;  fails  to  give  Russia 
support,  241;  supports  Admiral 
Kolchak,  242;  share  in  joint 
expedition  in  Siberia,  246. 

Great  North  Way  Scheme,  42. 

Grebyonka,  244. 

Greek  merchants,  laid  foundations 
of  Greek  Church  rule,  49. 

Greeks,  ancient  religion  of,  48. 

Grimm,  Colonel,  quoted,  127. 

Grozni,  oil  at,  329. 


Gulf  of  Amur,  322. 

Gulf  of  Anadyr,  1. 

Gulf  of  Mexico,  270. 

Gulf  of  Nakhadka,  322. 

Gulf  of  Pechili,  185,  186. 

Gulf  of  St.  Olga,  iron  near,  324, 

325- 
Gulf  of  St.  Vladimir,  iron  ore  near, 

325- 
Gutschmidt,  Baron  von,  118. 

H 

Habarovsk,  subject  to  ferocious 
rule  by  Kalmikov,  251. 

Hague  Conference,  protest  against 
Japan  to,  153. 

Hakodate,  197. 

Hamburg,  287. 

Hangchow:  opens  trade  to  Russia, 
114;  anti-Japanese  boycott  in, 
217. 

Hangkow,  anti-Japanese  boycott 
in,  217. 

Hanseatic  League:  and  German 
traders,  65;   60,  61. 

Hanyehping  Company,  agreement 
with  Japan,  172. 

Harbin:  growth  of,  215;  increase 
of  Japanese  in,  247. 

Harriman,  Edward  H.,  101. 

Harris,  Townsend,  144. 

Hawaii,  222. 

Hay,  Secretary  John,  176. 

Hellenism,  democratic  spiritual 
idealism  of,  48. 

Herzen,  Alexander:  agitates  for 
abolition  of  serfdom,  84;  his 
Kolokol,  84;  his  profound  in- 
fluence in  Russia,  84;  biographi- 
cal sketch,  84;  his  worship  of 
France  and  England,  88;  dis- 
illusioned by  revolution  of  1848, 
89;  power  of  bourgeoisie  in 
France  terrifies  him,  89;  turns 
to  Russia  with  new  hope,  89; 
believes  Socialism  can  be  based 
on  mir,  90;  meetings  with  Marx, 
90;  intense  friendship  for  Baku- 
nin,  90;  shares  Bakunin's  views, 
90-92 ;    quoted,   91  j    his   Open 


INDEX 


419 


Letter  to  Linton,  92  n;  believes 
embourgeoisement  not  neces- 
sary in  Russia,  92;  anticipates 
Lenin,  92;  and  People's  Will 
party,  93. 

Hideyoshi,Toyotomi:  quoted,  150; 
invades  Korea,  150. 

Hildebrandt,  Colonel,  quoted,  124. 

Hill,  James  J.,  101. 

Hindustan:  in  Pan-Asian  scheme, 
36;  Japanese  protection  of,  196. 

Hioki,  Mr.,  serves  Demands  on 
China,  170. 

Hodges,  Charles,  quoted,  192-193; 
196  n. 

Hogs,  21  n. 

Hohenzollerns,  232. 

Holland:  average  wheat  yield,  15; 
Russian  merchants  sell  Asiatic 
goods  to,  68;  Russia's  trade 
with,  138;  density  of  population, 
149;  colonial  territory  of,  149. 

Hongkong,  195,  222. 

Hornbeck,  S.  K.,  quoted,  173. 

Horseflesh,  consumption  of  brings 
glanders,  294. 

Horvath,  Genera!  D.  \L,  239. 

Housing  conditions  in  Russia,  12, 

Hungary:  average  wheat  yield, 
15;     failure    of    Bolshevism    in, 

342- 
Huns,  ij^. 
Hyndman,  H.  M.,  134  «;   quoted, 

196. 

I 

Ideals    and    Realities    in    Russian 

Literature,  S3   11. 
Tgnatiev,  Count  Paul  N.,  295. 
Tlim,  iron  ore  along  the,  323. 
Illiteracy,    decline    of,    in    Russia, 

307. 
//  Tempo,  publishes  text  of  alleged 

<  ierman-Japancse  treaty,  253. 
Imperial  Haven,  224. 
Imperialism, '  ierman,  140. 
Imports:     into    Russia,     130-132; 

huropcan    nations    must    limit, 

3  j  3  • 


Inagki,  General,  249. 

India:  independence  of,  6;  diffi- 
culties of  England  in,  121; 
nationalist  agitation  in,  196; 
critical  situation  in,  237;  peril 
of  German-Turkish  advance  on, 
237;  Anglo-Japanese  alliance 
and  protection  of,  237;  obliga- 
tion of  Japan  to  send  troops  to, 
237;  danger  of  Japanese  in,  238; 
nationalist  agitation  in,  aided 
by  Japanese,  238;  Bolsheviki 
and,  340;  Bolshevist  propaganda 
in,  342,  343. 

Industrial  machinery  needed,  31. 

Industrial  proletariat,  growth  of, 
108. 

Infant  mortality  in  Siberia,  204. 

Influenza,  294. 

Inland  waterways:  extent  of, 
275;  importance  of,  perceived 
by  Peter  the  Great,  275;  long 
neglected,  276;  effect  of  govern- 
ment-owned railways  on,  276; 
war  directs  attention  to,  276; 
plans  for  developing,  276-277; 
cost  of  development  of,  277; 
benefits  of,  277. 

Innokentevskaya,  good  coal  at, 
322. 

Intellectuals:  Nihilism  of,  88; 
idealization  of  western  nations 
by,  88;  and  peasants,  95;  assist 
co-operatives,  307. 

International  capitalism,  10. 

International  mutualism,  11. 

Internationalism:  n;  dangerous 
forms  of,  332. 

Irba,  iron  deposits  along  the,  323. 

Irbensk  crown  lands,  iron  in,  325. 

Ireland,  9. 

Irkutsk:  197;  growth  of,  207; 
growth  of  municipal  expendi- 
ture in,  208. 

Irkutsk  Government:  coal  in,  322; 
iron  ore  in,  323;   copper  in,  326. 

Iron:  and  steel,  production  of, 
107;  ore,  production  of,  128, 
323;  in  Siberia,  324-325;  213, 
216. 


42o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


Irtysh,  coal  near,  320. 

Ishii,  Viscount:  161;  opposes 
China's  entrance  into  World 
War,  167;  agreement  with 
Secretary  Lansing,  174,  176, 184; 
receives  demand  from  Secretary 
Lansing,  249. 

Italians:  attracted  to  Russia  by 
Catherine  II,  74;  industries 
owned  by,  78. 

Italy:  average  wheat  yield,  15; 
artisans  and  craftsmen  im- 
ported from,  61;  revolutionary 
movement  in,  81;  Russia's 
trade  with,  13S;  share  of,  in 
joint  expedition  in  Siberia,  246; 
troops  of,  in  Siberia,  250;  must 
limit  imports,  333. 

Ivan  III:  promotes  civilization, 
62;  work  of,  continued  by  Ivan 
the  Terrible,  62. 

Ivan  the  Terrible:  development  of 
Russian  economic  life  under, 
60;  continues  struggle  against 
Tatars,  62;  makes  Volga  a 
Russian  river,  62;  sound  states- 
manship of,  62;  continues  work 
of  Ivan  III,  62,  seeks  to  estab- 
lish industrialism  in  Russia,  63; 
fosters  immigration  of  skilled 
artisans,  63;  plans  to  reach 
western  seaboard  by  subjugat- 
ing Livonia,  63;  sends  Saxon 
envoy  to  Emperor  of  Germany, 
63;  Livonian  order  breaks  up 
immigration  scheme  of,  63; 
attitude  of  his  western  neigh- 
bors, 63;  King  of  Poland  and, 
63;  negotiates  trade  agreement 
with  Queen  Mary  of  England, 
64;  admiration  of,  for  England 
and  English,  64;  gratified  by 
weakening  of  Novgorod,  65; 
aids  English  traders  against 
Germans,  65;  assisted  by  Brit- 
ish in  industrial  plans,  65;  ap- 
peals to  Queen  Elizabeth  of 
England  for  skilled  workers, 
66;  grants  patent  to  English 
manufacturers,   66;     begins   to 


realize  plans,  66;  fails  to  extend 

dominion    to    Baltic  coast,  66; 

death  of,  66. 
Ivanovo-Vosnesenk,     growth     of 

population  of,  106. 
Izykh,  Mt.,  coal  deposits  of,  321. 

J 

Japan:  Sea  of,  1;  wages  in,  12; 
as  possible  suzerain  of  Russia, 
26;  war  with  Russia,  27;  domi- 
nating China  and  Manchuria, 
32;  could  take  southeastern 
Siberia,  32;  League  of  Nations 
and,  32,  34,  221;  secure  in 
hegemony  of  Asia  could  chal- 
lenge western  world,  33;  a 
menace  to  Siberia,  34;  sym- 
pathy of  Siberian  monarchists 
f°r>  35 j  possible  alliance  with 
Siberia,  36;  may  join  hands  with 
Germany,  36;  pro-German  senti- 
ment in,  36;  forced  secret  agree- 
ment on  Russia,  36-37;  re- 
sources of  China  controlled  by, 
36,  40;  Berlin-Tokio  combina- 
tion possible,  37;  Pan-Asian 
Empire  under  hegemony  of,  37; 
ability  to  meet  Russia's  require- 
ments, 40;  seeks  to  control 
Siberia,  44,  212;  suggested  bloc 
with  Russia  and  China,  99;  not 
yet  a  great  power,  104;  military 
and  industrial  strength  demon- 
strated, no;  war  with  China, 
114,  142,  154;  conditions  im- 
posed upon  China,  114;  ter- 
ritorial cessions  by  China  to, 
114;  indemnity  paid  to,  by 
China,  114;  trade  concessions 
to,  by  China,  114;  seeks  domi- 
nation of  Korea,  115;  Russian  re- 
monstrance to,  116;  opposed  by 
France  and  Russia,  116;  British 
friendship  for,  117;  apparent 
friendship  of  Germany  for,  117; 
opposed  by  Germany,  118; 
Lord  Rosebery  and,  118;  Baron 
von  Gutschmidt  and,  118; 
abandons  territorial  demands  on 


INDEX 


421 


China,  119;  receives  additional 
indemnity  from  China,  119; 
turns  over  Wei-hai-wei  to  Great 
Britain,  120;  Germany's  inter- 
est in  war  of,  with  Russia,  120; 
proposes  agreement  with  Russia, 
121;  delivers  ultimatum  to 
Russia,  122;  declares  war  on 
Russia,  122;  victory  over  Rus- 
sia, 122;  acquires  part  of  Sag- 
halien,  122;  suzerainty  over 
Korea  recognized  by  Treaty  of 
Portsmouth,  122;  receives  cash 
payment  from  Russia,  123; 
victory  of  a  German  triumph, 
124;  material  strength  com- 
pared with  Russia's,  125;  like- 
ness to  Prussia,  142,  146,  153, 
154;  Pan-Nipponism  and,  142; 
fall  of  Shogunate,  142;  Com- 
modore Perry  and,  143,  144; 
isolation  of,  143 ;  open  to  foreign 
trade,  144;  Europeanization  of, 
144;  French  influence  upon, 
144;  English  language  and,  144; 
Franco-Prussian  War  and,  145; 
turns  to  Germany,  145;  theoc- 
racy of,  146;  German  influence 
on,  147;  over-population  of, 
148,  212;  extent  of  annexation, 
149;  and  Korea,  149;  and 
Formosa,  149;  immigration  from 
prohibited,  149;  economic  mo- 
tivation of  imperialism  of,  150; 
relations  with  Korea,  1 50-151; 
brutal  treatment  of  Korea  by, 
151;  war  on  China,  i5i;Treaty 
of  Portsmouth  and,  152;  an- 
nexation of  Korea.  153;  policy 
toward  China,  154-158;  sends 
ultimatum  to  Germany,  159; 
declares  war  on  Germany,  159; 
Germany  courts  friendship  of, 
159;  motives  of,  for  entering 
war,  159-163;  agreement  with 
England.  160-163;  breaks  An- 
glo-Japanese agreement,  166; 
questionable  loyalty  of,  162; 
demands  of,  on  Germany,  162; 
wants  Shantung  Peninsula,  163; 
2S 


wants  South  Pacific  Islands, 
163;  economic  value  of  Pacific 
Islands  to,  164;  policy  of,  di- 
rected against  England,  164; 
promises  restoration  of  Kiao- 
chau,  165,  170,  188;  China's 
fear  of,  165;  opposes  President 
Yuan's  plans,  165-167;  asserts 
suzerainty  over  China,  165; 
refuses  to  invite  China  to  enter 
war,  157;  dominates  Entente 
policy,  167;  secret  agreements 
of,  167-169;  desires  pretext  for 
occupying  China,  168;  seeks 
support  of  Allies,  168;  diplomat- 
ic correspondence  with  Russia, 

169,  175-176;  disavows  im- 
perialist aims,  170;  denies 
promise    to    return    Kiaochau, 

170,  173;  Twenty-one  Demands 
on  China  by,  170-172;  drops 
part  of  Twenty-one  Demands, 
173;  treachery  of,  to  Allies,  173; 
Professor  Wheeler  on  aims  of, 
171;  Doctor  Hornbeck  on 
achievements  of,  173;  agree- 
ment with  United  States,  174; 
and  "open  door"  policy,  174; 
and  doctrine  of  "special  inter- 
ests," 174-176;  paramountcy  in 
Korea  recognized,  177;  flouts 
"open  door"  policy,  177,  194, 
214;  gains  under  Treaty  of 
Portsmouth,  178;  secret  treaty 
with  Russia,  178-183;  tricks 
Russian  diplomats,  183;  addi- 
tional secret  agreement  with 
Russia,  183;  triumphs  at  Ver- 
sailles, 184;  military  and  eco- 
nomic advantages  in  China,  185; 
violates  Chinese  sovereignty, 
186,  195,  214,  216;  economic 
interpenetration  of  China  by, 
186;  forces  morphia  on  China, 
187;  mastery  of  Shantung 
province,  18S;  aggressive  eco- 
nomic imperialism  of,  191; 
illicit  use  of  Chinese  postal 
system,  191;  smuggling  through 
Chinese  post-offices,  192;   com- 


422    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


merclal  methods  of,  on  China, 
192-194;  reduces  China  to 
colony,  195;  expansion  in  con- 
tinental Asia,  195;  "Asiatic 
Monroe  Doctrine"  and,  195; 
Twenty-one  Demands  and,  196; 
H.  M.  Hyndman  on,  196; 
foments  nationalist  agitation  in 
India,  196;  protection  of  Hindu- 
stan by,  196;  expansion  in 
Siberia,  197;  immigration  from, 
into  Siberia,  204;  and  annexa- 
tion of  Siberia,  212;  need  of  new 
sources  of  food  supply,  212; 
Russian  fishing  rights  and,  212, 
223-227,  240;  need  of  coal  and 
iron,  212;  desires  resources  of 
Russian  Saghalien  and  eastern 
Siberia,  213,  217;  relation  of 
Chinese  and  Siberian  policies, 
213-214;  in  southern  Manchuria, 
214;  victory  over  Russia,  214; 
acquires  Liaotung  Peninsula, 
Port  Arthur,  and  Dalny,  214;  ob- 
tains Manchurian  railway  lease, 
214;  agreement  with  Russia 
concerning  Manchuria,  214;  op- 
poses American  capital  in  Man- 
churia, 214;  Russian  Revolu- 
tion and,  215;  and  separation  of 
Siberia,  215;  Bolsheviki  and 
imperialists  of,  215;  controls 
northern  China,  215;  military 
strength  of,  216;  dependence 
on  manufactures,  216;  China  as 
market  for,  216-217;  Chinese 
boycott  of  goods  from,  217; 
Siberia  as  market  for  goods  of, 
218;  aspires  to  Russian  "rights" 
in  China,  218;  political  control 
of  Siberia  and,  218;  prefers 
reactionary  regime  in  Siberia 
and  Russia,  219,  228;  reasons 
for  opposing  Liberal  regime  in 
Russia,  220;  success  of  military 
party  danger  to,  220;  strategic 
importance  of  Siberia  to,  222; 
economic  colonization  by,  in 
Siberia,  222;  organizes  industry 
on  German  lines,  227;  Geologi- 


cal Institution  of,  229;  and 
Russian  Saghalien,  228,  229; 
regulation  of  press  in,  230; 
rumored  cession  of  eastern 
Siberia  to,  230;  Siberia  and 
foreign  policy  of,  231;  has  never 
surrendered  territory,  232;  pos- 
sible union  with  Germany,  232; 
danger  to  democracy  from  con- 
trol of  Siberia  by,  233;  dis- 
honorable conduct  toward  Allies 
by,  234;  exploits  Russian  de- 
pendence, 234;  fraudulent  com- 
mercial practices  of,  234-235; 
proposed  intervention  in  Si- 
beria, 236;  ready  to  send  troop* 
to  Europe,  236;  France  and, 
236-237;  Great  Britain  and, 
237-238;  India  and,  238;  ex- 
tension of  power  of,  feared  by 
Allies,  237-238;  and  separate 
peace  with  Germany,  238; 
American  government  defeats 
intervention  plan  of,  239;  makes 
overtures  to  General  Horvath, 
239;  proposes  exclusive  inter- 
vention in  Siberia,  240;  advan- 
tages in  Siberia  demanded  by, 
240;  limitation  of  proposed  in- 
tervention, 240;  manifests  no 
interest  in  restoration  of  Rus- 
sia, 240;  not  loyal  to  Allied 
cause,  240;  continues  overtures 
to  Russians,  241;  corrupts 
Semenov,  241;  resents  Ameri- 
can aid  to  Russia,  242;  agents 
of,  hamper  Stevens  Commis- 
sion, 242;  opposes  Kolchak's 
efforts,  242;  Allied  and  Ameri- 
can forces  under  leadership  of, 
243;  violates  agreement  relating 
to  joint  intervention,  246;  plans 
to  control  eastern  Siberia,  246; 
aims  to  make  Allies  and  America 
unpopular,  247;  masses  troops 
in  Manchuria,  247;  intrigues  of 
general  staff  of,  in  Siberia,  248- 
249;  forced  by  United  States 
to  withdraw  excess  troops,  249; 
number  of  troops  of,  in  Siberia, 


INDEX 


423 


250;  supports  Semenov  in  op- 
position to  Kolchak,  250;  vir- 
tually makes  war  on  Czecho- 
slovaks, 250;  supports  Kalmi- 
kov,  250-251;  discreditable  eco- 
nomic policy  of,  in  Siberia,  252; 
secret  negotiations  with  Ger- 
many, 252;  influence  of  German 
collapse  on  military  party  of, 
253;  alleged  secret  treaty  with 
Germany,  253-254;  designs  of, 
in  China,  253;  interests  of,  in 
eastern  Siberia,  254;  Germany 
undertakes  to  give  military  and 
naval  aid  to,  254;  uses  position 
in  Allied  expedition  for  smug- 
gling, 254;  dishonorable  eco- 
nomic methods  of,  in  Siberia 
and  China,  255-256;  right  of, 
to  a  fair  share  of  Russian  trade, 
258;  as  "Prussia  of  the  East," 
258;  passion  for  aggrandize- 
ment, 258;  unscrupulous  ag- 
gression of,  in  Korea,  China,  and 
Siberia,  258;  desires  control  of 
Russia's  industries,  266;  aware 
of  Russia's  resources,  266;  ready 
to  supply  experts,  297;  not  well 
supplied  with  oil,  329;  hampers 
Kolchak,  338,  339;  alters  policy, 
341,  343;  policy  of,  strengthens 
Bolsheviki,  341 ;  recognizes  dan- 
ger of  Bolshevism  in  Asia,  342; 
must  fight  Bolsheviki,  343:  must 
not  be  discriminated  against,  347. 

Japan  Advertiser,  157  n. 

Japan  and  If 'arid  Peace,  125  n, 
191  n. 

Japan    as    our    .Illy    in    Siberia, 

215  M. 

Japan,  from  the  Age  of  the  Gods 
:>>  the  Fall  of  Tsin^tau,  1 14  n. 

Japan     J'  litical  Ethics,  1^9  n. 

Jo  tan,  the  Rise  of  a  Modern 
Potvtr,  1 14  n. 

Japanese:  workers  poorly  paid, 
12;  in  Siberia,  204;  economic 
progress  in  Siberia,  206;  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce,  229;  troops 
in  Siberia,  250. 


Japanese    Economic    Interests    in 

Shantung,  191  n. 
Jews,  persecution  of,  98. 
Joint  stock  companies,  in  Russia, 

iio-iii,  113. 
Jordan,  Sir  John,  166. 
Junker  class  in  Germany,  36. 

K 

Kaji-Dorolo,  258. 

Kalmikov  (Cossack  Ataman): 
fights  both  Bolsheviki  and  anti- 
Bolsheviki,  250-251;  terrorizes 
Siberian  villages,  251;  refuses 
to  recognize  Omsk  Government, 
251;  supported  by  Japan,  251; 
executes  Swedish  Red  Cross 
officials,  251;  orders  flogging  of 
American  soldiers,  251;  steals 
American  Red  Cross  supplies, 
251;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bar- 
rows on,  251-252;  boasts  of 
allegiance  to  Japan,  251;  mu- 
tinous Cossacks  of,  seek  Amer- 
ican protection,  251. 

Kamchatka:  32;  fisheries  of,  223; 
coal  in,  322;  iron  in,  325; 
copper  in,  326. 

Kandalaksha,  272. 

Karagandinsk,  coal  deposit  of,  320. 

Karkaralinsk:  coal  near,  320; 
L'yezd,  iron  in,  324. 

Kato,  Baron,  quoted,  170. 

Kawakami,  K.  K  ,  125  n,  191  n. 

Kennan,  George,  200. 

Ken-Iibe,  iron  in,  525. 

Kerensky,  A.  F.:  assumes  reins  of 
government,  25;  arranges  for 
American  Railroad  Commission, 
25;  and  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, 30. 

Kerensky  Regime,  6,  30,  236. 

Khabarovsk:  65;  growth  of,  207; 
coal  near,  322. 

Khakhodatc,  224,  227. 

Kharkov,  244,  283. 

Khilk,  copper  alone;  the,  326. 

Kiaocha.i:  leased  to  Germany, 
119;  Germany  and,  160;  Japan 
demands    Germany    surrender, 


424    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

162,  165;  promises  of  Japan  to 

restore,  165,  170;  Chinese  pro- 
posals     concerning,      165-166; 

Japan  denies  promise  to  return, 

170;    conditions  of  return   of, 

to  China,  172,  188;   Japan  dis- 
avows obligation  to  return,  173; 

strategic    importance    of,    185; 

possession  of,  increases  Japan's 

power,  186;    morphia  trade  in, 

187;  Japanese  boast  of  promise 

to    return,    188;     railway   con- 
nections with,  188;    gold-mines 

at,  196. 
Kiev,   early   trading   center,   60; 

244. 
Kilmarnock,  Lord,  292. 
Kirghiz  Steppe:   coal  in,  320;  iron 

deposits  in,  325. 
Kizir,  iron  deposits  along  the,  325. 
Knights  of  Columbus,  305. 
Knox,  Secretary  P.  C,  214. 
Kola  Peninsula,  270. 
Kolchak,   Admiral:     attempts   to 

unite  anti-Bolshevist  forces,  242; 

is    supported    by    Allies,    242; 

opposed    by   Japan,   242;    col- 
lapse of  forces  of,  337;   should 

have  been  supported,  338-339; 

difficulties  of,  339;    reactionary 

elements  among  forces  of,  339; 

Bolshevist    victory    over,    340; 

failure  of  Allies  to  support,  345. 
Kolokol,  84. 
Koltan,  coal  at,  325. 
Koltansk,  coal-mines,  321. 
Koltchugin,  coal-mines,    320-321, 

324- 

Kondoma,  coal  near,  320. 

Konigsberg,  becomes  important 
trade  center,  67. 

Konovalov,3i2. 

Korea:  independence  of  recog- 
nized, 114;  Russian  designs  in, 
115;  domination  of,  acquired 
by  Japan,  115;  Russian  govern- 
ment on  independence  of,  116; 
Japan  and  annexation  of,  116; 
German  and  Russian  protecto- 
rate over,  117-118;  Japan  aban- 


dons claims  to,  119;  Russian 
bureaucracy  and,  121;  Japan 
proposes  treaty  concerning,  121; 
Russia  proposes  to  limit  Japan 
in,  122;  Japan's  suzerainty  over 
recognized,  122,  152,  177;  den- 
sity of  population  in,  149;  Re- 
gent Nobunaga  and,  150;  in- 
vasion of,  by  Hideyoshi,  150; 
infamous  treatment  of,  by 
Japan,  151;  pays  tribute  to 
Japan,  151;  independence  of, 
acknowledged  by  Japan,  151; 
revolts  in,  instigated  by  Russia 
and  Japan,  151;  regards  China 
as  protector,  151;  supported  by 
China  and  Russia,  151;  Treaty 
of  Shimonoseki  recognizes  inde- 
pendence of,  152;  annexation  of, 
by  Japan,  152,  153;  motives  of 
Japan  in  annexing,  152;  Rus- 
sia's desire  to  possess,  152; 
Japan  compelled  to  renounce 
claims  to,  152;  Great  Britain 
recognizes  Japan's  right  to  con- 
trol, 152;  Japan  guarantees 
integrity  of,  152;  protest  of, 
against  Japanese  suzerainty 
over,  153;  anti-Japanese  riots 
in,  153;  army  of  disbanded,  153; 
Japanese  resident-general  estab- 
lished in,  153;  emperor  of,  sur- 
renders crown,  153;  becomes 
part  of  Japanese  Empire,  153; 
brutality  of  Japanese  rule  in, 
153;  Russian  intrigues  in,  153; 
Japanese  violation  of  treaty 
concerning,  163;  iron  ore  pro- 
duction in,  190;  occupation  of, 
232;  and  Japanese  aggression, 
258. 

Korean  Strait,  222. 

Kotlas,  313,315. 

Kowloon,  proposal  to  neutralize, 
165. 

Krasin:  among  those  charged  with 
"selling  out  to  capitalists,"  34; 
formerly  manager  of  German 
firm,  42;  favors  German  capi- 
talists, 42;    not  a  Socialist,_42; 


INDEX 


4*5 


accepts  office..  42;  appoints 
German  specialists,  42;  stipu- 
lates terms,  42;  Tchaykovsky 
on,  43;   quoted,  314-315. 

Krasnoyarsk:  growth  of,  207; 
growth  of  municipal  expendi- 
ture in,  208. 

Kropotkin,  83  n. 

"Krug,"  Cossack,  251. 

Krupensky,  M.,  quoted,  169. 

Kuban  territory,  typhus  in,  293. 

Kugelmann,  letter  of  Marx  to,  93. 

Kultur  propaganda  in  Russia,  205. 

Kunst  &  Albers,  287. 

Kurdistan,  Bolshevist  menace  to, 

,  3431- 

Kureika,  coal  along  river,  321. 

Kurgan,  growth  of  municipal  ex- 
penditure in,  208. 

Kuropatkin,  General:  advises 
against  aggression  in  Manchuria 
and  Korea,  121;  attempts  to 
resign,  121 ;  Czar  sides  with,  121; 
is  overruled  by  bureaucracy, 
121;  proposes  to  limit  Russian 
interests  in  Far  East,  122;  ad- 
vises restoration  of  Liaotung 
Peninsula  to  China,  122;  warns 
Russia  of  Japanese  military 
strength,  122,  126;  accused  of 
graft,  126. 

Kuznetsk:  coal  deposits  of,  319, 
321;  magnetic  ore  near,  324; 
mines,    324;     Uyezd,    iron    in, 

325- 
Kwan^-cho-wau,  leased  to  I'  ranee, 
119. 

L 

La  Cause  Commune,  203  n. 

La  Crise  Sexuelle  en  Russic,  29/)  n. 

Lake    Baikal,   240,   247,   252,  325, 

341. 
Lake  Zhanka,  c<>al  ar,  322. 
Lamont,  T.  J.,  33  1  n. 
Land  and   1'  reedom  Society,  97. 
Land  problem,  dominant  economic 

and  political  concern,  80-87. 
Lansing,  Secretary  of  Stare:    if>K; 

agreement  with  Viscount   Ishii, 


174,  184;  makes  demand  on 
Japan, 249. 

Lansmg-Ishii  Agreement:  signed, 
174,  184;  pledges  Japan  to 
"open  door"  policy,  174;  Ameri- 
ca's friendship  for  China  evi- 
denced by,  174;  and  special 
interests  of  Japan,  174-175; 
Viscount  Motono  on,  176;  Rus- 
sian Ambassador  quoted  on, 
175-176. 

Laocoon,  139. 

La  Question  d' Orient,  La  Mace- 
doine.  Le  chemin  de  jer  de  Bag- 
dad. 124  n. 

Latin  America:  population  of, 
333;    import  trade  of,  333-334- 

Latin-American  Year-Book,  333  n. 

Latourette,  K.  S.,  155  n. 

Lavroff,  P.,  quoted,  93. 

Lead,  70,  328. 

League  of  Nations:  small  nations 
and,  3;  should  insist  on  unity  of 
European  Russia,  7;  antici- 
pated by  Alexander  I,  81;  and 
Japan,  221;   and  Russia,  259. 

League  of  Nations  Magazine,  The, 

I96  71. 

Lena,  coal  found  along,  322. 

Lenin:  and  revolution  in  western 
nations,  95;  on  economic  de- 
velopment as  basis  for  collectiv- 
ism, 342;  adopts  moderate  tone, 
344;   244.  309  «» 340. 

Lenin-1  rotzky  regime,  and  Ger- 
many, 274. 

Leninism,  anticipation  of,  in  Her- 
zen's  writings,  92. 

LermontofF,  83. 

Letvia,  as  barrier  to  Bolshevism, 

,346- 

L  Europe  Nouvelle,  on  German- 
Japanese  treaty,  254. 

Levine,  Isaac  Don,  306  n. 

L"lluvianite,  278. 

Liaotung  Peninsula:  ceded  to 
Japan,  114;  Russia  demands 
Japan  renounce  possession  of, 
116;  British  fear  of  Russian 
possession    of,    117;     India    en- 


426    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 


dangered  by  Russian  possession 
of,  117;  Germany  opposed  to 
Russian  control  of,  117;  Ger- 
many demands  Japan  renounce 
possession  of,  118;  and  Japan's 
claim  to,  119;  leased  to  Russia, 
119;  Russia  surrenders  lease 
of,  122-123;  acquired  by  Japan, 
214. 

Libau,  107,  271,  285^ 

Liberals,  hold  identical  view  with 
Tories,  8. 

Liebknecht,  Wilhelm,  232. 

Linton,  James,  English  Chartist, 
92  n. 

Lithuania:  independence  of,  2,  5; 
as  barrier  to  Bolshevism,  346. 

Living  conditions,  in  Moscow  and 
St.  Petersburg,  13. 

Livonia:  independence  of,  2,  5; 
acquired  by  Russia,  66. 

Livonian  order,  prevents  German 
immigration  to  Russia,  63. 

Livonian  traders,  early,  61. 

Lodge,  Senator  H.  C,  and  Ger- 
man-Japanese treaty,  253. 

Lodz,  growth  of  population  of,  106. 

London  Times,  The,  272,  342. 

Lopatin,  H.,  93. 

Lord's  Prayer,  in  languages  of 
Russian  Empire,  2. 

Lorraine  (and  Alsace),  237. 

Loutchina,  335. 

Lucius,  German  Ambassador,  253. 

Lumber:  high  cost  of,  312;  Russia 
as  a  source  of  supply  of,  312; 
Russia's  exports  of,  317-318; 
American  imports  of,  318. 

Lvov,  Prince,  292. 

M 

MacGowan,  D.  B.,  226. 

Magnitnaya,  Mount,  iron  in,  324. 

Magyars,  in  Bolshevist  army,  244. 

Maklakov,  B.,  292. 

Manchester  Guardian,  44. 

Manchuria:  and  Russian  control, 
115;  opposition  to  acquisition 
of,  by  Japan,  118;  Russia  agrees 
to    evacuate,    122;     provisions 


of  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  con- 
cerning, 178;  Japanese  economic 
aggression  in,  191-194;  Japa- 
nese troops  massed  in,  247-248; 
actions  of  Japanese  in,  247-248; 
Japanese  smuggling  in,  255; 
military  arrogance  of  Japanese 
in,  256;  dishonorable  conduct 
of  Japanese  government  in,  256. 

Manchurian  Railway,  acquired  by 
Japan,  214. 

Manganese:  production  of,  in 
Russia,  328;  Russian  exports 
of,  328;  production  of,  in 
British  India,  328;  production 
of,  in  Brazil,  328. 

Manufactures,  growth  of  Russian, 
107. 

March,  General,  U.  S.  A.,  261  w. 

Maritime  Commercial  Fisheries 
of  Tokio,  227. 

Maritime  Province:  fisheries  in, 
184;  mineral  riches  of,  213; 
Japanese  engineers  make  in- 
vestigations in,  228;  coal  in, 
322;   iron  deposits  in,  32^. 

Markt  &  Company,  of  Berlin,  28c. 

Marne,  victory  on,  made  possible 
by  Russia,  260,  261. 

Marshall  Islands,  163. 

Marx:  Communist  Manifesto,  by, 
90;  meetings  with  Herzen,  90; 
attacks  on  Bakunin,  90;  his 
charge  against  Bakunin  denied 
by  George  Sand,  90;  formal 
reconciliation  with  Bakunin,  90; 
quarrel  with  Herzen,  90;  assails 
Panslavisme,  91;  theory  of 
social  progress  of,  91;  quoted, 
9T>93»95;  letter  to  Kugelmann, 
93;  Russian  translation  of  his 
Capital,  93;  favorable  reception 
of  his  books  in  Russia,  93;  his 
views  on  development  of  Rus- 
sian Socialism,  94;  his  theory  of 
economic  determinism,  94;  vo- 
cabulary of,  97. 

Marxism:  and  proletarian  revo- 
lution, 96;  elements  of,  in  Bol- 
shevism, 97;   makes  progress  in 


INDEX 


427 


Russia,  98;  and  Mohammedan- 
ism, 348. 

Maurice,  Major  F.  B.,  122  n. 

Meat,  consumption  of,  in  Russia, 

33?-. 

Medicines  and  drugs  needed,  292. 

Mediterranean,  Russia's  way  to, 
blocked,  123. 

Mercury,  328. 

Merkulov,  S.  D.,  quoted,  225. 

Messenger  of  the  People's  Will,  94. 

Metternich,  joined  by  Alexander 
I,  in  suppressing  revolutions,  81. 

Mexico,  imports  of,  334. 

Middle  Ages,  epidemics  of,  re- 
called, 293. 

Militarism,  danger  of,  221. 

Miliukov,  Paul,  30,  61  n. 

Millard,  Thomas  F.,  148  n,  156  n, 
18271. 

Millard's  Review,  158  n,  187  n. 

Milyutin:  Bolshevist  official,  278- 
279;  on  destruction  of  Baku  oil 
fields,  3  28. 

Minusinsk:  coal  in,  321;  iron  in, 
325;  copper  in,  326. 

Mir,  The:  extension  of,  86;  divi- 
sion of  land  under,  86;  French 
Socialists  and,  89;  Proudhon 
on,  89;  Marx  and,  93;  as  basis 
for  a  Socialist  society,  89; 
idealized,  93. 

Mirbach,  Count,  274. 

Miyake,  Dr.  Yujiro,  quoted,  147. 

Mohammed,  62. 

.Mohammedanism,   and   Marxism, 

343- 

Mongolia:   Russia  and,  177;  Japan 

and, 213. 
Mongolians,  in  Siberia,  206. 
Monopolies,  state,  in  Russia,  69. 
"Monroe  Doctrine  for  Asia,"  195. 
Morgan,  J.  P.,  &:  Co.,  131  n. 
Moroccan  question,  1  25. 
Morphia  trade,  in  China,  187. 
Moscow:    living  conditions  in,  I"; 

mills  of,   24;    university  of,   -4; 

visited    by    Hrinsh   captain,   64; 

Oii.cn    M:irv    sends    < ,■    fo, 

64;      hnghsh    Ambassador    at, 


66;  English-owned  factories  at, 
66;  trade  route  to  Archangel, 
67;  route  to  Novgorod,  67; 
growth  of  population  of,  106; 
Soviet  Government  in,  262  n; 
suffering  in,  292,  295;  death 
rate  of  mothers  and  infants  in, 
293;  approach  of  Denikine's 
army  to,  340. 

Moscow-Archangel  route,  Dutch 
and  Germans  monopolize  trade 
of,  69. 

Motono,  Baron:  signs  Russo- 
Japanese  treaty,  179,  181;  169, 
176. 

Mukden,  Russian  defeat  at,  125. 

Municipalities  of  Russia,  have 
large  needs,  263-264. 

Muraviev,  Count,  115. 

Murman  Coast:  railway,  270, 
272-273,313;  Gulf  Stream  and, 
270;  freedom  from  ice,  270; 
advantages  of  ports  on,  271; 
value  of,  for  colonization,  273; 
resources  of,  273;  Germans  aim 
to  control,  274;  British  defeat 
German  aim  to  control,  274-275. 

Muscovites:  crush  Asiatic  foe, 
62;  feared  by  neighbors,  63,  65; 
not  feared  by  British,  65. 

Mutsu,  Count,  118. 

N 

Nadycsdinsk!  mills,  313. 

Nakashima,  General,  240,  250. 

Nanking,  anti-Japanese  boycott 
in,  217. 

Napoleon:  meeting  with  Alex- 
ander I  at  Tilsit,  80;  downfall 
of,  at  Waterloo,  80;  conquered 
by  Russian  people,  82;  Grand 
Army  of,  driven  from  Russia,  82. 

Narodnya  J'olya,  93. 

Nationalism:  and  international- 
ism, (>;  of  Russia  conflicts  with 
German  economic  control,  60; 
dangerous  forms  of,  332. 

Net  hit  lands,  demand  right  to  use 
\  iil    a  as  highway  to  Persia,  68. 

Nate  Rheniithe  '/.?itur£,  91  n. 


428    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 


Neue  Zurcher  Zeitung,  298  n. 

New  Orleans,  285. 

New  York  Commercial,  The,  268  ». 

New  York  Globe,  The,  343  n. 

New  York  Independent,  The,  170. 

New  York  Times,  The,  42  n,  250  n. 

New  York  Tribune,  The,  253  n. 

Nicholas  I:  accession  of,  83 ;  reign 
of,  period  of  dark  reaction,  83; 
suppression  of  Polish  insurrec- 
tion under,  83;  aim  of,  to  de- 
stroy Polish  nationalism,  84; 
his  fear  of  revolution,  84;  death 
of,  84;  sends  Decembrists  to 
Siberia,  201. 

Nicholas  II,  advised  by  Kaiser  to 
take  Port  Arthur  and  Talien- 
wan,  119. 

Nickel,  328. 

Nihilism:  paves  way  for  Bolshe- 
vism, 88;  development  of  criti- 
cal attitude  toward  western 
nations  results  from,  88. 

Nihon  Yujiro  Nihomjin,  148  n. 

Nijni-Tagil,  iron  ore  near,  324. 

Nikolaevsk:  coal  near,  322;  works, 
32$;  iron  ore  at,  325. 

Nikolsk-Ussuriisk,  growth  of,  207. 

Nitti,  Signor,  253. 

Nizhneudinsk     Uyezd,     iron     in, 

*  3*5- 

Nobunaga,  Japanese  regent,  150. 

North  China  Daily  News,  TJie, 
187  n. 

Northern  War,  the,  66. 

North  Sea,  258. 

Norway,  Russia's  trade  with,  138. 

Norwegian-American  Syndicate, 
312. 

Novaya  Zemlya,  270. 

Novgorod:  early  trading  center, 
60;  center  of  trade  for  Hanse- 
atic  League,  61 ;  virtually  a  city 
republic,  65;  weakened  by  new 
markets  opened  by  English, 
65;  its  decline  welcomed  by 
Czar,  65;   route  to  Moscow,  67. 

Novgorodians,  pioneers  in  Siberia, 

Novonikolaievsk:   growth  of,  207; 


growth  of  municipal  expenditure 

in,  208. 
Novoye  Vremia,  quoted,  225. 
Niigata,  197. 

0 

Oats,  production  of,  in  Russia,  14. 

Ob  (Obi),  313,  315. 

Obukhov  hospital,  mortality  in, 
294. 

Occidentalism,  cult  of,  50. 

Oda,  Mr.,  Japanese  plenipotenti- 
ary, 253. 

Odessa,  32. 

O'Hara  Ministry,  156. 

Ohlert,  firm  of,  285. 

Oil:  production  of,  107,  328;  de- 
cline in  production  of,  128,  213, 
328;  restrictions  on  production 
of,  328;  in  Baku  district,  328; 
new  fields  opened,  329;  on 
Caspian  coast,  329;  in  Trans- 
Baikal,  329;  in  northern  Sag- 
halien,  329;  needed  by  China 
and  Japan,  329. 

Okhotsk,  224. 

Okuma,  Count,  162;  quoted,  170. 

Olgin,  M.,  13  n,  107  n,  109  n. 

Omsk:  All-Russian  Government 
of.  32,  35»  338,  339.  3455  growth 
of,  207. 

"Open  Door"  Policy:  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement  and,  174;  Japan 
bound  to,  174;  a  protection  for 
China,  174-175;  John  Hay  and, 
176;  principle  of,  in  first  Brit- 
ish-Chinese treaty,  176;  favored 
by  Anson  Burlingame,  177;  rec- 
ognized by  Powers,  177;  Rus- 
sian reservations  concerning, 
177;  flouted  by  Russia  and 
Japan,  177,  214,  218;  violated 
by  Japan, 194. 

Orenburg,  iron  ore  in,  324. 

Oriental  elements  in  czarism,  52. 

Oriental  influences,  on  Russian 
character,  47,  48. 

Orientalism,  a  danger  to  Russia, 

52-. 
Otani,  General,  246,  249. 


INDEX 


429 


Other  Shore,  The,  89  it. 

Our  Wealth,  311. 

Owen,  Robert:  theories  of,  popu- 
larized by  Tchernyshevsky,  85; 
lasting  impression  on  Russian 
movement,  85. 


Pan-Asian:  empire,  danger  of,  37; 
agitation,  financed  by  Japan, 
195;  Bolshevism,  danger  of,  343. 

Pan-Asianism:  195;  and  annexa- 
tion of  Siberia,  212;  221;  dan- 
ger of,  258,  343. 

Pan-Germanism,  142,  163,  194, 
195,258. 

Pan-Islamism,  exploited  by  Bol- 
sheviki,  342. 

Pan-Nipponism,    142,    163,    194, 

J95- 
Panslavisme,  91. 
Paper,  scarcity  of  print,  311. 
Paris,  saved   by   Russian  armies, 

260. 
Pavlodar,  coal  in,  320. 
Pavlovitch,  Bolshevist  official,  34, 

315- 

Paz  River,  27^. 

Pechili,  Gulf  of,  185,  186. 

Peking,  anti-Japanese  boycott  in, 
217. 

Pelley.  W.  D.,  302  n. 

Penziiinsk,  coal  on  shores  of,  322. 

People's  Will  party,  93. 

Perm,  English  pioneers  at,  66. 

Perovskaya,  Sophia,  97. 

Perry,  Commodore,  142,  144. 

Persia:  Russian  trade  with,  68; 
Russia  as  intermediary  between 
Europe  and,  68;  European 
powers  demand  right  to  trade 
directly  with,  68;  profit  of  Rus- 
sia's trade  with,  68;  Russian 
extension  in,  102;  Bolsheviki 
and,  340;  Bolshevist  propaganda 

in.  34-,  343- 
Persian  Gulf,  258. 
Pescadores,   the,   ceded   to  Japan, 

1 1  j. 
[Vut  the  Great:  ami  "Europeani- 


zation,"  51;  favors  external 
"  Europeanization,"  51;  op- 
posed by  conservatives,  51;  sees 
need  of  sound  economic  basis, 
63;  and  industrial  revolution, 
67;  finances  great  industrial 
andertakings,  69;  war  and  ad- 
justment of  boundaries  under, 
70;  industrial  progress  under, 
70;  success  in  attaining  hold  on 
Baltic  seaboard,  70;  wisdom 
and  energy  of,  70;  brings  tech- 
nical advisers  and  organizers 
to  Russia,  70;  his  appreciation 
of  externals  of  western  civili- 
zation, 70;  his  statesmanship, 
71;  his  reforms  alarm  conserva- 
tives, 71;  and  serfdom,  71; 
despotic  spirit  displayed  by,  73; 
places  burden  on  industrialism, 
73;  binds  Russia  to  Asia,  y^; 
death  of,  73;  Catherine  II,  con- 
tinues work  of,  73,  74;  com- 
pared to  Catherine  II,  74;  con- 
sequences of  policy  of,  75,  78; 
sends  exiles  to  Siberia,  201;  and 
inland  waterways  of  Russia,  275. 

Peter  the  Great,  Bay  of,  224. 

Petrograd:  wages  in,  13;  number 
of  horses  in,  22;  and  Murman 
route,  271;  suffering  in,  292, 
294-295;  decline  in  population 
of,  294;   cholera  in,  295. 

Petropavlovsk:  growth  of,  207; 
near  to  Alaska,  231. 

Petrovsk  works,  375. 

Petrozavodsk:  to  Zvanka,  272; 
to  Arctic  coast,  273. 

Philanthropy  inadequate,  299. 

Philippines,  222. 

Pig  iron,  production  of,  128. 

Pitt,  Alexander  I  proposes  Euro- 
pean Confederation  to,  80. 

Platinum:  production  of,  in  Rus- 
sia, 327;  production  of,  in 
British  Columbia,  ^27;  de- 
creased production  of,  during 
w;ir,  327;  new  discoveries  ot, 
127. 

Pogoshcv,  109  n. 


43o    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


Pokrovsky,  V.  I.,  107  n. 

Poland:  population  of,  1;  in- 
dependence of,  6,  7,  31;  with- 
drawal of,  from  Russia,  32; 
king  of,  threatens  death  of 
English  sailors,  63;  Bolsheviki 
may  strike  at  central  Europe 
through,  340;  as  "  buffer  state," 
346;  proposal  to  strengthen,  by 
annexation  of  Russian  territory, 
346;   imperialists  of,  346. 

Poles:  persecution  of,  98;  exiled 
to  Siberia,  201. 

Polevoy,  P.  I.:  on  Japanese  activ- 
ity in  Russian  Far  East,  229; 
on  Saghalien  coa!,  323. 

Polish:  insurrection  suppressed, 
83 ;  Confederates  sent  to  Siberia, 
201. 

Poltava,  244. 

Popov,  Prof.  N.  M.:  on  secret 
Russo-Japanese  agreements, 1 83 ; 
quoted,  230. 

Port  Arthur:  ceded  to  Japan,  114; 
Prance  and  Russia  opposed  to 
Japanese  possession  of,  116; 
desired  by  Russia,  116;  ac- 
quired by  Russia,  119;  Russia 
surrenders,  123,  185;  acquired 
by  Japan, 214. 

Porter,  Robert  P.,  114  n,  119  n, 
143  u,  149  n. 

Portsmouth,  Treaty  of,  122,  127, 
152,  177. 

Portuguese,  persecuted  by  Japa- 
nese, 143. 

Potash,  Japanese  consumption  of, 
164. 

Powell,  Prof.  J.  B.,  quoted,  157. 

Pravda,  Bolshevist  organ,  22. 

Present  Situation  of  the  Russian 
Cause  in  the  Far  East,  The,  225  n. 

Prices,  inflation  of,  in  Russia,  102. 

Prinkipo,  340. 

Prokopovich,  S.  N.,  308. 

Propagandist  Narodniki  of  the 
Years  iS/yi887,  97  n. 

Protestants,  German-Dutch,  78. 

Proudhon:  theories  of  popularized 
by  Tchernyshevsky,  85;  regards 


tnir  as  foundation  for  Russian 
Socialism,  89;  quoted,  89;  his 
CEuvres  Posthumes,  90  n;  Marx's 
books  against,  93;  Marx's  letter 
suggests  views  of,  93,  94. 

Prussia:  Emperor  of,  joins  Alex- 
ander I,  in  pursuit  of  Napoleon's 
army,  82;  victory  of,  over 
France,  146. 

Prussian  rule,  world  saved  from, 
by  Russia,  260. 

Pskov,  early  trading  center,  60. 

Pushkin,  83. 

Q 

Queen  Elizabeth  of  England,  and 

Ivan  the  Terrible,  66. 
Queen    Mary    of    England    sends 

envoy  to  Ivan  the  Terrible,  64. 

R 
Radek,  Karl,  quoted,  343. 
Radicals,  indifferent  to  Russia,  8. 
Railways,  Russian:  capacity  bare- 
ly equal  to  Canada's  at  out- 
break of  war,  23;  constructed 
with  view  to  military  strategy, 
23-24;  extensions  of,  planned, 
24,  27;  crippled  by  over-mobili- 
zation, 24;  deterioration  of, 
during  war,  24;  effect  of  rail- 
way disorganization  on  social 
conditions,  25;  Kerensky  ar- 
ranges for  American  help,  25; 
American  Railroad  Commis- 
sion and,  25,  242;  decline  of, 
under  Bolsheviki,  25,  26;  mile- 
age of,  compared  with  United 
States  railways,  27;  income  of 
Russian  government  from  pri- 
vately owned  lines,  27;  new 
lines  and  prospective  mileage 
in  1927,  28;  cost  of  restoring 
existing  lines,  28;  cost  of  pro- 
posed extensions,  28;  steel  re- 
quired for  new  lines,  28-29; 
railway  development  dependent 
on  foreign  capital,  29;  United 
States  best  able  to  furnish  capi- 
tal   for,    29;     new    government 


INDEX 


431 


must  restore  and  extend,  31; 
equipment  needed  by,  45;  in- 
crease of  mileage,  in;  increase 
of  equipment,  in;  and  military 
strategy,  in;  backward  con- 
ditions of,  hampers  industrial 
development,  112;  comparison 
of,  with  other  countries,  112; 
Japanese  agents  hinder  Ameri- 
can aid  to,  242;  misuse  of,  by 
Japanese  in  Siberia,  255-257; 
need  of  reconstruction,  263; 
government  ownership  of,  263; 
program  for  reconstruction  of, 
268;  dilapidation  of,  26S;  re- 
lation of,  to  iron  and  steel  in- 
dustry, 269;  cost  of  recon- 
struction of,  269;  development 
of,  new  source  of  income  by, 
270;  Murman  coast  line,  270- 
273<  government  ownership  of, 
and  neglect  of  waterways,  276; 
relation  of,  to  waterways,  276; 
concession  for  private  construc- 
tion, 313-314;  Pavlovitch  on 
needs  of,  315;  and  development 
ot  copper  mining,  326. 

Raivola,  274. 

Ransome,  Arthur,  33  n,  42  n; 
quoted,  314-315. 

Raper,  Mr.,  M.  P.,  43. 

Raskolniks,  persecution  of,  201. 

Raw  materials,  ready  for  ship- 
ment from  Russia,  262-263. 

Red  Cross:  Russian,  funds  of, 
embezzled,  127;  American,  sup- 
plies of,  stolen,  251;  appeal 
made  by  Russian,  292-293. 

"Redemption  tax,"  87. 

Redfield,  Arthur  H.,  2821:. 

Report  of  the  Minister  of  Finance 
on  the  Budj/t  Proposals  of  1914, 
129  n. 

Rhcinland  Westphalia  Coal  Mines 
Syndicate,  56. 

Rice  &  llutcliins,  of  I.vnn,  Ma^s., 
286. 

Riga:  32;  he  com  s  important 
trade  cinrcr,  67. 

iov  Dynasty:  overthrow  of, 


8;  extinction  of  male  line,  73; 
succession  by  female  line  be- 
comes German,  73. 

Romanov,  Michael,  accession  of, 
67. 

Romanov,  port  of  Murman,  272, 

275- 

Roosevelt,  President,  122. 

Rosebery,  Lord,  118. 

Ross,  Prof.  E.  A.,  quoted  2,  7,  12; 
205  n. 

Rousseau:  Alexander  I,  a  disciple 
of,  80;  teachings  of,  and  Holy 
Alliance,  80;  European  Con- 
federation derived  from,  81. 

Ruble,  depreciation  of,  226. 

Rumania:  average  wheat  yield, 
15,  16;  as  "buffer  state,"  346; 
claim  of,  to  Bessarabia,  346. 

Russell,  Charles  Edward,  12  n, 
13  n,  23  n,  26  n. 

Russia:  area  of,  1;  boundaries  of, 
1;  population  of,  1,  9;  lan- 
guages spoken  in,  2;  "Balkani- 
zation" of,  2;  dismemberment 
of,  2;  struggle  to  gain  access  to 
sea,  5;  impossible  to  regard  her 
condition  with  indifference,  9; 
rapid  restoration  desirable,  11; 
suffering  ot  people  in,  11,  12; 
low  wages  paid  in,  12,  13;  small 
share  of  product  paid  workers 
in,  12;  hours  of  labor  in,  13; 
grain  production  and  export  of, 
13-14;  foodstuffs  of,  necessary 
to  existence  of  Europe,  14;  im- 
portance of  food  products  to 
United  States,  14;  decrease  of 
food  products  a  factor  in  Ameri- 
can cost  of  living,  14-15;  su- 
periority of  wheat-producing 
land,  15;  wheat  production 
compared  with  various  Euro- 
pean countries,  15;  wheat  pro- 
duction compared  with  princi- 
pal wheat-producing  countries, 
16;  usv  of  wooden  plows  and 
harrows  in,  16;  increased  use  of 
agricultural  machinery,  17;  im- 
ports of  agricultural  machinery, 


432    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 


17;  manufacture  of  agricultural 
implements  in,  17;  improved 
agricultural  productivity,  17; 
wheat  exports  to  United  King- 
dom, 18;  expenditure  of  De- 
partment of  Agriculture,  19; 
agricultural  societies  in,  19; 
war  interrupts,  modernizing  her 
agriculture,  19;  over-mobliza- 
tion  of  army,  20;  a  potentially 
great  agricultural  country,  20; 
able  to  supply  other  nations,  20; 
small  proportion  of  available 
land  under  cultivation,  20; 
enormous  possibilities  of  grain 
production,  20;  grazing  lands 
capable  of  supporting  large 
herds,  20;  cattle  per  head  ot 
population,  21;  scarcity  ot 
horses,  21;  industrial  back- 
wardness, 22;  capital  invested, 
22;  area  of,  compared  with 
United  States,  23;  capital  equal 
to  that  of  United  States  Steel 
Corporation,  23;  railways  at 
beginning  of  war,  23;  impor- 
tance of  railways  to,  23-24;  im- 
perative need  of  railway  de- 
velopment, 26;  must  depend  on 
foreign  capital,  26,  29;  need  ot 
railroads  not  affected  by  politi- 
cal organization,  26;  as  Socialist 
republic,  26;  important  which 
country  provides  capital,  26-27; 
railway  mileage  in,  27;  war 
with  Japan,  27,  121;  encourages 
private  enterprise  in  railroads, 
27;  income  from  railways,  27; 
danger  of  domination  by  re- 
actionaries, 29;  resources  almost 
limitless,  29;  program  of  eco- 
nomic reconstruction  important 
to  United  States,  38;  needs  of, 
45;  can  pay  for  what  she  needs, 
45;  danger  of  being  linked  to 
Orient,  45;  desires  unity  with 
Occident,  45;  her  destiny  con- 
trolled by  America,  45;  neither 
Asiatic  nor  European,  46;  a 
buffer  between  Orient  and  Oc- 


cident, 46;  Oriental  influences 
upon,  47;  subject  to  aggression 
by  Asia,  47;  taxed  by  Asiatic 
foe,  47;  bore  Tatar  yoke,  47; 
reasons  for  developing  un- 
European  characteristics,  47; 
cultural  development  demo- 
cratic, 53;  her  economic  union 
with  least  democratic  nations, 
53;  and  French  loan,  53;  capi- 
talists of  France  and  England 
preferred  democratic  govern- 
ment of,  53;  fear  that  Germany 
would  profit  by  revolutionary 
uprising  in,  53;  control  of, 
would  make  Germany  invincible 
dictator,  53;  Germany  would 
prevent  democratization  of,  53 ; 
British  diplomacy  in,  54;  as  a 
German  colony,  54-55;  57,  195 1 
danger  to,  from  monopolization 
of  foreign  trade,  55;  natural 
advantage  of  Germany  in  deal- 
ing with,  55;  reactionary  ele- 
ments in,  favor  Germany,  55; 
German  elements  in,  55;  her 
industrial  development  hindered 
by  Germany,  56;  and  German 
export  bounties,  56;  compelled 
to  impose  high  import  duties,  57; 
unable  to  retaliate  against  Ger- 
many, 57;  why  feared  by  Ger- 
many, 58;  potential  advantage 
of  her  geographical  position,  58; 
German  trade  and  isolation  of, 
59;  kept  by  Germany  in  an- 
achronistic state,  59;  her  politi- 
cal independence  endangered  by 
Germany,  59-60;  close  economic 
co-operation  with  western 
Europe  and  United  States  de- 
sired by,  60;  seeks  economic 
assistance  under  Ivan  the  Ter- 
rible, 60;  commercial  inter- 
course with  Europe  before  Ivan 
the  Terrible,  60;  trade  with  mer- 
chants of  Gothland  in  twelfth 
century,  60;  markets  under  di- 
rection of  Hanseatic  League  in 
fourteenth  century,  60;  Hanseatic 


INDEX 


433 


League  monopoly  challenged  by 
Swedish  and  Livonian  competi- 
tors, 61 ;  trade  of,  drawn  to  new 
routes  in  fifteenth  century,  61; 
trade  of,  with  English  in  sixteenth 
century,  62;  beginnings  of  indus- 
trial capitalism  in,  62;  Ivan  the 
Terrible  introduces  new  spirit  in, 
62;  freed  from  Tatar  yoke  by 
Ivan  III,  62;  England's  trade 
with,  under  Elizabeth  profitable, 
65;  British  workers  sent  to,  by 
Elizabeth,  66;  Ivan  the  Terri- 
ble's  efforts  to  bring  into  family 
of  European  nations,  66;  at- 
tempts to  extend  to  Baltic 
coast,  66;  Peter  the  Great 
acquires  important  territories 
for,  66;  Swedish  Baltic  and,  66; 
Livonia  acquired  by,  66;  Es- 
thonia  acquired  by,  66;  part  of 
Finland  acquired  by,  66;  in- 
dustrial revolution  in  began  early 
in  seventeenth  century,  67;  ham- 
mered into  national  shape,  67; 
becomes  one  of  the  great  trading 
nations  of  world,  69;  growth  of 
contacts  with  western  Europe, 
68;  establishment  of  industries 
in,  68;  Northern  War  and,  66; 
Treaty  of  Nystad  and,  66; 
development  of  trade  with  Asia, 
68;  enormous  profits  of  her 
Asiatic  trade,  68;  develops  im- 
portant commercial  capitalism, 
68;  as  intermediary  between  Per- 
sia and  European  countries,  68; 
refuses  demand  for  right  to  cross 
her  territory,  68;  monopoly  of 
alcohol  by  government  of,  69; 
monopoly  of  forests,  69;  Orien- 
tal trade  monopoly,  69;  devel- 
opment of  class  of  merchant- 
middlemen,  69;  English  lose 
supremacy  of  trade  with,  69; 
Dutch  and  Germans  become 
supreme  traders  in  markets  of, 
69;  Peter  the  Great  makes  in- 
dustrial capitalism  a  power  in, 
69;      indigenous     chaiacter     ot 


early  industrialism,  70;  indus- 
trial progress  of,  under  Peter 
the  Great,  70;  development  of 
naval  power  of,  70;  technical 
advisers  and  organizers  brought 
to,  by  Peter  the  Great,  70; 
efforts  to  "Europeanize"  eco- 
nomic life,  70;  serf  labor  in,  71 ; 
bound  to  Asia  by  Peter  the 
Great,  71;  industrial  system  of, 
72;  growth  of  German  influence 
in,  73;  subject  to  German 
regime,  73-74;  foreigners  in- 
vited to,  by  Catherine  II, 
74;  foreigners  establish  factories 
in,  74;  effects  of  serfdom  on 
industrial  life  of,  75;  efforts  to 
transplant  western  culture  in, 
77;  influx  of  German  agricul- 
turists, 77;  influence  of  Ger- 
man-Dutch Protestants,  78;  ef- 
fects of  immigration  on,  under 
Catherine  II,  78;  foreign  owner- 
ship of  industries  of,  78;  influ- 
ence of  western  nations  in  eigh- 
teenth century,  78; consequences 
of  preservation  of  serfdom  in, 
78;  artificial  bolstering  of  no- 
bility, 79;  weakness  of  bour- 
geoisie, 79;  French  Revolution 
and,  79;  war  with  France,  80 
Napoleon  driven  from,  82 
revolutionary  idealism  in,  82 
linked  to  western  Europe  by 
revolutionary  bond,  82;  eman- 
cipation of  serfs  in,  84;  com- 
munal land  ownership  in,  86; 
the  land  problem  in,  86-87; 
rise  of  agrarian  Socialism  in,  87; 
growth  of  discontent  in,  87; 
Nihilism  in,  88;  new  attitude 
toward  western  nations  in,  88; 
new  attitude  toward,  by  revolu- 
tionists, 89;  communal  land  sys- 
tem of,  admired  by  French,  89; 
theory  of  instinctive  commun- 
ism, 92;  cmbourgeoisement  and, 
92;  Marx's  Capital  published 
in,  93:  application  of  Marxian 
theory    to,    93-94;      terroristic 


434    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


party  develops  in,  93;  Marx  on 
capitalist  development  in,  94; 
as  Asiatic  power,  99;  in  bloc 
with  Japan  and  China,  99;  eco- 
nomic policy  dominated  by 
military  policy,  100;  Witte  and 
Europeanization  of,  101;  ex- 
tension of,  in  Asia,  102;  high 
prices  in,  102;  menaced  by 
German  economic  aggression, 
102;  English  suspicion  of,  103; 
foreign  capital  in,  103,  133,  265- 
266;  and  Occidentalism,  104; 
artificial  famine  in,  105;  poten- 
tialities of,  106;  industrial  prog- 
ress of,  107-109;  growth  of 
industrial  proletariat  in,  108; 
effect  of  Chino-Japanese  War 
on,  no,  114;  stock  companies 
in,  iio-iii;  growth  of  railway 
mileage,  in;  inadequacy  of 
railways,  112;  industrial  capi- 
tal invested  in,  113;  oppor- 
tunities for  industrial  develop- 
ment, 113-114;  and  Manchuria, 
115;  intimate  relations  with 
China,  115;  interest  in  Korea, 
115;  protests  against  Treaty  of 
Shimonoseki,  116;  supported  by 
France  and  Germany,  116,  117; 
strained  relations  with  England, 
117;  guarantees  Chinese  loan, 
119;  forces  China  to  cede  Liao- 
tung  Peninsula,  119;  acquires 
Dalny  and  Port  Arthur,  119; 
German  relations  with,  120; 
war  with  Japan  accelerates  in- 
dustry, 121;  Japan  proposes 
agreement,  121;  makes  counter- 
proposal to  Japan,  121;  Japan 
delivers  ultimatum,  122;  Japan 
declares  war,  122;  disastrous 
defeat  by  Japan,  122;  requests 
intercession  by  President  Roose- 
velt, 122;  makes  peace  with 
Japan,  122;  is  forced  back  to 
central  Asia,  123;  blocked  by 
Turkey  and  Germany,  123; 
Bagdad  railway  and,  124;  de- 
feat   by    Japan    welcomed    in 


Germany,  124;  unable  to  help 
France,  125;  incompetency  of 
government  of,  126;  corruption 
of  bureaucracy,  126;  growth  of 
industry  and  commerce,  127- 
128;  commercial  houses  in,  128; 
self-sufficiency  of,  129;  imports 
of  130-132;  exports  of,  130-132; 
importation  of  machinery  and 
implements,  132;  wool  produc- 
tion in,  132;  economic  ties  with 
European  nations,  132;  sol- 
vency of,  134;  preponderance 
of  French  capital  in,  134; 
British  capital  in,  134;  instigates 
revolt  in  Korea,  151;  upholds 
Korea  against  Japan,  151;  wants 
Korea,  152;  Treaty  of  Ports- 
mouth and,  152;  recognizes 
Japan's  suzerainty  over  Korea, 
152;  intrigues  in  Korea,  153; 
impeded  by  Germany,  154;  cor- 
rupted by  Germany,  154;  im- 
portance of  Japanese  policy  to, 
159;  declaration  of  war  by  Ger- 
many, 159;  Japan  settles  score 
with,  163;  secret  agreements 
concerning  China,  167;  secret 
treaties  with  Japan,  168-169, 
179-184;  nominally  recognizes 
China's  sovereignty,  177;  at- 
tempts to  establish  protectorate 
over  Mongolia,  177;  cessions  to 
Japan,  178;  military  adminis- 
tration of  Manchuria  by,  178; 
violates  pledges  concerning 
China,  178;  diplomats  of,  duped 
by  Japanese,  183;  friendship 
for  America,  183;  close  relation 
to  China,  197;  colonization  in 
Siberia,  199;  conquest  of  Siberia 
by,  199;  elite  of,  sent  to  Siberia, 
201-202;  emigration  from,  to 
Siberia,  203,  206;  criminals  of, 
sent  to  Siberia,  202;  German 
colonists  in,  205;  trade  with 
Siberia,  211;  agreement  with 
Japan  concerning  Manchuria, 
214;  military  collapse  of,  215, 
237;    Revolution  and,  215;  dis- 


INDEX 


435 


integration  of,  215;  possible 
separation  of  Siberia  from,  215; 
flouted  "open  door"  policy, 
218;  Japan  seeks  "rights"  of, 
in  China,  218,  219;  Japan  de- 
sires reactionary  regime  in,  219; 
possible  alliance  with  Japan, 
219;  democratic  regime  in, 
check  to  imperialism,  220;  union 
of,  with  western  nations  desir- 
able, 220,  298;  Japanese  im- 
perialist success  disastrous  to, 
221;  Pacific  ports  of,  222;  fish- 
ing industry  of,  223-224;  im- 
portations of  fish,  224;  agree- 
ments with  Japan  concerning 
fishing  rights,  224-226;  Japan's 
aim  to  dominate,  228;  Geologi- 
cal Commission  of,  229:  pro- 
posed cession  of  Sagh alien  to 
Japan  by,  230;  recovery  of 
German  influence  in,  232;  pos- 
sible joint  German-Japanese 
control  of,  233;  concessions 
wrested  from,  by  Japan,  234; 
dependence  upon  Japan,  234; 
weakened  by  Revolution,  235; 
Bolshevist  counter-revolution  in, 
235;  suggested  repudiation  of 
war  debts  by,  237;  anti-Boi- 
shevist  forces  of,  238;  friend- 
ship of  United  States  for,  241; 
efforts  of  United  States  to  assist, 
242;  Czccho-SIovaks  and,  243- 
246;  lack  of  agreement  of  Allies 
concerning,  244;  Japan  and,  246; 
Soviet  government  of,  exposes 
German-Japanese  treaty,  253; 
German-Japanese  agreement 
concerning  division  of,  254; 
monarchical  element  in,  favors 
German-Japanese  treaty,  254; 
as  bridge  between  Berlin  and 
Tokio,  258;  Rt.  Hon.  Winston 
Churchill  on,  259;  League  of 
Nations  and,  259;  indestructi- 
bility of,  259;  neither  pauper 
nor  bankrupt,  260:  starvation 
in,  260;  debt  of  Allied  nations 
to,   260,     sacrifices   of,   in    war, 


260-261;  program  essential  to 
restoration,  261-262;  need  of 
credit,  262-264;  available  raw 
materials  in,  262  n;  propriety 
of  loan  to,  by  United  States 
government,  263;  possible  gov- 
ernment insurance  of  Russian 
securities,  264;  British  govern- 
ment insures  Russian  trade 
risks,  264;  situation  in  analo- 
gous to  that  in  America  after 
Civil  War,  264;  abundant  and 
varied  human  and  material 
resources  of,  265;  fundamental 
democracy  of,  265;  Germany's 
struggle  to  possess  industries  of, 
266;  Japan  and,  control  of  in- 
dustries of,  266;  turns  to  United 
States,  266;  America's  interest 
in  trade  of,  266;  potentially 
richest  country  in  world,  266; 
small  share  of  America  in  im- 
port trade  of,  266-267;  foreign 
intermediaries  and  American 
trade  with,  267;  American 
agricultural  machinery  in,  267; 
possibilities  of  trade  with  Russia 
demonstrated,  268;  decline  of 
American  exports  to,  268;  new 
railway  construction  required 
by,  26R;  imperative  necessiry 
of  increased  iron  and  steel  pro- 
duction in,  269;  enormous  neces- 
sary expense  estimate,  269; 
new  sources  of  income  made 
accessible,  270;  Germany's  ef- 
forts to  take  Murman  coast 
railway  from,  270;  importance 
of  Murman  coast  to,  270-271; 
construction  of  Murman  coast 
line  by,  271-273;  deprived  of 
Black  Sea  and  Baltic  ports,  274; 
Peace  of  Brest-Litovsk  and, 
274:  Germany  aims  at  sys- 
tematic dismemberment  of,  274; 
dependence  of  prosperity  of,  on 
transportation  system,  275; 
British  save  Murman  coast  fur, 
274-275;  importance  of  inland 
waterways  to,   275;    ncjjlect   of 


436    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


waterways  of,  by  old  regime, 
276;  war  emphasizes  impor- 
tance of  inland  waterways  to, 
276;  program  for  developing 
waterways  of,  276;  development 
of  waterways  and  future  of,  277; 
lack  of  survey  of  industrial 
needs  of,  277;  blockade  of,  by 
Allied  governments,  278;  Bol- 
shevist official  on  needs  of,  278- 
279;  electro-technical  industry 
of,  280-282;  need  of  clothing 
and  shoes  in,  284;  cotton  needed 
in,  284;  importance  of  eliminat- 
ing intermediaries  in  American- 
Russian  trade,  284-287;  legiti- 
mate German  trade  with  Russia 
desirable,  287;  danger  of  res- 
toration of  former  German 
domination,  287;  German  and 
English  commercial  methods  in 
contrasted,  288-289;  credit  cus- 
toms in,  290;  German  com- 
mercial agencies  in,  290;  ex- 
perts needed  by,  291;  ravages 
of  disease  and  hunger  in,  291- 
292;  appeal  of  Red  Cross  of, 
292-293;  Bolshevist  accounts  of 
typhus  and  smallpox  epidemics 
in,  293-294;  British  parlia- 
mentary report  on  epidemics  in, 
294;  British  official  on  condi- 
dions  in,  295;  lack  of  doctors 
and  sanitary  experts,  295; 
enormous  prevalence  of  venereal 
diseases,  295;  venereal  diseases 
no  longer  dependent  upon  vice, 
296;  many  thousands  of  trained 
specialists  necessary  in,  297; 
probable  influence  of  specialists 
on  public  opinion  in,  297; 
influence  of  German  specialists 
in,  297;  must  be  regarded  as 
customer,  not  beggar,  298-299; 
economic  laws  warrant  exten- 
sion of  credit  to,  299;  people 
and  assets  of  described,  299-300; 
capacity  of  people  of,  for 
organization,  300-301;  result  of 
studying  her  in  abnormal  chaos, 


302;  zemstvos  and,  302-306; 
co-operative  movement  in,  307- 
309;  kept  alive  by  co-operatives, 
309^-310;  co-operatives  as  foun- 
dation for  future  development 
of,  310;  extent  and  value  of 
forest  resources,  310-312;  im- 
portance to  America  of  timber 
supply  of,  311;  proper  manage- 
ment of  her  forests  sufficient  to 
pay  interest  on  war  debts,  312; 
Provisional  Government's  ex- 
pert survey  of  natural  resources 
of,  512;  Bolsheviki  grant  con- 
cessions to  develop  natural 
resources  of,  312-317;  impos- 
sibility of  present  realization  of 
communist  ideals  in,  3 17;  growth 
of  timber  exports  from,  317-318; 
mineral  resources  of,  barely 
scratched,  318;  coal  production 
of,  318;  undeveloped  coal  re- 
sources of,  319;  undeveloped 
iron-ore  deposits  in,  323;  pro- 
duction of  copper  in,  326;  gold 
production  in,  326-327;  platinum 
production  in,  327-328;  pro- 
duction of  manganese  ore  in, 
328;  silver  in,  328;  lead  in,  328; 
zinc  in,  328;  tin  in,  328;  mer- 
cury in,  328;  antimony  in,  328; 
sulphur  in,  328;  production  of 
petroleum  in,  328;  reasons  for 
decline  of  production  of  petro- 
leum in,  328;  immense  unde- 
veloped oil-fields  of,  329;  export 
trade  of,  in  furs  and  hides,  329; 
enormous  output  of  flax  and 
wool  by,  329;  almost  unlimited 
possibilities  of  agriculture  and 
fisheries,  330;  destruction  of 
productive  machinery  of,  330; 
development  of  new  ideas  and 
standards  of  living  in,  330; 
world's  greatest  market  for 
machinery  and  manufactured 
goods,  331;  most  important 
field  for  investment,  331;  no 
economic  order  until  Russia  is 
restored,  332;    enlightened  self- 


INDEX 


437 


interest  in  helping,  332;  service 
to,  is  service  to  America,  333; 
Latin-America  compared  to, 
333;  America  does  not  need 
monopoly  of  trade  of,  334; 
Belgium  depends  upon  trade  of, 
334;  ampie  room  for  German- 
Japanese  trade  in,  334;  interest 
in  preventing  economic  domina- 
tion of,  334;  hope  of  Allies  in 
linking  with  Occident.  333; 
resumption  of  trade  with,  345; 
and  "buffer  states,"  346;  united 
against  dismemberment,  346- 
5.17;  danger  of"  Balkanization" 
of,  347;  no  nation  must  monop- 
olize trade  of,  147;   our  interest 

in,  348- 

Russia  and  Europe,  49  n,  62  n. 
Russia  at  the  End  of  the  Nineteenth 

Century,  107  n. 
Russia  from  Within,  126  n. 
Russia,    Her    Economic    Past    and 

Future,  14  n,  112  n,  128  n,  224  n, 

310  n. 
Russia  in  IQIO,  33  n,  315  n. 
Russia  in  V-pheaval,  2  n,  7  n. 
Russia  on  the  Pacific,  113  n. 
Russian-American     Chamber     of 

Coriimen  e,  2S6. 
Russian    army,   over-mobilization 

of,   I9-20. 

ir.  Economist,  The,  223  n, 
:  7  > . 

K  .  Kmpire:   area  of,  1;  popu- 

lation of,  1;  foundation  of,  46; 
evolution  of,  46;  Slav  and 
{•inrush  t;ii<-  •-.  progenitors  of,  46. 

ku,   '.an    la  lory    in    the   Past  and 
Present,  77.  •,  (><)  n,  1 

in-French  War  of  1S07,  80. 

1  in    Geological    Commission, 

in-German  Commercial 
Treaty,  2S8. 

Russian   Onhodox  Church:   theo- 

ciatic   character  of,    .('.;     revolt 

of  In:  t- Hi  ,   ;    . 

Rus'  lan  ,  z')2. 

Russian  Revo!  .  md  separatist 


movements,  2;  hunger  and,  25; 
and  railways,  25;  ruinous  results 
of,  31;  prevents  industrial 
development,  283;  equipment 
or  large  estates  destroyed  dur- 
ing, 284;  24,  28,  215,  235,  301- 
302. 

Russian  Revolution,  The,  306  n. 

Russian  Year-Book,  204,  209  n. 

Russia's  Ruin,  12  v.,  105  n,  330  n. 

Russkaya  folia,  quoted,  226. 

Russo-Japanese  War,  27,  177,  228, 
301,  307. 

Russo-  Turkish  War,  100. 

Rye,  production  of,  in  Russia,  14. 

Rvkov,  Bolshevist  official,  34. 

Ryleef,  83. 


Sack,  Q.  J.,  129  n,  318  n. 

Saghalien  Island:  half  of,  ceded  to 
Japan,  122;  Japanese  expan- 
sion in,  197;  coal  in,  213,  322- 
323;   oil  in,  213,  329. 

St.  Petersburg:  living  conditions 
in,  13;  growth  of  population  of, 
106. 

Saint-Simon:  theories  of,  popu- 
larized by  Tchernyshevsky,  S3; 
influence  of,  on  Russian  move- 
ment, 85. 

Sakurai,  M.,  229 

Salvation  Army,  305. 

Sand,  Madame,  90. 

San  Francisco  Examiner,  The, 
231  n. 

Sanitary  experts  needed,  293. 

San  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  ico. 

Santo  Domingo,  179. 

Sashch,  open  to  trade,  1 14. 

Sazonov,  M.:  on  autonomy  and 
self-government,  4;  signs  Rus- 
so-Japanese   treaty,    179,    181; 

Scandinavian  straits,  271. 
Schuchardt  &  Schutte,  285. 
Schultzc-Ciavermtz,  (i.,  65  n. 
Seacoasr,    importance    of,    to   lun- 

terland,  5. 
Sea  ol  Azov,  123,  1  ;  ;,  319. 


438    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


Sea  of Japan, i,  222. 

Secret  treaties  and  agreements, 
between  Russia  and  Japan, 
178-184. 

Semenov  (Cossack  Ataman):  en- 
couraged in  opposition  to  Kol- 
chak,  250;  boasts  of  allegiance 
to  Japan,  250;  refuses  recogni- 
tion of  Kolchak's  authority, 
250;  his  forces  attack  Czecho- 
slovaks, 250. 

Semipalatinsk:  growth  of,  207; 
coal  in,  320;  iron  ore  in,  324; 
copper  in,  326. 

Serbia,  average  wheat  yield,  15. 

Serfdom:  extent  of,  in  Russia,  71; 
Peter  the  Great  and,  72;  an 
obstacle  to  industrialism,  72, 
73;  prolonged  and  brutalized 
by  industrialism,  73;  indus- 
trialism made  dependent  upon, 
73;  makes  industrial  production 
costly,  75;  Catherine  II  and, 
76;  sets  gulf  between  Russia 
and  western  nations,  78;  Alex- 
ander I  and,  80;  abolished  by 
Alexander  II,  84;  influence  of 
Tchernyshevsky  in  abolishing, 
84;  abolition  of,  fails  to  satisfy, 
86;  the  land  problem  and,  86. 

Severnaya Kommuna,  313. 

Shanghai,  185;  anti-Japanese  boy- 
cott in,  217. 

Shantung  Peninsula,  120,  163. 

Shantung  People's  Association, 
185. 

Shantung  Province:  185-187;  area 
of,  188;  population  of,  188; 
mining  industry  in,  189-190; 
economic  aggression  of  Japan 
in,  191;  Japanese  smuggling  in, 
192;  Japan's  intentions  con- 
cerning, 232. 

Sheep,  21  n. 

Shimonoseki,  Treaty  of,  114,  115, 
116,  IC2. 

Shoes,  American,  imported  into 
Russia,  286. 

Shogun  Iyemitsu,  143. 

Shogunate,  fall  of,  142,  144. 


Siberia:  population  of,  1,  204; 
desirous  of  union  with  Russia, 
32;  vulnerability  to  Japanese 
attack  on  eastern,  32,  34;  pos- 
sibility of  becoming  independent 
state,  33;  will  not  unite  with 
Bolshevist  Russia,  34;  as  demo- 
cratic republic,  34;  menace  of 
Japanese  aggression,  34;  incapa- 
ble of  self-defense,  34;  reliance 
on  League  of  Nations,  34;  dan- 
ger of  economic  control  by 
Germany  or  Japan,  34,  35; 
League  of  Nations  cannot  pro- 
tect against  economic  subjec- 
tion, 35;  prefers  capital  from 
United  States,  35;  possibly 
forced  to  accept  German-Japa- 
nese control,  35;  may  become 
monarchy,  35;  sympathy  of 
her  monarchists  with  Japan,  35; 
reactionary  elements  in  Omsk 
government  in,  35;  danger  of 
alliance  with  Japan,  35  ;  union 
of  Japan,  China,  and,  36; 
League  of  Nations  could  be 
flouted  by  union  of  China, 
Japan,  and,  36;  Decembrists 
exiled  to,  83,  201;  coal  trans- 
ported from  western,  to  Urals, 
112;  opportunities  for  Japanese 
expansion  in,  197;  attempts  at 
colonization  in  eleventh  cen- 
tury, 199;  Novgorodians  in,  199; 
ease  of  conquest  of,  199;  sinister 
reputation  as  penal  colony,  199; 
early  military  establishment  in, 
200;  origin  of  penal  settlement, 
200;  Raskolniks  exiled  to,  201; 
Avvakum,  protopope,  exiled  to, 
201;  Imperial  Guards  sent  to, 
201;  Peter  the  Great  and,  201; 
Catherine  II  and,  201;  Polish 
Revolutionists  sent  to,  201; 
Nicholas  I  and,  201;  Alexander 

I  sends  Poles  to,  201;  Alexander 

II  sends  Poles  to,  201;  Tcherne- 
shevsky  exiled  to,  201;  cultural 
influence  of  exiles  in,  202; 
ordinary  criminals  sent  to,  202; 


INDEX 


439 


enforced  settlement  in,  202; 
miserable  plight  of  exiles  in,  202; 
voluntary  settlement  in,  203; 
Cossacks  in,  203;  Yamshiks  in, 
zcy,  subsidized  colonization  in, 
203;  Emancipation  Act  and, 
203;  mass  migration  to,  203; 
area  of,  204.;  boundaries  of,  204; 
low  birth-rate  in,  204;  high 
infant  mortality  in,  204;  Japa- 
nese in,  204-205;  German  and 
Austrian  war  prisoners  in,  205, 
238;  growth  by  immigration, 
206;  Bolshevist  terrorism  and, 
206;  ethnological  elements  in 
population  of,  206;  remarkable 
growth  of  towns  of,  206-207; 
'Irans-Siberian  railway  and,  208, 
215;  growth  of  municipal  ex- 
penditures in,  2CQ;  distribution 
of  population,  209:  inland  water- 
ways, 209,  276;  principal  divi- 
sions of,  209;  economic  char- 
acteristics of  principal  divisions 
cJ,  209-212;  Japanese  policy  in, 
212,  234;  relation  of,  to  China, 
213-214;  growth  ot  Russian 
militarism  in,  215;  possible 
separation  from  Russia,  215; 
motives  of  Japan  in,  217-218; 
Japanese  R-ar  of  liberal  govern- 
ment in,  219-220;  importance 
of  iss: ;•  ■  at  stake  in,  22C-222; 
Japanese  colonization  in,  222; 
Japanese  acquire  hotels  in,  223; 
special  Japanese  currency  used 
in,  223;  gold-mines  in,  acquired 
by  Japanese,  22;;  Japanese 
:  •  nv<  ;■  st'  a  me  1  s  in,  223 ; 
electric  plant  acquired  by  Japa- 
nese, 223;  monopoly  rights  ac- 
qni'ed  by  Japanese,  223;  fishing 
iirl  isrry  in,  22  5-227;  polirii  al 
and  military  objectives  o!  Japan 
in,  227-22- ;  possibilities  of  an- 
nexation of,  by  Japan,  22  S 
2,c-2",2;  climate  of,  227; 
Japanese  surveyors  in,  22S; 
contiguity  of,  to  Alaska,  :p; 
interest  of  United  States  in  pre- 


serving independence  of,  232; 
meaning  of  Japanese  control  of, 
233;  economic  concessions  in, 
234;  arrogance  of  Japanese  in, 
234;  bitter  feeling  against  Japa- 
nese in,  234;  extension  of  Japa- 
nese influence  in,  233;  Bolshe- 
viki  and,  235;  proposed  Japa- 
nese intervention  in,  236;  fear 
of  Japanese  intervention  in,  by 
Allies,  237-258;  United  States 
opposes  Japanese  intervention 
in,  230;  efforts  of  Bolsheviki  to 
control,  239;  Japanese  offer 
to  expel  from,  239;  Japan  op- 
poses stable  self-government  in, 
242;  Allied  and  American  inter- 
vention in,  243;  Czecho-Slovaks 
in,  243-245;  saved  from  Bol- 
sheviki by  Czecho-Slovaks,  245; 
Japan  exceeds  quota  of  troops 
in,  246;  Japanese  ambitions  in, 
246;  Japanese  control  strategic 
points  in,  247-249;  Japan  and 
Czecho-Slovaks  in,  250;  Kalmi- 
kov's  forces  create  terror  in, 
250-252;  discreditable  economic 
policy  of  Japan  in,  252;  Japanese 
understanding  with  Germany 
concerning,  252;  alleged  secret 
German-Japanese  treaty  con- 
cerning, 253-254;  misuse  of 
Allied  military  agencies  by  Japa- 
nese in, 254-257:  Lieutenant-Col- 
onel Barrows  on  Japanese  in, 
255;  Japan's  method  in  similar 
to  those  employed  in  China,  255; 
growth  of  Japanese  trade  in, 
257;  unscrupulous  aggression 
ot  Japan  in,  258;  coal  resources 
ot,  31'  -323 ;  deposits  of  iron 
ore  :.',  324-325;  copper  1:1,  326; 
gold  in,  527;  oil  m,  529;  Japa- 
nese and  turmoil  111,  341;  modi- 
fication of  Japan's  policy  in, 
-,41.  343. 

.   and  the   Exile  System,  2CO. 
S:  1  ' .   I <<  'in  Rucia,  Ml. 

ns-Sehuckert  Company,  42, 


440    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 

Siemens  &  Halske,  2S1. 

Silver,  328. 

Sinn  Fein,  6. 

Siratoi,  oil  at,  329. 

Smallpox,   epidemic*  of,   292-294. 

Small  states  and  nationalities, 
rights  of,  3. 

Socialism:  European  influences  on 
Russian,  85;  agrarian,  of  Rus- 
sia, arises,  87;  the  mir  and,  89; 
theory  that  Russia  might  be 
first  nation  to  adopt,  90;  "in- 
stinctive communism"  of  Rus- 
sian peasants  and,  92;  Marx  on 
Russian  capitalism  and,  94. 

Socialist  Press  of  Denmark  and 
Sweden,  44. 

Socialists:  in  Siberia,  34;  govern- 
ment   of,    and    foreign    trade, 

Sonsk,  325. 

Solvency  of  Russia,  despite  finan- 
cial policy,  134. 

Soroka,  272. 

Soul  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  The, 
13  n,  107  n. 

Sourakhani,  oil  at,  329. 

South  Africa:  difficulties  of  Eng- 
land in,  121;  and  Japanese  im- 
migration, 149. 

South  America:  German  trade  in, 
140,  289;  market  for  American 
goods,  333;  German  competi- 
tion in,  333;  trade  less  than 
Russia's,  334;  statistics  of 
trade  of  various  countries  of, 
334  n. 

South  Pacific  Islands:  economic 
and  political  value  of,  163-164; 
population  of,  164;  Great  Brit- 
ain and,  164;    168. 

Soviet  Government:  of  Russia, 
publishes  account  of  German- 
Japanese  treaty,  233;  produc- 
tion of  agricultural  implements 
under,  278;  nationalization  of 
industries  by,  278-279;  aim  of, 
279;  fear  of  recognition  of,  343; 
pro-forma  recognition  of,  345; 
controls  co-operatives,  345. 


Soviet  Russia,  34. 
Soviet  Russia,  1  n,  130  n,  263  n. 
Soviets  at  Work,  The,  309  n. 
Spain:    average  wheat  yield,   15; 

revolutionary  movement  in,  8i, 
Spanish,  expelled  from  Japan,  143. 
Spargo,  John,  quoted,  303-304. 
Specialists  needed,  297. 
Standards    of    living    in    Russia 

changed,  330. 
Starvation  in  Russia,  260,  292. 
StatisticalTables: 

Average  annual  wheat  yield, 
1901-10,  15. 

Annual  average  yield  of  wheat 
per  acre  in  the  principal 
wheat-growing  countries,   16. 

Stock  companies  in  Russia,  in. 

Imports  into    Russia,    1909-13, 

Exports  from  Russia,  1909-13, 

Showing  relative  importance 
of  British  and  German  im- 
ports, 137. 

Value  of  Russia's  trade  with 
various     countries,     1908-13, 

Growth  of  towns  in  Siberia,  207. 
Growth   of  municipal   expendi- 
tures in  Siberia,  208. 
Growth    of  co-operative   socie- 
ties, 308. 
Per-capita  production  of  coal  in 

various  countries,  318. 
Showing   amount  of  pure   gold 
delivered  at  laboratories  from 
1908  to  1915,  327. 
Steel,  production  of,  107. 
Stevens  Commission,  242. 
Stevens,  John  F.,  25. 
Stockholm,    German-Japanese 

treaty  concluded  at,  253. 
Straits  of  Formosa,  222. 
Struve,  Peter,  30. 
Stryeltsy,  sent  to  Siberia,  201. 
Studies  in  the  History  of  Russian 

Culture,  61  n. 
Studies  in  the  National  and  Politi- 
cal Economy  of  Russia,  65  n. 


INDEX  441 

Suchow,  open  to  trade,  114.  Tchita:  growth  of,  207;  growth  of 

Sudzhensk,  coal-mines,  320.  municipal  expenditure  in,  20S; 

Sulphur,  328.  247. 

Sunset,  302.  Tchulym,  coal  along,  321. 

Sun  Yat-sen,  espouses  Pan-Asian-  Tchumysh,  coal  near,  320. 

ism,  196.  Telbesa,  iron  deposits  along  the, 

Supreme     Council     of     National  325. 

Economy,  278-279.  Tesha,  coal  near,  320. 

Sutchan,  coal  along  the,  322.  Textiles,  production  of,  107. 

Sutchansk,  coal  deposits,  322.  Tientsin,  Treaty  of,  151. 

Sirnsk  Har.delstidning,  312.  Tilsit,   meeting  of  Napoleon  and 

Sweden:    average  wheat  yield,  15;  Alexander  1  at,  80. 

Russia's   trade   with,   38;     Rus-  Tin,  213,  32S. 

sian  merchants  sell  Asiatic  goods  Tobolsk:    growth  of,  207;    growth 

to,  68.  of  municipal  expenditure  in,  208; 

Swedes:   early  trade  of,  with  Rus-  government,  iron  ore  in,  324. 

sia,  67;     attracted  to  Russia  by  Togai,  iron  in,  325. 

Catherine     II,     74;      industries  Tokio,  252. 

owned  by,  "Q.  Tom,  River,  320,  325. 

Switzerland,  foreign  trade  of,  217.  Tomsk:    growth  of,   20S;    growth 

Syphilis  and  Public  Hcaltli,  296.  of  municipal  expenditure  in,  20S. 

Tomsk  Government:   coal  in,  320; 

I  iron  deposits  in,  325;  copper  in, 

Tahen-wan,  cedtd  to  Japan,  114.  526. 

Tangier,  visit  of  Kaiser  to,  125.  Tonking,  117,  119. 

Tang-Shao-yi,    on     Indian    mde-  Torgova-Promyshlennaya     Gazetia, 

pendence,  196.  268. 

Tatars:    rule  of  Rusr.ia,  47;    Ivan  Tories,  indifferent  to  Russia,  8. 

Ill  and,  62;    Ivan  ihe  Terrible  Toughan-Baranovsky:        Russian 

and,  62;   territory  wrested  from,  economist,    69;      quoted,     108; 

62:   in  Siberia,  J99;   3^5.  108  n. 

'I  cha\ I                    .    on  krasin,  42;  Trailing  ihe  Bolsheviki,  243  n. 

quoted,  4",;    circle  of,  97;  292.  Trans-Baikal:    and  Japanese  rule, 

emkhovsk    mines,    319,    322.  197;      mineral    riches    of,    213; 

'/'•"''•'               .,  A.,  86  n.  railway,  322;   coal  in,  322;   iron 

I chernvshevsky,  N\:  induces  Alex-  ore  in,  325;   copper  in,  326;   oil 

ander  1  to  liberate  serfs,  84;  his  in,  •,29. 

('  >     mi    rary  Rr.nr.c,  85;  popu-  Trans-Caspian  Railway,  329. 

lari/.<-d      I-  rench     and      English  Trans-Siberian    Railway:     Erench 

social      theories,      85;       equally  capital  ami,  117,    101,  115,222, 

influenced  by  Owen  and  Fourier,  241,  24^,  ^21. 

?■;    reu'aids   tr.ir  as   foundation  Transpoitation     experts     needed, 

for  Socialist   Society,  90;    influ-  291. 

ewe  nri  People's  Will  party,  93;  Treaty  of  Aigun,  115. 

idealizes    »:;r    and    mwJiik,    95;  Treaty  of  Nystad,  66. 

exiled  in  Siberia,  201.  Treaty   of   Portsmouth,    122,    127, 

I    hi  h   rine:   on  ( n  rman-Japanese  15:,  177. 

near-,,  253;    Bolshevist   foreign  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  100. 

Minister,     274;      quoted,     316;  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki,      114-116; 

moderate  tone  of,  344.  IC2. 


442    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN   PROBLEM 


Treaty  of  Tientsin,  151. 

Treaty  of  Versailles:  and  dismem- 
berment of  Russia,  2;  recog- 
nizes independence  of  Finland 
and  Poland,  31-32;  41;  184, 
185. 

Trebizond,  195. 

Trotzky,  quoted,  43;    244,  245. 

Tsushima,  destruction  of  Russian 
fleet  off,  122. 

Tuba,  iron  deposits  along  the,  325. 

Tuberculosis,    epidemics    of,    292, 

^  295-  . 
Turgeniev,  83. 

Turkestan:  cotton  of,  24;  Allied 
military  stores  in,  239;  cotton 
fields  of,  ruined,  284;  Bolshevist 
menace  to,  343. 

Turkey:  German  mastery  of,  123; 
obstacles  to  Russia,  123;  war 
with  Russia,  126;  Russia's 
trade  with,  138;  joins  German 
coalition,  271;  Bolshevist  prop- 
aganda in,  342. 

Turkish  War  of  1877,  scandals  of, 
126. 

Turko-Tatars,  in  Siberia,  206. 

Turks,  in  Siberia,  206. 

Turukhansk,  coal  in  region  of,  321. 

Twenty-one  Demands:  served 
upon  China,  170;  existence  of 
officially  denied  by  Jipan,  171; 
Japan's  aims  through,  171; 
analysis  of,  172;  revision  of, 
172;  China  makes  concessions 
regarding,  172;  Japan's  ultima- 
tum concerning,  172-173;  China 
forced  to  concede,  173;  British 
and  American  intervention  and, 
173;  part  of  Pan-Asian  pro- 
gram, 196. 

Typhus,  epidemics  of,  292-295. 

Tyumen:  growth  of,  207;  iron 
deposits  near,  324. 

Tzaritzyn,  growth  of  population 
of,  107. 

u 

Uda,  copper  along  the,  326. 
Ufa,  245. 


Ukraine:  independence  of,  2; 
Czecho-Slovaks  in,  244. 

"Ukraine  Republic,"  243. 

Ukrainians,  7. 

Ular,  A.,  126  n,  127  n. 

Ulijanov,  N. — See  Lenin. 

Ullman,  engineer  for  German  firm, 
offered  concession,  42. 

Ulrich,  Charles  Peter,  becomei 
heir  apparent,  75. 

Union  of  Siberian  Creamery  As- 
sociations, 309. 

Union  of  Zemstvos,  304-306. 

United  Kingdom,  coal  production 
of,  318. 

United  Press,  253  n. 

United  States:  wages  in,  compared 
with  Russian  wages,  12;  average 
wheat  yield,  16;  cattle  per  head 
of  population  in,  21;  railway 
mileage  compared  with  Russia's, 
27;  best  able  to  furnish  capital 
for  Russia,  29;  entrance  into 
World  War,  36;  importance  of 
enormous  Russian  trade  to, 
38:  Russian  market  enables,  to 
avoid  prolonged  industrial  de- 
pression, 39;  working  class  of, 
interested  in  securing  Russian 
trade,  40;  railways  of,  112; 
belittled  by  Germany,  121; 
and  Russia,  self-sufficiency  of, 
129;  imports,  130;  exports, 
130;  restricts  Japanese  immi- 
gration, 149;  trade  with  Man- 
churia, 215;  interest  of,  in 
Siberia,  220;  interest  in  uniting 
Russia  with  Occident,  220; 
naval  bases  of,  221;  military 
interests  in,  preventing  Japa- 
nese occupation  of  Siberia,  231; 
contiguity  of,  to  Siberia,  231; 
interested  in  preserving  Siberia's 
integrity,  232;  menace  to,  in 
possible  German-Japanese  com- 
bination, 232;  share  of,  in  joint 
expedition  in  Siberia,  246;  Rus- 
sia must  turn  to,  266;  total 
exports  from,  to  Russia,  267; 
agricultural  machinery  exported 


INDEX 


443 


to  Russia,  267;  decline  of  ex- 
ports from,  to  Russia,  268; 
forest  area  of,  310;  coal  pro- 
duction of,  318;  importance  of 
Russian  market  to,  331;  as 
creditor  nation,  331;  credit 
balance,  331;  trade  balance, 
331;  leader  in  international 
finance,  331;  obligation  to 
Russia,  331-332;  and  Latin- 
American  trade,  333;  cannot 
tupport  war  on  Russia,  347; 
must  oppose  dismemberment  of 
Russia,  347;  importance  of 
Russian  trade  to,  347. 

United  States  Steel  Corporation, 
23,  113. 

University  of  Glasgow,  311. 

University  of  Moscow,  54. 

Ural  Mountains:  possible  Bol- 
shevist control  west  of,  33; 
political  development  east  of, 
34;  penetrated  by  English 
pioneers,  66:  iron  production 
in,  112;  lack  of  coal  in,  112; 
iron  deposits  in  region  of,  324; 
copper  in,    ;  :•  . 

Ussuri  Railway,  322. 

Ussurisk  Cossack  "  Krug,"  251. 

Ustyug-Veliki,  3  13. 


Vanine  Ray,  224. 

Varangian,  Vladimir  I,  the,  47. 

Wtll-T,  Lieut.-Col.  Edward  B., 
M.I).,  y/,n. 

Venereal  Diseases:  increase  of,  in 
Russia  after  war  with  Japan, 
296;  military  authorities  neglect 
to  take  measure  againsr,  296; 
no  segregation  or  restriction  of 
prostitutes,  296;  alarming  spread 
of,  296;  endemic  nature  of,  296; 
no  longer  dependent  on  vice, 
296;  spread  by  accidental  con- 
tact, 296;  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Vedder,  M.I).,  on,  29671;  Rus- 
sia needs  help  to  combat,  296- 
297;  zemstvos  and,  30;. 

Vera  Company,  of  Berlin,  286. 


Verdun,  261. 

Verkhne-Udinnk,  275. 

Versailles,  Treaty  of,  64,  184,  185. 

"Villa  of  Siberia,"  the,  241. 

Vishnegradski,  quoted,  100. 

Vladimir,  115  n. 

Vladimiri  (The  Holy):  introduces 
Christianity,  47;  conversion  to 
Christianity,  48;  a  treacherous 
pagan,  48;  consequences  of  his 
selection  of  the  religion  of 
Byzantium,  48. 

Vladivostok:  American  machinery 
sent  from,  28;  gateway  to 
Siberia  established,  115;  growth 
of,  207;  growth  of  municipal 
expenditure  in,  208;  Allied 
military  stores  in,  238;  Japa- 
nese warships  in,  249;  Japanese 
firms  in,  257;  32,  197,  211,  212, 
247. 

Vladivostok  Echo,  The,  t,i6. 

Volga:  becomes  a  Russian  river, 
62;  Germans  establish  villages 
on,  77;  107. 

Volga  Territory,  diversity  of  races 
and  faiths  in,  7. 

Vologda,  establishment  of  English 
factories  at,  66. 

Voronoff,  Prof.  A.  A.,  on  electro- 
technical  industry,  280-282. 

Vyatka,  313. 

Vytchegda,  establishment  of  Eng- 
lish factories  at,  66. 

W 

Wages:  in  Japan,  12:  in  Russia.  12, 
13;  in  the  United  States,  12; 
in  Petrograd,   13. 

Waterloo,  downfall  of  Napoleon 
ar,  80. 

Waterways,  inland,  of  Russia, 
275-277. 

VAletm,  Canadian  De- 
partment of  Trade  and  Com- 
merce, 204  71,  257  7?,  326  71. 

Wei-Hai-Wei:  given  as  pledge  to 
Japan,  114;  proposal  to  neu- 
tralize, 165;    222. 

Western    Siberia:     population    of, 


444    RUSSIA  AS  AN  AMERICAN  PROBLEM 


209;  provinces  of,  209;  boun- 
daries of,  210;  characteristics  of, 
210;  economic  resources  of,  210; 
trade  through  Moscow,  211; 
Japan  and,  218. 

Wheat:  yield  per  dessiatine  in 
Russia,  15;  yield  per  dissiatine 
in  various  European  countries, 
15;  yield  per  acre  in  principal 
wheat-producing  countries,    16. 

Wheeler,  Professor,  quoted,  171; 
177  n. 

White  Book,  English,  292. 

White  Sea,  67. 

Wilcox,  E.  H.,  17  n;  quoted,  II, 
105,  330. 

Wilhelm  II,  Kaiser:  advises 
Nicholas  II,  119;  motives  of, 
120;  visits  Tangier,  125. 

Willoughby,  W.  W.,  189*1. 

Wilson,  President,  on  rights  of 
nationalities,  3. 

Witte,  S.  J.:  anomalous  position 
of,  100;  saw  need  of  moderniz- 
ing Russia,  101;  his  purpose 
incompatible  with  oligarchy, 
101;  saved  railway  system  of 
Russia,  101;  head  of  railroad 
department,  101;  Minister  of 
Finance,  101;  his  fiscal  policy, 
101;  brutality  of,  102;  favored 
expansion  in  Asia,  102;  domina- 
tion of  Manchuria  and,  102; 
his  fiscal  methods,  102;  recog- 
nized German  menace,  103; 
his  resistance  to  Germany,  103; 
hated  in  Wilhelmstrasse,  103; 
compelled  to  rely  on  French, 
Belgian,  and  German  capital, 
103;  his  protective  policy  not 
a  success,  103;  checkmated, 
104;  and  Asiatic  colonization, 
104;  and  Occidentalism,  104; 
failure    relative,    not    absolute, 

Woodruff,  C.W.,  149  «.. 

Wool,   production   of,   in   Russia, 

132; 

Working  class,  interest  of,  in 
capitalist  success,  39. 


World  War:  Russian  Empire  at 
outbreak  of,  1;  interrupts  im- 
provement of  Russian  agri- 
culture, 19;  decreases  number  of 
horses  in  Russia,  21;  railways 
of  Russia  and,  23,  27;  127,  130, 
I33»  139.  159,  I94»  196,  202, 
214,  229,  233,  275,  297,  319,  331. 


Yakutsk  Province,  coal  in,  322. 

Yamshiks,  203. 

Yangtse-kiang,  open  to  navigation, 

IJ4- 

Yangtse  Valley,  Chinese  capital 
in,  217  n. 

Yellow  Sea,  222. 

Yenisei  Government:  coal  in,  321; 
iron  in,  325;   copper  in,  326. 

Yeniseisk,  iron  ore  in,  325. 

Yoshito,  Emperor  of  Japan,  160. 

Young  Men's  Christian  Associa- 
tion, 305. 

Young  Women's  Christian  Asso- 
ciation, 305. 

Ypres,  Russia  and  Allied  front  at, 
261. 

Yuan,  President,  165,  166. 

Yudenish:  collapse  of  army  of, 
337;  victory  of  Bolsheviki  over, 
34°- 


Zaisansk,  coal  deposit,  320. 

Zapadniki,  50-51. 

Zasulich,  Vera,  98. 

Zemstvos:  origin  of,  302;  nature 
of,  302-303;  restrictions  of,  303; 
development  of,  303;  work  of, 
in  World  War,  304-306;  fight 
venereal  diseases,  305;  supply 
shoes  to  army,  306;  prove  Rus- 
sian capacity  for  organization, 
306. 

Zhitomir,  244. 

Zinc,  213,  328. 

Zlatonst,  iron  ore  in  district  of, 

324- 
Zvanka:      to    Petrozavodsk,    271- 
272;  to  Petrograd,  272. 


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